Iraq’s Militias, Accused of Threatening US, Pose a Quandary for Iraq

Members of a militia with the Popular Mobilization Forces at the Tal Afar airport, west of Mosul, Iraq, in 2017.CreditCreditAhmad Al-Rubaye/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Members of a militia with the Popular Mobilization Forces at the Tal Afar airport, west of Mosul, Iraq, in 2017.CreditCreditAhmad Al-Rubaye/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
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Iraq’s Militias, Accused of Threatening US, Pose a Quandary for Iraq

Members of a militia with the Popular Mobilization Forces at the Tal Afar airport, west of Mosul, Iraq, in 2017.CreditCreditAhmad Al-Rubaye/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Members of a militia with the Popular Mobilization Forces at the Tal Afar airport, west of Mosul, Iraq, in 2017.CreditCreditAhmad Al-Rubaye/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

When the United States said this week that American forces in Iraq faced threats from Iranian “proxies,” it was referring to the armed groups that helped fight ISIS and have bedeviled Iraq ever since.

The Iraqi armed groups, some with ties to Iran, have a footprint in every Iraqi province. Whether they function as Iranian proxies, however, is far from settled.

“The word ‘proxy’ implies that these are tools of Iran, and they aren’t,” said Anthony H. Cordesman, a national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“You have a range of groups in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization: Some are Sunni, some are pro-Iraqi government, some have ties to the Quds force and the Islamic Guard,” he said.

The question is further clouded by the fact that these groups are recognized and funded by the Iraqi government.

This week, the United States ordered an aircraft carrier and bombers to the Persian Gulf in response to what it termed as threats from the groups.

There are roughly 30 of the militias, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, with at least 125,000 active-duty fighters.

Their relationships with Iran vary widely, according to experts and government officials in Iraq and Washington. Some Popular Mobilization groups keep their distance from Iran while others — including some of the most powerful — are deeply intertwined with it.

Now that the fight against ISIS has dwindled, the problem facing Iraq is what to do with these groups. While there has been talk of having them disband and disarm, only a couple of them seem willing to do so.

Although the militias have been absorbed into the Iraqi security forces, they are not under the command of either the Defense or Interior Ministries. Instead, they enjoy a special status, reporting to the prime minister.

Some of the groups seem relatively benign and carry out almost exclusively local responsibilities, providing policing services where the police are in short supply.

However, others are corrupt, behaving like mafias, and several have been accused of human rights abuses. And while they report to the prime minister, it is not clear that anyone really can restrain them.

“If they have armed wings and are corrupt, no one can control them,” former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said in an interview this year.

A major concern among some officials is that, much like Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, they will go into business, but with the unfair advantage of having armed men behind them and the implicit protection of senior figures in the Iraqi government.

“In Iraq if you don’t put controls on these groups, you will have these guys morph into networks that will range from semi-criminal entities to politically predatory forces that would act as a state within a state,” said Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

It is the four or five groups with the closest ties to Iran that are seen as exercising unauthorized power. Some run kickback schemes on a local level, using coercion to force business people to give them a piece of the action or compel citizens to use their services.

Many of these groups have large numbers of representatives in the Iraqi Parliament, where the power to designate ministers is divided among the political blocs. If a bloc or a party controls who becomes a minister, they have a chance to influence who gets valuable contracts or jobs.

These groups also can act as a lobby for Iranian interests within the Iraqi state.

Senior Iraqi government officials worry privately about the influence of the groups that have proved closest to Iran and are impervious to efforts to bring them under the government’s control, but the officials are generally reluctant to speak publicly about it.

The Defense Ministry was angry when some of the Popular Mobilization’s brigades moved to the Syrian border in November, taking up crucial positions, but the ministry worked out a way of avoiding a confrontation with them.

Similarly, soon after the United States Treasury Department announced in March it was listing one of the Popular Mobilization groups, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, as a foreign terrorist organization, the Iraqi government made clear it disagreed.

Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi did not defend the group by name — al-Nujaba has proved difficult for the Iraqi military to work with at times — but he did support the Popular Mobilization groups.

“The Americans can make the decisions they want, but the Americans see things differently from the way we do, and our attitude toward the Popular Mobilization is well known and clear,” he said in March. “We respect all of the groups of the Popular Mobilization that made sacrifices.” The sacrifices he was alluding to were largely made from 2014 through 2016, when ISIS swept across northern Iraq.

However, in areas where they defeated ISIS, some militias took over the extremists’ illegal activities, enriching themselves but doing little for local communities. These groups, most notably in northern Iraq, fought Iraqi government forces as recently as last year to hold on to their oil smuggling business. They ultimately lost, but still have bases near the now-capped oil wells.

