Exclusive: Hezbollah’s Gains From Syria War Equal Its Losseshttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1542841/exclusive-hezbollah%E2%80%99s-gains-syria-war-equal-its-losses
Exclusive: Hezbollah’s Gains From Syria War Equal Its Losses
Hezbollah members carry the coffin of top Hezbollah commander Mustafa Badreddine, who was killed in an attack in Syria, as his brother mourns his death during his funeral in Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon, May 13, 2016. REUTERS/Jamal Saidi
Exclusive: Hezbollah’s Gains From Syria War Equal Its Losses
Hezbollah members carry the coffin of top Hezbollah commander Mustafa Badreddine, who was killed in an attack in Syria, as his brother mourns his death during his funeral in Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon, May 13, 2016. REUTERS/Jamal Saidi
Nearly seven years have passed since Hezbollah got practically engaged in the Syrian war – the movement’s biggest challenge since its establishment in 1982.
Today, as the battles calm down, the party has returned to the political work inside Lebanon, seeking to invest what it considers “filed victories”. Thus, the party leadership and observers have started to evaluate this experience.
Perhaps the first thing to look for in any attempt to assess Hezbollah’s experience in the Syrian war is the number of party members killed on the field, amid a total blackout on the matter. However, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announced on the war’s seventh anniversary that around 122,000 members of the Syrian regime and its pro-Syrian and non-Syrian armed forces were killed, including 63,820 Syrian soldiers and 1,630 members of the Lebanese Hezbollah.
As battles intensified in Syria, specifically in 2013 and 2014, the number of Hezbollah fighters there was estimated at 5,000. The AFP, in a past report, noted that elements of the party received training in Lebanon and Iran before going to the field.
The number of party fighters in Syria has recently dropped significantly, in conjunction with the decline of fighting intensity. The director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Rami Abdul Rahman, told Asharq Al-Awsat that those were currently concentrated in the vicinity of Deir Ezzor, Bukamal, Al-Qusayr, Rif Dimashq, Syrian Badia Aleppo and Al-Qamishli airport.
The movement refuses to set a date for its withdrawal from Syria. Its secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, said last summer that the pullout would be at the request of the Syrian leadership.
Die Welt, a German newspaper, recently published a report on the end of Hezbollah’s mission in Syria, after losing a large number of fighters on the battlefield. The newspaper noted that the party would maintain an advisory role after participating in the Syrian war with about 8,000 fighters.
Opinions converge over Hezbollah’s gains in the Syrian war. Supporters and opponents alike agree that the party achieved a great combat experience. The head of the Middle East Center for Strategic Studies, retired Brigadier General Dr. Hisham Jaber, said that the “combat experience gained by the party fighters [during the war] cannot be provided through training organized by the party leadership.”
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy published in 2016 a study prepared by an IDF officer in 2014, in which he concluded that Hezbollah could pursue a more aggressive combat strategy in any future war with Israel in order to shorten the duration of the conflict. He added that the deep engagement in Syria affected the overall approach of the organization in the planning and implementation of military operations.
The military gains of the party are not limited to combat experience. Military experts said that Hezbollah has probably acquired large quantities of weapons over the past years, both from Syria and Iran. Jaber noted that in the July 2006 war, Israel estimated the number of surface-to-surface missiles possessed by Hezbollah at around 20-30 thousand, but today, it puts them at around 100-150 thousand.
Politically, Hezbollah considers that the most important thing it has gained from engaging in the Syrian war is to prevent what it calls “terrorist organizations” from reaching Lebanon, especially after the battle of al-Qusayr. Jaber said that the party also considered itself a major contributor, along with Russia and Iran, to support the Syrian regime and prevent its collapse.
However, as much as the party won, it lost its popularity both inside Lebanon and on the Arab level, in addition to losing hundreds of its members. Jaber emphasized that the number of party members killed in Syria ranged between 1,500-2,000, in addition to hundreds of people with disabilities.
A study by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in 2016 stated that when Hezbollah began its intervention in Syria, its priorities, strategies and rhetoric changed, and a much larger proportion of its budget was allocated to military spending. Despite the continued funding for social services, a larger proportion has been directed to families and institutions associated with Hezbollah’s military infrastructure as part of the party’s efforts to support its forces.
Abdul Rahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that the party “lost most of the popularity it enjoyed in Syria, especially in the Sunni and Shiite communities, as well as among the other components.”
The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munichhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5043589-day-%E2%80%98black-september%E2%80%99-shook-olympic-village-munich
The Day ‘Black September’ Shook the Olympic Village in Munich
One of the attackers is seen at the Israeli team’s headquarters in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
Yehya al-Sinwar was ten years old when the Black September Palestinian organization carried out its hostage taking of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Nearly a billion people watched the Munich Massacre unfold on television as German police and Palestinian fighters traded fire during the operation. The events of September 1972 could be compared to the al-Aqsa Flood Operation that sparked Israel’s war on Gaza in October 2023.
