Abbas Ibrahim … The Eyes and Ears of the Lebanese State

Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
TT

Abbas Ibrahim … The Eyes and Ears of the Lebanese State

Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)
Lebanese General Security chief Major General Abbas Ibrahim. (NNA)

In the few years that followed his appointment as general director of the Lebanese General Security, Major General Abbas Ibrahim managed to prove himself to be a major sponsor of successful internal and foreign mediations, especially in regards to the fierce war his agency is waging against terrorist groups. He has, at the same time, managed to persuade these groups to accept deals, taking advantage of their ambitions and fears.

Ibrahim’s name rose to prominence in successful swap deals with terror groups where he played the role of “achieving the greatest possible gain, while paying the lowest possible price.” These prices were usually paid to the “pockets” of others, not the Lebanese state, which has never paid a dime in these deals that have involved its citizens and its territory.

Ibrahim’s special ties with the contradictory sides have made him an acceptable negotiator and an in-demand mediator in several internal and foreign affairs.

Based on his position as head of the General Security, Ibrahim plays the role of the “eyes and ears of the state.” He is the president’s aide on security files and is also tasked with working on several sensitive affairs, whether through special appointment or through the nature of his work. The reality on the ground however sees him playing a central role in combating terrorist groups through the General Security, which is working at a remarkably effective rate, in cooperation with the other security agencies. He is also in charge of the Palestinian and Syrian files in Lebanon, as well as the administrative role his institution plays in managing foreigners in Lebanon, whether they are artists, expatriates or terror groups.

Some believe that since his appointment to his post in July 2011, Ibrahim succeeded in avoiding being politically affiliated to a certain party. He stayed close to the side that named him – AMAL and “Hezbollah” that appoint all Shi’ite public employees to their posts – while convincing their rivals of his centrist mediator role. This therefor enabled him to maintain his position at a distance from the rival parties in Lebanon, giving himself ample room to maneuver to fulfill his security-political role.

Despite all this, Ibrahim has had his fair share of criticism from both rival parties, whether in his counter-terrorism duty that saw him work closely with the Syrian regime and “Hezbollah” or in his adherence to official institutions and accompanying the interior minister on visits and conferences.

As usual, Ibrahim treated each side with remarkable balance. On the one hand, he repeatedly hailed the role of the “resistance”, which shuts down his critics from the pro-”Hezbollah” camp, and on the other he also praised the official security institutions, which prevents the armed group’s rivals from going too far in criticizing him.

Those close to Ibrahim acknowledge the difficulty of the centrist role he is playing. Editor-in-chief of the “General Security” magazine Mounir Akiki said that Ibrahim has more than once “called on the Lebanese to steer clear of political disputes … stressing that all sides operate under the constitution and Taef Accord.” Lebanon unfortunately, lies in an arena of regional contradictions that affects everyone, but they are all ultimately bound to return to national principles, he noted.

At the General Security, Ibrahim sought to develop the agency and eliminate corruption, which he said usually comes from the head of an institution. If the leader lacks the necessary abilities to manage the institution, then it is doomed to fail.

Upon his appointment to his position, said Akiki, Ibrahim devised a set of programs and goals under the umbrella of the law and jurisdiction. This saw cooperation between the army, Internal Security Forces and State Security agency. Each one of them has its jurisdiction and duties under law. If all three work together properly, then a safe state can be established.

Syrian crisis

Ibrahim has also played a prominent role in mediations linked to the Syrian crisis. In 2012, a pro-Syrian opposition Lebanese group was ambushed by the regime and most of its members were killed. Ibrahim, after being tasked by the political authority, managed to contact the regime and return the corpses to their loved ones. A prisoner who had been captured by the regime was also released.

He played an even more important role after the abduction in Syria of a bus of Lebanese Shi’ites who were traveling from Iran to Lebanon. Here, Ibrahim used his ties with Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan to work on releasing them. The mediation saw Ibrahim contact Turkey, Qatar and the Syrian regime to ensure their release.

