John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

A BBC journalist’s journey of 52 years… worldly interviews and crossfire

John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it
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John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

John Simpson: The More I Covered War the More I Hated it

The waitress at London’s Landmark Hotel led me to his usual table in the corner, and there he was, an English, elegant man in his seventies. He was engrossed in an article on his MacBook. He greeted me with a warm smile. And after we exchanged pleasantries, he immediately assumed the role of the interviewer, forgetting that I was the one asking the questions. He soon realised and said, “I prefer asking the questions, as people’s stories and documenting the truth is my passion”.

To John Simpson, journalism is not a career, it is a calling. When he was only 15 years old he read George Orwell’s “1984”, and decided ever since to always be on the side of those who preserve memories rather than ones trying to erase them. He devoted his life to documenting history in public records.

Simpson’s name became linked to the BBC from day one. This partnership allowed for a journey of 52 years packed with adventures in over 120 countries, and 47 wars. Death brushed him ten times, and he lost one of his crew members in Iraq, a few metres away from where he was standing. As he grew older, his hatred for war grew with him. However, he refuses to allow those bad experiences to take control of his endless memories.

He told me about the time he snuck into Afghanistan in a Shadoor (Afghani Burqa), and how he discovered the Massacre of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon. When he told me about his mock execution in the outskirts of Beirut, I felt I was there with him.

I asked him about his interviews with world leaders so he praised Mandela, told me he was charmed by King Hussein of Jordan, and expressed his annoyance with Khomeini. He even diagnosed Gaddafi with insanity.
One cannot summarize Simpson’s career in numbers and anecdotes, but interviewing him gave me an insider’s look at the world of journalism aimed at humanizing politics.

* You have covered tens of wars, and have become regarded as one of the most important British war correspondents. How do you feel about that?
I do not regard myself as a war reporter. I am really more of a diplomatic correspondent who strays into wars. I have covered around 47 wars all together, but it is not how I see myself. I see myself as somebody who is really interested in politics. Of course, wars are a nasty form of politics, so that is really why I have strayed into that. Also, not everyone likes to cover wars, but I do not mind. Like Martin Bell and the others, whatever happens I ought to report on it, and sometimes it is a war, sometimes it is a revolution..

* Claire Hollingworth late war reporter used to take socks and a toothbrush with her in a small rucksack to war. What do you take?
I am much less organized than her. I also take much more than Claire. I always carry some form of gadget for music whatever it may be, and I always carry one big book because you can get arrested or stuck somewhere and if you do not have anything to read that is absolutely dreadful. I am very forgetful. I often forget the toothbrush or the socks, but I never forget the music or the book.

* You have categorized wars in your last book as dirty wars, proxy wars, and so one. How is the notion of war changing today?
Back where Claire Hollingworth and Martha Gellhorn started, at the time of the Spanish Civil War, big powers were fighting. I think that is true for Syria and in other parts of the world where the big countries are moving in, paying people, supplying them with weapons and fighting out their ideological, religious or just purely political battles in other people’s territory. The idea of an all-out major war between powers, that seems to have vanished, the last example of that I believe was Saddam Hussein’s attack on Iran in 1980. I do not think we have had anything as straightforward ever since.

* In your Panorama special on the BBC in 2016, you predicted an isolationist America under Trump, and this year’s Munich Security Conference has come to a conclusion that diplomacy is dead. How do you perceive the scene now?
I think that is profoundly wrong about diplomacy, as I feel that it is all what we have got. It is a lifebelt that saves us from disaster. However, there are times where diplomacy goes silent, but it can never go away. I must say having covered 47 wars in 52 years, wars make me profoundly angry and as I have got older and have become a father again quite late in life, it has made me all the more angry. I have a hatred of war, that I suppose I previously did not have.

