Iran’s Ethnic, Religious Minorities Face Persecution, Sectarian Discrimination

A supporter of pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP) makes a victory sign as she celebrates the results of the HDP party as part of the legislative election in Ankara, on June 9, 2015. (AFP photo/Adem Altan)
A supporter of pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP) makes a victory sign as she celebrates the results of the HDP party as part of the legislative election in Ankara, on June 9, 2015. (AFP photo/Adem Altan)
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Iran’s Ethnic, Religious Minorities Face Persecution, Sectarian Discrimination

A supporter of pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP) makes a victory sign as she celebrates the results of the HDP party as part of the legislative election in Ankara, on June 9, 2015. (AFP photo/Adem Altan)
A supporter of pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HDP) makes a victory sign as she celebrates the results of the HDP party as part of the legislative election in Ankara, on June 9, 2015. (AFP photo/Adem Altan)

The non-Persian population in Iran has faced many problems that were accumulated even before the establishment of the Iranian republic. The demands of the oppressed minorities surfaced immediately after the overthrow of the Shah regime in 1979.

The era of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, from 1926 till 1979, witnessed repression against national demands. Today, the current system continues with the same approach, treating the minorities with discrimination and humiliation.

Iran comprises six main ethnic groups: Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baloch and Turkmens. They are spread throughout Iran, each with its own language, culture, customs and traditions.

There are no official statistics about the numbers of non-Persian people. Tehran authorities consider national affiliations as a threat to the country’s unity. Therefore, various governments have adopted security measures to counter national activities, and worked to obliterate ethnic minorities by changing the demographic fabric of their regions.

Early in the era of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the son of the founder of the Pahlavi state, Iran experienced a series of unrest in the non-Persian provinces after the new shah followed his father’s footsteps in establishing a national rule that did not recognize the rights of non-Persian minorities, under the pretext of strengthening unity in the country.

The provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan witnessed the declaration of two independent republics. Following the exile of Shah Reza, non-Persian groups found the ground for the formation of communities and civil institutions on cultural and social bases, and quickly developed into political organizations and parties that took on the task of restoring their national rights.

But these demands were rejected by the central government in Tehran, which refused to communicate and respond to the telegrams of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. “I will pay no attention to these telegrams even if they were a hundred,” the Iranian prime minister said at the time.

Consequently, neglect and humiliation by Tehran led to the growing nationalist movement in Azerbaijan, leading to the formation of the National Government of Azerbaijan, which took over large parts of the region and formed a local administration. This happened with the support of the Soviets. Forces of the former Soviet Union had been deployed throughout Iran since World War II, especially following the British-Soviet invasion to overthrow the Shah.

In Kurdistan, a similar autonomous region was established in 1946 under the name of the "Republic of Mahabad" led by the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Qazi Muhammad, with the support of Mullah Mustafa Barzani. However, the young republic lasted only 11 months; it was toppled by Iranian forces in conjunction with the departure of the Soviet forces. The Iranian authorities executed Qazi Muhammad and a group of his comrades, while Mullah Mustafa Barzani withdrew with his fighters from the area.

The Shah regime, after suppressing the nationalist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, established for a new phase of repression against national demands in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Ahwaz and the Turkmen desert. Under these circumstances, the political activity of the oppressed during the reign of Reza went underground. Indeed, the Shah’s regime carried out public executions against many political activists.

Moreover, Shah Mohammad Reza turned his back on his Arab neighbors when he fully allied with Israel and opened an Israeli embassy in Tehran, establishing extensive relations with it, contrary to the desire of public opinion in Iran and the interests of neighboring countries.

These hostile positions paved the way for the formation of a ground for opponents of the Shah's regime in countries affected by his policies, especially Iraq and Syria.

The atmosphere of openness that Iran witnessed in the first year following the overthrow of the Shah led to the launch of a local debate and the formation of national organizations and committees. This strengthened the position of political activists, who demanded that the new government give them the rights they have been denied for many years.

The positions of the new leaders in Tehran ranged from absolute rejection to promises of achieving some national demands at a later stage.

But once the Khomeini regime tightened its grip on the country, it started suppressing the non-Persian provinces.

In Kurdistan, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards forces moved into the province and clashed with armed rebels in Kurdish cities. The clashes continued sporadically until 1983 and left more than 10,000 people dead.

With the start of the war between Iran and Iraq, the Khomeini authorities firmly confronted any activity opposed to the regime, which soon eliminated all the forces that participated in the revolution against the Shah.

Not only did the Khomeini regime confront opposition activists at home, but they pursued them in exile and carried out multiple political assassinations in different parts of the world, especially in France, Germany and Iraq.

