Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
TT
20

Years of Tensions between Lebanon’s Aoun and Berri Culminate in Constitutional Dispute

Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)
Lebanese President Michel Aoun meets Speaker Nabih Berri at the Baabda presidential palace in November 2017. (Dalati & Nohra)

The dispute between Lebanese President Michel Aoun and parliament Speaker Nabih Berri has gone beyond the promotion of military academy officers to enter the realm of constitutional and sectarian differences that are a culmination of years of tensions between the two leaders.

The two officials see themselves as the respective leaders of their sect, Aoun of Maronite Christians and Berri of Shi’ites. They have however been separated by a “lack of chemistry” that dates back to at least 2009 and this dispute will likely cast its shadow on the government, May 6 parliamentary elections and beyond.

The current dispute reopens old wounds among Shi’ites over the return of the Maronite-Sunni equation (despite its imbalance) that was prevalent before the signing of the Taif Accord in 1989. This has therefore led Berri to express his commitment to the agreement that ended Lebanon’s 15-year civil war. It enforced the role of Shi’ites in power through the executive authority and represented in the signature of the finance minister.

Shi’ites have assumed the Finance Ministry portfolio in two consecutive governments in the post-Taif period before it was held by Sunni figures in the cabinets of late former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. It again fell in Shi’ite hands in the governments formed in 2014 and 2016.

The Aoun-Berri dispute erupted in December when the president and Prime Minister Saad Hariri signed a decree, without the signature of the finance minister, to give priority in promotion to military academy officers who graduated in 1994.

These officers joined the academy when Aoun was head of a “transition government”, which comprised three Christian military figures, before he was forced out of power by the Syrian regime in 1990. The military stipulates that officers must spend three years of training before graduating. Those officers however were forced to spend a year at home due to the Lebanese war. They did however rejoin the academy at the end of the war, graduating in 1994.

Berri deemed December’s decree a violation of legal norms because it incurs financial burdens on the state, which requires the signature of Finance Minister Ali Hassan Khalil, one of the speaker’s most prominent representatives in government.

Aoun declared on December 25 that granting the 1994 officers priority was “justified” and due to “certain political spite at the time, they were sent home and summoned two years later. We therefore tried to give back to them half of what they are owed.”

They were “sent home” at the time when Aoun was ousted from power in 1990.

The president declared that anyone objecting to the decree he signed with the premier should plead his case before the judiciary.

Responding to his declaration, Berri stated: “Only the weak go to the judiciary.”

He also warned that Aoun’s actions violate the Taif Accord and constitution, throwing the ball in the president’s court.

Missing chemistry

The truth of the matter is that ties between Aoun and Berri had never witnessed positive development since the former returned to Lebanon from exile in Paris in 2005. The differences between them took a turn for the worse when Hariri reached a settlement with Aoun that saw him elected president in 2016, knowing that the speaker was one of the most ardent objectors of his candidacy.

Observers are not shy in pointing out the “lack of chemistry” between the president and speaker, saying that had they enjoyed good ties, the current dispute between them would not have reached such a complicated phase.

The lack of meetings between Aoun and Berri has only exacerbated the problem. Members of the president’s Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) have said that a meeting between them will help resolve the issue, especially in wake of media escalation between the camps of either official.

“Hezbollah”, an ally to both Aoun and Berri, has tried to mediate a solution between them. Hariri meanwhile announced that he is not concerned with such efforts, therefore opening a debate on the role of Shi’ites in the executive authority.

Shi’ite concerns of elimination

The Shi’ites’ concern of the elimination of their role in the executive authority has come to the forefront in the Aoun-Berri dispute because Hassan Khalil’s signature was excluded from the promotion decree. The president and speaker’s camps have however denied that such sectarian and constitutional concerns are at play.

Former deputy Speaker Elie Firzli told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There are often points in the Lebanese constitution that end up being contentious issues between the president, speaker and prime minister due to their multiple interpretations.”

“We have always stressed the need to implement and commit to the Taif Accord. We have also spoken of the need for a constitutional authority that can serve as arbiter in interpreting its disputed articles,” he added.

He said the current dispute between Aoun and Berri does not revolve around the “Shi’ite voice” because the same problem would have arisen had a finance minister from another sect been present in cabinet.

He therefore reiterated the demand for the establishment of an authority that could act as arbiter in constitutional disputes.

“The new parliament should resolve this predicament,” stressed Firzli.

He did not deny however that Shi’ites may be concerned about being shut out of the executive authority given the current Christian-Sunni agreement.