* How many times did you have a near death experience?
I have it written out actually. In 2016, pure chance, I had kidney failure and I lay there in hospital and was lucky to survive. I had nothing else to do on my hospital bed, and so I recalled all the times.. the Kidney failure was the 10th. Death has brushed me. It was not just the bullet that is fired here and there, it is the bullet what hits the wall right beside you. It has been bombs more than bullets for me, and knives and physical attack by groups and so forth in Northern Ireland, Iran, Lebanon (three times), and others. I know very well now what it feels like to be on the point of death and I have to say, it is not that disturbing.

* Would you count losing members of your crew more upsetting them?
That is far worse. When my translator was killed in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq, I could not see any reason to be still alive while he was dead. He was standing quite close to me and he had his legs cut off by a piece of shrapnel, and I just had a piece of shrapnel in my leg. It just seemed to me to be unfair that he died and I lived.

* Do you suffer from PTSD?
No. I do not believe in it. I have got friends who had suffered from it, so I know it does actually exist. I am not denying it, but it has not affected me. I am not saying that I go through those experiences and they do not matter, and that they do not have an effect on me. However, I do not believe in letting it affect me, and it has not. I do get little flashbacks of these things, but I do not feel of damaging flashbacks, they are more like memories. I will never forget the business of the mock execution I once had just outside Beirut during the civil war in the 80s. I knew the gun was not loaded, but it felt like a near death experience. I was made to kneel down. The guy put the gun behind my neck, I remember it with the greatest clarity, looking down at the sandy earth filled with cigarette ends, feeling that it was the last scene I would see, and then he pulled the trigger with no bullet and everybody laughed. I do have these memories, and I do think it is important to, but they are not my master, they do not control me.

* Do you prefer interviewing or being interviewed?
I much prefer interviewing. I do not like being interviewed.

* Is it because you would rather hear someone’s story rather than tell yours?
Yes. I am not very keen on talking. When I am with somebody who is talkative, I prefer getting them to talk.

* You say journalism is more of a calling than a profession, why did you become a journalist?
It is. It is not organized enough to be a profession. I became a journalist for rather noble reasons in a way, although I find it quite amusing to think of nobility and journalism in the same sentence. When I was about 15, I read George Orwell’s 1985 and it was wonderful. That idea that you could destroy the reality of the past by destroying documents, newspapers and memories, was such a concept to me. So I thought, whatever I do I will be on the side of the memories, not on the side of people trying to stop them. I still think that if you can get things out on the public record that is what counts. To tell people the truth has a serious effect on the way these events are seen. An example of that, the Chinese government for decades tried to make out that there was no massacre in Tiananmen square. I was there, I saw it. Every time I talk to a government official in
China I manage to get a reference to Tiananmen, and I always use the world massacre, and it causes upset and embarrasses people. We must not allow ourselves to forget what really, really, happened.

* You mention in your book that the kindest person you interviewed was Nelson Mandela. What was it like to interview him?
It is a big cliché and I know that, but he was the greatest person I ever interviewed. What made him the greatest was simply his normality and naturalness. You really could ask him anything and he would not have been offended by it. I asked him about corruption in South Africa for instance, which is a very sensitive subject, and he just talked through it. He was so honest and accepted that some of his ministers were corrupt. That is something you do not often see.

* You also note that some of the people you interviewed were impressive, some were not at all. Can you give examples?
I have interviewed a lot of people, many we impressive and a lot were not over the years. To me, it is their relationship to truth that makes them a serious interviewee or just another politician defending him or herself. I used to interview Margaret Thatcher quite a lot and she was terribly difficult to interview because she was so sharp and well informed and if you made any slightest little mistake she would be on you and she would correct you. I did not really like her very much as a person, but I did admire her. I have interviewed various Arab leaders over the years, amongst them was Bashar Al Assad.

* What did you think of him?
This was long before the war began. It was in 2006, and at that stage he seemed to me to be more like a North London Ophthalmologist than a Syrian president. I asked him quite a lot of difficult questions and he answered them all. I remember my producer was with me and he was very worried when I asked Assad about who was in charge in Syria, was it him or his brother or his uncle, and I heard my producer gasping, and he answered honestly. Now if you interviewed Assad you would sadly be talking about the most appalling violations of the rules of war and some of the worst examples of attacks on civilians in modern history, and he is responsible. He carries the burden of guilt for that.

