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Baghdad's Green Zone, a Barometer of War and Peace

In this Tuesday, May 28, 2019 photo, Iraqi security forces remove concrete blast walls at the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraq. The Green Zone has been a barometer for tension and conflict in Iraq for nearly two decades. The 4-square mile (10-square kilometer), heavily guarded strip on the Tigris River was known as "Little America" following the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein. It then became a hated symbol of the country's inequality, fueling the perception among Iraqis that their government is out of touch. (AP Photo/Ali Abdul Hassan)
In this Tuesday, May 28, 2019 photo, Iraqi security forces remove concrete blast walls at the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraq. The Green Zone has been a barometer for tension and conflict in Iraq for nearly two decades. The 4-square mile (10-square kilometer), heavily guarded strip on the Tigris River was known as "Little America" following the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein. It then became a hated symbol of the country's inequality, fueling the perception among Iraqis that their government is out of touch. (AP Photo/Ali Abdul Hassan)
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Baghdad's Green Zone, a Barometer of War and Peace

In this Tuesday, May 28, 2019 photo, Iraqi security forces remove concrete blast walls at the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraq. The Green Zone has been a barometer for tension and conflict in Iraq for nearly two decades. The 4-square mile (10-square kilometer), heavily guarded strip on the Tigris River was known as "Little America" following the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein. It then became a hated symbol of the country's inequality, fueling the perception among Iraqis that their government is out of touch. (AP Photo/Ali Abdul Hassan)
In this Tuesday, May 28, 2019 photo, Iraqi security forces remove concrete blast walls at the Green Zone in Baghdad, Iraq. The Green Zone has been a barometer for tension and conflict in Iraq for nearly two decades. The 4-square mile (10-square kilometer), heavily guarded strip on the Tigris River was known as "Little America" following the 2003 US-led invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein. It then became a hated symbol of the country's inequality, fueling the perception among Iraqis that their government is out of touch. (AP Photo/Ali Abdul Hassan)

Baghdad's Green Zone has been a barometer for tension and conflict in Iraq for nearly two decades.

The 4-square mile (10-square kilometer) heavily guarded strip on the banks of the Tigris River was known as "Little America" following the 2003 US invasion that toppled dictator Saddam Hussein. It then became a hated symbol of the country's inequality, fueling the perception among Iraqis that their government is out of touch.

The sealed-off area, with its palm trees and monuments, is home to the gigantic US Embassy in Iraq, one of the largest diplomatic missions in the world. It has also been home to successive Iraqi governments and is off limits to most Iraqis.

Various attempts and promises by the Iraqi government to open the area to traffic over the past years have failed to materialize, because of persistent security concerns.

Here's a look at the Green Zone, past and present:

BEFORE THE INVASION

Although not visible, security was always tight around the area, as Saddam Hussein's presidential palace complex was located inside. So were the homes of some of Iraq's top government officials. The road leading to the presidential palace had been closed for decades before the war.

The zone is also home to important Baghdad landmarks including the "Victory Arch" - a 40-meter (131-feet) tall arch of two swords held by bronze casts of Saddam's hands to commemorate the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. The area is also home to the Monument of the Unknown Soldier, Baghdad's famous clock tower and the renowned Rasheed Hotel, where entering guests had to tread over a mosaic of former US President George Bush placed on the floor after the 1991 Gulf War.

Every year in July, Iraq's army held a massive parade marking the 1968 coup that brought Saddam's Arab Socialist Baath Party to power and ruled the country until the US invasion in 2003.

The first strike by the US-led coalition in the early hours of March 20, 2003 struck Saddam's Republican Palace inside what later came to be known as the Green Zone.

THE GREEN ZONE POST INVASION

The area was seized by US military forces in April 2003 in some of the heaviest fighting as American troops swept into Baghdad. The neighborhood became home for the Coalition Provisional Authority, a transitional government established following the invasion.

The first step taken to set up the area was taken by Jay Garner, who at the time headed the reconstruction team and set up its headquarters at Saddam Hussein's main palace.

The official name under the interim government was the International Zone, but the name Green Zone, al-Mintaqa al-Khadraa in Arabic, was more commonly used, because the area was safer than the rest of Baghdad, where explosions, kidnappings, sectarian killings and shootings soon became common. Blast walls and checkpoints were soon set up, and only people with special cards could enter.

Despite the blast walls, Shiite militiamen in eastern neighborhoods of the city commonly fired rockets into the Green Zone. Suicide attacks repeatedly struck at its gates, killing hundreds of people, including Americans.

At the height of the attacks, men reaching the gates of the area had to open their jackets and raise their shirts so that the guards knew they were not wearing explosive belts. Vehicles were thoroughly searched and bomb-sniffing dogs deployed.

One of the biggest security breaches occurred in April 2007, when a suicide bomber detonated his explosives in the cafeteria of the parliament building, killing eight people including three legislators.

In April 2016, supporters of populist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr launched an anti-government protest, angrily scaling up the blast walls, tearing down some of the Green Zone's walls and stormed the parliament building in a major escalation of a political crisis that had simmered for months.

