When al-Qaeda’s planes tore through New York’s skyline on September 11, 2001, Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi cut short a visit to Berlin and rushed back to Sana’a, confronting a moment that would reshape global politics and Yemen’s foreign policy for years to come.
The attacks – among their many repercussions – pushed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fully align with the United States in its war on terror. One of Saleh’s first moves was to seek an urgent meeting with President George W. Bush, hoping to convince the White House that Yemen was not a breeding ground for al-Qaeda.
In the first part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Qirbi, who served as Yemen’s top diplomat from April 2001 until 2014, recounts his experience navigating regional upheaval, from the USS Cole bombing off Aden in October 2000 to the US-led invasion of Iraq.
He also reflects on Saleh’s last-ditch attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations – a message the Iraqi leader rejected, declaring instead: “This is a battle for the dignity of the nation, and we will pay the price.”
Below are excerpts from the interview:
Q: Your first major test as foreign minister was the September 11 attacks. Where were you when they happened, and how did you react?
A: I was on an official visit to Berlin, having lunch with the German foreign minister at the time. We were preparing for a river cruise and a reception with German officials and Arab diplomats when we were stunned by the news. We gathered around the television and immediately cancelled the event.
Q: How did President Saleh respond to the 9/11 attacks?
A: I wasn’t in Yemen at the time, so I can’t speak to his immediate reaction. But it was deeply concerning for all of us, especially coming so soon after the USS Cole bombing. That incident had already cast Yemen as a hub for al-Qaeda and terrorism. We knew the attacks in New York would only intensify that perception.
Q: When you returned from Berlin and met President Saleh, was the potential fallout from 9/11 your main concern?
A: Absolutely. We were not only concerned about Yemen but also the wider region. Our priority was to shield Yemen from the consequences. That’s why our first step was to arrange a swift visit for President Saleh to Washington. He was among the first Arab leaders to arrive there after the attacks, meeting President Bush in November of that year.
Saleh’s Confrontation with Bush at the White House
Q: How would you describe the meeting between President Saleh and President Bush?
A: It was, in many ways, a confrontation – but a diplomatic one. Saleh aimed to convince Bush that Yemen was not a terrorist haven and should not be punished for the 9/11 attacks.
Q: Did Bush accuse Saleh directly?
A: No, he didn’t. But he did emphasize the importance of fighting terrorism and acknowledged the presence of extremists in Yemen. In the end, President Saleh defused the situation by pledging Yemen’s cooperation with the international community in combating terrorism. That marked the beginning of a new chapter in Yemen-US relations.
Q: Did the US make specific demands during President Saleh’s visit to Washington in late 2001?
A: Not at that time. But eventually, the main concern became how to cooperate in combating al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen.
Q: Did Yemen take serious action on that front?
A: Absolutely. We launched operations to pursue the group responsible for the USS Cole bombing, and our security services arrested some of them. Investigations began shortly thereafter. The US requested direct participation in those interrogations, but Yemen declined, insisting that the investigations were the government’s responsibility. However, we allowed US observers to attend the sessions and submit questions through Yemeni investigators.
Q: Did the investigations uncover anything significant about 9/11?
A: I can’t recall specific details from the security files, but there was definitely intelligence exchanged between the two countries’ agencies.
From Security Cooperation to Military Invasions
Q: Intelligence cooperation between Yemen and the US became more structured. As foreign minister, did you anticipate that the US would launch military campaigns in Afghanistan and then Iraq?
A: We knew the US was deeply wounded by 9/11, but I didn’t expect it to act so hastily. In my view, the rush into war dragged the US into complications later on.
Q: Did President Saleh view the US as both a powerful partner and a potentially dangerous one?
A: Definitely. During his visit to the US, Saleh recognized how volatile the American position was for Yemen and the wider region. That was reflected in his positions on many Arab issues—whether the Palestinian cause or later the Iraq war. We were constantly trying to avoid provoking the US Our main concern was to spare Yemen from becoming a target.
Saleh’s Final Message to Saddam Hussein
Q: After the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, did you grow concerned as Washington turned its focus to Iraq?
A: The Iraq campaign came later, around 2003, and stemmed from different motives. It wasn’t directly linked to Afghanistan. The US seemed determined to expand its influence in the region—politically, strategically, and economically. After 2001, there was a clear shift toward targeting Arab regimes, including through initiatives like the “Greater Middle East Project” and what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called “creative chaos.” That deeply unsettled many Arab governments.
