UN: ISIS Still Active in Iraq, Syria, Qaeda Greatest Threat in Somalia, Yemen

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Services in West Mosul during last year’s offensive to retake the area from ISIS. (AFP)
Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Services in West Mosul during last year’s offensive to retake the area from ISIS. (AFP)
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UN: ISIS Still Active in Iraq, Syria, Qaeda Greatest Threat in Somalia, Yemen

Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Services in West Mosul during last year’s offensive to retake the area from ISIS. (AFP)
Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Services in West Mosul during last year’s offensive to retake the area from ISIS. (AFP)

A United Nations report revealed on Tuesday that ISIS is still active through cells in several cities in Iraq and Syria that were under its control.

It said that the Jaysh Khaled bin al-Walid group alone has some 700 to 1,500 fighters operating east of the Euphrates River.

Asharq Al-Awsat obtained a copy of the report, which also warned that the al-Qaeda terrorist network was still active and that its al-Nusra Front affiliate still boasts some 7,000 to 11,000 fighters.

The report said that ISIS had effectively lost all the territories it had controlled in Iraq and Syria, but it is now turning into "a global network, with a flat hierarchy and less operational control over its affiliates," with some members willing to cooperate with al-Qaeda networks "to support one another's attacks."

As a result of the changing threat, the report said the fight against the extremist group is entering a new phase "with more focus on less visible networks of individuals and cells acting with a degree of autonomy."

The report to the Security Council circulated Tuesday said ISIS "has lost its focus on conquering and holding territory" but is continuing "to give prominence to external attacks."

"In future, it will focus primarily on a smaller and more motivated group of individuals willing to fight or conduct attacks," the experts said.

While the group's ability to generate revenue "was considerably weakened" by its losses, falling by more than 90 percent according to one unnamed country, ISIS may still be able to profit from oil and gas sales, extortion, and control of checkpoints. And the group is still able to send money to its branches "despite heavy military pressure."

Al-Qaeda meanwhile, “has persevered” and it poses a “greater threat than ISIS in several regions,” such as Somalia and Yemen. Al-Nusra Front remains one of the group’s largest and most powerful affiliates.

In East Africa, despite ISIS’ expansion and activities being curtailed last year, the group has established underground cells in some regions of Somalia. But the al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabab is determined to ensure that ISIS does not eclipse it in Somalia.

The UN report highlighted global efforts to combat terrorism, noting Saudi Arabia’s hosting in November 2017 of the first meeting of the Defense Ministers of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition. The 41-member alliance is dedicated to fighting ISIS.

Given the evolution of ISIS, experts said in some ways, individual countries and the international community now face "a more difficult challenge," making it vital to share information on the identity of former fighters, their location and travel plans.

They said ISIS foreign fighters unable to blend into the local population may be trying to leave, making their identification critical.

"ISIS has collected travel and identification documents from incoming fighters for potential use in future travel and has obtained several thousand blank Syrian passports," the experts said. While the numbers have been reported to INTERPOL and are in their database, "member states highlighted that their use by returnees or relocators is possible."

The experts said countries bordering Iraq and Syria have highlighted "continued challenges" in identifying ISIS foreign fighters seeking to return home or relocate, as well as those on the UN sanctions blacklist.

The report urged greater use of biometric data, fingerprints and high-quality pictures to identify ISIS fighters.

It noted that the flow of new foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria "has almost come to a halt."

In the past six months, the experts said, governments and organizations at all levels have continued to strengthen cooperation with the private sector on sharing sensitive information on terrorism-financing patterns and suspect individuals.

This has enabled "law enforcement authorities to disrupt travel by foreign terrorist fighters, detect terrorists and individuals associated with terrorism networks and bring terrorists to justice," the report said.

"Nonetheless," it said, "financial intelligence in the possession of entities in the private sector remains underused in many regions of the world."



Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
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Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)

Doubts persist over whether senior Hamas military commander Mohammed al-Sinwar has been killed or survived an alleged Israeli strike, as Israeli officials intensify efforts to confirm his assassination while Hamas remains tight-lipped.

Multiple sources within the group have refused to confirm or deny al-Sinwar’s fate, fueling speculation surrounding the elusive commander, who has a decades-long track record of evading Israeli assassination attempts.

Al-Sinwar, the younger brother of slain Hamas leader Yehya al-Sinwar, has remained a top Israeli target throughout the Gaza war.

Yet, for more than 18 months of fighting, Israel has not officially confirmed a direct strike on him — a fact that reinforces his reputation as a master of disguise and a “high-value, hard-to-detect” target.

Despite a 13-year age gap — Yehya was born in 1962 and Mohammed in 1975 — the two shared not only blood ties but a deep-rooted partnership within Hamas, rising through the ranks together to lead the group’s military and political strategies.

