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Exclusive – Syria’s Oil: Lion’s Share Goes to Russia as US Enjoys Control though Proxies

This April 2018 photo, shows a former farmer working at a primitive refinery making crude oil into diesel, in a village controlled by a US-backed Kurdish group, in Rmeilan, Syria. (AP)
This April 2018 photo, shows a former farmer working at a primitive refinery making crude oil into diesel, in a village controlled by a US-backed Kurdish group, in Rmeilan, Syria. (AP)
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Exclusive – Syria’s Oil: Lion’s Share Goes to Russia as US Enjoys Control though Proxies

This April 2018 photo, shows a former farmer working at a primitive refinery making crude oil into diesel, in a village controlled by a US-backed Kurdish group, in Rmeilan, Syria. (AP)
This April 2018 photo, shows a former farmer working at a primitive refinery making crude oil into diesel, in a village controlled by a US-backed Kurdish group, in Rmeilan, Syria. (AP)

Since the eruption of the conflict in Syria, warring parties, most notably foreign powers, have been scrambling to seize control of the country’s oil wealth. As the majority of the Syrian people struggle to provide the most basic of heating and electrical resources, foreign powers are dividing the Syrian cake among themselves as they reap the spoils of war.

During the 1930s, Syrian media said that the country’s oil “does not belong to the Syrians.” This is now more true than ever as Russia, the United States, Iran and various factions on the ground seek to capture the country’s lucrative oilfields.

A Syrian economic expert told Asharq Al-Awsat: “Since the 1980s and until 2010, Syria’s oil sector was controlled by the ruling Assad family.”

It kept the facts and figures hidden from the people and generated oil was not registered at OPEC, he said on condition of anonymity. It was only after the eruption of the 2011 uprising against the Assad regime that the hidden figures and details of the sector came to light.

As the conflicted heated up in 2012, the regime began to gradually lose control of the majority of the oilfields. Those in the east soon fell into the hands of the Free Syrian Army and later the extremist al-Nusra Front. The factions resorted to primitive methods to extract the oil. In 2013, ISIS emerged in the country, capturing the fields and securing funds for its terrorist activities. By 2014, it had seized the majority of Syria’s oilfields, most significant of which was the al-Omar field in Deir Ezzour.

The US Defense Department said in 2015 that ISIS generated revenues of 40 million dollars a month from Syria’s oil. Two years later, however, the group was defeated in Syria and the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces swept into the regions it once held. The SDF came to control some 70 percent of Syria’s oil, including the al-Omar field that used to generate 80,000 barrels per day before 2011.

In 2017, the regime regained control of the al-Shaer field in the eastern Homs countryside. It produces some 2 million cubic meters of gas per day. The regime and the Fifth Brigade, under the supervision of Russian forces, now control the gas fields in the Palmyra region in the Homs countryside. They also control oilfields that generate 9,000 bpd.

Selling Syrian oil

The conflict over Syria’s oil is a matter of life for the people because it is a main source of income in their country. Figures by British Petroleum revealed that Syria produced 406,000 barrels of oil in 2008, 401,000 in 2009, 385,000 in 2010, 353,000 in 2011 and 171,000 in 2012. The numbers continued to decline throughout the conflict to reach 24,000 in 2018.

The Syrian economic expert said Syria boasts 2.5 million barrels in reserve. This is a “very low” figure compared to other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia that enjoys 268 billion in reserves. Moreover, he said Syrian oil itself is of low quality and the cost of its extraction is high, reaching 20 to 25 dollars. In contrast, extraction in regional countries costs around 5 dollars.

The SDF, and ISIS before them, is forced to sell the oil to the Syrian regime, which sends it to the Homs and Banyas refineries. The SDF sells crude oil for roughly 30 dollars and generates some 10 million dollars in revenues per month.

The regime, meanwhile, receives oil from the SDF through agents and companies that were set up during the war for this very purpose. The agents used to purchase the oil from ISIS and later delivered it to regime-controlled regions. They now assume the same duties, this time with the SDF as the seller. Businessman Hussam al-Qaterji has emerged as one of the most prominent of such agents. He is a member of Syria’s parliament and heads a militia that is dedicated to delivering oil to regime-held areas.

Russian-American competition

Turkey’s operation against northeastern Syria in early October threw a wrench in the Russian and regime plans to restore control over the area and its oilfields. Ankara launched its offensive to cleanse the border area from Kurdish factions, including the SDF. Despite this, Russia has underlined the need for the regime to regain control of its oilfields. US President Donald Trump further complicated plans when he announced in October that he was determined to ink a deal with a major American company to operate Syrian oilfields. “What I intend to do, perhaps, is make a deal with an ExxonMobil or one of our great companies to go in there and do it properly ... and spread out the wealth,” Trump said. He explained that protecting the fields prevents ISIS from reaching them and allows the Kurds to benefit from them. The US must also reap its share, he remarked.

Trump had initially ordered all troops out of Syria in October, then decided to keep a force in place to hold the oil infrastructure. The move reinforces Washington’s Kurdish allies and prevents Russia and Iran from laying their hands on Syria’s oil. This also deprives Syria and Iran from the oil in the east, in line with US sanctions against them.

Since 2017, Iran has sought to impose its control over the eastern Alboukamal region. It has controlled the al-Qaim crossing that effectively secures a land route between Iran and the Syrian coast through Iraq. Tehran is also seeking to invest in Syria’s energy sector, however the American deployment in areas east of the Euphrates River are obstructing these ambitions. Russia, its friendly rival, also has ambitions in Syria. It is Moscow that has the lion’s share of Syria’s resources.

Today, Russia deploys military patrols in some oil regions in coordination with Turkey. It has emerged as the strongest player in Syria against the US. Russia first came to the regime’s aid in 2015, swinging the war in its favor. It also effectively entered the race to reap the majority of oil and gas deals in the country.

While the US, through its allies, has seized control of the majority of Syria’s oilfields, Moscow has sought to capture its gas wealth in the Mediterranean, which the Syrian oil ministry estimates at 250 billion cubic meters. It has struck deals to drill for oil and gas in territorial waters. These include the fields off the Tartus and Banyas coasts. Russia is also in charge of phosphate mines in Palmyra.

As it stands, Russia appears to benefit the most from any political settlement that can be reached in Syria. The US does not appear as eager and is instead employing its deployment in Syria to confront Iran and Russia.

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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.