In the Arab League, we foreign ministers discussed how to send clear messages to Washington—that Arab states were not sponsors of terrorism and that we supported political and economic reform.
Q: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, how did President Saleh and the Yemeni government respond?
A: Our role was first through the Arab League. We wanted a unified Arab position to confront the looming US aggression, but unfortunately, the region was divided.
The second step was to try to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid war. I was the last Arab official to visit Iraq carrying a personal message from President Saleh to Saddam—this was about six to eight weeks before the invasion.
Q: Was that message directly from President Saleh?
A: Yes, it was.
Q: And you personally handed it to Saddam Hussein?
A: Yes, I delivered it to him in person. The message urged Saddam to preserve Iraq and its achievements and avoid dragging the country into a destructive war.
Saddam, however, refused. He thanked President Saleh for his concern and support. But he said: ‘This is a battle for the dignity of the Arab nation. We must pay the price to defend it.’ Saddam’s only request was that Saleh protect Yemen’s national unity.
Saleh’s Plea Rejected
Q: What exactly did Saleh’s message to Saddam Hussein contain?
A: It urged him to comply with United Nations demands—demands largely driven by the United States at that point.
Q: Did Saddam show any willingness to compromise?
A: No. He saw meeting American demands as a humiliation to the Arab nation.
Q: As a foreign minister hearing that this was about Arab dignity, did you feel Iraq was in danger?
A: Absolutely. After I delivered the message in an official capacity, I asked to speak to him as an Arab citizen speaking to an Arab leader. I told him: yes, this may be a battle for dignity, but it also requires wisdom. Iraq had built institutions, achieved development, and possessed military capabilities—those gains could be lost. I warned that the war wouldn’t end with an invasion and that all Arabs might pay the price. Saddam replied: “We in Iraq will bear that responsibility.”
Q: Did you meet with any Iraqi officials on that trip?
A: No, only President Saddam Hussein.
Q: When you relayed his response to President Saleh, how did he react?
A: He was pained by it. He sensed Iraq was heading toward war and feared the consequences.
Q: What is it like for an Arab foreign minister to sit face-to-face with Saddam Hussein?
A: You’re sitting with a leader who achieved much for his country. But in the Arab world, decisions of war and peace are often made by one man. That’s a core problem in our region—decisions are taken unilaterally, without consultation with military, security, or political institutions.
Q: Did you have the same feeling about Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait?
A: Certainly. Much of what we suffer from today stems from that same tragedy: the concentration of power.
Q: Do Arab leaders feel they are entrusted with historic missions? Was Saleh also a unilateral decision-maker?
A: Sometimes, yes. But Saleh evolved. After years of war and political conflict, he initiated a national dialogue to bring political forces together. Still, some decisions remained personal.
Q: Did Saleh ever describe Saddam as stubborn or autocratic?
A: He didn’t say that explicitly, but I believe he thought Saddam had made a grave mistake.
Preparing for the Inevitable
Q: As the invasion of Iraq loomed, how did Saleh respond?
A: For months, the Arab League debated ways to avert war. Some states tried to contain the conflict, while others, I wouldn’t say encouraged it, but refrained from opposing the US. Yemen believed war was inevitable. We viewed it as a disaster and sent several envoys to Iraq before I went personally.
Q: After Saddam’s regime collapsed, did Saleh fear for his own future?
A: No.
Q: Yet when Saddam was executed, Saleh was visibly affected. What do you recall of that?
A: I remember it well—I was in Amman at the time. His execution on Eid had a strong emotional impact on Saleh. He felt it was vengeful and driven by deep hatred. We had hoped for a fair trial and a more humane process.
Q: In an Arab summit, Saleh made a comment: “Before they shave your head, shave it yourself.” Was that a reference to Saddam’s fate?
A: Yes, that was his phrasing. He meant: before others impose their will on you, take the initiative and fix things yourself.
A Bond Forged in Shared Causes
Q: What was behind the strong personal bond between Saleh and Saddam? Was it Yemen’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War?
A: That support stemmed from an already close relationship between the two leaders. They shared a pan-Arab stance, a firm position on Israel, and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Their chemistry was real—and they were very close.
Saddam’s Support for Yemen? “I Don’t Know”
Asked whether Saddam Hussein ever provided concrete support to Yemen, al-Qirbi said he was not aware of such assistance. Yemen, however, joined Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the so-called “Arab Cooperation Council,” a bloc seen by some as an effort to reshape regional balances.
“Unfortunately, the Arab world was facing one crisis after another,” he said. “Some leaders formed new councils either to escape collective Arab action or to strengthen it. In reality, these councils achieved little on the ground.”