Akiki attributed Ibrahim’s success in these deals to his belief in the importance of credibility, his official position and his personal relations. These factors allowed him to enter negotiations and continue with them. Ibrahim has not once made concessions at the expense of the Lebanese state, stressed Akiki.

“His smart negotiation skills, patience and knowledge of how the other side thinks, as well as the trust, credibility and direct ties that he enjoys, have built his success,” added Akiki.

He noted however that direct negotiations were never held with “terrorists”.

“I do not believe that he would accept to negotiate with them directly. There was a mediator tasked with relaying their conditions or demands to us and also relaying our own to them,” he explained.

Future ambition

Some say that Ibrahim is seeking to enter the political field in the future and that he is laying the foundation for it now. In his current role, he appears to be walking in the footsteps of Speaker Nabih Berri, who enjoys excellent ties with several main parties in Lebanon, as opposed to “Hezbollah”, which has a limited number of allies and several rivals.

On this speculation, Akiki said: “We need to wait five years (the end of Ibrahim’s term in office) to see if it will come true.”

Ibrahim says that he will be in the place where he will be able “to serve the most, which is what he is doing in his current post,” explained Akiki.

Profile

Abbas Ibrahim was born on March 2, 1959. He hails from the town of Kawthariyet al-Sayyad in southern Lebanon. He is married to Ghada Zeineddine and they have three children: Mohammed, Ali and Bilal.

He first enrolled in military school when he was 19 and he graduated three years later with the rank of lieutenant. Throughout the 1980s, he took part in several training courses in the military, culminating in an infantry course in the United States in 1989. This was followed by a computer course in 1996 to stay up to date with the electronic age. He also received advanced security training in the United Kingdom in 1998.

In 1989, Ibrahim was the personal bodyguard of Arab League envoy to Lebanon Lakhdar Brahimi. He was then appointed bodyguard to late President Elias al-Hrawi and remained in that post until 1992 when he was tasked with protecting then newly appointed Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In 1994, he was appointed head of the counter-terrorism and espionage department at the intelligence directorate.

Between 2005 and 2008, Ibrahim was head of the intelligence bureau in the South, putting him on the frontlines of the unrest in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-Hilweh and all of its complications. He has successfully dealt with this thorny issue, building special ties with the Palestinian leadership there, which he has since used to his advantage in his current post as head of General Security.

Commander of the Palestinian national security forces in Lebanon Sobhi Abou Arab told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ibrahim “was the first Lebanese official to enter the refugee camps and meet with all sides, including popular, organized and Islamic factions. He was the first to initiate contact out of his keenness on security and stability.” Abou Arab hailed Ibrahim’s calm approach, as well as his negotiation skills and diplomatic abilities.

Two years after his appointment as General Security chief in 2011, Ibrahim declared that he had remained at an equal distance from all sides and that he had sought to serve all citizens away from sectarian disputes. This was proven true, garnering him the trust of all sides, who have put their faith in him with the county’s most difficult and complicated files.



Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
TT

Iranians Have Long Sought Work and Relative Stability in Türkiye. The War Could Force Some to Return

Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)
Iranian Serdar Taghizade speaks to a customer inside his currency exchange business in Istanbul on Monday, April 13, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Sadri Haghshenas spends her days selling borek — a layered, savory pastry — at a shop in Istanbul, but her mind is on her daughter in Tehran.

The family had to send her home to Iran after they ran into difficulties renewing her visa, despite fears that a shaky ceasefire could soon collapse.

For years, short-term residency permits have allowed tens of thousands of Iranians to pursue economic opportunities and enjoy relative stability in neighboring Türkiye. But it's a precarious situation, and the war has raised the stakes.

“I swear, I cry every day,” Haghshenas said, raising her hands from behind the counter of the pastry shop. “There is no life in my country, there is no life here, what shall I do?”

Haghshenas and her husband moved to Türkiye five years ago with their then-teenage daughters and have been living on tourist visas renewable every six months to two years.