"LITTLE AMERICA"

During America's military occupation of Iraq, parts of the Green Zone were referred to by some as "little America" because of the US troops deployed around it, and American brands available inside. At one point, the Green Zone had at least seven bars, including a Thursday night disco, a sports bar, a British pub, a rooftop bar run by General Electric and a bare-bones trailer-tavern operated by the contractor Bechtel.

Then, the plushest tavern was the CIA's watering hole, known as the "OGA bar." OGA stands for "Other Government Agency," the CIA's low-key moniker. The OGA bar had a dance floor with a revolving mirrored disco ball and a game room. It opened to outsiders by invitation only.

There was also the Green Zone Cafe, a tent erected in the parking lot of a former gas station. On a typical evening, one could see US soldiers smoking from 4-foot-tall hookahs and security contractors laughing over beers, their machine guns by their sides.

A tiny back room at the cafe also held the green zone's chief liquor store, where bottles of whiskey, vodka, and wine were sold at approximately double the price charged outside the green zone's blast walls.

The sealed-off zone also boasted gyms, a pizza parlor and a makeshift casino that had a glorified game room.

Its name was adapted for the 2010 Matt Damon action thriller "Green Zone," about a US army officer hunting for weapons of mass destruction.

ALL IN THE PAST?

There has been talk for years that restrictions would be lifted in the Green Zone, first by then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in 2015.

In March, Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi removed thousands of grey cement blast walls, easing the snarling traffic around Baghdad, and public access to the "Victory Arch" was restored.

The UN envoy to Iraq, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, told a UN Security Council meeting earlier this month that "very soon the Green Zone will no longer exist."

Only a few days earlier, a rocket was fired into the Green Zone, landing less than a mile from the sprawling US Embassy.

Eager to show the war-scarred nation is returning to normal, Abdul-Mahdi is now promising to open it to the public on the first day of Eid al-Fitr, the upcoming holiday marking the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

"Once the area is fully opened, all Iraq will be green," said Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamid Kadhim.

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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
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Amine Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Assad Viewed Lebanon the Same Way Saddam Viewed Kuwait

Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)
Hafez al-Assad and Amine Gemayel during a Non-Aligned Movement summit in India. (Getty Images)

Former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said that the late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad viewed Lebanon the same way the late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein viewed Kuwait. He added that Assad “considered Lebanon a historic mistake that could be corrected by bringing it back into the Syrian fold.” He emphasized that Assad wanted “nothing more, nothing less than to annex Lebanon,” noting that he upheld his constitutional oath during 14 summit meetings with the Syrian president.

Gemayel made these comments in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, where he discussed Lebanon’s experience during the long “Assad era” and other key moments.

In the 1970s, Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party, received an invitation from Assad to visit Damascus. He brought along his sons Amine and Bashir. The Syrian president warmly welcomed them into his home, but the honeymoon did not last long.

Reminiscing stirred up painful memories for Gemayel, who carries two deep wounds: the assassination of his son, MP and Minister Pierre Gemayel, in 2006 amid a wave of killings that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, and the assassination of his brother, President-elect Bashir Gemayel, in 1982. Amine Gemayel assumed the presidency that same year, following two political earthquakes: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and his brother’s assassination.

Hafez al-Assad welcomes Amine Gemayel in Damascus. (Photo courtesy of Amine Gemayel)

Hafez al-Assad and the ‘Lebanese mistake’

Asked what Hafez al-Assad wanted from Lebanon, Gemayel said: “You’re asking a foregone question, as the French saying goes. He wanted to annex Lebanon—nothing more, nothing less. Syrian politicians, even before Assad, couldn’t accept Lebanon’s existence. They saw it as an artificial country that should be part of Syria. They believed Lebanon was wrongly separated due to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Beirut’s port is closer to Damascus than Tartus, so they believed Lebanon was an inseparable part of Syria.”

“Assad also held this view. He couldn’t digest the idea of Lebanon as a stable, independent country. His ultimate goal was annexation. Every agreement or relationship Syria pursued was aimed at eventually achieving this annexation,” he revealed.

“Assad told me plainly, in a one-on-one meeting: ‘Don’t forget that Lebanon is part of Syria. We’re one country. Colonial powers divided us, and it’s in your interest as Lebanese to return to the Syrian fold. No matter how circumstances change, Lebanon must return to Syria.’”

“He was that blunt. He even tried to soften it by comparing it to European unity. ‘Europe united, why can’t we do the same?’ He argued that the countries had shared interests: political, security, economic. So why not unite?”

Asked whether Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait reminded him of Assad’s attempt to annex Lebanon, Gemayel said: “Yes. To Saddam, Kuwait was what Lebanon was to Hafez al-Assad.” He noted that Iraqi leaders claimed colonial powers had stolen Kuwait from Iraq—just as Syrian leaders believed colonialism had stolen Lebanon from Syria.

Still, Gemayel clarified: “Despite all this, I maintained a normal relationship with Assad. Even affection, you could say. We respected each other. He understood my position and would say, privately, that if he were in my place, he’d do the same. And I understood his views, though our ideologies were completely opposed.”

