Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.



Healey to Asharq Al-Awsat: UK Has More Jets Flying in the Region Than at Any Time in the Last 15 Years

British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026.  EPA/ANDY RAIN
British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026. EPA/ANDY RAIN
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Healey to Asharq Al-Awsat: UK Has More Jets Flying in the Region Than at Any Time in the Last 15 Years

British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026.  EPA/ANDY RAIN
British Secretary of State for Defense John Healey arrives for a cabinet meeting at 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, 24 March 2026. EPA/ANDY RAIN

British Defense Secretary John Healey revealed Wednesday that UK pilots and aircrew have flown over 1,200 hours on defensive missions across the Middle East since the conflict with Iran erupted, saying they have now had over 80 engagements together with RAF Regiment Gunners.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat following his visit to Saudi Arabia, Healey said that the UK has around 1,000 personnel in the region and an extra 500 air defense personnel in Cyprus.

“I continue to work closely with our partners in the region on what further support we can provide,” he said, lauding the UK-Saudi Arabia defense partnership which he said is “founded on mutual security interests and longstanding industrial collaboration.”

“Although our friendship is historic, it has evolved into a modern partnership that responds to contemporary challenges,” he added.

On ties between Moscow and Iran, Healey did not rule out a hidden Russian hand behind some of the Iranian tactics.

The following are the key points from the interview:

80 engagements

“UK pilots and aircrew have flown over 1,200 hours on defensive missions across the region. Together with our RAF Regiment Gunners, they have now had over 80 engagements since the conflict began,” said Healey.

“I am proud of the work that our UK Armed Forces are doing alongside our Gulf partners to help keep people safe in the region. Their dedication and professionalism is helping to save lives as Iran indiscriminately targets countries across the Gulf,” he added.

Heavy Deployment

“The UK has around 1,000 personnel deployed to the region, not including our personnel in Cyprus,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Force protection is at the highest levels for UK bases in the region.”

“We have more UK jets flying in the region than at any time in the last 15 years. We are undertaking defensive counter air operations over Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE as well as Cyprus,” he said.

“Since January, I have deployed extra equipment and people to the region. This includes Typhoon and F-35 jets, Wildcat helicopters armed with purpose-built counter-drone Martlet missiles, a Merlin Crowsnest helicopter, providing airborne surveillance and control plus radar systems, air defense systems and counter-drone units.”

He added that there are now an extra 500 air defense personnel in Cyprus, and the warship, HMS Dragon - which is fully integrated within the layered air defense system with allies and partners - is deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Defense Systems to Support the Gulf

“I continue to work closely with our partners in the region on what further support we can provide, which was the purpose of my visit (to Riyadh) this week,” Healey told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I confirmed during my meeting with the Defense Minister, His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, that we will deploy Sky Sabre to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - an air defense system that will be integrated into Saudi Arabia’s defenses to support Saudi Arabia's efforts in repelling Iran's attacks,” he added.

He also said that Rapid Sentry – a system made up of a radar and a missile launcher – was deployed to Kuwait, and Lightweight Multiple Launchers to Bahrain.

“We have extended the operations of our jets in Qatar which are flying defensive missions every night, and through Taskforce Sabre we're ensuring UK industry steps up too. The Taskforce brings together industry who offer counter drone and air defense capabilities with governments, including Gulf partners ... to rapidly provide them with the equipment they need.”

Advanced defense partnership with Saudi Arabia

On his visit to Saudi Arabia, he said the trip was aimed at showing support “during this period of sustained and indiscriminate Iranian attacks, and also to discuss further cooperation between our nations to protect our people and our shared interests in the Kingdom. That's why I was delighted to meet with His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Salman to discuss recent events in the region.”

“The UK and Saudi Arabia have a close, longstanding friendship, and share a decades-long defense partnership, founded on mutual security interests and longstanding industrial collaboration.”

That friendship “has evolved into a modern partnership that responds to contemporary challenges. This really matters in times like today: it means we have the trust and the shared understanding to respond quickly and decisively when the security environment demands it. It is precisely because of that deep foundation that we are able to act as we have done, such as deploying Sky Sabre to Saudi Arabia.”

