Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
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Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)

Netflix last week released a series about Israeli spy, Eli Cohen, who had infiltrated Syria in the 1960s. The six-episode series sought to glamorize the image of the spy, taking into account only the Israeli version of accounts. The show was after all written and directed by Israeli director Gideon Raff and sought to present Israeli intelligence “heroics” in contrast with corruption and betrayal among the Syrian political class.

The series, starring comedic actor Sacha Baron Cohen, was rife with factual and political errors and omits the Syrian version of the story. Few Syrian accounts exist. One was recounted by Judge Salah al-Dalali, who presided over the court that sentenced Cohen to death. The Mossad spy operated in Syria between 1962 and 1965 when he was arrested and executed.

Syrian writers and historians pointed to ten historical errors committed in “The Spy”:

1- President Amin al-Hafez: The series showed that he met and struck a friendship with Cohen when he served as Syria’s military attache in Argentina. Hafez himself denied the relationship during a television interview in 2001. He explained that he was in Argentina in 1962 long after Cohen had arrived in Damascus. He revealed that he only met Cohen after his arrest in 1965. Claims of the friendship was promoted by Egyptian dailies at the time as part of a campaign against Hafez over a backdrop of political tensions. No document or picture exist to prove the relationship between Hafez and Cohen.

2 - Hafez al-Assad and Amin al-Hafez: Assad was not a lieutenant general as claimed by the series. He was an officer deployed in Egypt. Amin al-Hafez did not come to power after the March 8, 1963 coup in Syria as shown in the series. He was appointed interior minister and then assumed the presidency of the revolutionary command council. He became president on July 27 later that year.

3 - Michel Aflaq: He did not meet with Cohen and did not give him a list of people to invite, including Prime Minister Khaled al-Azm, for a March 8 soiree. Azm had never visited Cohen in his life. Contrary to what the series claimed, Aflaq did not have information about the army’s activity during the March 8 coup.

4 - Abdul Karim Zahreddine: An army chief of staff, he never set foot in Cohen’s house, but his nephew, reservist Maazi, did. Maazi was Cohen’s friend and released from the army on the day of the coup. He later assumed minor positions in public office. He used to meet with Cohen at his house or at the al-Kamal cafe in central Damascus. He was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison in 1965.

5 - Maazi Zahreddine and the front: Maazi escorted Cohen to the Syrian front with Israel in 1962. It was claimed that the spy obtained military intelligence that was vital to the June 5, 1967 defeat during Six-Day War. However, there is a five-year period between the visit and the defeat, raising questions over just how vital the information actually was. Moreover, officers deployed at the front and military positions were repeatedly changed after March 8, 1963 and later in 1966. A western expert revealed earlier this week that Cohen’s mission was not aimed at gathering information about the front, but cracking down on Nazi officers who were staying in Damascus. He was also tasked with following up on the situation of Jews in the Syrian capital.

6 - Deputy defense minister: The series claimed that Cohen was considered for the position of “deputy defense minister”. No such position had existed at the time. It was introduced in 1970. Moreover, such a position is restricted to military figures and no civilian can occupy it.

7 - Ahmed Suweidani: He later became chief of staff. He was not head of Hafez’s security in Argentina. The scene from the series where Cohen secretly enters Hafez’s office and takes photographs of classified documents is pure fiction. The series did get Suweidani’s suspicions against Cohen right. An expert revealed: “He was suspicious of Cohen from day one. He played a central role in exposing and arresting him in 1965.”

8 - Execution: The series showed Damascene Majed Sheikh al-Ard doffing his hat to Cohen out of sorrow and respect the moment he was hanged in al-Marjeh square. A historian said that it is well-known that Sheikh al-Ard was deceived by Cohen. He was one of his victims.

He met Cohen in 1962 on board a ship that was sailing from Europe to Beirut. Cohen ingratiated himself to Sheikh al-Ard and entered Syria with him through Lebanon under the alias Kamel Amin Thabet. Sheikh al-Ard helped Cohen rent a furnished apartment on Abu Rummaneh street in Damascus. The expert added: “The relationship between the two men did not go any further because Sheikh al-Ard had no information of use to the spy.” Moreover, he once spoke about his admiration of Adolf Hitler, which immediately caused friction between him and Cohen.

Sheikh al-Ard did not witness Cohen’s execution and did not doff his hat to him. He was in jail, serving a life sentence. He was held in Qalaa prison in Damascus and later transferred to Palmyra prison where he died in his cell reportedly of suicide.

Neither Hafez, not his wife, were present at the execution. Another fabrication is the disgusting storyline about the sexual relationship between Hafez’s wife and Cohen and allegedly with the approval of her husband.

9 - Infiltration of society: The series claimed that Cohen had wormed his way into Syrian society and befriended influential figures. In fact, he only made friends with B and C class figures. He avoided top rank officials out of fear of being exposed. In 2004, Dalali told the writer that Cohen was “just an ordinary spy.” He was buried in a cave by the al-Dimas road. Later his remains were dug up and buried in an undisclosed location.

10 - Abu Rummaneh neighborhood: The series’ depiction of the neighborhood looks more like Talaat square in Cairo. It also claimed that a Russian officer helped detect radio waves, as part of communication with Israel, coming from Cohen's apartment and which led to his discovery. There are four accounts of how he was exposed: by the Russian officer, nearby Indian embassy that detected radio interference, Egyptian intelligence and Suweidani.



