Moroccan ISIS Commander: We Killed Italian Father Paolo Dall'oglio

ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
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Moroccan ISIS Commander: We Killed Italian Father Paolo Dall'oglio

ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.
ISIS members in a Syrian Democratic Forces prison in Raqqa-- In the frame is a shot of a Moroccan national who joined the ranks of ISIS, during his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

September of 2013 A.A. turned his back to his home just off the coast of the Mediterranean in the Moroccan capital Rabat, and headed to Raqqa, arguably the hottest zone of the Syrian conflict. Rising within ISIS ranks, A.A. eventually became a “leader” in the extremist group.

He aspired to thrive under a self-proclaimed “caliphate,” that was until he found himself locked up in a top-security prison north of the country belonging to the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Born in Rabat in 1982, A.A. holds a technology certificate and had opened a private company to sell electronic devices.

No one in his family knew when he made up his mind and traveled to Syria.

Speaking to an Asharq Al-Awsat at the SDF headquarters in the northern Raqqa, he explained how footage showing the events of the Syrian civil war stirred his feelings, eventually building up to his decision to join the fight.

He denied however ever being involved with ultra-hardline Islamist groups in Morocco—but said that the woes of the Syrian civil war became the center of discussions of his family members, and everyone initially thought he intended to travel to aid displaced people and refugees in makeshift camps.

In the summer of 2013, he established a line of communications with extremists over social media networks, and received an in with al-Qaeda. Members of the group presented him with a route to travel and gave him exclusive contact information to link up with him upon his arrival.

Later in September, A.A. flew to Istanbul, Turkey, from where he took a bus to the city of Gaziantep near the Syrian border.

"I called the trafficker, who was informed about my arrival. He sneaked me across the border with Syria, and dropped me off at a meeting point where I was received by members of the organization who then took me to a reception.”

The next day, he joined a group of newcomers who were sent to Idlib, northwestern Syria, where he stayed for some 60 days. During this period, he attended an educational course and received arms and combat arts training.

He contacted his family to inform them that he was in Syria and had joined Qaeda’s offshoot Al-Nusra Front.

"My father did not tolerate the news and hung up his conversation with me. My mother was a bit more calm. She asked me to stay in touch with them, and tried to persuade me into going back on my decision."

Two months after A.A. arriving to Syria, disputes between ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Al-Nusra Front, headed by Abou Muhammad al-Julani, escalated and the two sides parted ways.

Many foreign and Arab fighters preferred to join al-Baghdadi, A.A. included.

"Al-Julani was harsh with the foreign fighters and deployed them in city outskirts—Al-Nusra was in disarray and confusion with no apparent goal, while ISIS on the other hand declared that his goal to establish an alleged caliphate.”

After ISIS secured its control of the city of Raqqa in January 2014, A.A. was appointed commander of the northern border. He was responsible for the land strip between the town of Ras al-Ayn and its border gate with Turkey.

He said that his multilingual skills had earned him the position.

"It was because I could speak English, French and Spanish in addition to my mother tongue Arabic. I was then dubbed Abou Mansour."

He pointed out that until the end of 2013, the number of foreign arrivals to Syria did not exceed 150 per month.

“After I took office, and as of 2014, an average rate of about 300 foreigners came in daily wishing to fight among the organization’s ranks.”

ISIS members set up a special registry bureau dedicated to noting down the names, nationality and date of entry of foreign recruits.

On the case of the disappearance and murder of the Italian Christian priest Father Paolo Dall'oglio, who visited Raqqa in July 2013, he confirmed that ISIS militants killed him days after keeping him locked up.

"In the summer of 2014, a year after the incident, a Vatican-linked association contacted ISIS via intermediaries in Turkey and asked to interview us on the border between Syria and Turkey, to unveil the fate of Father Paolo and an Italian journalist who had gone missing,” said A.A.

“I in turn delivered the request to the commander-in-chief of Abou Muhammed al-Iraqi who warned not to ask about Father Paolo and refused to meet the association for an interview. ISIS leaders told me that Abou Luqman al-Raqqawi (an ISIS member) had executed the Christian priest. "

Commenting on the nationalities that joined the organization, A.A. said that the majority of fighters came in from Chechnya, Georgia and former Soviet republics.

As for combatants joining from Arab countries, Tunisia registered the highest share, followed by Morocco, then Algeria, Egypt and Libya.

Two years after the so-called "caliphate" was declared in the areas under ISIS control, many towns were gradually lost on the outskirts of Raqqa, most notably Tal Abyad and Ein Issa. The terror group was completely driven out from its Raqqa stronghold in October, 2017.

"A ‘caliphate’ without historic capitals means nothing, a ‘caliphate’ without control over Damascus or Baghdad is incomplete," A.A. said.

The organization staged mass executions, beheadings, rapes, abductions, ethnic cleansing, stoning and other barbaric practices in Raqqa and other cities it controlled.

ISIS was keen on using modern techniques to broadcast its atrocities through live footage posted on the Internet to spread terror among people.



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.