Russian-Iranian cooperation

On Russia’s role in the Iran war, Healey said: “Our assessment is that, even prior to US and Israeli strikes, Russia highly likely shared intelligence and provided training to Iran, including on things such as drone technology and operations, and electronic warfare. And our intelligence also indicates that this cooperation is ongoing.”

“No one will be surprised that Putin’s hidden hand may be behind some of the Iranian tactics and potentially some of their capabilities as well. We see an axis of aggression between Russia and Iran - two countries that menace their neighbors and that pose a threat more widely to us all.”

No assessment on targeting Europe

Healey said that there is no assessment Iran is trying to target Europe with missiles. “Even if they did, we have the resources and alliances we need to keep the UK and our allies safe from any kind of attacks, whether it's on our soil or from abroad. The UK stands ready 24/7 to defend itself and protection of forces is at the highest levels for our bases in the region.”


Spain’s FM Backs Saudi Arabia, Tells Asharq Al-Awsat that Iranian Attacks Are ‘Unjustified’

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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Spain’s FM Backs Saudi Arabia, Tells Asharq Al-Awsat that Iranian Attacks Are ‘Unjustified’

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Manuel Albares has expressed Madrid’s support to Saudi Arabia, describing Iranian attacks on the Kingdom and other countries in the Gulf as “unjustified.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat published Thursday, the minister revealed that efforts were being exerted by Spain as part of several European countries and in coordination with nations in the Middle East to de-escalate, resort to diplomacy and put an end to the US-Israeli-Iranian war.

Albares said “Spain has openly condemned” the Iranian attacks and summoned Iran’s ambassador to convey “its firm rejection of violence.”

The Spanish Foreign Ministry also “called for an immediate cessation of these attacks," he said.

“The attacks conducted by Iran are completely unjustified,” Albares told Asharq Al-Awsat, while stressing full solidarity with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries against the Iranian attacks.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has recently received a phone call from the Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, who expressed “Spain’s support and solidarity in light of the unjustified attacks that the country is suffering.”

“Spain's stance is firmly rooted in defending international law and the United Nations Charter, rather than the principle of might makes right,” said Albares.

This message has been conveyed to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Jordan, Türkiye, Egypt, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, he added.

Call for de-escalation and negotiation

“Spain advocates de-escalation, negotiation, and respect for international law. Our voice aims to bring reason and restraint to the current situation. We cannot accept the idea of war becoming a means by which countries interact with one another or a mechanism for establishing a balance of power in the Middle East. Violence never brings peace, stability or democracy; it only creates more violence and chaos,” said the minister.

“In light of this military escalation, Spain is acting coherently in accordance with the values of peace and solidarity that define Spanish society — values that are also shared by the majority of European states. Our country makes its decisions in line with European principles, the UN Charter, and international law,” he added.

The war has already had consequences that extend beyond the Middle East. For example, it has affected Cyprus and Türkiye, he said, warning that this increases the risk of the ongoing conflict spreading beyond the region.

The minister told Asharq Al-Awsat that the war is also affecting international trade and production of energy, which have a direct impact on global economies and geopolitics.

“The unpredictable consequences of the current conflict are making the situation extremely dangerous for the security and stability of the Middle East, including the Gulf states, which are being particularly targeted,” he said in response to a question.

Countries involved in the confrontation

Albares spoke about the situation of several countries in the region, including Lebanon, which he said “is facing a dramatic situation with numbers of victims increasing daily, an overstretched medical system incapable to attend them, more than a million of displaced people, and the destruction of civil infrastructure. The life of the people of Lebanon is disappearing before their eyes.”

He said Spain has condemned the attacks carried out by Hezbollah, that are fueling the spiral of confrontation, as well as Israel's attacks. “An Israeli land invasion is already ongoing, a grave error in a country that has already endured immense suffering.”

“We cannot ignore the attacks by Israel and non-State actors on UN forces, on UNIFIL, in which Spain has a significant presence, nor the repeated violations of international humanitarian law," Albares said.

The minister also expressed concern over the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. “There is no clear vision for the future, and humanitarian aid is not reaching the area, with access blocked and NGOs and humanitarian actors prevented to operate on the ground. In the West Bank in particular, settlement expansion and settler violence continues to increase with impunity,” he said.