The timing of Israel’s apparent attempt to target al-Sinwar — roughly 24 hours after the release of Israeli-American soldier Edan Alexander — has raised questions about whether the move was a calculated signal or the result of an intelligence breakthrough.

Sources within Hamas and other Gaza-based militant factions declined to confirm or deny whether the operation to recover Alexander was linked to locating al-Sinwar’s suspected hideout.

Tuesday’s intense airstrike, followed by a continued bombardment of the area on Wednesday that created a fire belt to prevent any rescue attempts, suggests Israel believed it was striking a high-value target.

Israel’s use of fire belts in a recent air assault on southern Gaza has drawn comparisons to previous assassination attempts targeting senior figures in Hezbollah and Hamas, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and top Hamas military commanders Marwan Issa, Ahmed al-Ghandour, Bassem Issa and Jamal al-Zebda during the 2021 Gaza war.

On Tuesday night, Israeli warplanes dropped dozens of bombs and missiles on the emergency yard and rear compound of the European Gaza Hospital east of Khan Younis, as well as surrounding areas — with strikes extending up to 500 meters in some directions and about 300 meters in others, according to field sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that the attack involved bunker-busting bombs aimed at destroying a suspected underground tunnel network in the area. The strikes targeted multiple tunnel entrances to ensure that anyone hiding inside would be killed, even if not directly hit.

Sources from Gaza-based factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the location did in fact contain a tunnel system previously damaged in the 2014 war. Hamas’ military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, reportedly managed to restore the tunnels, which had only suffered minor damage in earlier attacks during the current conflict.

As his role within Hamas expanded, al-Sinwar became a frequent target of Israeli assassination attempts spanning more than two decades.

One of the closest calls came during the 2021 conflict, when he was lightly wounded in a tunnel strike alongside Rafaa Salama, the former commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.

Both men survived the attack with minor injuries.

Salama was later killed in an Israeli strike in July, along with Mohammed Deif, Hamas’ elusive military chief, in the coastal al-Mawasi area.

Al-Sinwar has survived at least seven Israeli assassination attempts over the past two decades, according to Hamas sources — a track record that has helped cement his image as one of the group’s most elusive and high-value operatives.

One early attempt came during the Second Intifada, which erupted in September 2000. In 2003, an explosive device was planted in the wall of his home, but he escaped unscathed.

In 2006, an Israeli strike targeted a vehicle believed to be carrying al-Sinwar. He was not inside at the time, and the operation failed — one of several similar attempts over the years.

In 2008, Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Sinwar outwitted Israeli intelligence by manipulating radio communications.

He allegedly used pre-recorded transmissions to give the impression he was speaking live over a two-way radio, prompting Israeli forces to bomb the signal’s location. The attack missed its target — al-Sinwar was never there.

In another reported incident in 2019, local media claimed that al-Sinwar, Salama and other Hamas commanders were the targets of an Israeli commando operation involving a plot to poison and abduct them from a beach in Khan Younis. The Al-Qassam Brigades swiftly denied the report, calling it baseless.

Al-Sinwar is credited with founding the group’s secretive “Shadow Unit,” tasked with guarding high-value captives, including Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

The unit was established with approval from Mohammed Deif, the elusive commander of Hamas’ armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. Al-Sinwar personally oversaw the formation of its initial core, selecting trusted field operatives from his home city of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

Al-Sinwar’s central role in the 2006 abduction and concealment of Shalit near the Rafah border prompted the creation of the unit. Sources say it was formed roughly three months after the kidnapping, following several Israeli airstrikes on suspected Shalit hideouts.

The unit’s existence remained classified until 2016 — five years after Shalit’s release in a prisoner swap — when al-Qassam released previously unseen footage of the soldier during his captivity.

According to the same sources, both Deif and al-Sinwar ordered the establishment of the unit, with many of its founding members hailing from the Khan Younis refugee camp.

They included senior field commanders such as Abdul Rahman al-Mubasher, Khaled Abu Bakra, and Mohammed Dawoud — all of whom were later killed in Israeli operations in 2013 and 2021.

Other key figures linked to the unit included Sami al-Humaidah from Rafah, killed in 2008, and Abdullah Labad, a top explosives engineer from Gaza’s al-Shati camp, who was assassinated in 2011 along with his brother Ismail, a senior field operative involved in weapons production and smuggling.

Al-Sinwar continued to expand and develop the Shadow Unit for years, discreetly recruiting new members and enhancing its capabilities. Its full mission only became clearer following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel.

Within Hamas, al-Sinwar has long been seen as the de facto operational commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

While Deif remained the official general commander, al-Sinwar is believed to have overseen many of the group’s military and administrative portfolios, shaping battlefield tactics and command structures behind the scenes.