Nasser al-Qasabi to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Al-Asouf’ Broke Taboos

Saudi actor Nasser al-Qasabi. (AP)
Saudi actor Nasser al-Qasabi. (AP)
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Nasser al-Qasabi to Asharq Al-Awsat: ‘Al-Asouf’ Broke Taboos

Saudi actor Nasser al-Qasabi. (AP)
Saudi actor Nasser al-Qasabi. (AP)

A drama series aired on mbc television during the holy fasting month of Ramadan has drawn attention for tackling a period of Saudi history that is seldom addressed.

Prominent Saudi actor Nasser al-Qasabi stars in “Al-Asouf”, the drama that has become the talk of the people and social media throughout the Arab world.

Nasser bin Qassem al-Qasabi, 56, is one of the most famous actors in the Arab world. He kicked off his career 34 years ago. Asharq Al-Awsat sat with him to address the controversy surrounding the show and the current artistic scene in Saudi Arabia.

The actor has courted controversy every year, to which he remarked: “I do not know why that is. It appears that our society is a bit too conservative and our media too calm.”

“Of course, it is not deliberate otherwise it would be silly because you would come out as obsessed with riling a certain segment of society. This is not conducive to a healthy environment,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat by telephone.

Saudi society does not seem accustomed to viewing programs that openly address its customs and traditions.

“People will disagree or differ with you when you address sensitive issues or when they have bizarre ideas about issues that should be off-limits,” Qasabi said. “They also have a tendency to exaggerate the idea of an ideal society. When you speak about this society, the so-called ‘enlightened’ ones are quick to attack you.”

“‘Al-Asouf’ is a drama show, not a documentary. Had it been so, it would have been shot differently,” he went on to say.

The series depicts a family that lives in a traditional neighborhood during the 1970s and the developments that take place there, as well as on the overall Arab scene.

“The developments include the 1973 war, the Israeli invasion, the death of King Faisal and the Iranian revolution,” revealed Qasabi. “We are pointing out to the viewers the history that the family is experiencing without really documenting that history. We are not concerned with that.”

“The issue of the Muslim Brotherhood has been at the foundation of our work for several years. We had a clear stance from the group even before it transformed into a terrorist organization for us. We had started work on the show over seven years ago and we completed the first part over four years ago. We knew at the time which path the Brotherhood was going to follow.”

“The show is not a documentary, even when it addresses the Brotherhood. The majority of the dialogue is simply about making observations, without going into details of events.”

“We sought to avoid delving into the details of the Brotherhood, but we sought to highlight its infiltration of society,” Qasabi told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Al-Asouf” completed filming two years ago, but was not aired until 2018. Qasabi denied that censors were involved in the delay, explaining that it was set to air four or five months before Ramadan, but structural changes at mbc led to its being broadcast two weeks before the holy month.

“This is confusing, even for me as an actor,” he admitted.

The series will have two more seasons. Season two was wrapped in early 2018 and the third season will be filmed after three months, he revealed.

Commenting on criticism that the show does not represent Saudi Arabia or its people, Qasabi responded: “Everyone has the right to criticize any work. They also have the right to like it or not. What bothers you though is that the general media and cultural scenes judge you on your work and impose themselves on you. They do not even understand the game.”

“They look at you as if you come from Hollywood or Cairo’s artistic environment. They do not see that you have to work in a very poor artistic environment that does not even have the basics to produce a dramatic work, whether they are writers, directors or photographers,” he explained.

“I would respect anyone who has an objective opinion, but not when they speak down at you,” he stressed. “You should not be so critical when I present a series from such a modest artistic background.”

“Thank God that we are now starting to realize the importance of theater and drama. We will now be able to pave the way for artistic scene of the future that would be able to produce works to rival and even possibly surpass Egyptian ones,” he stated.

Despite the criticism, Qasabi said that “Al-Asouf” was a success.

“Its value lies in drawing attention despite its flaws,” he explained. “No work of art is perfect, but the series has achieved its goal by reaching the people and provoking several of them. I have called this the ‘Great Provocation’ because it has stirred controversy and broken taboos.”

“Our society must grow accustomed to such issues. Other more powerful issues and stories will be put out in the open in the future. It will not stop here.”

“This is the nature of conservative societies. Taboos will be broken with time,” he declared.



Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Fakhri Karim: My Complaint to Sistani on Corruption Spurred Suggestion of Saddam-Era Minister

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

In post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, the prime minister's office gained significant power. It became customary for the prime minister to be Shiite, the president Kurdish, and the speaker of Parliament Sunni.

This power-sharing arrangement, focusing on sectarian representation over institutional structure, has remained strong.

Attempts to break this norm have failed, including when former US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden tried to support Ayad Allawi, a Shiite politician, for the presidency. The aim was to keep Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in power with support from both Washington and Tehran.

Despite Allawi’s parliamentary majority win, he didn’t become president.

Arab states were slow to react to changes in Iraq, allowing Iran to step in. Iran supported the US-created Iraqi Governing Council and sought to bring together Shiite factions to join the political process.

Its influence grew due to its backing of groups that opposed Saddam Hussein. Iran gained a key role in Iraq, effectively having veto power over decisions and a say in forming governments, while also expecting an eventual US military withdrawal.