One of those groups is Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which was accused by rights groups of the extrajudicial killings of Sunnis during the fight against ISIS. In recent months, it has been criticized for demanding that business owners in northern Iraq give it a cut of any business they are involved in. The group has denied the accusations against it.

For Iraqi politicians, who want to build their country and improve life for its citizens, the pressure from Iran on Iraq presents a daunting challenge.

The New York Times



Sudan’s Day Laborers Struggle to Survive as War Devastates Livelihoods

Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
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Sudan’s Day Laborers Struggle to Survive as War Devastates Livelihoods

Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)
Farmers harvest arugula in Khartoum on Oct. 5, 2026. (AP)

In Khartoum, where life is struggling to regain its rhythm after years of war, many doors remain closed to day laborers who once lived on each day's earnings.

A day without work can leave a family without food, a child without money for school or a patient forced to stop treatment because medicine is out of reach.

On sidewalks, in markets and at workshops, day laborers search for any job to get them through the day. More people are competing for fewer jobs, while rising prices and a weakening Sudanese pound erode their wages.

As the gap between earnings and living costs widens, many face a stark choice: accept less pay or go home empty-handed.

Compounding burdens

Labor unionist Abdullah Youssef says the vast majority of workers "lost their jobs because of war, displacement and homelessness." Daily work available before the war is now scarce.

Most workers support families with five or six children at different stages of schooling, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. Economic hardship has pushed some families into debt. Some people have been jailed for failing to meet their financial obligations.

For day laborers, a wage is measured not just in hours worked but in the needs of an entire family. With food and service prices climbing, their earnings have lost much of their purchasing power before they reach home.

Babiker Khalifa, a day laborer and father of three, says the war "destroyed the economy." His family gets by mainly on small meals of fava beans and lentils. Meat, fruit and vegetables are beyond their reach much of the time.

His children need money each day for school, but there is not enough food at home to meet their needs, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. On some nights, they "cry from hunger."

Babiker al-Taher faces much the same hardship. He fled to Gedaref after the war broke out, then returned to Khartoum to find even harsher economic conditions.

"Sometimes we eat, and other times we don't," he said of his family, which includes four children. Rising prices and inflation have sharply cut the real value of a day laborer's pay.

With more people seeking work, laborers often have to accept lower wages to avoid returning to their families empty-handed, he said.

“We need a miracle”

Even tradespeople and craftspeople still in work face shrinking purchasing power and rising living and production costs.

Abdul Karim Ibrahim, a tailor supporting two sons and two daughters, says his daily earnings no longer meet his family's needs.

The economic situation "needs a miracle," he said. Food is now unaffordable for many families, and medical treatment adds to the burden.

Young barber Othman Ali says rising prices and a weakening currency have left his income insufficient for basic needs.

Long power outages and disruptions to the banking apps his customers use for transfers also make it harder to collect payments.

The war forced Ali to leave secondary school and work to help support his large family. He is part of a generation whose education has paid a direct price for the conflict.

The war is no longer the only source of pressure on citizens, Youssef said. Higher levies and fees, a higher exchange rate used to calculate customs duties and bans on some imported goods have compounded the strain and widened the gap in markets, he said.

He called for higher wages and better conditions for pensioners. Some employees receive very little pay, while some retirees receive sums that do not reflect their years of service, he said.

Youssef urged the government to act quickly to help workers and their families. The persistent gap between wages and prices is leaving millions of families facing severe hardship, he said.

“The most vulnerable”

Day laborers are among those hardest hit by Sudan's war, economist Mohammed al-Nayer said. Halted construction and declining craft activity have stripped large numbers of their livelihoods.

"These groups face extremely difficult living conditions amid lost job opportunities and unprecedented increases in the prices of goods and services, alongside a decline in the national currency's value and rising inflation, unemployment and poverty," he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

A comprehensive reconstruction program could employ large numbers of day laborers in construction and related activities, he said. But they remain among the hardest hit as their sources of income remain disrupted.

Al-Nayer said the state must fulfill its responsibility to protect vulnerable and poor people. He called for a comprehensive social protection program to address current economic challenges and support those most affected by the war.

These accounts echo International Labor Organization warnings about the war's deep impact on Sudan's labor market: lost jobs, shrinking economic activity and disrupted livelihoods. Workers in the informal economy are among the most vulnerable.


Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

The killing of a retired Lebanese Army chief warrant officer by Israeli tank fire in Yater has underscored the perilous reality for southern farmers. Targeted while inspecting his home and olive grove, his death has turned this year's harvest season into a stark symbol of the dangers facing those attempting to reach their land.

