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Pope in Myanmar: The Way to Confronting Violence and Radical Buddhism

Pope Francis arrives at Yangon International Airport, Myanmar November 27, 2017. (Reuters)
Pope Francis arrives at Yangon International Airport, Myanmar November 27, 2017. (Reuters)
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Pope in Myanmar: The Way to Confronting Violence and Radical Buddhism

Pope Francis arrives at Yangon International Airport, Myanmar November 27, 2017. (Reuters)
Pope Francis arrives at Yangon International Airport, Myanmar November 27, 2017. (Reuters)

Communist leader Joseph Stalin once asked Pope Pious XII how many military brigades he commands. No one at the time would have predicted that this spiritual authority would after a few decades have enough power to confront the Communist wave in eastern Europe.

The recent visit by Pope Francis to Myanmar and his mission to resist the evil there, represented by radical Buddhism, reminds us of the power that truth has against oppression. He traveled to Myanmar armed with the truth, not armies, in order to confront the radical Buddhist oppression against Muslim Rohingya. The truth championed his trip despite the restrictions and traps set up for him by extremists.

The Rohingya have for years suffered marginalization in Myanmar. Authorities have stripped them of their nationality in an effort to displace them from the country, where many either drown or burn in their attempt to flee a government crackdown against them. The authorities’ main concern is emptying Rakhine state from the Rohingya and imposing Buddhist rule there, while lying to and deceiving the public to justify its actions.

The analytic reader realizes that the developments in Myanmar can be described as genocide or even ethnic cleansing. The armed forces, backed by radical Buddhist militias, have committed the ugliest forms of oppression against the Muslim Rohingya. It is no longer shocking to hear that Burmese authorities have killed the Rohingya and later systematically burned their villages, raped their women and caused forced displacement in the area.

Observers said that the radical Buddhists believe in ethnic purity and therefore their main concern and obsession at the moment is the displacement of the Rakhine state Rohingya. According to some reports, some 14,000 people have been killed and wounded in the crackdown, while over 600,000 have been forced to flee.

Vatican stance

Argentine Pope Francis has spoken out several times against the barbaric Buddhist actions against the Rohingya. In February, he said: “They are being killed and tortured because they simply want to practice their Muslim beliefs.”

On August 27, the Pontiff declared his solidarity with the Rohingya, demanding that their rights be respected. “Our brothers are being harmed and oppressed due to their faith and creed,” he said.

Was Pope Francis welcome in Myanmar?

As the pope was preparing to head to Myanmar, radical Buddhists were tirelessly working on “negatively affecting his trip,” going so far as to being prepared to threaten him directly if he even uttered the word “Rohingya.”

Nationalism is the fatal sin of this age. Nationalist Buddhist monks in Myanmar had condemned Pope Francis’ visit and the Patriotic Myanmar Monks Union issued a statement at the time, saying that the visit was aimed at oppressing the country’s Buddhists because the Pontiff had previously spoken openly about the Rohingya crisis.

Hardline Buddhist monk and spokesman of the Ma Ba Tha organization Ashin Thawparka threatened the pope by saying: “Pope Francis will be received with the welcome he deserves, but he will unleash a wave of criticism if he expresses his support for the Rohingya.”

Even thought the pope had throughout the year refused to heed these warnings and repeatedly used the term “Rohingya” to describe the minority, he did not say it during his Myanmar visit even though his comments all held implicit statements about the oppressed people.

Behind the scenes statements

Even though Pope Francis did not speak directly about the Rohingya, that does not mean that their plight was not discussed behind the scenes of his meetings.

The issue was addressed during a meeting he held with army commander Min Aung Hlaing, who is accused of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya.

The meeting was a last minute addition to the pope’s schedule and made at the request of Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Yangon Charles Bo. A source from the Vatican said that this meeting had to inevitably be held during the pope’s trip because the chief of staff plays a major role in Myanmar’s economy and reconciliation efforts.