They could not afford a lawyer this year, because her husband is out of work due to health problems. As a result, they missed the deadline to apply for a new visa for their 20-year-old daughter, Asal, who is still in her final year of high school.

Asal was detained at a checkpoint earlier this month and spent a night at an immigration facility. Her mother found a friend to take her back to Tehran rather than face deportation proceedings that could complicate her ability to return to Türkiye. They hope she can come back on a student visa.

Haghshenas has been unable to talk to her daughter since she left because of a monthslong internet blackout in Iran.

A man walks past an Iranian grocery shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

Türkiye has not seen an influx of refugees, as most Iranians have sought safety within their country. Many who have crossed the land border were transiting to other countries where they have citizenship or residency.

Nearly 100,000 Iranians lived in Türkiye in 2025, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute. Around 89,000 have entered Türkiye since the start of the war, while around 72,000 have departed, according to the United Nations' refugee agency.

Some Iranians have used short-term visa-free stays to wait out the war, but there are few options for those who want to stay longer.

Sedat Albayrak, of the Istanbul Bar Association’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Center, said that getting international protection status can be difficult, and the system encourages Iranians to apply for short-term permits instead.

“There are people who have lived on them for over 10 years," The Associated Press quoted him as saying.

Nadr Rahim, right, sits with a friend at an Iranian coffee shop in Istanbul on Tuesday, April 14, 2026. (AP Photo/Khalil Hamra)

If the war continues, more may have to return Nadr Rahim came to Türkiye for his children’s education 11 years ago. Now, the war may force him to go home.

Because of the difficulty of getting a permit to start a business or work legally in Türkiye, he lived off the profits of his motorcycle salesroom in Iran. But there have been no sales since the war started, and international sanctions — and the internet outage — make it extremely difficult to transfer funds.

His family only has enough money to stay in Türkiye a few more months. His children grew up in Türkiye and don't read Farsi or speak it fluently. He worries about how they would adapt to living in Iran, but said “if the war continues, we will have no choice but to return.”

In the meantime, he spends most of his days scrolling on his phone, waiting for news from his parents in Tehran or discussing the war over waterpipes with Iranian friends.

A 42-year-old Iranian woman came to Türkiye eight months ago, hoping to make money to support her family. She and her daughter registered as university students to get study visas.

She attends classes in the morning to keep her legal status before rushing to service jobs, sometimes working until 3 a.m.

They share a room with six other people at a women's boarding house, she said, speaking on condition of anonymity out of fear for her security should she return to Iran.

“I truly love Iran. If necessary, I would even go and defend it in war,” she says. But she sees no future there, while in Türkiye, she’s barely scraping by and only able to send small amounts of money to her parents.

“I have a bad life in Türkiye, and my parents have a bad life in Iran,” she said. “I came to Türkiye with so much hope, to support my parents and build a future. But now I feel hopeless.”

A 33-year-old freelance architect from Tehran traveled to Türkiye during Iran's violent crackdown on mass protests in January. She had planned to return after the situation calmed down, but then the United States and Israel went to war with Iran at the end of February.

“I started to believe that it’s a very bad situation, worse than I expected,” she said, speaking on condition of anonymity for fear of persecution if she returns to Iran.

She has been unable to work for her usual clients back in Iran because of the internet blackout. With the end of her 90-day visa-free window approaching, she can't afford to apply for a longer stay in Türkiye.

Instead, she has decided to go to Malaysia, where she will get free accommodation in return for building shelters during a month of visa-free stay.

She has no plan for what comes next.


Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
TT

Strait of Hormuz Blockade Step by Step: What Do We Know?

A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)
A view of Iranian-flagged cargo ship M/V Touska as the US Navy Arleigh Burke-class Aegis guided missile destroyer USS Spruance conducts its interception in a location given as the north Arabian Sea, in this screen capture from a video released April 19, 2026. (CENTCOM/Handout via Reuters)

Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained mostly at a standstill on Monday, with just three vessels crossing the vital waterway, according to Kpler, a maritime data firm.