* Which other interviews with Arab leaders resonated with you?
I interviewed Colonel Gaddafi several times, and I thought probably he was insane, he was just a weirdo. I am never still to this day, even after talking to several people who worked for him or knew him, quite been able to understand how he managed to survive because he was really off the wall and a very nasty character, and now we know the details. To me he seemed eccentric to the point of craziness. I also interviewed the late king of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah bin Abdel Aziz. He was very charming, and very sharp. He was absolutely delightful, and walking away from the interview I felt much better to having met this person. Not many politicians give you that feeling. He was a very thoughtful man. Another interview I remember was with King Abdullah of Jordan. Delightful. My favorite really in many ways was the late King Hussein of Jordan. He was such a charmer and his sons got those same qualities. I just think that Abdullah has done extraordinarily well.
The list also includes various prime ministers of Lebanon but they do come and go a little bit more. I have also specialized in Iran even before the revolution. Now, sadly Tehran is so terrified by the BBC Persian service they have placed a total block on anybody from the BBC going there. I would like to go back to Iran on holiday. I tried to also learn Farsi. I interviewed Ayatollah Khomeini.

*What did you think of Al Khomeini?
He was absolutely firmly lodged in the past. All his concerns were related to the Shah’s father and to the Shah himself and to the role the Western countries played in helping the Shah and all of that kind of stuff. He was also concerned about fighting Saddam Hussein, and I do not think it was anything more in his life except that. He was very withdrawn and did not want to have any kind of relationship with his interviewer. Rafsanjani who took over from him was a lot funnier and more charming. He was more interesting and far more plugged into the realities of the real world.

*What about American Presidents?
Historically, I was not very involved in reporting from America, as the BBC has a big bureau there. There was rarely a need for me to go there. I have however met and got to know many of the American Presidents like Bill Clinton and George Bush Sr. I also met Obama, and felt he was light weight even though he is intelligent. He wanted to be liked too much. I was from the start a little less enthusiastic about his presidency than a lot of people were. Decent man no question, but not very good as a president.

*You mention in your book that a scoop should be sacrificed for the sake of checking and verifying the news before broadcasting it. The BBC does not tend to break news to the public. What do you think of that?
They never did. They are uncomfortable with stories that only one of their correspondents has got. You can feel the sense of their relief when other newspapers and outlets pick the news up. An example from a long time ago is the massacre in Sabra and Shalita in 1982. It was something which together with another BBC correspondent we were the first people to come across. Even when we broadcast the pictures of the piles of bodies I could see that the BBC was uncomfortable about it. Fortunately quite soon, it got picked up by Reuters and everybody relaxed. For the BBC the most important thing is to get it right not to get it fast. I believe in that, but it is sometimes very frustrating. I did some reporting in Iraq about abnormalities in children being born, and clearly there was something very wrong in this town, the doctors all said it. It was difficult to get to because ISIS was taking hold of the town then. It was dangerous to get to, and we got lots and lots of pictures with children with dreadful abnormalities, and proof of why it might have happened and seemed to be something to do with the weapons that the Americans had used when they stormed the town, but the BBC was terribly nervous about it. We used it in the end, but the editors were scared.

* You have done things that were not very safe, like in Afghanistan. Can you tell me more about that?
I have done a lot of crazy things in Afghanistan without necessarily setting out to do that. in 1989 when the Russian troops were just withdrawing a cameraman and I were smuggled in to Kabul by one of the fighter groups. We did not realise how dangerous it was. we were betrayed to the secret police and there was a shootout. We kind of got out stepping over the bodies of secret policemen who were attacking the house where we had been hiding. I have near thought it was something to be terribly proud of, as it sparked a fight with casualties, but it was a major story at the time, and the story was how deeply the fighters had infiltrated the government structure in Kabul. It was exciting and alarming. After 9/11, the Taliban closed of Afghanistan completely, and said that any journalists found there will be dealt with. I do not like people telling i cannot do things, so i got a group of smugglers in Pakistan who smuggled goods into Afghanistan, to agree to take me and they said the only they would do it if you and your cameraman wear a Burka and we did that.

