Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
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Exclusive - 10 Factual Errors Committed by ‘The Spy’ Series on Eli Cohen

Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)
Israeli spy Eli Cohen (L) and two other unidentified co-defendants, during their trial in Damascus, ten days before his execution. (AFP)

Netflix last week released a series about Israeli spy, Eli Cohen, who had infiltrated Syria in the 1960s. The six-episode series sought to glamorize the image of the spy, taking into account only the Israeli version of accounts. The show was after all written and directed by Israeli director Gideon Raff and sought to present Israeli intelligence “heroics” in contrast with corruption and betrayal among the Syrian political class.

The series, starring comedic actor Sacha Baron Cohen, was rife with factual and political errors and omits the Syrian version of the story. Few Syrian accounts exist. One was recounted by Judge Salah al-Dalali, who presided over the court that sentenced Cohen to death. The Mossad spy operated in Syria between 1962 and 1965 when he was arrested and executed.

Syrian writers and historians pointed to ten historical errors committed in “The Spy”:

1- President Amin al-Hafez: The series showed that he met and struck a friendship with Cohen when he served as Syria’s military attache in Argentina. Hafez himself denied the relationship during a television interview in 2001. He explained that he was in Argentina in 1962 long after Cohen had arrived in Damascus. He revealed that he only met Cohen after his arrest in 1965. Claims of the friendship was promoted by Egyptian dailies at the time as part of a campaign against Hafez over a backdrop of political tensions. No document or picture exist to prove the relationship between Hafez and Cohen.

2 - Hafez al-Assad and Amin al-Hafez: Assad was not a lieutenant general as claimed by the series. He was an officer deployed in Egypt. Amin al-Hafez did not come to power after the March 8, 1963 coup in Syria as shown in the series. He was appointed interior minister and then assumed the presidency of the revolutionary command council. He became president on July 27 later that year.

3 - Michel Aflaq: He did not meet with Cohen and did not give him a list of people to invite, including Prime Minister Khaled al-Azm, for a March 8 soiree. Azm had never visited Cohen in his life. Contrary to what the series claimed, Aflaq did not have information about the army’s activity during the March 8 coup.

4 - Abdul Karim Zahreddine: An army chief of staff, he never set foot in Cohen’s house, but his nephew, reservist Maazi, did. Maazi was Cohen’s friend and released from the army on the day of the coup. He later assumed minor positions in public office. He used to meet with Cohen at his house or at the al-Kamal cafe in central Damascus. He was arrested and sentenced to five years in prison in 1965.

5 - Maazi Zahreddine and the front: Maazi escorted Cohen to the Syrian front with Israel in 1962. It was claimed that the spy obtained military intelligence that was vital to the June 5, 1967 defeat during Six-Day War. However, there is a five-year period between the visit and the defeat, raising questions over just how vital the information actually was. Moreover, officers deployed at the front and military positions were repeatedly changed after March 8, 1963 and later in 1966. A western expert revealed earlier this week that Cohen’s mission was not aimed at gathering information about the front, but cracking down on Nazi officers who were staying in Damascus. He was also tasked with following up on the situation of Jews in the Syrian capital.

6 - Deputy defense minister: The series claimed that Cohen was considered for the position of “deputy defense minister”. No such position had existed at the time. It was introduced in 1970. Moreover, such a position is restricted to military figures and no civilian can occupy it.

7 - Ahmed Suweidani: He later became chief of staff. He was not head of Hafez’s security in Argentina. The scene from the series where Cohen secretly enters Hafez’s office and takes photographs of classified documents is pure fiction. The series did get Suweidani’s suspicions against Cohen right. An expert revealed: “He was suspicious of Cohen from day one. He played a central role in exposing and arresting him in 1965.”

8 - Execution: The series showed Damascene Majed Sheikh al-Ard doffing his hat to Cohen out of sorrow and respect the moment he was hanged in al-Marjeh square. A historian said that it is well-known that Sheikh al-Ard was deceived by Cohen. He was one of his victims.

He met Cohen in 1962 on board a ship that was sailing from Europe to Beirut. Cohen ingratiated himself to Sheikh al-Ard and entered Syria with him through Lebanon under the alias Kamel Amin Thabet. Sheikh al-Ard helped Cohen rent a furnished apartment on Abu Rummaneh street in Damascus. The expert added: “The relationship between the two men did not go any further because Sheikh al-Ard had no information of use to the spy.” Moreover, he once spoke about his admiration of Adolf Hitler, which immediately caused friction between him and Cohen.

Sheikh al-Ard did not witness Cohen’s execution and did not doff his hat to him. He was in jail, serving a life sentence. He was held in Qalaa prison in Damascus and later transferred to Palmyra prison where he died in his cell reportedly of suicide.

Neither Hafez, not his wife, were present at the execution. Another fabrication is the disgusting storyline about the sexual relationship between Hafez’s wife and Cohen and allegedly with the approval of her husband.

9 - Infiltration of society: The series claimed that Cohen had wormed his way into Syrian society and befriended influential figures. In fact, he only made friends with B and C class figures. He avoided top rank officials out of fear of being exposed. In 2004, Dalali told the writer that Cohen was “just an ordinary spy.” He was buried in a cave by the al-Dimas road. Later his remains were dug up and buried in an undisclosed location.

10 - Abu Rummaneh neighborhood: The series’ depiction of the neighborhood looks more like Talaat square in Cairo. It also claimed that a Russian officer helped detect radio waves, as part of communication with Israel, coming from Cohen's apartment and which led to his discovery. There are four accounts of how he was exposed: by the Russian officer, nearby Indian embassy that detected radio interference, Egyptian intelligence and Suweidani.



Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
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Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan’s Governments: From Alliance to Rupture

One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)
One of the Islamic Action Front Party’s offices in Jordan (Party’s official website)

The arrival of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, marked by periods of resolution and banning of activities, is not disconnected from the long history of the group’s journey in the kingdom, dating back to the mid-1940s when it was first established.

However, this journey—characterized by varying relations with successive governments—began with collaboration and ended in conflict. How did this unfold?

Leaders of Jordan’s Islamic movement, encompassing both the banned Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front, consistently supported Jordan’s stability during the last decades of the 20th century.

This support, however, shifted into decades of confrontation with the authorities after the divisions within the movement emerged.

A key moment in the movement's history came when Jordanian authorities accused the group of plotting to “stir chaos” and possessing “explosive materials,” marking a significant turning point for the Islamic movement in the kingdom.

This came especially after recordings revealed the arrested individuals’ ties to the unlicensed Brotherhood group in Jordan.

Founded in 1946, the Brotherhood initially operated as a charitable society, providing aid through fundraising efforts. It attracted young people who were influenced by its leaders’ calls for public activism.

Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained an alliance with the government. Its leaders gradually moved into senior official positions, using their power to expand their grassroots support and promote their message within Jordanian society, which historically had a strong conservative religious base.

During this time, the Brotherhood’s influence on school students was significant. It encouraged protests and sit-ins against political forces opposed to them, particularly the Communist and Ba’ath parties before the latter's split. Clashes occurred between these groups in downtown Amman and in key cities across the kingdom.

In the 1970s, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the government evolved into one of partnership and alliance, particularly under the leadership of former Prime Minister Wasfi Tal. This period saw prominent Islamic leader Ishaq Farhan appointed as Minister of Education and later as Minister of Awqaf, overseeing important reforms in educational curricula.

Farhan’s task of reforming the education system included incorporating the Brotherhood’s religious teachings into school textbooks, reflecting the growing influence of the group in shaping Jordanian public life.

Meanwhile, members of the Brotherhood, funded by the government, pursued advanced studies in the United States, returning to hold key positions in the Ministry of Education, with Abdullatif Arabiyat, a senior member, serving as the ministry’s deputy for almost a decade.

Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Brotherhood sought to capitalize on regional developments, aiming to increase its political influence. Its leadership, particularly in key urban centers such as Amman, Zarqa, and Irbid, began to broaden its outreach.

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Awqaf became critical battlegrounds for the Brotherhood, enabling it to infiltrate mosques through imams and transform them into organizational hubs.

This religious outreach laid the groundwork for political mobilization, with gatherings and lessons organized after evening prayers, further solidifying the Brotherhood’s presence in the public sphere.

The political journey of the Brotherhood in Jordan took a dramatic turn in 1989, when the country lifted martial law and resumed parliamentary life after decades of authoritarian rule.

The Brotherhood seized the opportunity, winning a powerful bloc in the 11th Parliament and securing popular support, positioning itself as a key political player.

That era also marked the Brotherhood’s first foray into governance, backing Prime Minister Mudar Badran’s cabinet as part of a national effort to support Iraq against a US-led coalition. It was a rare alignment with the state, underscored by the election of Arabiyat as parliamentary speaker for three consecutive terms — a move widely seen as part of a government-Brotherhood alliance.

In 1992, the group formalized its political arm with the creation of the Islamic Action Front, cementing the link between its religious mission and political ambitions. But the distinction between party and group remained blurred, with critics arguing that the party remained under Brotherhood control.

That same year, tensions flared when the Brotherhood opposed Jordan’s participation in the Madrid Peace Conference, prompting a no-confidence motion against the government of Prime Minister Taher Masri. Although Masri resigned voluntarily, the incident marked the start of growing rifts between the Brotherhood and the state.

The following parliamentary elections in 1993 deepened internal fractures, both within the movement and between the Brotherhood and its political allies. The rift widened further in 1994, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Islamic Action Front boycotted the vote on the treaty, signaling a decisive shift from cooperation to confrontation.

In the aftermath of the peace treaty, the Brotherhood distanced itself from official alliances and became a staunch opponent of normalization with Israel. The group boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, a move that triggered an exodus of leaders who opposed the boycott. Some dissidents went on to form the moderate Islamist Wasat Party, led by Abdel Rahim Akkour.

Distrust between the Brotherhood and the government deepened under the shadow of King Hussein’s illness and the succession of King Abdullah II. The movement remained politically dormant until 2003, when the Islamic Action Front re-entered parliament following a two-year suspension of legislative life during the Second Intifada. The party secured 16 seats in the 14th Parliament.

However, the rocky relationship persisted. In 2007, the Brotherhood and its party participated in elections again after negotiations with then-Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit. But allegations of large-scale vote rigging saw the Islamic Action Front secure only six seats — a result it denounced as a betrayal of the agreement with the government.

The controversial election result sparked a leadership crisis within the Brotherhood. The group’s hardline faction, known as the Hawks, overpowered the traditional moderates (the Doves) in internal polls, leading to a purge of long-standing leaders.

Accusations emerged that the group had been hijacked by Hamas sympathizers, reshaping the Brotherhood’s identity and guiding principles.

In the years that followed, former leaders split from the movement, accusing its new leadership of dragging the Brotherhood and its political arm into a confrontational path aligned with regional Islamist movements.

From mainstream political player to marginalized actor, the Brotherhood’s trajectory in Jordan mirrors a broader regional trend — one where Islamist movements rise through democratic openings but often clash with the state over ideology, foreign policy, and the limits of political power.