Netanyahu’s Governing Coalition Is Fracturing. Here’s What It Means for Israel and Gaza

 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
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Netanyahu’s Governing Coalition Is Fracturing. Here’s What It Means for Israel and Gaza

 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government suffered a serious blow on Tuesday when an ultra-Orthodox party announced it was bolting the coalition.

While this doesn’t immediately threaten Netanyahu’s rule, it could set in motion his government’s demise, although that could still be months away. It also could complicate efforts to halt the war in Gaza.

United Torah Judaism's two factions said they were leaving the government because of disagreements over a proposed law that would end broad exemptions for religious students from enlistment into the military.

Military service is compulsory for most Jewish Israelis, and the issue of exemptions has long divided the country. Those rifts have only widened since the start of the war in Gaza as demand for military manpower has grown and hundreds of soldiers have been killed.

The threat to the government “looks more serious than ever,” said Shuki Friedman, vice president of the Jewish People Policy Institute, a Jerusalem think tank.

Netanyahu is on trial for alleged corruption, and critics say he wants to hang on to power so that he can use his office as a bully pulpit to rally supporters and lash out against prosecutors and judges. That makes him all the more vulnerable to the whims of his coalition allies.

Here is a look at Netanyahu's political predicament and some potential scenarios:

The ultra-Orthodox are key partners

Netanyahu, Israel’s longest serving leader, has long relied on the ultra-Orthodox parties to prop up his governments.

Without UTJ, his coalition holds just 61 out of parliament’s 120 seats. That means Netanyahu will be more susceptible to pressure from other elements within his government, especially far-right parties who strongly oppose ending the war in Gaza.

The political shake up isn't likely to completely derail ceasefire talks, but it could complicate how flexible Netanyahu can be in his concessions to Hamas.

A second ultra-Orthodox party is also considering bolting the government over the draft issue. That would give Netanyahu a minority in parliament and make governing almost impossible.

The ultra-Orthodox military exemptions have divided Israel

A decades-old arrangement by Israel’s first prime minister granted hundreds of ultra-Orthodox men exemptions from compulsory Israeli service. Over the years, those exemptions ballooned into the thousands and created deep divisions in Israel.

The ultra-Orthodox say their men are serving the country by studying sacred Jewish texts and preserving centuries’ old tradition. They fear that mandatory enlistment will dilute adherents’ connection to the faith.

But most Jewish Israelis see the exemption as unfair, as well as the generous government stipends granted to many ultra-Orthodox men who study instead of work throughout adulthood. That bitterness has only worsened during nearly two years of war.

The politically powerful ultra-Orthodox parties have long had outsize influence in Israel’s fragmented political system and used that status to extract major concessions for their constituents.

But a court last year ruled Netanyahu’s government must enlist the ultra-Orthodox so long as there is no new law codifying the exemptions.

Netanyahu’s coalition has been trying to find a path forward on a new law. But his base is largely opposed to granting sweeping draft exemptions and a key lawmaker has stood in the way of giving the ultra-Orthodox a law they can get behind, prompting their exit.

The political shake up comes during Gaza ceasefire talks

The resignations don't take effect for 48 hours, so Netanyahu will likely spend the next two days seeking a compromise. But that won't be easy because the Supreme Court has said the old system of exemptions amounts to discrimination against the secular majority.

That does not mean the government will collapse.

Netanyahu's opponents cannot submit a motion to dissolve parliament until the end of the year because of procedural reasons. And with parliament's summer recess beginning later this month, the parties could use that time to find a compromise and return to the government.

Cabinet Minister Miki Zohar, from Netanyahu’s Likud party, said he was hopeful the religious party could be coaxed back to the coalition. “God willing, everything will be fine,” he said. A Likud spokesman did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Once the departures become official, Netanyahu will have a razor-thin majority. The far-right parties within it could threaten to leave the coalition, further weakening him, if he gives in to too many of Hamas' demands.

Hamas wants a permanent end to the war as part of any ceasefire deal. Netanyahu's hard-line partners are open to a temporary truce, but say the war cannot end until Hamas is destroyed.

If they or any other party leave the coalition, Netanyahu will have a minority government, and that will make it almost impossible to govern and likely lead to its collapse. But he could still find ways to approve a ceasefire deal, including with support from the political opposition.

Israel may be on the path toward early elections

Netanyahu could seek to shore up his coalition by appeasing the far-right and agreeing for now to just a partial, 60-day ceasefire with Hamas, promising his governing partners that he can still resume the war once it expires.

But Netanyahu is balancing those political constraints with pressure from the Trump administration, which is pressing Israel to wrap up the war.

Gayil Talshir, a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said she expects Netanyahu to work during those 60 days to shift the narrative away from the draft exemptions and the war in Gaza, toward something that could potentially give him an electoral boost – like an expansion of US-led normalization deals between Israel and Arab or Muslim countries.

Once the 60-day ceasefire is up, Netanyahu could bend to US pressure to end the war and bring home the remaining hostages in Gaza — a move most Israelis would support.

Elections are currently scheduled for October 2026. But if Netanyahu feels like he has improved his political standing, he may want to call elections before then.