*How did you feel wearing a Burka?
Horrible. You feel so powerless. You just have that little panel with lace on it. It is amazing how quickly you start obeying other people's instructions just like Afghan women tend to do that. it was not sensible, but i am too old to be sensible.

*Did you feel that you had to fight to be sent by the BBC everywhere?
Quite often I did, In a big organization like that, there are so many competing groups. it is a very competitive environment. I had to pull out all the stops, from bullying to contacts. It does not make me popular with my colleagues, which is sad, but there are more important things than popularity.

*You were the first BBC correspondent to use the Online Service for reporting. Tell me more?
Yes I think I was. What I really was genuinely the first person in the world to do, in Afghanistan in 2001 I was able to broadcast from there live from a battle. things going off all around us.

*You are very caught up with technological advances; you have a verified twitter account. why is that so?
You have got to keep up. A fellow BBC journalist friend of mine still uses a typewriter. I think if you step out of the line as it is moving forward, you just end up being completely forgotten about. I now rather enjoy Twitter and I am still not very good at Facebook. The technology is terribly important particular in television and you have got to keep up. When you get to my age its quite easy to stop, but I feel the need to keep on pushing myself.

*What is the most essential advice you can give to young journalists?
We are living in a different kind of world, where newspapers and television and radio news are much less popular than they were. People do not want to know about things. They want to just be in their little echo chamber where they just hear the views that they like to hear which is disturbing. I just feel that young journalists in particular have to be aware of that and have to fight against it. It is the death of real journalism if we just simply write and broadcast about things that will please people. You have to challenge the other peopple’s views of things, and keep on forcing it through. It is more difficult now because institutional journalism is on the way down. We need good young journalists more than any other stage. It is not a profession that makes money. You do not get rich by being a journalist, and you should not ever want to. You absolutely have to be true to the kind of voice inside you and not be somebody else’s employee.

*What is your next project?
I have decided to turn to fiction and am currently writing a novel about Russia. More important to me is my television work. 25 years ago, I went to Brazil to the farthest reaches of the amazon and I met a tribe there that never had any contact with the outside world. They were lovely. Now I want to go back and see what has happened to them, and I am scared that they would all be wearing Manchester United t-shirts.



Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
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Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)

When al-Qaeda’s planes tore through New York’s skyline on September 11, 2001, Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi cut short a visit to Berlin and rushed back to Sana’a, confronting a moment that would reshape global politics and Yemen’s foreign policy for years to come.

The attacks – among their many repercussions – pushed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fully align with the United States in its war on terror. One of Saleh’s first moves was to seek an urgent meeting with President George W. Bush, hoping to convince the White House that Yemen was not a breeding ground for al-Qaeda.

In the first part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Qirbi, who served as Yemen’s top diplomat from April 2001 until 2014, recounts his experience navigating regional upheaval, from the USS Cole bombing off Aden in October 2000 to the US-led invasion of Iraq.

He also reflects on Saleh’s last-ditch attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations – a message the Iraqi leader rejected, declaring instead: “This is a battle for the dignity of the nation, and we will pay the price.”

Below are excerpts from the interview:

Q: Your first major test as foreign minister was the September 11 attacks. Where were you when they happened, and how did you react?

A: I was on an official visit to Berlin, having lunch with the German foreign minister at the time. We were preparing for a river cruise and a reception with German officials and Arab diplomats when we were stunned by the news. We gathered around the television and immediately cancelled the event.

Q: How did President Saleh respond to the 9/11 attacks?

A: I wasn’t in Yemen at the time, so I can’t speak to his immediate reaction. But it was deeply concerning for all of us, especially coming so soon after the USS Cole bombing. That incident had already cast Yemen as a hub for al-Qaeda and terrorism. We knew the attacks in New York would only intensify that perception.