Bo said that the purpose of Pope Francis’ meeting with the general was not to emphasize the military’s oppression, but to hold dialogue. “Perhaps he could soften his heart in what could be the first step towards peace,” he added.

Means to overcoming radicalism

After talks with Min Aung Hlaing, Pope Francis sought to address the humanitarian sentiment of the religious leaderships of Myanmar and the rich ethnicities it represents. For 40 minutes, he held a meeting with 17 religious officials in the country, including representatives of Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, Jews and Christians. He condemned man’s inclination for murder, stopping just short of explicitly talking about the Rohingya crisis.

He urged unity among the divers ethnicities, stressing that they were all brothers despite their differences. “We should not fear differences. We all come from the same father and therefore we are brothers and we should remain that way. If we cannot agree among ourselves, then let us act like brothers who soon reconcile,” he remarked.

Openness or tolerance?

Aware of the influential role Buddhists play in Myanmar, the pope sought to meet with Sitagu Sayadaw, a prominent Buddhist monk, in order to emphasize the importance of coexistence in the country. He also met with the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, the government-appointed body of high-ranking Buddhist monks.

He then met with government representatives, which was an opportunity to urge them to push forward the peace process and national reconciliation, which can both be achieved by committing to justice and respecting human rights. The pope remarked that Myanmar enjoys important resources, but its most significant treasure is the diversity of its people, who have long suffered from internal conflicts that have led to deep divisions.

He reminded the government representatives that scholars and prophets have all highlighted justice as a pillar for real and long-lasting peace.

Religious differences should not be a source of division and lack of trust, but they should lead to unity and tolerance. Furthermore, he said that religions can play a role in healing old spiritual, existential and psychological wounds.

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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was a masterful negotiator, fiercely protective of his image and reputation. He was known for exhausting his guests with lengthy detours into history before addressing the substance of any talks.

Assad had an exceptional ability to restrain his anger, circling around an issue before striking again — often with calculated patience.

He avoided coarse language, allowing resentments to speak for themselves, but he never forgave those he believed had tried to derail his vision. Among them, according to accounts, were Yasser Arafat, Kamal Jumblatt, Bashir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel, and Samir Geagea.

In dealing with rivals and pressuring opponents, Assad often relied on a trusted enforcer: Abdel Halim Khaddam, his long-time foreign minister and later vice president. In the second part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said Khaddam was Assad’s “stick,” used to assert control.

Many Lebanese politicians believed Khaddam’s bluntness was not personal, but rather a reflection of an official mandate from his mentor.

Assad rarely issued direct threats. Instead, he preferred subtle intimidation — as when he told Gemayel that his aides had once suggested blowing up President Anwar Sadat’s plane to prevent him from reaching Jerusalem.

Khaddam, the late Syrian strongman’s long-serving envoy, was known for humiliating both allies and foes who dared defy Damascus’ directives. His tactics were often unsettling — deliberately designed to leave visitors unnerved and pliant by the time they reached Assad’s office.

In a conversation in Paris during his retirement, Khaddam defended his hardline methods, saying they were not meant to insult but to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. “The aim was to avoid escalation that could lead to security agencies taking over, which might have resulted in worse outcomes,” he said.

In the same meeting, Khaddam accused former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel of obstructing a political solution in Lebanon, calling him “hesitant and suspicious.”

He also acknowledged Assad was caught off guard when the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. The Syrian leader, Khaddam said, had not believed anyone in Lebanon would openly defy Syria — or the other Lebanese factions who had signed the accord.

“President Assad had many cards to play. President Sarkis had none,” recalled former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, reflecting on the stark imbalance between Syria and Lebanon during Elias Sarkis’s presidency.

Assad, he said, had the power to topple or paralyze the Lebanese government before Sarkis even returned to Beirut. “Sarkis had no leverage over Assad,” Boutros noted. “But while Sarkis often showed flexibility, he would stand firm when asked to compromise Lebanon’s core principles.”