After the war, especially after the reformists (led by Mohammad Khatami) came to power, non-Persian people took advantage of the relatively open atmosphere to submit their demands.

The authorities did not meet the basic demands of non-Persian peoples, and various governments continued to make mere promises.

With the arrival of President Hassan Rouhani to power, he appointed an assistant in the affairs of nationalities and minorities, former intelligence minister Ali Younesi. But Younesi does not seem interested in resolving the issues of the non-Persian communities, as he has come from the same security services that have long confronted national activists with executions, imprisonment, exile and assassinations.



Mounting Pressure on Iran Revives the Specter of the 2000 Aden Attack

US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
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Mounting Pressure on Iran Revives the Specter of the 2000 Aden Attack

US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush
US Navy aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush

US author Anne-Marie Slaughter argues in The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World that the world no longer operates or interacts according to the logic of a traditional chessboard.

The old model was linear and two-dimensional, centered on a single objective: toppling the king by controlling territory.

That logic no longer defines 21st-century conflict. Today’s world operates across overlapping, interlocking layers that interact and often collide simultaneously, within a continuously evolving network that includes military, economic, political, alliance, and informational dimensions.

As this network evolves, it generates both solutions and complications so rapidly that they outpace the ability of leadership to make timely decisions. Improvisation comes to dominate decision-making, errors multiply and accumulate, feeding back into the system and further deepening its complexity.

On the escalation ladder

Escalation depends on strategic flexibility and the tools available. In practical terms, the greater the flexibility, the greater the ability of actors to climb the escalation ladder, from low-intensity conflict to higher levels, until reaching a peak where one side yields, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table.

But this climb is inherently a trap. Each step builds on the last. As these steps accumulate over time, the cost compounds, making it increasingly difficult to step back without incurring significant losses.

The US blockade

This is not the first time the US Navy has imposed a maritime blockade. The most notable case was Cuba in the 1960s during the Cuban Missile Crisis, labeled a “quarantine,” a term deliberately used to indicate a measure short of full wartime blockade. Cuba’s geography made it relatively easy to encircle.

A similar approach was later applied to Venezuela. Today, the focus has shifted to Iranian ports, both inside and outside the Gulf.

Direct comparisons are limited by differing contexts. Still, one constant remains: the US Navy possesses the capability to enforce such blockades, particularly given its dominance over global seas and oceans.

In Cuba, Soviet missiles targeted major US cities and the world was divided between two superpowers. In Venezuela, President Donald Trump invoked the Monroe Doctrine and implemented a national security strategy prioritizing the Western Hemisphere and America’s immediate sphere.

The Strait of Hormuz, however, is fundamentally different. Other waterways can be bypassed; Hormuz cannot. It is a closed corridor through which oil, gas, petrochemicals, helium, fertilizers, and other critical goods must pass. There is no alternative route; all shipments must transit Hormuz in both directions.

Iran’s strategy

Since the Shah’s era, aligned with the Nixon Doctrine, Tehran has pursued control over Gulf waters and influence over the Strait of Hormuz. The continued occupation of the UAE islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa since the 1970s underscores this long-standing strategic objective.

More than 30 islands are scattered across the Gulf’s deep waters, precisely along the routes used by oil tankers that require significant depth to pass safely. If linked together as part of a military-security network, they reveal long-term planning for scenarios such as the current one.

Iran’s naval doctrine relies on both the Revolutionary Guards and the regular navy, employing small submarines, torpedoes, fast attack boats, naval mines, drones, and ballistic missiles.

At its core lies an anti-access strategy designed to deny adversaries freedom of movement in Gulf waters.

Centers of gravity

Qeshm Island is critical for controlling access to the Strait of Hormuz. Kharg Island follows, serving as the hub for more than 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports, supplied by the oil fields of Khuzestan.

Beyond the islands, the South Pars gas field in Bushehr province is central to Iran’s energy system, providing more than 70 percent of the country’s domestic electricity needs.

These key sites have already been targeted during the conflict by US or Israeli airpower. To expand the scope of escalation and increase pressure, Trump deployed additional forces, including Marine units and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, aimed at broadening military options and forcing Iran to soften its negotiating position. After talks in Pakistan failed, he moved to announce the blockade.

The current US approach

By declaring the blockade, Trump effectively altered the existing rules of engagement in the Gulf, imposing an asymmetric approach that avoids Iran’s strengths and prevents it from dictating the battlefield dynamics.

Instead, the US leverages distance, operating from the Arabian Sea, along with its technological superiority and strategic flexibility.

This effectively turns Iran’s own strategy against it. What once constrained US freedom of movement inside the Gulf is now being used to impose external pressure on Iran from the Arabian Sea.