“This does not mean that the Christian-Sunni relationship should be abandoned. It should instead grow and develop because it is in the country’s high national interest,” he added, while emphasizing that the Sunni-Shi’ite relationship must also be given the opportunity to grow.

Other sources said that these concerns were unfounded because “political agreements are part of the democratic process in Lebanon and in politics there are alliances and rivalries. This is normal.”

“All sides are in agreement over the constitution and Taif that should not be violated,” they told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The current dispute is not sectarian, they stressed.

Taif Accord

The Taif transformed the Lebanese system of rule from the presidential to the collective whereby the executive authority is now represented by the government when previously it was limited to the president, who was aided by the ministers. The accord therefore ensured that powers are distributed in a manner that offers fair representation for all sects.

The pre-Taif period saw “bilateralism in rule” where the decrees needed the signature of the Maronite president and Sunni prime minister, knowing that the president had the authority to appoint and sack the premier.

In the post-Taif period, the government now controls rule and its decrees need the signature of the concerned minister, as well as that of the president. The signature of the finance minister is needed for any decree that incurs financial burdens.

Post-elections battle

Political researcher George Alam told Asharq Al-Awsat that talk of the marginalization of Shi’ites is valid at this point, referring to what Berri once said: “The Lebanese paid 150,000 lives in the civil war for the Taif so that the decision-making power of the state does not lie in the hands of one person, but in a cabinet that represents consensus in Lebanon.”

Given that Lebanon will witness parliamentary elections in May, Alam said that the problem will be resolved if Aoun and Berri met and reached an agreement that would see the latter remain as speaker in the post-elections phase. Observers however remain skeptical that the dispute could be resolved in this way.

Alam added that the Aoun-Hariri understanding did arouse concerns among Shi’ites and led Berri to question his fate as speaker of parliament if elections are held. He has been holding that position since 1992.

Given the current political scene however, there appear to be no alternatives to the speaker at this point, he noted. The post-elections phase may have other options in store, “especially since Lebanon is not an isolated island from regional changes,” he remarked.

The changes in the regions may bring about new equations, similar to the ones that led to the Aoun-Hariri agreement, he said without elaborating.

Alam did not rule out the possibility that the Aoun-Berri dispute could affect government work, while also highlighting “Hezbollah’s” neutral stance on the problem involving its ally, describing it as “negative.”

Aoun-Berri disputes

Differences between Aoun and Berri had emerged from as far back as 2005 when the former returned to Lebanon. Soon after his return, Aoun signed an understanding with “Hezbollah”, Berri’s most prominent ally, to form a Shi’ite-Maronite balance. This did not help in adding warmth to ties between the two leaders. The speaker at one point described his rival as “the ally of my ally.”

Tensions between them exacerbated during the 2009 parliamentary elections when Aoun’s FPM fielded candidates in the southern Christian-majority Jezzine region against Berri’s candidate. In the end, the speaker’s candidate was defeated in a battle that Aoun dubbed “restoring Jezzine’s voice.”

Even though the two sides were part of five governments since 2008, differences between them came to the forefront and soured when Aoun refused the extension of parliament’s term in 2013 and again in 2017. He even went so far as to describe the parliament as “illegal”. Tensions boiled even further when Berri nominated MP Suleiman Franjieh, instead of Aoun, for president.



To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
TT
20

To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)

Cash is the lifeblood of the Gaza Strip’s shattered economy, and like all other necessities in this war-torn territory — food, fuel, medicine — it is in extremely short supply.

With nearly every bank branch and ATM inoperable, people have become reliant on an unrestrained network of powerful cash brokers to get money for daily expenses and commissions on those transactions have soared to about 40%.

"The people are crying blood because of this," said Ayman al-Dahdouh, a school director living in Gaza City. "It’s suffocating us, starving us."

At a time of surging inflation, high unemployment and dwindling savings, the scarcity of cash has magnified the financial squeeze on families — some of whom have begun to sell their possessions to buy essential goods.

The cash that is available has even lost some of its luster. Palestinians use the Israeli currency, the shekel, for most transactions. Yet with Israel no longer resupplying the territory with newly printed bank notes, merchants are increasingly reluctant to accept frayed bills.

Gaza’s punishing cash crunch has several root causes, experts say.

To curtail Hamas’ ability to purchase weapons and pay its fighters, Israel stopped allowing cash to enter Gaza at the start of the war. Around the same time, many wealthy families in Gaza withdrew their money from banks and then fled the territory. And rising fears about Gaza’s financial system prompted foreign businesses selling goods into the territory to demand cash payments.