Then Israeli Prime Minister Gold Meir refused the kidnappers’ demand to be flown to Egypt with the hostages. The German government ambushed the kidnappers, but its lack of experience led to the massacre that has since become the subject of countless movies, documentaries and books.
After some initial hesitation, Meir yielded to the pressure of several of her ministers and agreed to Operation Wrath of God that would go after and assassinate nearly everyone involved in the Munich attack.
Paris, which is hosting the Olympic Games this summer, is bound to be worried that such a global event would attract terrorists, especially groups inspired by al-Qaeda, and ISIS.
My profession would have it that I met two of the men who took part in planning and carrying out the Munich attack. The first is Salah Khalaf, also known as Abu Iyad, who was a member of the executive committee of the Fatah movement and the second in command after Yasser Arafat. The second was Mohammed Daoud Oudeh, or Abu Daoud, a member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council.
Abu Daoud speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Arafat and Abbas
More than half a century since the attack, the Israeli Mossad managed to kill the majority of those involved except its three masterminds: Abu Iyad, his aide Fakhri al-Omari (Abu Mohammed) and Abu Daoud.
Abu Iyad and al-Omari were eventually assassinated but by Palestinian, Sabry al-Banna, or Abu Nidal, the founder of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council. Abu Daoud was also wounded in al-Banna's attack.
In Tunis, Abu Daoud told me that al-Omari came up with the Munich attack during a meeting between him and Abu Iyad. Arafat was aware that the hostage taking would take place in Munich and that the Israelis would be swapped with Palestinians held in Israeli jails, recalled Abu Daoud. Mahmoud Abbas, or Abu Mazen, Fatah’s financial officer was tasked with providing the funds for the operation.
Abu Iyad stressed to me that the operation got out of hand because of Meir’s hardline position and the recklessness of the German government. He said the kidnappers had strict orders not to kill the hostages or open fire except when extremely necessary in self-defense. Abu Daoud confirmed the orders.
Weapons smuggled in undergarments
Abu Iyad personally oversaw the smuggling of weapons that would be used in the operation. He was accompanied by a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who had concealed the weapons in her luggage that was carrying her undergarments. When German customs sought to search the luggage for anything suspicious, they were embarrassed to find the underwear and quickly closed the luggage without searching it thoroughly.
Abu Daoud was tasked with storing the luggage at the train station and changing their locations daily to avoid suspicion until the day of the operation.
German security agencies were never alerted to the traveler who moved between Munich hotels using an Iraqi passport. The man was Abu Daoud and he was tasked with scouting the Olympic Village.
Black September
The Black September organization was born in wake of the battles that erupted between the Jordanian army and Palestinian groups in September 1970. The fighting ended the following year with the Palestinians’ defeat. Black September was formed out of desire for revenge against the Jordanian regime and to wage an open confrontation with Israel.
The defeat and ouster from Jordan were a major blow to the Palestinians who believed the country was the best position to confront Israel. Black September would be used to settle several scores. On November 28, 1971, it assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal as he entered the Sheraton Hotel in Cairo. The incident is still the subject of heated debate to this day with some speculation that al-Tal was actually killed by a sniper on a nearby building, not the Palestinian group.
Egypt released the suspects without trial, raising doubts in Jordan that Cairo may have been involved in the attack or at least turned a blind eye to its planning. Abu Iyad agreed to discuss several issues with me, except al-Tal's assassination given how sensitive it still is.
Several setbacks
In 1972 the Palestinians were dejected. They had suffered a blow in Jordan and Palestinian factions in southern Lebanon lacked the weapons to confront Israeli attacks and incursions. The Palestinian leaders were worried that the factions would succumb to despair.
Over the spring, ideas started floating around to carry out an operation that would attract the world’s attention to the situation of the Palestinians and prove to the people in the camps that the resistance is capable of harming Israel.
Over the summer, Abu Iyad became even more invested in the idea of a major attack, especially with the summer Olympics around the corner. He asked that Abu Daoud visit Bulgaria to obtain weapons equipped with silencers “because we will need them in Europe.” The goal was to deal blows to Mossad agents in Europe.
Earlier that year, Palestinian authorities had sent a letter to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) asking that Palestinian athletes be allowed to compete at the Games, but they received no reply. A second letter was also left without a reply.
The Palestinians were dealt a new blow with the assassination of journalist Ghassan Kanafani in Beirut. He was also the editor of the al-Hadaf magazine, the mouthpiece of the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Meeting at a Rome cafe
Abu Iyad, al-Omari and Abu Daoud met soon after the assassination. Al-Omari proposed launching attacks against Israeli embassies and consulates, but Abu Iyad said that would put the resistance in a confrontation with the countries hosting those missions.
