Exclusive - Syrian Refugees Trickle Back to Qusayr under Watchful Eyes of the Regime, Hezbollah

Returnees walk together and hold Syrian flags as they enter the city of Qusayr, Syria July 7, 2019. (Reuters)
Returnees walk together and hold Syrian flags as they enter the city of Qusayr, Syria July 7, 2019. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Syrian Refugees Trickle Back to Qusayr under Watchful Eyes of the Regime, Hezbollah

Returnees walk together and hold Syrian flags as they enter the city of Qusayr, Syria July 7, 2019. (Reuters)
Returnees walk together and hold Syrian flags as they enter the city of Qusayr, Syria July 7, 2019. (Reuters)

“I want to be buried in my hometown, al-Qusayr,” said a retired school teacher who has been worn down by years of misery and old age that caught up with him soon after he and his family were displaced in from his town in 2012.

The teacher, 65, recently became one of many refugees who returned to Qusayr in recent months. He returned to his home, which was all but destroyed during the Syrian war. All that stands is a single room.

Asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about why he returned knowing that his house was in ruins, he replied: “Living in a tent over property that I own is a thousand times easier than living as a refugee in a rented home.”

“I have spent years in displacement and pray to God that I die in Qusayr,” he added.

Strategic importance

Qusayr lies 35 kilometers west of Homs and 15 kms from the border with Lebanon. The city witnessed in 2013 the first and largest wave of displacement during the Syrian war. At the peak of the unrest only a handful of the 65,000 residents remained in the city. The population is predominantly Sunni with Christian, Alawite and Shiite minorities.

The picture has since changed after the Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah party imposed their control over the city and its countryside.

Qusayr holds strategic importance to Hezbollah because it links the Lebanese Bekaa region to the central Syrian province of Homs. It is accessed through the Jousiyeh crossing that was set up in 1919. Qusayr was also a significant trade hub between Homs and northern Lebanon.

Soon after the regime captured Qusayr from opposition factions, its ally, Hezbollah set up major centers throughout the roads connecting Homs to Lebanon. Qusayr was inaccessible except to its residents, who were still living there. After the reopening of the Jousiyeh crossing in 2017, travelers heading to Lebanon were allowed to pass through the area, local sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Once Jousiyeh was reopened, pro-regime residents, mainly Alawites, Shiites and Christians, were allowed to return. Some 8,000 people have gradually returned between 2013 and 2017. Up until July this year, Sunnis were barred from returning. Even then, only those not suspected of anti-regime activity were allowed to come back.

Destruction

The first batch of refugees returned to Qusayr’s Hezbollah-held western countryside in July. Exposing who really controls the region, the some 1,000 returnees were seen waving the Hezbollah flag, far outnumbering official Syrian flags and images of regime leader Bashar Assad. The second batch, of some 5,000 people, arrived in October. This time, the majority waved regime flags and Assad posters. Since 2013, some 14,000 residents have returned to what was left of their homes.

With very limited means, they struggled to rebuild Qusayr as they awaited aid from charities, civil and public agencies. The city council was also unable to cope with the massive reconstruction. Neighborhoods that were seized by opposition factions were almost completely destroyed, in contrast to the districts that never escaped the clutches of the regime during clashes with the opposition. Pro-regime residents, Hezbollah and security stations are located in these districts.

Overall, the city lacks the most basic infrastructure. Sewage systems remain mostly inadequate, power cuts are frequent and water is in short supply.

A refugee from Qusayr, currently residing in Lebanon, told Asharq Al-Awsat that prior to the war, people from Homs and nearby Lebanese villages used to flock to Qusayr for their daily needs, education and medical treatments. Bread produced from the city used to be enough to feed all neighboring areas. Smuggling from Lebanon of various goods that were not available in Syria was also active.

This led to the development of close ties between the surrounding areas. These relations rose above sectarian and political interests and Hezbollah was virtually nonexistent in the area.

At the turn of the 21st century, fuel began to be smuggled from Syria to Lebanon through Qusayr. This led to the emergence of fierce outlaws, who were controlled by corrupt figures in the regime’s security apparatus. The situation was exacerbated further with the beginning of the smuggling of drugs from Lebanon to Syria after 2005.

This naturally led to increased school dropouts, higher unemployment, a weakening economy and fragmentation of the traditional social and economic fabric.

Hezbollah control

After the displacement of the people in 2013, Hezbollah seized the region west of the Orontes (Assi) River. The party succeeded in recruiting residents of the region to fight in its ranks against their own fellow Syrians. The party also seized control of all legal and illegal border crossings between Qusayr and Lebanon. The region consequently became the most important drugs smuggling route from Lebanon to Syria and then from Syria to the Mediterranean through Latakia port.

In the city itself, Hezbollah captured several properties and buildings and transformed them into party headquarters, barring their owners from accessing them. The party also seized agricultural fields to grow its cannabis crops, transforming it into a lucrative gang-run business linked to regional networks.



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.