Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.



Ould Cheikh Ahmed Moves From Mediation to OIC Leadership

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
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Ould Cheikh Ahmed Moves From Mediation to OIC Leadership

Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)
Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed arrives in Jeddah with firsthand experience of some of the region’s most complex crises. (Organization of Islamic Cooperation)

After more than three decades in UN posts and crisis zones, Mauritanian diplomat Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed is set to take the helm of the 57-member Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

The organization’s foreign ministers elected him Thursday to succeed Chadian Hissein Brahim Taha, whose term ends in November.

Born in 1960, Ould Cheikh Ahmed holds a degree in economics from France’s University of Montpellier, a master’s degree in human resources development from Britain’s University of Manchester and an advanced certificate in economics and social policy analysis from the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance.

He spent most of his career within the United Nations system, moving between development work, humanitarian operations and crisis management. At the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, he held several senior posts, including director of change management in New York, deputy regional director for Eastern and Southern Africa and representative in Georgia.

But it was the Middle East that shaped the most prominent chapter of his career.

From 2008 to 2012, Ould Cheikh Ahmed served in Syria as the UN resident coordinator, humanitarian coordinator and resident representative of the United Nations Development Programme. He moved to Yemen in 2012 to take on similar UN roles until 2014, before being appointed deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general and deputy head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

In January 2015, he took charge of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response as the health crisis posed a major international challenge.

Yemen, however, remains the defining political assignment of his career.

Then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Ould Cheikh Ahmed special envoy for Yemen on April 25, 2015, succeeding Jamal Benomar. His mandate was to work with the Security Council, Gulf states, regional governments and the Yemeni parties to pursue a political settlement.

He later led Yemen peace talks in Kuwait in 2016, bringing the Yemeni government, the General People’s Congress and the Houthis together for direct negotiations. The talks explored ways to halt the fighting and establish security and political arrangements.

They ended without a final agreement but placed the Mauritanian diplomat at the center of one of the region’s most complex conflicts.

After his assignment in Yemen, Ould Cheikh Ahmed returned to Nouakchott and entered national diplomacy. He served as Mauritania’s minister of foreign affairs and cooperation from 2018 until early 2022, before becoming the director of the cabinet of President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani in June that year.

His career has spanned humanitarian work, international mediation, and state diplomacy. That record now brings him to a different mission in Jeddah, home to the OIC General Secretariat, with direct experience of some of the region’s most difficult crises.

Crisis management has been a constant throughout his career: bringing Yemen’s warring parties closer together, working in Syria and Libya under the UN umbrella, and representing his country’s foreign policy.

As the organization’s new secretary-general, Ould Cheikh Ahmed will face a broader test, moving from managing mediation efforts to forging consensus among 57 member states.

The OIC Charter does not limit the secretary-general’s role to diplomatic representation. It tasks him with following up on resolutions adopted by Islamic summits and meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, coordinating the work of the organization’s bodies, and raising issues that could advance or impede its objectives.


After Six Months of Iran War, US Goals Have Shifted. The Strait of Hormuz is Now a Top Concern

Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
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After Six Months of Iran War, US Goals Have Shifted. The Strait of Hormuz is Now a Top Concern

Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /
Vessels are seen in the Strait of Hormuz, off the port city of Bandar Abbas in southern Iran on August 10, 2026. (Photo by Atta KENARE / AFP) /

When President Donald Trump launched the war with Iran in late February, he initially forecast it would last four to five weeks. Six months later, there's still no off-ramp in sight despite Trump's repeated assertions that the war has been won or a deal to resolve it was nearly complete.

A June memorandum of understanding designed to pave the way to end the war has fallen by the wayside. US stockpiles of key weapons have diminished, and the Trump administration has pivoted to pressuring Iran economically rather than launching more strikes, The Associated Press said.

As the shape of the war has morphed over the last half year, so have the goals for the conflict.

One of the prime goals now — reopening the Strait of Hormuz — was not one of Trump's original objectives. The waterway had been a vital shipping lane through which about 20% of the world's oil passed.

But Iran seized on it as a chokepoint for the global economy and it has been largely closed since the war started, driving up prices for fuel and fertilizer needed for farms and creating economic and political pressure in the US.

The US has had tactical success on its goals to degrade Iran's military capabilities. But some of the other key objectives Trump laid out at the start of the conflict remain unfulfilled — and others have shifted.

Here’s a look at the objectives and what we know about where they stand:

Stop Iran from having a nuclear weapon

Last June, Trump declared that the US had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program. But when the war started, his aides justified the strikes by warning that Iran had been just weeks away from developing a bomb.