As Gaza’s money supply dwindled and civilians’ desperation mounted, cash brokers' commissions — around 5% at the start of the war — skyrocketed.

Someone needing cash transfers money electronically to a broker and moments later is handed a fraction of that amount in bills. Many brokers openly advertise their services, while others are more secretive. Some grocers and retailers have also begun exchanging cash for their customers.

"If I need $60, I need to transfer $100," said Mohammed Basheer al-Farra, who lives in southern Gaza after being displaced from Khan Younis. "This is the only way we can buy essentials, like flour and sugar. We lose nearly half of our money just to be able to spend it."

In 2024, inflation in Gaza surged by 230%, according to the World Bank. It dropped slightly during the ceasefire that began in January, only to shoot up again after Israel backed out of the truce in March.

Cash touches every aspect of life in Gaza

About 80% of people in Gaza were unemployed at the end of 2024, according to the World Bank, and the figure is likely higher now. Those with jobs are mostly paid by direct deposits into their bank accounts.

But "when you want to buy vegetables, food, water, medication -- if you want to take transportation, or you need a blanket, or anything — you must use cash," al-Dahdouh said.

Shahid Ajjour’s family has been living off of savings for two years after the pharmacy and another business they owned were ruined by the war.

"We had to sell everything just to get cash," said Ajjour, who sold her gold to buy flour and canned beans. The family of eight spends the equivalent of $12 every two days on flour; before the war, that cost less than $4.

Sugar is very expensive, costing the equivalent of $80-$100 per kilogram (2.2 pounds), multiple people said; before the war, that cost less than $2.

Gasoline is about $25 a liter, or roughly $95 a gallon, when paying the lower, cash price.

Bills are worn and unusable

The bills in Gaza are tattered after 21 months of war.

Money is so fragile, it feels as if it is going to melt in your hands, said Mohammed al-Awini, who lives in a tent camp in southern Gaza.

Small business owners said they were under pressure to ask customers for undamaged cash because their suppliers demand pristine bills from them.

Thaeir Suhwayl, a flour merchant in Deir al-Balah, said his suppliers recently demanded he pay them only with brand new 200-shekel ($60) bank notes, which he said are rare. Most civilians pay him with 20-shekel ($6) notes that are often in poor condition.

On a recent visit to the market, Ajjour transferred the shekel equivalent of around $100 to a cash broker and received around $50 in return. But when she tried to buy some household supplies from a merchant, she was turned away because the bills weren’t in good condition.

"So the worth of your $50 is zero in the end," she said.

This problem has given rise to a new business in Gaza: money repair. It costs between 3 and 10 shekels ($1-$3) to mend old bank notes. But even cash repaired with tape or other means is sometimes rejected.

People are at the mercy of cash brokers

After most of the banks closed in the early days of the war, those with large reserves of cash suddenly had immense power.

"People are at their mercy," said Mahmoud Aqel, who has been displaced from his home in southern Gaza. "No one can stop them."

The war makes it impossible to regulate market prices and exchange rates, said Dalia Alazzeh, an expert in finance and accounting at the University of the West of Scotland. "Nobody can physically monitor what’s happening," Alazzeh said.

A year ago, the Palestine Monetary Authority, the equivalent of a central bank for Gaza and the West Bank, sought to ease the crisis by introducing a digital payment system known as Iburaq. It attracted half a million users, or a quarter of the population, according to the World Bank, but was ultimately undermined by merchants insisting on cash.

Israel sought to ramp up financial pressure on Hamas earlier this year by tightening the distribution of humanitarian aid, which it said was routinely siphoned off by militants and then resold.

Experts said it is unclear if the cash brokers’ activities benefit Hamas, as some Israeli analysts claim.

The war has made it more difficult to determine who is behind all sorts of economic activity in the territory, said Omar Shabaan, director of Palthink for Strategic Studies, a Gaza-based think tank.

"It's a dark place now. You don't know who is bringing cigarettes into Gaza," he said, giving just one example. "It's like a mafia."

These same deep-pocketed traders are likely the ones running cash brokerages, and selling basic foodstuffs, he said. "They benefit by imposing these commissions," he said.

Once families run out of cash, they are forced to turn to humanitarian aid.

Al-Farra said that is what prompted him to begin seeking food at an aid distribution center, where it is common for Palestinians to jostle over one other for sacks of flour and boxes of pasta.

"This is the only way I can feed my family," he said.