High-risk situation defined by an unpredictable conflict

“We are facing an escalation of violence that has already killed thousands of people and negatively impacted maritime navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and critical energy infrastructures, with direct consequences for global energy security,” he said.

“In short, it is an extremely high-risk situation defined by an unpredictable conflict that poses a direct threat to the security and stability of the Middle East, with repercussions that can be felt across the globe,” he added.

Asked about his views of the Gulf's concern about the war’s repercussions, Albares said: “Spain fully understands the Gulf countries' concerns about the consequences of this war. This has been reflected in the diplomatic outreach that I have conducted with my counterparts in the region.”

“Increasing insecurity in countries under attack from missiles and drones without justification — attacks that Spain firmly condemns — particularly those launched by Iran, contribute to an increasingly dangerous and complex situation. In this context, Spain advocates clear de-escalation, negotiation and respect for international law, insisting that we must avoid anything that adds to the tension.”

He added that “the situation in the Strait of Hormuz is also extremely worrying, as its impact on energy security and international trade is clear.”

He stressed that the conflict has human and humanitarian dimensions, such as loss of life and displacement, warning that this could have direct consequences also in Europe. So, he called for “a responsible solution based on solidarity.”

Unified position

“The only clear thing is that a response is necessary, and in this sense, Spain supports a response based on the unity of the international community around the universal applicability and respect of International law and the UN Charter,” said Albares.

Asked to what extent the current situation is likely to explode into a broader war,” the minister said: “The consequences of the actions of Israel, as well as Iran’s response, are unpredictable. We are entering a situation that makes it difficult to determine where the escalation could lead and what the ultimate effects could be.”


Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
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Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member and Governor of Yemen's eastern Hadramout province Salem al-Khanbashi says he believes that “Hadramout triumphed for itself,” and that what took place there in December 2025 and early January 2026 marked a decisive moment in which Hadhramis reclaimed their right to protect their identity and blocked any political project seeking to dissolve the “Hadhrami self” under the slogans of outsiders.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Podcast, recorded in Riyadh on February 9, 2026, al-Khanbashi advised the new Yemeni government led by Dr. Shayea al-Zindani to steer clear of partisanship, raise performance levels, and combat corruption. During the discussion, he presented his account of events, framing the operation as a “takeover of military camps,” not the “ignition of a war.” He broadened the discussion to what he views as the priority of the current phase: consolidating stability, activating development, and opening the door to long-awaited Hadhrami investments returning home.

“Liberate us" from ourselves?

In describing the outcome of the confrontation, the deputy rejects reducing the picture to who won and who lost. He says the real victory was achieved when the people of Hadramout rejected the notion that someone could arrive and say, “We came to liberate you,” asking: “Liberate you from whom? From ourselves?” He stresses that the governorate, with its history stretching back “thousands of years,” cannot have another identity imposed upon it. He records his appreciation for those who stood in defense of this distinctiveness, while at the same time extending explicit thanks to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership and role, which he said was a key player in containing last month’s events.

On the moment he was tasked with the governorship at an extremely sensitive time, al-Khanbashi recounts that he was residing in Hadramout and did not leave except when necessary, before receiving a call from President Rashad al-Alimi and from parties including Saudi officials and colleagues on the Leadership Council, asking him to assume responsibility for the governorate “because we need you.”He says he tried to decline, but accepted under the pressure of “necessity,” emphasizing that he is a son of Hadramout who spent most of his life there, and that he accepted the post fully aware of the weight and complexity of the phase.

The picture becomes heavier as al-Khanbashi moves to his successive roles: governor, then commander of the National Shield Forces in Hadramout , then a member of the Leadership Council with the rank of vice president. He deliberately labels the January operation a “battle to take over the camps,” so that it would not be understood as targeting civilian society or as a search for settling scores.

Al-Khanbashi says his overriding concern was to spare Hadramout street fighting, protect civilian infrastructure, and minimize human losses. He describes the operation as “swift and decisive,” with a limited number of casualties.