On Sunday, a US Navy destroyer attacked and seized an Iranian-flagged cargo ship that US President Donald Trump said had tried to evade the US blockade on ships traveling to and from Iranian ports.

In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center, which is administered by Britain’s Royal Navy, said that two vessels had been hit while trying to cross the Strait of Hormuz, according to a notice published on Saturday.

In one instance, gun ships operated by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps fired at a tanker without radio warning, the British organization said. In the second incident, a container ship was hit by “an unknown projectile” that damaged some of the containers.

On Tuesday, the US military said it had seized an Iran-linked tanker in international waters, in what appears to be the latest move to enforce a blockade as the ceasefire deadline looms.

The US military said it had boarded the tanker Tifani “without incident.”

The ship, capable of carrying 2 million barrels of crude, last reported its position on Tuesday morning near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, according to MarineTraffic tracking data. It was close to fully loaded and had signaled Singapore as its destination.

A two-week ceasefire between the US and Iran is set to expire early Wednesday.

Latest developments

The US Navy has turned back 27 ships trying to enter or exit Iranian ports since an American blockade outside the contested Strait of Hormuz began about a week ago, the military’s Central Command said on Monday.

On Sunday, a Navy destroyer disabled and seized the Touska, an Iranian cargo ship, in the Gulf of Oman after it tried to evade the blockade. It was the first time a vessel was reported to have tried to evade the US-imposed blockade on any ship entering or exiting Iranian ports since it took effect last week.

The guided-missile destroyer Spruance, one of more than a dozen Navy warships enforcing the US blockade, ordered the vessel’s crew to evacuate its engine room.

The Spruance then fired several rounds from its Mk-45 gun into the ship’s propulsion system as it steamed toward the port of Bandar Abbas in Iran, Central Command said in a statement that included a video of the firing.

American officials will determine what to do with the disabled vessel once the search is completed, a US military official said on Monday, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, according to the New York Times. One option would be to tow the stricken ship to Oman, independent specialists said. An alternative would be to let the Touska steam to an Iranian port, if it can.

A spokesman for Iran’s military reiterated a threat on Monday to “take the necessary action against the US military” in response to the ship’s seizure, Iran’s state broadcaster reported.

How is the US imposing the blockade?

According to CENTCOM, more than 10,000 US personnel, including sailors, marines, and airmen, are participating in the operation, supported by over a dozen warships and dozens of aircraft. The effort spans key waterways surrounding Iran, including the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

The US blockade on Iranian ports does not have a defined geographic boundary, and the United States can interdict vessels almost anywhere in international waters until they arrive at their final port.

Analysts say modern technology allows blockade enforcement at great distances.

Can ships evade the blockade?

Maritime intelligence experts say that more ships in and around the Strait of Hormuz seem to be adopting “spoofing” tactics to avoid detection.

Under international maritime law, most large commercial vessels travel with a transponder that automatically transmits the ship’s name, location, route and other identifying information. That includes a nine-digit number with a country code, which serves as a digital fingerprint for a ship.

The tactics were used by Russian “shadow fleet” vessels evading sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

When a ship is engaged in spoofing, its captain can type in a false origin or destination or can pretend to be piloting another ship altogether. Vessels can also temporarily turn off their transponders, seeming to disappear in one place and reappear in another.

The strait is “a contested information environment,” said Erik Bethel, a partner at Mare Liberum, a maritime technology venture capital fund.

Still, whatever ruses they employ, vessels going to and from Iran may get only so far. It is difficult to pass between the open ocean and a waterway as narrow as the Strait of Hormuz without being detected.

“My expectation is that the US Navy can sit out in the Gulf of Oman,” said Ami Daniel, the chief executive of Windward, a maritime intelligence data provider. “I don’t think there’s a way to breach the blockade.”

What are the US and Iranian strategies?