One of the most pressing questions has been what will be done with a stockpile of about 970 pounds (440 kilograms) of enriched uranium that Tehran could potentially use for a weapon. The material is believed to be buried under three sites bombed by the US and Israel last year. Trump said in a May 29 social media post that it would be retrieved by the US “in close coordination and conjunction with Iran, plus the International Atomic Energy Agency, and DESTROYED.”

Iran has not said whether it would consent. Without permission from Iran, experts have said seizing it would be a dangerous mission requiring a sizable deployment of US troops into the country.

Officials said that Tehran reaffirmed in the June memorandum of understanding that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The deal called for Iran to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. But many other details about Iran's program were left for future negotiations, and it's unclear how much progress, if any, was made before talks quickly fell off.

Reopen the Strait of Hormuz

Trump has said that a proposed deal with Iran would include the reopening of the strait and the US ending its blockade of Tehran’s ports, but at other times he has suggested the international waterway would somehow become American territory and indicated the US could impose a toll on passing ships.

Trump also has repeatedly said that the strait is open, including during an interview on Wednesday on conservative commentator Glenn Beck’s radio show.

“It’s a functioning strait. Yes, every once in a while, there’ll be a drone or a rocket or something shot, but it is a very functioning strait,” Trump said.

Destroy Iran's ability to fire missiles

One of the prime objectives laid out by the administration was to “destroy their missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground."

Trump said in late March that Iran's missiles “are mostly decimated" and that 90% of their missiles and launchers were knocked out.

By mid-May, that shifted to a more conservative estimate, with the president saying that 82% of Iran's missiles were gone.

Iran has shown its ability to still launch attacks in the region, including drone strikes on ships sailing through the strait.

As recently as July, the US military still had Iranian military targets to strike, with its Central Command announcing it was striking “Iranian military command centers, air defense and coastal surveillance sites, maritime capabilities, missile and drone launch sites and communications networks.”

Destroy Iran's defense industrial base

Early in the war, the president and his administration sometimes listed this as a standalone objective. Other times, it has fallen off their list.

US Central Command has said its targets for strikes in Iran have included weapons production and missile and drone manufacturing facilities.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in early June that Iran has had “massive destruction” of its defense industrial base and “80 to 90% of attrition. It will take years for them to rebuild it.”

Eliminate Iran's navy and air force

The US and Israel quickly established air superiority in the skies above Iran, where they flew largely unchallenged.

Rubio told lawmakers that Iran still has drone capabilities, but it lacks the ability to use swarms of drones to attack targets, as it did at the start of the war. He also said Iran does not have a navy anymore, and relies on small craft outfitted with machine guns that harass ships and sometimes drop mines in the water.

Trump on Wednesday said that Iran's navy and air force are “totally gone."

Protect America's Middle Eastern allies

Trump, in a March social media post, added another objective for the US: “Protecting, at the highest level, our Middle Eastern Allies ...".

The US maintains thousands of troops on bases and other installations in the region, but Trump has been unclear on how far he'd be willing to go to protect Middle East allies from threats in the long term. In June, when the US said Iran fired missiles at Kuwait and Bahrain, the US launched strikes on Iran in response.

In mid-August, Trump threatened in an interview that the US would bomb Oman if it “gets in the way," using an expletive for emphasis.

Cut off support for Iranian proxy groups

In March, Trump and his administration repeatedly said degrading Iran's proxy terror networks was a key goal.

As time has gone on, administration officials have offered fewer updates about this objective, which the president described as ensuring that “the region’s terrorist proxies can no longer destabilize the region or the world and attack our forces” and “ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of their borders.”

Early on, the US struck Iranian-aligned militia groups in Iraq. But the biggest focus has been Israel's war in Lebanon against Hezbollah, which Iran backs. Iran has insisted that the fighting in Lebanon must be stopped as part of any deal with the US, Israel and the Lebanese government announced a deal, which was mediated by the US, for Israeli forces to leave southern Lebanon in exchange for Hezbollah's disarmament — something an administration official described as a “huge step,” speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to address the issue on the record. But the militant group has refused direct talks and its leader has said it will not disarm.


Death of Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah: The Libyan Who Escaped the Noose of the Lockerbie Case

A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
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Death of Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah: The Libyan Who Escaped the Noose of the Lockerbie Case

A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)
A photo shows late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi with Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah (second from left) upon the latter's arrival in the capital Tripoli, a day after his definitive acquittal in the plane bombing case (Tripoli, February 1, 2001) (Getty Images)

On August 25, 2026, in a quiet corner of the Libyan capital Tripoli, the life of Libyan citizen Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah came quietly to an end at the age of nearly 70.