Amine Gemayel and Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel during the interview. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

“Assad would get infuriated by my rejections at times. He thought Lebanon was ripe for the picking—and there I was, blocking him. But he respected me for it. He knew that, in my place, he might have acted the same way. Still, he believed it was in Syria’s interest to ‘unite’ with Lebanon.”

“The Syrian army was already in Lebanon and had co-opted many Lebanese leaders who were ‘pilgrimaging’ to Syria. Assad thought the moment was right. He also mobilized pro-Syrian Palestinian factions,” recalled Gemayel.

“I stood in the way of this dream, which led to fierce political clashes between us—an intellectual struggle, if you will, between his push for unity and my defense of Lebanese independence. We had mutual respect. I met Assad 14 times during my presidency.”

Telling Assad ‘no’ required extraordinary courage’

“I debated, resisted, and stood firm. Facing Assad—his weight, his stature in Syria and the Arab world was no easy task. I had no army, no stable institutions, and Lebanese political leaders were scattered. The situation in Lebanon was dire,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Eventually, even my own allies turned on me. Assad had even co-opted a faction of the Lebanese Forces. He thought I’d cave and sign the papers. But I didn’t. That moment was one of the hardest. Saying ‘no’ to Assad under those conditions required extraordinary courage.”

Asked whether the May 17 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement was the most difficult point in his relationship with Assad, Gemayel said: “No. The hardest point was the Tripartite Agreement between Amal, the Progressive Socialist Party, and the Lebanese Forces. With that agreement, Assad fully controlled the Lebanese scene—especially after winning over leaders like Elie Hobeika and Samir Geagea.”

“Assad believed Lebanon was in his grasp. Only I stood in the way. He didn’t care much about my position but needed my signature. As president, I had taken an oath to preserve the constitution and sovereignty.”

“Despite enormous internal and external pressure—even from within the Christian camp—I stood alone. But I was committed to the Lebanese cause. Ultimately, we won. The public, especially the Christian community, rallied around me. The other leaders who had sold out were exposed. That moment saved Lebanon’s sovereignty and its democratic system.”

Asked by Asharq Al-Awsat, if Assad resented him for sabotaging the Tripartite Agreement, Gemayel replied: “Assad thought he had Lebanon in the bag and was just waiting for congratulations. The day of the signing, King Hussein of Jordan was set to visit Syria. They delayed his visit to finalize the agreement. That’s how important it was to them.”

Pierre Gemayel and Hafez al-Assad. (AFP)

“Assad was frustrated, maybe even bitter. He couldn’t believe that I—stripped of power—dared to say no. But he respected me for it,” added Gemayel.

“After the deal collapsed, I was in Morocco. Syria’s ambassador, a close Alawite to Assad, visited me and conveyed Assad’s respect. It was a message to reopen communication. Assad may have been furious, but he still respected how I stood firm as a young leader facing such odds.”

The bomb on the presidential plane

Asked whether he feared assassination like Kamal Jumblatt, Gemayel replied: “All kinds of pressure were used to make me sign. One story Assad told me—casually—was about how Sadat informed him he was going to Jerusalem. Assad opposed it strongly. After Sadat left the room, Assad’s people asked if they should stop him, maybe even blow up his plane.”

“Assad said he thought about it, but his conscience stopped him. The way he told me the story, it felt like a warning. Like he wouldn’t make the same ‘mistake’ again,” said Gemayel.

“There were several attempts to assassinate me. The most serious one was when I was flying to Yemen. My plane had been rigged with a bomb. The pilot, a meticulous man named Makawiy, noticed a minor issue with the radio and refused to fly. They discovered a wire under the cockpit leading to a bomb.”

“Syrian intelligence was at the airport and immediately seized the bomb and equipment to block any investigation. Who else could rig a presidential plane under heavy guard? Clearly, only they had that kind of access.”

Amine Gemayel and his father Pierre during Bashir Gemayel’s funeral. (Getty Images)

Syrian intelligence behind Bashir’s assassination

Asked whether he believed Syrian intelligence was behind his brother Bashir’s assassination, Gemayel said: “That’s a fact. The killer was from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, which was under direct Syrian intelligence control under Assad Hardan. The bomb was planted in Bashir’s office by Habib Chartouni, who had access to the building.”

“After the Syrian army ousted Michel Aoun from the presidential palace under President Elias Hrawi, they sent one unit to the palace and another to Roumieh Prison to free Chartouni. He walked free and gave a speech thanking Syria. That says everything.”

“Chartouni was initially too afraid to detonate the bomb, but party leaders pressured him. The operation was directly linked to Syrian intelligence,” added Gemayel.

Final meeting with Assad

Gemayel recounted his last meeting with Assad, two days before the end of his term: “We were trying to reach a deal: electing Michel al-Daher as president in exchange for certain guarantees. While I was with Assad explaining the plan, he received a note about a meeting in Lebanon between Geagea and Army Commander Michel Aoun.”

“He saw it as a coup attempt and ended the meeting abruptly. I returned to Beirut, but we couldn’t resolve the situation. Despite this, Assad—though ill—insisted on accompanying me to the airport, saying: ‘We are brothers no matter what.’”