Q: When you returned from Berlin and met President Saleh, was the potential fallout from 9/11 your main concern?

A: Absolutely. We were not only concerned about Yemen but also the wider region. Our priority was to shield Yemen from the consequences. That’s why our first step was to arrange a swift visit for President Saleh to Washington. He was among the first Arab leaders to arrive there after the attacks, meeting President Bush in November of that year.

Saleh’s Confrontation with Bush at the White House

Q: How would you describe the meeting between President Saleh and President Bush?

A: It was, in many ways, a confrontation – but a diplomatic one. Saleh aimed to convince Bush that Yemen was not a terrorist haven and should not be punished for the 9/11 attacks.

Q: Did Bush accuse Saleh directly?

A: No, he didn’t. But he did emphasize the importance of fighting terrorism and acknowledged the presence of extremists in Yemen. In the end, President Saleh defused the situation by pledging Yemen’s cooperation with the international community in combating terrorism. That marked the beginning of a new chapter in Yemen-US relations.

Q: Did the US make specific demands during President Saleh’s visit to Washington in late 2001?

A: Not at that time. But eventually, the main concern became how to cooperate in combating al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen.

Q: Did Yemen take serious action on that front?

A: Absolutely. We launched operations to pursue the group responsible for the USS Cole bombing, and our security services arrested some of them. Investigations began shortly thereafter. The US requested direct participation in those interrogations, but Yemen declined, insisting that the investigations were the government’s responsibility. However, we allowed US observers to attend the sessions and submit questions through Yemeni investigators.

Q: Did the investigations uncover anything significant about 9/11?

A: I can’t recall specific details from the security files, but there was definitely intelligence exchanged between the two countries’ agencies.

From Security Cooperation to Military Invasions

Q: Intelligence cooperation between Yemen and the US became more structured. As foreign minister, did you anticipate that the US would launch military campaigns in Afghanistan and then Iraq?

A: We knew the US was deeply wounded by 9/11, but I didn’t expect it to act so hastily. In my view, the rush into war dragged the US into complications later on.

Q: Did President Saleh view the US as both a powerful partner and a potentially dangerous one?

A: Definitely. During his visit to the US, Saleh recognized how volatile the American position was for Yemen and the wider region. That was reflected in his positions on many Arab issues—whether the Palestinian cause or later the Iraq war. We were constantly trying to avoid provoking the US Our main concern was to spare Yemen from becoming a target.

Saleh’s Final Message to Saddam Hussein

Q: After the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, did you grow concerned as Washington turned its focus to Iraq?

A: The Iraq campaign came later, around 2003, and stemmed from different motives. It wasn’t directly linked to Afghanistan. The US seemed determined to expand its influence in the region—politically, strategically, and economically. After 2001, there was a clear shift toward targeting Arab regimes, including through initiatives like the “Greater Middle East Project” and what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called “creative chaos.” That deeply unsettled many Arab governments.

In the Arab League, we foreign ministers discussed how to send clear messages to Washington—that Arab states were not sponsors of terrorism and that we supported political and economic reform.

Q: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, how did President Saleh and the Yemeni government respond?

A: Our role was first through the Arab League. We wanted a unified Arab position to confront the looming US aggression, but unfortunately, the region was divided.

The second step was to try to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid war. I was the last Arab official to visit Iraq carrying a personal message from President Saleh to Saddam—this was about six to eight weeks before the invasion.

Q: Was that message directly from President Saleh?

A: Yes, it was.

Q: And you personally handed it to Saddam Hussein?

A: Yes, I delivered it to him in person. The message urged Saddam to preserve Iraq and its achievements and avoid dragging the country into a destructive war.

Saddam, however, refused. He thanked President Saleh for his concern and support. But he said: ‘This is a battle for the dignity of the Arab nation. We must pay the price to defend it.’ Saddam’s only request was that Saleh protect Yemen’s national unity.

Saleh’s Plea Rejected

Q: What exactly did Saleh’s message to Saddam Hussein contain?