If successful, the strategy could deprive Iran, according to The Wall Street Journal, of roughly $435 million per day, or $13 billion per month, while avoiding the costs of direct military action such as seizing islands like Kharg.

It would also confine Iran’s asymmetric capabilities within the Gulf and strip it of its most effective operational tools.

The central question now is how Iran will respond. How will it adapt its strategy in the face of this pressure? Will escalation continue? And could that escalation take the form of a maritime attack similar to the 2000 strike on the US destroyer USS Cole near Aden?


Iran Can Go up to Two Months without Oil Exports Before Cutting Output, Analysts Say

A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
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Iran Can Go up to Two Months without Oil Exports Before Cutting Output, Analysts Say

A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)
A man rides past a large billboard referring to the Strait of Hormuz in Tehran's Vanak Square on April 15, 2026. (AFP)

Iran can withstand a complete halt in oil exports of up to two months before being forced to curb production, analysts said, after the US began blocking shipping in and out of the country's ports on April 13.

The blockade could prevent roughly 2 million barrels per day (bpd) of Iranian crude from reaching its main buyer China.

Any Iranian production shutdowns would add to more than 12 million bpd of supply already disrupted by the regional war, tightening markets further and ‌lifting oil ‌prices.

With its exports blocked, Iran faces having to ‌divert ⁠crude into onshore storage ⁠tanks. Once those tanks are filled, the OPEC member would be required to curb upstream output.

Consultancy FGE NextantECA estimates Iran has about 90 million barrels of available onshore crude storage capacity, out of total capacity of roughly 122 million barrels.

"Iran can sustain current production of around 3.5 million bpd for roughly two months without exports, extendable to around three months with a modest ⁠500,000 bpd production cut," FGE NextantECA said in a ‌note.

Iranian domestic refineries process about 2 million ‌bpd of oil, they added.

The relevant Iranian authorities were not immediately available for comment.

Energy ‌Aspects assumes significantly lower available onshore storage of about 30 million barrels, ‌based on data from Kayrros.

Under that scenario, Iran could maintain current export levels for about 16 days before storage capacity runs out, based on export levels of 1.8 million bpd.

"The blockade may not have a significant impact on Iranian production in ‌April, but if it continues into May then output would need to be reduced substantially," said Richard ⁠Bronze, co-founder of Energy ⁠Aspects.

He said the consultancy assumes Iran cannot utilize its full nameplate storage capacity, adding that historic data show stocks peaked at 92 million barrels in May 2020, which likely marks a realistic ceiling.

Bronze also said Iran will likely deploy available oil tankers in ports as floating storage, delaying production cuts.

The US military said more vessels were being turned back under the blockade, including the Chinese-owned tanker Rich Starry, which is under US sanctions and which was seen heading back through the Strait of Hormuz on Wednesday.

Eight Iran-linked oil tankers have been intercepted since the blockade began on Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported. A US destroyer stopped two tankers attempting to leave Iran's Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman on Tuesday, a US official said.


World Bank Announces Water Security Plan for One Billion People

 A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
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World Bank Announces Water Security Plan for One Billion People

 A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)
A girl carries jerrycans on a wheelbarrow after collecting water from a well at a mosque in Deh Mazang, Kabul, Afghanistan, Thursday, April 2, 2026. (AP)

The World Bank announced a plan Wednesday that aims to improve secure water access for a billion people within the next four years.

The new "Water Forward" program aims to "expand reliable water services and strengthen systems against droughts and floods."

The Bank said its own funds and technical advice would help improve water supplies to some 400 million people by 2030, with the balance coming from partners.

Regional development banks, OPEC's development fund, and the BRICS-aligned New Development Bank are among institutions that will participate, the World Bank said.

The global lender did not specify how much capital it would commit to the initiative.

Some four billion people -- half the world's population -- face water scarcity, due in part to "unclear policies, weak regulations, and financially unsustainable utilities that have slowed progress and deterred investment," the Bank said.

The global lender said that 14 countries had already voluntarily committed to reform and strengthen their water sectors under the new program.

The focus on governance issues -- not simply physical water infrastructure -- is promising, David Michel, senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said.

"In many countries, the water sector fails to fully deploy the funds already allocated to it."

However, the Bank's initiative "faces a long and difficult road ahead," he warned.

The issue of access to safe drinking water, in particular, has been highlighted during the war in the Middle East, with desalination plants in Iran and across the region damaged in bombardments.

Beyond conflicts and immediate drinking water needs, the World Bank said that better water security was needed to grow the global economy.

"Strong water systems are foundational to healthy economies that can attract private investment and create jobs," the Bank said.