Fakhri Karim, senior adviser to late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said Iran stepped in to fill a vacuum in Iraq, solidifying its role and protecting its interests.

This made Iran’s Quds Force commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani a key figure in Iraq, shaping everything from the reduction of US military presence to the formation of governments.

A foreign power’s influence in a neighboring country grows only if locals accept its role.

Soleimani and deputy leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a US strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Karim noted that Soleimani “was dedicated to serving his country’s interests, and the other side should have defended its own role and interests.”

He recalled Soleimani as being “skilled, effective, and able to earn trust, shifting from flexibility to rigidity when needed.”

This was clear in a letter Soleimani sent to Talabani when he considered supporting a no-confidence motion against Maliki’s government.

Karim also mentioned that al-Muhandis was deeply trusted by the Iranian general.

Talabani assigned his senior adviser various missions in Iran, focusing on forming Iraqi governments and relations with Kurdistan.

During a visit to Tehran, Adil Abdul Mahdi, who would later become prime minister, informed Talabani and Karim that “Soleimani’s claim that Iran supports Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister is false.”

“I was told that Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei supports me,” argued Abdul Mahdi at the time.

Talabani felt awkward despite being close to Abdul Mahdi. He asked Karim to visit Tehran, where he met Soleimani and al-Muhandis. Soleimani denied Abdul Mahdi’s claims, saying he could take Karim to the Supreme Leader to hear the truth.

For his part, Karim said the Supreme Council didn’t support al-Maliki and that influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s stance was hardening. Soleimani assured that the Iranians were in contact with al-Sadr and would handle the issue of the Supreme Council.

When Karim returned, he informed Talabani and Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani that the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, had left the Supreme Council to join Maliki, shifting the balance and allowing the formation of a government without the Council’s interference.

Karim remembered that Iran initially supported Ibrahim al-Jaafari for prime minister (2005-2006). However, Jaafari quickly became a burden on the political process and Shiite leaders then signaled the need for change.

The US Ambassador advised Jaafari to resign, threatening him if he didn't comply.

Maliki’s name wasn’t initially considered; Ali al-Adib from the “Dawa” party, of which Maliki was a member, was the favored choice. But Maliki didn’t support Adib, so after deliberations, the party settled on Maliki instead.

Breakfast with Soleimani

Karim remembers a breakfast meeting with Soleimani and al-Muhandis. He brought up Maliki’s performance during his second term and the widespread corruption in Iraq.

Soleimani suggested discussing it further, but Karim insisted the issue was urgent.

He questioned why, if all major Shiite forces agreed, change couldn’t happen. Soleimani indicated that decisions within the Shiite alliance were made by those who remained in it, prompting Karim to ask if Soleimani was implying it was him. Soleimani then replied : “Think what you wish.”

Sadr’s misstep

In the post-Saddam Hussein era, Sadr emerged as a major political force in Iraq. He led a large popular and armed movement.

Dealing with Sadr was challenging for political factions, especially among Shiites. Some disputes even culminated in armed conflicts. Managing Sadr’s influence was difficult both internally and for external interests, especially given his unpredictability.

When asked about Sadr’s decision to quit politics in 2022, Karim called it a major mistake.

He believed Iraq suffered greatly from this move, as it left parliament without any influential Shiite force capable of standing up against decisions not aligned with common goals.

Karim highlighted that filling seats with losing candidates seemed odd and turned the minority into the majority, undermining the constitutional process. He also noted the Shiite community’s fragmentation, with many Shiites not participating in recent elections due to their disenchantment with the political parties.

Karim warned against underestimating the potential for renewed protests and uprisings among the marginalized against the government and ruling powers.

Sistani’s unexpected proposal

When discussing top Shiite Religious Authority in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, Karim highlighted his political astuteness, surpassing the majority of other Shiite leaders. Sistani’s Friday sermons, delivered by his representatives, reflect this forward-thinking approach.

Karim noted a key observation about Sistani’s mindset. Despite corruption concerns, Sistani surprised Karim by suggesting bringing back the former Minister of Trade for his effectiveness in managing the ration card distribution.

He even proposed considering a Christian minister if they were honest and prioritized the people’s interests.

Furthermore, Sistani emphasized the importance of inclusivity in the new Iraq, advocating for the rights of Sunni and Kurdish components. He rejected marginalization and insisted on their participation and rights.

Sistani’s fatwa and the PMF

Karim believes that Sistani issued a fatwa on “jihad” to rally people against the significant threat posed by ISIS in 2014. He didn’t specifically mention the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or any other organization but referred to volunteers.

“Many responded to Sistani’s call and made significant sacrifices alongside the armed forces and Peshmerga. Volunteers participated in liberating areas once occupied by the terror group,” said Karim.

Karim further noted that there was a belief that those who made sacrifices had the right to be part of the armed forces and receive state support.

“The idea of integrating militias or military entities into the armed forces is not new,” explained Karim.

“US diplomat Paul Bremer [the first post-invasion governor of Iraq] proposed something similar to factions and organizations under the banner of integration into the army, and steps were taken in this direction,” he added.

“The goal was to eliminate the threat of ISIS, not to create a parallel army or establish another institution.”