The US blockade sets up a significant test in the Iran war: Which side can endure more economic pain?

Instead of directing missiles and bombs, Trump is trying to choke off Iran’s oil exports, which make up just about all of the government’s revenue.

Some experts questioned whether the US blockade would work.

“Iran is already hurting, and they have shown that they are willing to take more than a couple of hits,” said Ahmet Kasim Han, a professor of international relations at TED University in Ankara, Türkiye.

Iran’s strategy appears to be using its leverage over global energy markets, where Tehran has discovered new powers that can cause pain in the US economy through spikes in the price of gasoline and other staples.

Why is the strait so important?

The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic waterway connecting the Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. It is the only sea route for moving oil, natural gas and other cargo out of the Gulf. Iran’s coastline runs along the entire route.

At the strait’s narrowest and most vulnerable point — between Iran to the north and the Musandam Peninsula of Oman to the south — the navigable channel is about two miles wide each for inbound and outbound traffic, according to the International Energy Agency.

The legal status of the strait is complex. It lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, but under international law it is treated as an international waterway where ships are generally guaranteed passage.

Iran has signed but not ratified that framework and has disputed the extent of those rights.

Before the war, about 20% of global oil and liquid natural gas passed through the strait. Most of the fossil fuels are bound for Asia, especially China, India, Japan and South Korea.

Other large vessels also use the strait, including car carriers and container ships.

Crucial industrial goods traveling through Hormuz include helium from Qatar, fertilizer from Oman and Saudi Arabia, and plastic feedstocks from Saudi Arabia and Emirati petrochemical plants.

How does Iran control the strait?

Iran’s military can threaten shipping traffic throughout the Strait of Hormuz, even though much of its navy has been destroyed by US and Israeli strikes.

The United States and Israel launched their war against Iran on the argument that if Iran one day got a nuclear weapon, it would have the ultimate deterrent against future attacks.

It turns out that Iran already has a deterrent: geography.

“The Iranians have thought a lot about how to utilize the geography to their benefit,” said Caitlin Talmadge, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology who studies Gulf security.

*The New York Times


US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
TT

US-Iran Talks Test Power Balances in Tehran as National Security Council Comes to the Forefront

Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)
Qalibaf (L) at a meeting of the regime's Expediency Discernment Council, with Supreme National Security Council secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr. (Qalibaf’s official site)

After US-Israeli bombardment eliminated Iran’s supreme leader and much of its top echelons, the country’s leadership didn’t fall apart — but negotiations to end the war offer a new test.

For decades, the supreme leader successfully managed several powerful factions, bringing to heel those who challenged his authority while listening to rival opinions. It’s now unclear who wields that kind of authority over the collection of civilian figures and powerful generals from the Revolutionary Guard who appear to be in charge.

They have found unity — for now — by taking a tough line. But disagreements over how much to concede in negotiations with the United States could reveal fault lines, as Pakistani mediators try to host a new round of talks this week, according to The Associated Press.

Who is in charge?

In the past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was able to impose his will on the country's disparate power centers. After Israeli strikes killed him on the first day of the war, his son Mojtaba Khamenei succeeded him.

But doubts continue to swirl over the younger Khamenei’s role after reports he was wounded in the strikes. Still in hiding, he has not appeared in public since becoming supreme leader and how he gives orders to top leaders is a mystery.

At the center of power now is a politburo-like body known as the Supreme National Security Council, which includes Iran’s top civilian and military officials. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the parliament speaker and a veteran insider with strong contacts on all sides, has emerged as its face and the chief negotiator with the US.

The late Khamenei began giving more authority to the council before his death, but the war has consolidated its power.

The council contains a range of political opinions and often acute rivalries. A political rival of Qalibaf and uncompromising opponent of the US, Saeed Jalili, represents the supreme leader on the council, while the body’s nominal head is reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Hard-liner members include the Guard’s new chief commander, Ahmad Vahidi, and the council’s new secretary, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, also a commander in the Guard.