A: It urged him to comply with United Nations demands—demands largely driven by the United States at that point.

Q: Did Saddam show any willingness to compromise?

A: No. He saw meeting American demands as a humiliation to the Arab nation.

Q: As a foreign minister hearing that this was about Arab dignity, did you feel Iraq was in danger?

A: Absolutely. After I delivered the message in an official capacity, I asked to speak to him as an Arab citizen speaking to an Arab leader. I told him: yes, this may be a battle for dignity, but it also requires wisdom. Iraq had built institutions, achieved development, and possessed military capabilities—those gains could be lost. I warned that the war wouldn’t end with an invasion and that all Arabs might pay the price. Saddam replied: “We in Iraq will bear that responsibility.”

Q: Did you meet with any Iraqi officials on that trip?

A: No, only President Saddam Hussein.

Q: When you relayed his response to President Saleh, how did he react?

A: He was pained by it. He sensed Iraq was heading toward war and feared the consequences.

Q: What is it like for an Arab foreign minister to sit face-to-face with Saddam Hussein?

A: You’re sitting with a leader who achieved much for his country. But in the Arab world, decisions of war and peace are often made by one man. That’s a core problem in our region—decisions are taken unilaterally, without consultation with military, security, or political institutions.

Q: Did you have the same feeling about Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait?

A: Certainly. Much of what we suffer from today stems from that same tragedy: the concentration of power.

Q: Do Arab leaders feel they are entrusted with historic missions? Was Saleh also a unilateral decision-maker?

A: Sometimes, yes. But Saleh evolved. After years of war and political conflict, he initiated a national dialogue to bring political forces together. Still, some decisions remained personal.

Q: Did Saleh ever describe Saddam as stubborn or autocratic?

A: He didn’t say that explicitly, but I believe he thought Saddam had made a grave mistake.

Preparing for the Inevitable

Q: As the invasion of Iraq loomed, how did Saleh respond?

A: For months, the Arab League debated ways to avert war. Some states tried to contain the conflict, while others, I wouldn’t say encouraged it, but refrained from opposing the US. Yemen believed war was inevitable. We viewed it as a disaster and sent several envoys to Iraq before I went personally.

Q: After Saddam’s regime collapsed, did Saleh fear for his own future?

A: No.

Q: Yet when Saddam was executed, Saleh was visibly affected. What do you recall of that?

A: I remember it well—I was in Amman at the time. His execution on Eid had a strong emotional impact on Saleh. He felt it was vengeful and driven by deep hatred. We had hoped for a fair trial and a more humane process.

Q: In an Arab summit, Saleh made a comment: “Before they shave your head, shave it yourself.” Was that a reference to Saddam’s fate?

A: Yes, that was his phrasing. He meant: before others impose their will on you, take the initiative and fix things yourself.

A Bond Forged in Shared Causes

Q: What was behind the strong personal bond between Saleh and Saddam? Was it Yemen’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War?

A: That support stemmed from an already close relationship between the two leaders. They shared a pan-Arab stance, a firm position on Israel, and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Their chemistry was real—and they were very close.

Saddam’s Support for Yemen? “I Don’t Know”

Asked whether Saddam Hussein ever provided concrete support to Yemen, al-Qirbi said he was not aware of such assistance. Yemen, however, joined Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the so-called “Arab Cooperation Council,” a bloc seen by some as an effort to reshape regional balances.

“Unfortunately, the Arab world was facing one crisis after another,” he said. “Some leaders formed new councils either to escape collective Arab action or to strengthen it. In reality, these councils achieved little on the ground.”

A Trusted Ally: Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah

Among Arab leaders, Saleh’s closest relationship in the 2000s was with Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Their bond deepened after Yemen signed a border agreement with the Kingdom.

“That trust translated into tangible support,” al-Qirbi said. “With Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, we worked to strengthen Yemen’s position, alongside Qatari FM Hamad bin Jassim and UAE’s Abdullah bin Zayed.”