The three would meet again later at a cafe in Rome. Abu Iyad angrily said the IOC was continuing to ignore the Palestinian athletes. Al-Omari replied: “Since they are insisting on ignoring us, then why don’t we try to infiltrate the Olympic Village to kidnap Israeli athletes?” Abu Iyad thought he was crazy. Abu Daoud also noted that the majority of Israeli have received military training so overpowering them would be a challenge.
Abu Iyad went quiet as he mulled over the idea. “We could take hostage the Israelis and demand the release of several of our prisoners from Israel. It’s not a bad idea,” he remarked. He turned to Abu Daoud to say: “Munich is on your way to Bulgaria.”
So, the planning for the Munich operation got underway. Abu Daoud asked Abu Iyad to speak to Abu Mazen about securing funds for the operation.
Abu Daoud couldn't persuade the Bulgarians to hand him weapons, who demanded that they communicate with an official authority, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization or Fatah. Abu Iyad intervened, but the Bulgarians then demanded that the weapons head to the Middle East, not Europe.
Abu Daoud lies wounded after an assassination attempt in Warsaw in 1981. (Getty Images)
Scouting visits
Meanwhile, Abu Daoud was trying to scout the Olympic Village. He met a Palestinian woman who spoke some German and he pretended to be a Brazilian who wanted to get inside the village to meet some friends. The German guard sympathized with him and allowed them inside. Abu Daoud would return again with the executor team, Youssef Nazal and Mohammed Mosalha.
In the village, Abu Daoud approached a woman who happened to be Israeli, and he asked her if he could point her in the direction of where the Israeli team was staying. He told her that he was interested in Israel and wanted to learn more about the country and relay that information back to his family in Brazil.
Abu Daoud, Nazal and Mosalha, all pretending to be Brazilians, scouted the area where they will carry out the operation. The planning took weeks of meetings, training and trips between Athens, Madrid, Sofia, Geneva, Beirut and Libya’s Tripoli. The biggest hurdle they needed to overcome was how to smuggle the weapons to Munich.
Lebanese ‘wife’
Abu Iyad instructed Abu Daoud to wait for him at Frankfurt airport on August 24, 1972. Abu Iyad arrived with a Lebanese lady, Juliet, who was pretending to be his wife. At customs, the German officer ordered Abu Iyad to open his luggage, which was carrying the weapons, for inspection.
Abu Daoud became more nervous. But Abu Iyad, with some feigned annoyance, opened the luggage and began taking out his “wife’s” undergarments, which embarrassed the officer, who quickly allowed the luggage through without further inspection. Abu Daoud and Abu Iyad then took a taxi to their hotel.
Abu Iyad transported the weapons to Germany with the help of his Lebanese “wife”. (Getty Images)
Finishing touches
The remaining members of the executor team flew in from Tripoli. They stayed at three hotels and were provided with tracksuits, as well as bandages and biscuits should the hostage-taking take some time.
The Olympic Games opened on August 26 and the planners waited for the games to get underway and for security to become somewhat lax before they could carry out the attack.
Abu Daoud said a meeting was held in Beirut ahead of the operation to ensure that the attack would not be seen as an act of revenge, but rather as a political message and that blood would not be shed except during extreme moments.
The plans were now complete: The attackers would enter from the fence surrounding the Village and head to building 31 where the Israeli team was staying. They would try to take as many Israelis as possible hostage. Mosalha was tasked with carrying out the negotiations. He would hand over a list of over 200 Palestinians held in Israeli jails.
The hostages would then be flown to a Middle Eastern country, preferably Egypt, which would demand that a prisoner swap be held with Israel, added Abu Daoud.
German security forces try to enter the location where the hostages are held in the Olympic Village. (Getty Images)
Night of the operation
Abu Daoud gave the order to carry out the attack on September 4. The attackers, dressed in tracksuits and concealing their weapons in their bags, met by the village fence. As they were about the climb over, they heard a raucous that turned out to be American athletes who had been staying out late drinking. They were sneaking into the village. Abu Daoud recalled that the athletes helped the attackers over the fence not knowing that they were intruders.
Abu Daoud returned to the hotel and waited for news of the attack to make it on the news. Abu Daoud said that had the operation been a failure, the team would meet again at the train station. The operation was set to begin at 4:30 in the morning and by 8:00 news of the attack had made it to the media, captivating the world.
The kidnappers’ helicopter is destroyed during the gunfight at a military airport near Munich. (Getty Images)
Meir’s government refused to negotiate with the kidnappers. The German government ambushed the attackers as they made their way to the airport ahead of being flown to Egypt. The ensuing gunfight left five of the kidnappers, nine hostages and a German policeman dead. Two Israeli athletes were killed in the initial raid of where they were staying.
‘Wrath of God’
Soon after, Meir’s government agreed to operation “Wrath of God” that led to the assassination of several Palestinian officials and diplomats – some of whom had nothing to do with the Munich operation. Israel succeeded in killing several of its targets except for the masterminds.