The incident comes as residents of border villages continue to be deprived of their harvests for nearly three years. It also coincides with a lawsuit filed in France accusing the Israeli military of uprooting around 600 ancient olive trees in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah. Local officials warn of economic and social repercussions that extend far beyond the loss of crops.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon take part in an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Targeted While Inspecting His Land

The Lebanese Army announced on Sunday the death of retired Chief Warrant Officer Ali Abdel Hassan Sweidan after being directly targeted by Israeli tank fire while inspecting his property in Yater in the Bint Jbeil district.

The army said a military unit supervised the recovery of his body after contact with him was lost. The municipality of Yater stated that he had been checking on his home and olive grove on the outskirts of the town when he came under fire from the direction of Sarbine, warning residents against approaching unsafe areas.

The incident once again highlights the obstacles facing farmers during a season when families traditionally head to their groves to gather their harvests, as access to parts of agricultural land has become fraught with ongoing security risks.

600 Trees at the Center of a Lawsuit

In Paris, a 37-year-old French businessman of Lebanese origin filed a complaint against unknown persons on September 22, accusing the Israeli military of uprooting roughly 600 olive trees from his family's land in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah.

According to his lawyers, cited by Agence France Presse (AFP), some of the trees are approximately 500 years old, while the family has cultivated the land for about 250 years.

The complaint includes allegations of theft, destruction, and damage to property as potential war crimes. The complainant suspects that the trees were transported to Israel, though this has not been established judicially. He stated that his family home was destroyed in an Israeli strike in April, before the trees were uprooted following Israeli control of the area.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon sort olives during an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Half the Fields Out of Reach

Hanna Al-Amil, head of the municipality of Rmeish, told Asharq Al-Awsat that since the beginning of the war nearly three years ago, residents have been deprived of access to a large part of their olive fields “because most of them lie along the border, where security conditions do not permit locals to reach them and harvest their crops.”

“Even today, we do not know whether we will be able to harvest olives this year, especially since the season has not yet started and security risks continue to prevent access to the land."

He explained that roughly three-quarters of Rmeish's territory lies along the border and that more than 50 percent of its olive groves have remained unharvested for the past three years.
This deprives families of a basic source of income, he added.

Al-Amil stressed that agricultural losses are not limited to olives but also affect tobacco cultivation, the town's primary agricultural activity. "This year's tobacco production reached only about 60 percent of pre-war levels, meaning families have lost a significant portion of the income on which they relied."

A Memory Shared by Families and Generations

Mohammad Ismail, head of the municipality of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the town's olive groves are “more than just trees or a source of income. They are heritage, history, and the memories of generations. They embrace the hills and fields, shade the alleys of Zawtar, and provide cool breezes that ease the summer heat."

He noted that olive trees also provide heating wood for many residents.

According to Ismail, the olive harvest is an annual occasion that brings entire families together. "Not merely to gather the crop, but to renew their connection to the land and to the ancestors who planted and cared for these trees, keeping a shared memory alive across generations."

"Today, the occupier seeks to strip us of our spirit and sever our connection to history, our ancestors, and life itself. It seeks to erase the traces of life from our hearts and minds and wipe away its fragrance from our memory,” he said.

"What is happening is not merely the uprooting of trees. It is the uprooting of hearts from chests and an attempt to erase the people's memory and their bond with the land,” he added.

Olive Trees as Part of Southern Identity

Ibrahim Sweidan, deputy head of the municipality of Yater, told Asharq Al-Awsat that "olive groves have become part of the identity of southern Lebanon. For southerners, the olive tree is not merely a tree but part of who they are and their attachment to the land."

A Lebanese farmer shows harvested olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

He said the strongest evidence of that attachment is the return of residents to their villages and homes despite difficult security conditions and their determination to remain on their land.

According to Sweidan, attacks on agricultural land, public facilities, and homes all form part of the same pattern: "A strategy aimed at undermining the foundations that allow people to remain in their villages and weakening everything that connects southerners to their land and identity."


Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
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Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)

Details and behind-the-scenes accounts of the October 7, 2023, attack continue to emerge day by day, although many secrets were buried with those who planned the attack and whom Israel pursued and ultimately killed. They include Yahya Sinwar, the former head of Hamas’s political bureau; his brother Mohammed, one of the most prominent commanders of the Qassam Brigades; the brigades’ commander-in-chief, Mohammed Deif; and other figures.

Last July, Israeli intelligence agencies disclosed the contents of a letter they claimed belonged to Sinwar, reportedly seized from Hamas premises in Gaza. In it, he allegedly anticipated a major Israeli response to the attack, including the possibility of using nuclear weapons to strike Gaza. New Palestinian information is now emerging about the planning behind the attack and expectations of Israel’s response.