But the relationship began to sour around 2008 during the war with the Houthis. Miscommunication, al-Qirbi suggested, led Saudi Arabia to question Saleh’s stance on ending the conflict.

Outside the Gulf, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was another key ally. Both he and Saleh viewed Eritrea’s actions—particularly its threats to Yemeni islands and its war with Ethiopia—as destabilizing to the region.

Post-Eritrea Tensions, Quiet Mediation

Saleh also had cordial ties with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki until territorial disputes soured the relationship. Yemen later attempted to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with al-Qirbi visiting both countries several times in an effort to mend relations.

Syria, Iraq, and the Perils of Foreign Intervention

During his tenure, al-Qirbi said Yemen maintained only limited ties with Hafez al-Assad. But when Syria plunged into conflict years later, Saleh opposed any external military intervention.

“Saleh believed—whether in Iraq or Syria—that foreign intervention ultimately destroys the country,” he said.

Saleh and Gaddafi: A Strained Arab Brotherhood

The relationship between Saleh and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was marked by what al-Qirbi called “political sparring.”

“Gaddafi saw himself as the heir to Nasser’s Arab nationalist mantle,” he said. “Saleh thought he exaggerated his role as a pan-Arab leader.”

Q: Did Saleh mock Gaddafi privately?

A: No. He didn’t mock him but did criticize his frequent calls for Arab unity, especially after so many failed attempts.

Q: Why did Gaddafi support the Houthis?

A: I don’t know his motives. Perhaps to pressure Saleh—or to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.

Q: Did Gaddafi send weapons or money to the Houthis?

A: I have no information, but he did have contact with them.

Putin, China, and Yemen’s Future

In 2008, al-Qirbi accompanied Saleh on a visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin amid growing unrest in Yemen.

“The atmosphere was very warm. Putin understood Yemen’s political situation,” he said. “Yemen relied heavily on Russian military equipment, and the two leaders discussed ways to strengthen that cooperation.”

Putin invited Saleh to a military parade showcasing advanced weaponry. “It was clear that Putin saw Saleh as one of the Arab leaders closest to Moscow,” al-Qirbi said, adding that Saleh greatly admired the Russian president. “He said Putin would restore Russia’s global role.”

While Saleh held some admiration for Western leaders like France’s Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and US President George W. Bush—whom he met multiple times—his primary focus remained the Arab world.

China was another rising partner. In one of Saleh’s final visits to Beijing, he sought to open Yemen to Chinese investment. The Chinese agreed to lend Yemen $1 billion for development projects as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, but Yemen’s parliament ultimately stalled the agreement over repayment terms.

Arab Diplomacy Through Al-Qirbi’s Eyes

Reflecting on fellow Arab diplomats, al-Qirbi spoke warmly of Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal.

“He was known for his wisdom and patience, even when hearing views he didn’t like,” al-Qirbi said. “He always sought consensus.”

Other standout figures included Oman’s Yousef bin Alawi, Sudan’s Mustafa Osman Ismail—“a leading figure during the Iraq crisis”—and Libya’s Ali Treki, a staunch Arab nationalist often at odds with Gaddafi’s more erratic stances.

Q: Did you know Libya’s former foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham?

A: Yes. A cultured man. I remember once in Cairo, during a dinner gathering, he played the oud and sang for us.

Q: What about Amr Moussa?

A: I admired him when he was Egypt’s foreign minister—especially his firm stance on the Palestinian cause. That admiration only grew when I worked with him at the Arab League. I consider him among the League’s best secretary-generals during my time—not just as foreign minister but as an observer of the League’s work. He always held firm to Arab principles.

Unfortunately, decisions at the Arab League are shaped by powerful member states and their foreign ministers—not the secretary-general.

From Medicine to Diplomacy... and Arabic Poetry

A physician by training, al-Qirbi’s love for classical Arabic poetry has endured.

Q: Who is your favorite poet?

A: Al-Mutanabbi.

Q: Why him?

A: His verses are full of timeless wisdom and values. To me, they are like proverbs for life.