But Israel’s strategy of eliminating top leaders points to a misreading of how the Iranian regime works, experts say.

Iran’s leadership survived “precisely because there are multiple power centers with overlapping authorities,” said Ali Vaez, Iran director at the International Crisis Group. “Factionalism is just built into the DNA of this system.”

But since the war, the Guard’s growing clout on the council has also stoked speculation that a fundamental change could be coming.

Negotiations with the US will stress test the power structure

The council now faces potentially divisive questions over how far to go to reach a deal with the US, which is demanding Iran make major concessions aimed at ensuring it is never able to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran has long insisted its program is peaceful while saying it has the right to uranium enrichment.

In an interview with Iranian state TV on Sunday, Qalibaf said Iran wants a comprehensive accord that brings “a lasting peace” where the US no longer attacks the country.

“This dangerous loop needs to be cut,” he said. The US has twice launched strikes on Iran during high-level negotiations: once in the 12-day war in June, then again in the current conflict.

Council members have projected confidence that Iran holds the upper hand now, particularly because its grip on the Strait of Hormuz — a crucial passage for the world’s oil — enables it to drive up fuel prices, thus threatening the global economy and exerting political pressure on US President Donald Trump back home.

Senior officials have insisted they can hold out for assurances that Iran won’t be attacked again — even risking the war reigniting — because they believe Iran can endure the pain longer than the United States and its allies.

But ultimately, the leadership’s priority remains its own survival. The war and the US blockade, which is threatening Iran’s oil trade, are tightening the screws on the country’s cratering economy.

Economic hardship has fueled waves of unrest over the past two decades, including protests in January that openly called for the regime’s overthrow. A deal with the West lifting sanctions could help it keep its grip at home.

Signs of disagreement

Events over the weekend surrounding the Strait of Hormuz gave an indication of serious differences over how much to concede in negotiations. Engagement with Washington has long divided Iran’s top ranks, despite a shared deep mistrust of the US.

On Friday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a posting on X that Iran was opening the strait to commercial traffic as part of the ceasefire agreement with the US. Hours later, Trump proclaimed that the US would continue its blockade to keep pressure on Iran to reach a deal over its nuclear program.

On Saturday morning, Iran’s military announced that it was reclosing the strait in retaliation for the blockade.

Some Iranian media criticized Araghchi, suggesting his post created the impression Iran was showing weakness and revealing the differing positions behind the scenes. A report by the Tasnim news agency, seen as close to the Guard, said the position on the strait should have come from the National Security Council itself.

Araghchi’s office pushed back, saying the Foreign Ministry “does not take any action without coordinating with higher-level institutions.”

In his interview Sunday, Qalibaf tried to paper over any divisions, emphasizing that everyone in the leadership was on the same page on Iran’s strategy in US talks.

A possible bridge builder

The 64-year-old Qalibaf is best positioned to bridge divides among Iran’s factions.

Qalibaf is a former general in the Guard and national police chief and kept close to the Guard throughout his long political career. As Tehran’s mayor from 2005 to 2017, Qalibaf gained a reputation as a pragmatist able to get things done, like overhauling an ailing public transport system, even as he faced major corruption and human rights abuse allegations.

Ali Rabie, a well-known reformist and an assistant to the president, wrote last week in a newspaper editorial that Qalibaf was “the representative of the country and the regime.”

At the same time, Qalibaf is close to the Khamenei family both hailing from the area of the eastern city of Mashhad, said Mohsen Sazegara, one of the founders of the Revolutionary Guard in the 1980s who is now an opposition figure living in the US.

During his father’s rule, Mojtaba Khamenei backed Qalibaf’s several unsuccessful attempts to run for president.

Qalibaf is also close to the senior Guard figures who stepped in to replace those killed by Israel and who are widely seen as holding the key to any future agreement with the US. His cross-factional backing could enable him to ensure support at home for a deal against blowback from ideologues who will resist compromise.