Asharq Al-Awsat Tours Extremist Dens in Libya: The Story of Sidi Khreibish

A man stands next to the rubble of a destroyed building in Sabri, a central Benghazi district, Libya, August 15, 2017. (Reuters)
A man stands next to the rubble of a destroyed building in Sabri, a central Benghazi district, Libya, August 15, 2017. (Reuters)
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Asharq Al-Awsat Tours Extremist Dens in Libya: The Story of Sidi Khreibish

A man stands next to the rubble of a destroyed building in Sabri, a central Benghazi district, Libya, August 15, 2017. (Reuters)
A man stands next to the rubble of a destroyed building in Sabri, a central Benghazi district, Libya, August 15, 2017. (Reuters)

The Libyan army, commanded by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, announced last summer the liberation of the city of Benghazi from extremist and terrorist groups. However, dozens of gunmen still remain fortified and besieged in the Sidi Khreibish neighborhood, said sources close to the army.

They estimated their numbers to be 90, but sources close to the besieged said that they were closer to 150.

In the second part of a series of features on the extremist dens in Libya, Asharq Al-Awsat took a closer look at the Sidi Khreibish neighborhood, which has become unrecognizable after years of fighting.

The area, known as Old Benghazi, used to be a cultural and shopping hub. Now its streets are littered with explosives and its empty buildings carry the scars of war.

A military officer accompanied Asharq Al-Awsat on its tour. He said that the gunmen have taken up al-Baladi Hotel as their main headquarters.

“We are monitoring them, but entering the area is difficult at the moment,” he continued.

“There is no doubt that we will eventually get there and regain the position,” he stressed, while explaining that the army will incur great losses in the impending battle because the besieged fighters have booby-trapped “everything” in the area.

The Libyan army has described the gunmen as ISIS members, but a mediator close to the armed groups said that they belong to the so-called “Libya 1 Shield,” which was formed three years ago at the national general conference (former parliament) in order to defend Benghazi.

The military official added that the ISIS terrorists have not only booby-trapped the area, but they have also dug underground tunnels where snipers lie in wait.

“They are surviving on expired food and it would be easy for us to bombard them with airstrikes, but we want them alive,” he declared.

Their capture will be valuable because they will be able to inform authorities about the local terror groups’ ties with international ones that are seeking chaos and destruction in Benghazi.

The mediator meanwhile said that the sides that have embroiled these fighters in the Benghazi war do not want them to leave the Sidi Khreibish battle alive.

“If they do, they will expose their backers, who have involved them in the fighting that has been ongoing throughout Libya since 2014,” he added.

Asked if there were any military personnel among the besieged fighters, he replied there are perhaps two or three, but the rest are civilians from the Libya 1 Shield.

He revealed that there have been previous local and international mediation efforts to end the siege, but they have been thwarted by the Muslim Brotherhood and another group. These two parties have been waging “nonstop” anti-military propaganda, alleging that the army was besieging Sidi Khreibish, he said.

“I think someone is benefiting from the continuation of this problem,” he remarked to Asharq Al-Awsat.

A walk in one of Sidi Khreibish’s neighborhoods reveals colored ribbons along the sidewalks and abandoned buildings.

A red and white ribbon means that areas beyond that point were dangerous. Despite the warning, some families attempted to go back to their homes, away from the military’s protection.

One of these families managed to reach their home, located on the second floor of a residential building on al-Shweikhat street, but they were soon surprised to find that it was in the hands of extremists.

The terrorists eventually withdrew, but not without booby-trapping the house, thereby claiming the life of the entire family.

Majed, one of the family’s neighbors in the four-storey building, said that the family did not heed warnings against entering the area. They ignored the ribbons that the military had placed and mine warnings.

Majed volunteered with the army and become a trained soldier.

He spoke of how ISIS had occupied and later completely destroyed his home.

“On the outside, it looked undamaged, but on the inside it was total destruction,” he recalled.

The building was planted with mines and they are still there.

“Two of my neighbors were killed when they returned to inspect their homes after ISIS’ retreat,” Majed explained.

His brother, Darwish, was also killed in the fighting in Sidi Khreibish.

Despite the destruction, residents and construction workers derive hope from an elderly woman, Hajja Khadija, who remained in Sidi Khreibish throughout the years of the fighting.

With a smile of determination and defiance, one of the workers said: “We ware happy to see residents return to the areas that have been cleared of explosives … We will not forget Hajja Khadija, who remained in her house in spite of the war and death.”

“After the fighting eased, we returned to fix electrical cables and Hajja Khadija used to check up on us to encourage us, bringing with her breakfast and lunch,” he said.



The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.