His death officially closes one of the most mysterious and compelling chapters in the history of the diplomatic and intelligence conflict between East and West. It also closes a living chapter in the case of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which was traveling from Frankfurt to New York via London when it exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie in 1988, an incident that reshaped international politics for decades.

For an entire decade, the name of this man, who began his career as a low-ranking airline employee, echoed through the corridors of the United Nations Security Council. His photograph appeared on television screens around the world and in newspapers for years as the "second suspect" in the most horrific act of aerial terrorism of the 20th century.

Fhimah was an unwilling participant in a unique legal and political saga in which the details of his everyday life on the island of Malta became the basis of an international case that nearly brought an entire country to the brink. He later stood behind the glass of the historic Camp Zeist courtroom in the Netherlands and heard the word "acquitted" pronounced by Scottish justice at the dawn of the new millennium. He returned home carrying an acquittal that politics had been unable to grant him for years.

His death has reopened the memories of the era of crippling sanctions and international isolation, reminding the world of the story of a man who lived at the heart of the storm and died in complete seclusion, far from the political turmoil that had nearly consumed him.

Forgotten Beginnings: From Tripoli to Luqa Airport

Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah was born in 1956 in the Souq al-Jumaa area on the outskirts of the Libyan capital, Tripoli. He progressed through his career until he joined Libyan Arab Airlines. In the mid-1980s, he was sent to work as an airline official, dispatcher, and station manager for the company at Luqa Airport in Malta.

The position appeared routine for the young employee, had it not intersected with the intense intelligence conflict unfolding across the Mediterranean between the former Libyan regime and the United States and its Western allies.

At the time, Fhimah did not know that his signature on cargo documents and the timing of his shifts at the Mediterranean airport would later become key evidence cited in the international indictment prepared by senior investigators in Washington and London.

The Night the Plane Fell and the International Storm Began

On December 21, 1988, the sky over the Scottish town of Lockerbie was torn apart when a Boeing 747 operated by Pan Am, Flight 103, exploded while traveling from Frankfurt to New York, killing 270 people.

After three years of complex joint investigations by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Scottish police, two Libyan nationals were formally accused in November 1991: Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah.

At the time, Western investigators alleged that Fhimah had used his position and contacts at Malta's airport to facilitate the passage of a bomb-laden brown Samsonite suitcase. The suitcase contained a timed bomb concealed inside a cassette recorder and was allegedly placed aboard a Libyan Airlines flight bound for Frankfurt, from where it was transferred to the doomed Pan Am flight.

Historic Handover and Trial on Neutral Ground

Tripoli initially refused to hand over its citizens, placing Libya under severe international sanctions and an air and economic blockade imposed by the UN Security Council in 1992.

Libya endured a decade of deep isolation and economic paralysis until difficult diplomatic efforts led by Arab and African parties produced a unique legal and historic settlement.

Under the settlement, Libya agreed in 1999 to hand over the two suspects for trial before a special Scottish court, but on neutral ground at Camp Zeist, a former US military base near Utrecht in the Netherlands, under Scottish criminal law.

Camp Zeist Shock: Historic Acquittal and Return

On January 31, 2001, the world held its breath as Scottish judges delivered the verdict millions had been awaiting. While his associate Abdelbaset al-Megrahi was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, the court definitively acquitted Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah of all charges and ordered his immediate release from behind the bulletproof glass enclosure.

The judges based his acquittal on insufficient evidence and major gaps in the witnesses' account, particularly that of Maltese clothing merchant Tony Gauci. The defense also conclusively established that Fhimah was not in Malta but was in Sweden on a business trip when the bomb-laden suitcase was checked in.

Voluntary Seclusion Until His Final Days

Following his acquittal, Fhimah returned immediately to Libya, where he received a hero's welcome in Tripoli from both officials and the public. He was portrayed as living proof that Western justice itself had established the innocence of the Libyan state from the full American account of events.

Yet the man, exhausted by years of fear, uncertainty, and detention, made a firm decision to stay completely out of the spotlight and politics. He lived the rest of his life as an ordinary citizen among his family in Tripoli, refusing to give press interviews that might reveal the secrets of that era.

The announcement of his death and the official mourning that followed brought a complete chapter of the bitter Libyan-Western conflict to a close.