Securing withdrawals... and a political outlet

Asked whether the military operation in Hadramout ended with reprisals against opponents, al-Khanbashi is keen to deny this. He says the withdrawal of departing forces was secured and that they were not subjected to any military or popular harassment. “We instructed that no one who was in the Southern Transitional Council, whether military or civilian, be harmed,” he says. At the same time, he explains that he took decisions to dismiss certain security and military leaders accused of involvement in looting weapons and ammunition or of poor performance, and that they will be referred for accountability in accordance with what they committed against the governorate.

Amid this, al-Khanbashi reiterates a message he wants widely understood: “Hadramout has room for all.” He calls for civic conduct that avoids incitement, and warns against marches he believes target civil peace and provoke the local scene.

He again urges adherence to civil behavior without incitement, citing gatherings that took place in early February 2026 in Seiyun. He suggests they were not spontaneous, saying: “We have evidence that these people were paid, and we want them not to force us to take measures involving a degree of coercive force against those who want to practice such acts. We are still under a state of emergency, and all measures can be taken.”

In the broader political context, al-Khanbashi speaks of moves to convene a broad Hadhrami meeting in Saudi Arabia bringing together political and social components, including Hadhramis from the Southern Transitional Council, with the aim of preparing a unified vision in the name of Hadramout to be presented to the Southern Dialogue Conference. He notes that a preparatory committee was formed in Mukalla to draft a position reflecting “all societal and political forces” in the governorate, alongside a parallel desire to represent the voice of Hadhrami expatriates within a single vision.

Electricity and investment

Electricity tops the services file, according to the governor. He places it at the head of priorities, explaining that the needs of the coast and the valley differ, but the headline is the same: energy that does not meet demand, especially in summer, with humidity and heat on the coast and harsh desert conditions in the valley.

He speaks of support projects to generate 300 megawatts for the coast, and other projects for the valley, alongside proposals for gas-powered plants and private-sector solar energy options with capacities that could reach 150 megawatts. He believes that a medium-term solution is not a substitute for a long-term strategic project for a large gas plant capable of covering Hadramout's future needs.

From energy he turns to investment as the other face of stability. Al-Khanbashi lists opportunities he sees as promising: tourism, real estate, the export of high-purity gypsum, potential minerals, coal in specific areas, black sands and heavy elements, fisheries, and the idea of aquaculture. He recalls his participation in a Hadhrami investment conference, calling on businessmen to balance their external investments with investing in Hadramout, while pledging to provide facilitation and an attractive environment.

On government affairs, al-Khanbashi describes the discussions that preceded the formation of the new government as having focused on criteria of competence, experience, and geographic balance, while rejecting the principle of quota-sharing. He then offers three pieces of advice he places at the core of the government’s test: moving away from ego and partisan drift, combating entrenched corruption in several ministries, and raising the level of revenue collection and transferring it to the central bank, especially in revenue-generating ministries. He highlights the need to regulate the financial relationship between the center and the governorates in accordance with the Local Authority Law, arguing that strict application would ease many chronic problems.

He recalls Hadramout's experience with oil revenues before exports were halted, noting that the governorate received 20 percent of the value of exported oil and used it for development projects such as electricity, roads, health, and education, before this resource stopped after the Houthis targeted export facilities.

"No barriers" with Saudi Arabia

In assessing Saudi development support, al-Khanbashi links relief and reconstruction as a single window for enabling Yemen to overcome its crisis, pointing to packages of projects in electricity, roads, health services, and others within Hadramout.

He places this within a relationship he describes as intertwined, difficult to separate socially, economically, and politically, invoking the extended borders, shared tribes, and cultural ties, to conclude that it is not possible to erect a “barrier” between Hadramout and the Kingdom.

Asked about the moment that remained most vivid in his memory during the 48 hours of the operation, al-Khanbashi says he feared the forces might not withdraw easily and what that could entail in terms of destruction and casualties, before the operation ended in record time with limited losses. He says this is what he will continue to take pride in: that Hadramout succeeded in avoiding internal fighting. In his message to the people of Hadramout, he calls for unity, abandoning the causes of division, and prioritizing security and development, pledging that the expansion of stability will lead to a “bright development era” reflected in the lives of the governorate’s residents.