A Trusted Ally: Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah
Among Arab leaders, Saleh’s closest relationship in the 2000s was with Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Their bond deepened after Yemen signed a border agreement with the Kingdom.
“That trust translated into tangible support,” al-Qirbi said. “With Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, we worked to strengthen Yemen’s position, alongside Qatari FM Hamad bin Jassim and UAE’s Abdullah bin Zayed.”
But the relationship began to sour around 2008 during the war with the Houthis. Miscommunication, al-Qirbi suggested, led Saudi Arabia to question Saleh’s stance on ending the conflict.
Outside the Gulf, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was another key ally. Both he and Saleh viewed Eritrea’s actions—particularly its threats to Yemeni islands and its war with Ethiopia—as destabilizing to the region.
Post-Eritrea Tensions, Quiet Mediation
Saleh also had cordial ties with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki until territorial disputes soured the relationship. Yemen later attempted to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with al-Qirbi visiting both countries several times in an effort to mend relations.
Syria, Iraq, and the Perils of Foreign Intervention
During his tenure, al-Qirbi said Yemen maintained only limited ties with Hafez al-Assad. But when Syria plunged into conflict years later, Saleh opposed any external military intervention.
“Saleh believed—whether in Iraq or Syria—that foreign intervention ultimately destroys the country,” he said.
Saleh and Gaddafi: A Strained Arab Brotherhood
The relationship between Saleh and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was marked by what al-Qirbi called “political sparring.”
“Gaddafi saw himself as the heir to Nasser’s Arab nationalist mantle,” he said. “Saleh thought he exaggerated his role as a pan-Arab leader.”
Q: Did Saleh mock Gaddafi privately?
A: No. He didn’t mock him but did criticize his frequent calls for Arab unity, especially after so many failed attempts.
Q: Why did Gaddafi support the Houthis?
A: I don’t know his motives. Perhaps to pressure Saleh—or to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.
Q: Did Gaddafi send weapons or money to the Houthis?
A: I have no information, but he did have contact with them.
Putin, China, and Yemen’s Future
In 2008, al-Qirbi accompanied Saleh on a visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin amid growing unrest in Yemen.
“The atmosphere was very warm. Putin understood Yemen’s political situation,” he said. “Yemen relied heavily on Russian military equipment, and the two leaders discussed ways to strengthen that cooperation.”
Putin invited Saleh to a military parade showcasing advanced weaponry. “It was clear that Putin saw Saleh as one of the Arab leaders closest to Moscow,” al-Qirbi said, adding that Saleh greatly admired the Russian president. “He said Putin would restore Russia’s global role.”
While Saleh held some admiration for Western leaders like France’s Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and US President George W. Bush—whom he met multiple times—his primary focus remained the Arab world.
China was another rising partner. In one of Saleh’s final visits to Beijing, he sought to open Yemen to Chinese investment. The Chinese agreed to lend Yemen $1 billion for development projects as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, but Yemen’s parliament ultimately stalled the agreement over repayment terms.
Arab Diplomacy Through Al-Qirbi’s Eyes
Reflecting on fellow Arab diplomats, al-Qirbi spoke warmly of Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal.
“He was known for his wisdom and patience, even when hearing views he didn’t like,” al-Qirbi said. “He always sought consensus.”
Other standout figures included Oman’s Yousef bin Alawi, Sudan’s Mustafa Osman Ismail—“a leading figure during the Iraq crisis”—and Libya’s Ali Treki, a staunch Arab nationalist often at odds with Gaddafi’s more erratic stances.
Q: Did you know Libya’s former foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham?
A: Yes. A cultured man. I remember once in Cairo, during a dinner gathering, he played the oud and sang for us.
Q: What about Amr Moussa?
A: I admired him when he was Egypt’s foreign minister—especially his firm stance on the Palestinian cause. That admiration only grew when I worked with him at the Arab League. I consider him among the League’s best secretary-generals during my time—not just as foreign minister but as an observer of the League’s work. He always held firm to Arab principles.
Unfortunately, decisions at the Arab League are shaped by powerful member states and their foreign ministers—not the secretary-general.
From Medicine to Diplomacy... and Arabic Poetry
A physician by training, al-Qirbi’s love for classical Arabic poetry has endured.
Q: Who is your favorite poet?
A: Al-Mutanabbi.
Q: Why him?
A: His verses are full of timeless wisdom and values. To me, they are like proverbs for life.