Boutros, who played a key role in Lebanon’s diplomacy during the civil war, said he had to exercise utmost restraint to keep Khaddam — Syria’s often abrasive envoy — from derailing talks with personal attacks or inflammatory language.

The dynamic, he suggested, was not unique to Sarkis. It also echoed the later, uneasy relationship between Gemayel and Assad.

Gemayel recalled a cold and confrontational relationship with Khaddam, describing him as “the stick and the poison” used by Assad to pressure Beirut into submission.

“There was no warmth between us from the beginning,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Khaddam used underhanded tactics to undermine the presidency and sow division within my team. While President Assad treated me with respect and politeness, he needed someone to apply pressure — and that was Khaddam,” he added.

Gemayel said Khaddam was behind all the pressure campaigns Syria waged against him — all with Assad’s full knowledge. “Assad played the courteous statesman. Khaddam handled the dirty work. Syria wanted me to sign agreements harmful to Lebanon’s interests, and Khaddam was the one tasked with forcing my hand.”

Despite Khaddam’s harsh demeanor, Gemayel said he never allowed him to overstep.

“I kept him in check. He didn’t dare cross the line with me. We were once in a meeting with President Assad, and Khaddam had been spreading ridiculous rumors beforehand. When he spoke up, I turned to Assad and said: ‘Mr. President, we have a problem with Khaddam. Please ask him to stop acting like a spy when dealing with us.’”

Khaddam, Gemayel said, tried to intimidate many Lebanese politicians — but not him.

“He was rude, even insolent to the point of absurdity. But he knew that if he said anything out of line with me, I would respond immediately.”

Assad’s Subtle Control and the Language of Minorities

Assad understood early on the fragility of Lebanon’s sectarian makeup. To him, the country was a meeting place for minorities — one that always needed an external patron to manage its wars and truces. He allowed for limited victories, but never total defeat, ensuring that no side could do without Syria’s oversight.

Assad sought to rule Syria indefinitely, with Lebanon as a backyard extension of his regime. Yet unlike his brother Rifaat, he avoided openly sectarian rhetoric or calls for partition. Rifaat, according to Gemayel, once suggested dividing both Syria and Lebanon along sectarian lines during a conversation with Lebanese leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh.

When asked whether he ever felt his dialogue with Assad was, at its core, a conversation between an Alawite and a Maronite, Gemayel replied: “No — that was Rifaat’s language. He used to say minorities must come together and show solidarity. But that narrative was never pushed by President Assad or his inner circle. It was always tailored to serve their own agenda.”

Assad’s political strategy was built on gathering leverage — and minority groups were central to that plan. His ties with Lebanon’s Druze community, and his clash with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, fit squarely within this framework. Assad relied on Syria’s own Druze population, as well as the Christian minority, to tighten his grip on the country’s diverse communities and align them under the banner of his regime.

“Assad had a firm hold on the minorities,” Gemayel said, adding that “he brought them all together to make them part of the Syrian system.”

Tensions between Syria’s Alawite leadership and the country’s Sunni majority were well known, Gemayel added, particularly through the candid rhetoric of Assad’s brother, Rifaat.

“Rifaat was open about the hostility between Alawites and Sunnis,” Gemayel said. “In his conversations with us, it was clear. But with President Assad, there was no visible sign of that. What lay beneath the surface, only God knows — but in our dealings with him, we never felt it.”

Gemayel Dismisses Reports of a Syria-Lebanon Confederation Proposal

Asked about longstanding claims that former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had once proposed a confederation between Lebanon and Syria to Hafez al-Assad, Gemayel was quick to reject the idea.

“That’s absolutely not true,” he said. “President Chamoun would never have made such a proposal. A lot of things were said at the time. There were even reports that US envoy Dean Brown had suggested relocating Lebanon’s Christians to California — all of it nonsense, poetic talk with no grounding in reality.”