Yahya Sinwar in an archive photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011. (AP)

Ezzedine Al-Haddad

Two Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ezzedine al-Haddad, the commander of the Qassam Brigades who assumed responsibility for the brigades after the assassinations of Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar, had predicted in a message sent on the first day of the war that it would last only 80 days, after which an agreement would be reached to exchange prisoners and secure Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

According to one source, al-Haddad, who was among the planners and overseers of the attack, had assigned defensive tasks to certain field commanders, instructing them not to exceed specific limits during their participation in the assault on the morning of October 7. However, the sudden collapse of the Gaza Division prompted Qassam fighters to expand their incursion and reach areas that the brigade leadership had not expected them to reach inside the Israeli communities surrounding Gaza. The leadership had overseen the operation from several command centers.

The source said some units had been tasked with advancing deep into Israeli territory and disrupting Israeli forces, while others had been assigned limited objectives before withdrawing to take up defensive positions later. However, the plan did not unfold as intended in several respects because of the collapse of Israeli defenses.

Another source noted that the deaths of numerous field commanders during clashes or in the intense Israeli bombardment in the attack’s opening hours undermined the defensive plan prepared for parts of Gaza Governorate, where al-Haddad was then responsible for a brigade.

The source said al-Haddad was one of the figures who had the greatest influence on the execution of the October 7 attack. He had overseen efforts to increase production of the Yasin 105 launcher for defensive as well as offensive operations. He also authorized field commanders to launch the operation just hours before it began. They had not been briefed on the plan or informed about the attack in advance. During the operation, he had urged them to capture as many Israelis as possible to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

A Hamas banner bearing the slogan “We Are the Flood... We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages. (File photo: AFP)

​​​​​​​The Defensive Plan

The source explained that al-Haddad was responsible for defending Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip. He led the defensive plan alongside field commanders and did not leave the northern part of the territory after Israel separated it from central and southern Gaza. He continued moving among his fighters at the most advanced positions where clashes with Israeli forces were taking place, while also focusing on protecting Israeli hostages.

Assessments within the Hamas and Qassam Brigades leadership that the war could last several months reflected a more optimistic expectation of Israel’s response, given that the group held hostages. However, observers believe these assessments failed to account for the scale of the events, particularly after Israel felt that its security and national pride had been wounded and that it had been humiliated. This prompted Israel to seek revenge by every means available and to continue the war to this day.

A third source said the collapse of the defensive plan forced al-Haddad to find replacements quickly among the leadership. However, the limited experience of some of them led the Qassam commander to adopt a strategy of launching surprise attacks while allowing Israeli forces to advance deep into areas where fighters had set up ambushes. The aim was to inflict unexpected casualties on the Israeli military and focus on capturing soldiers to undermine their morale.

One aspect al-Haddad appears to have failed to anticipate in his defensive plan for northern Gaza was Israel’s ability to reach certain military positions and weapons, missile, and drone storage facilities quickly.

At the same time, the sources believe that al-Haddad and prominent field commanders succeeded in thwarting what became known as the “Generals’ Plan.” The plan aimed to carry out a very large-scale military operation in northern Gaza after separating it from the center and south of the Strip. It involved coordinated attacks by air, land, and sea; taking control of hospitals, shelters, and other facilities; killing, wounding, and arresting hundreds of people and transferring them into Israel; and displacing residents to the southern part of the Strip.

However, after more than 107 days, the plan had failed, and Israel withdrew from those areas amid fierce surprise attacks that killed dozens of Israeli troops.

Raed Saad

Another revelation from behind the scenes of the war concerns divisions within Hamas and the Qassam Brigades leadership over ceasefire proposals. According to one source, prominent Qassam Brigades commander and military council member Raed Saad called in the early months of the war for efforts to end the fighting at any cost.

According to several sources, Saad was among the leaders taken by surprise by the October 7 attack and did not know when it would be carried out, despite being one of the commanders who had helped develop the plan. Israel calls the plan “Jericho Wall,” based on intelligence it had obtained years earlier. Saad was then responsible for operations and had drawn up the plan in 2016. Its implementation was postponed several times over the following years.

According to the first source, Saad sent a written message to the military council leadership during the first four months of the war, urging it to reach an agreement and accept a ceasefire. He stressed that continuing the war did not serve Hamas or the Qassam Brigades, particularly given the high number of fatalities and the possibility that the toll would rise over time.

However, Israel’s repeated rejection of proposals and insistence on continuing the war sidelined those voices, and the fighting continued, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The source added that Saad oversaw numerous areas of responsibility and tasks during the war that strengthened the Qassam Brigades’ ability to withstand the fighting. He continued supporting field commanders in combat and remained in close and regular contact with al-Haddad and other leaders to determine military operations, confront Israeli forces, and keep Israeli hostages in a way that could help secure a prisoner-exchange deal.