Gemayel also addressed one of the most controversial moments in US diplomacy during Lebanon’s 1988 presidential crisis: the phrase reportedly used by US envoy Richard Murphy — “Mikhael Daher or chaos.”

Daher, a Christian MP close to Damascus, had been floated as the only candidate acceptable to both Syria and the United States.

But Washington later distanced itself from the deal. The episode, Gemayel said, underscored a period in which American pressure aligned more with Syrian — and by extension, Israeli — interests, leaving Lebanon’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.

Gemayel confirmed that US envoy Richard Murphy did indeed issue the stark ultimatum in 1988. The phrase, which became emblematic of foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential crisis, reflected what Gemayel described as Washington’s unwillingness to confront Damascus — despite acknowledging its destabilizing role in Lebanon.

“Yes, Murphy said it,” Gemayel affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Americans had a problem — they wanted Syria, and they didn’t. They knew Syria was playing a destructive role in Lebanon, but they didn’t want to challenge it. They kept trying to find common ground with Syria, not with us.”

According to Gemayel, the US saw Daher — a respected Christian parliamentarian close to Damascus — as a palatable compromise. “They thought Daher was a respectable figure who might be acceptable to the Lebanese, so they went along with Syria’s choice,” he said.

Washington, he added, had consistently prioritized pragmatism over principle in Lebanon, often aligning with whichever side could deliver results — even if it came at Beirut’s expense.

“It was the same with the May 17 Agreement with Israel,” Gemayel said, referring to the short-lived 1983 accord.

“The US couldn't pressure Israel, so Lebanon had to pay. And they couldn’t pressure Syria either — Syria was stubborn, had resources, and they didn’t want a confrontation. So they kept trying to sell us solutions that weren’t in Lebanon’s interest.”

“The Americans were always looking for the quickest deal,” he added. “They wanted to please both Syria and Israel. With Syria, it was clear — they didn’t want to upset Assad, because they knew who held the real power in Lebanon.”

Gemayel said that while he personally held the reins in decision-making and negotiations with Syria during his time in office, several close advisers and intermediaries played essential roles in laying the groundwork for dialogue with Damascus.

“The relationship and final decisions were in my hands,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I was the one doing the actual negotiating. But when it came to preparation, the late Jean Obeid played a very valuable role. He was intelligent, committed to Lebanon’s interests, and had close ties with the Syrians. He couldn’t get everything done, but he managed to ease certain issues,” said Gemayel.

Gemayel also credited Eli Salem, another aide, for navigating delicate talks with Syrian officials — particularly with Khaddam.

“Salem had a knack for getting through on specific points,” Gemayel said. “He had good chemistry with Khaddam, and that helped, especially since Khaddam and I didn’t get along.”

One figure who unexpectedly played a constructive role, according to Gemayel, was Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed, then an intelligence officer stationed in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley.

“You may be surprised,” he said, “but Jamil al-Sayyed was very helpful. Whenever I was heading to Damascus, I would stop in the Bekaa to meet him. He gave me very precise insights into what was happening at the Syrian presidential palace and the broader picture in Damascus. He was well-informed, sincere, and provided intelligence that wasn’t widely available — information that truly benefited Lebanon.”

Asked whether Syria was uneasy about the role of veteran journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni in his administration, Gemayel said the Syrians had little affection for him.

“There was never any warmth toward Ghassan,” he said. “He came with me to Syria just once, and it was clear there was tension. Whenever he was present, things got heated. Ghassan and Khaddam were like a ping-pong match — constantly hitting the ball back and forth.”

The friction, Gemayel explained, stemmed in large part from Tueni’s association with An-Nahar, the Beirut daily he helped lead, which often published sharp criticism of Syria.

“Syria never appreciated An-Nahar,” Gemayel said. “Even if Ghassan tried to distance himself from specific articles, the content was out there for everyone to see — and the Syrians didn’t forget it.”