Exclusive - Crisis Fails to Reunite Lebanon’s March 14 Forces

A general view of demonstrators during 2019 anti-government protests in central Beirut. (Reuters)
A general view of demonstrators during 2019 anti-government protests in central Beirut. (Reuters)
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Exclusive - Crisis Fails to Reunite Lebanon’s March 14 Forces

A general view of demonstrators during 2019 anti-government protests in central Beirut. (Reuters)
A general view of demonstrators during 2019 anti-government protests in central Beirut. (Reuters)

A new crisis emerged in Lebanon after the “Shiite duo” of Amal and Hezbollah, as well as the Free Patriotic Movement, voted for Hassan Diab as the country’s new prime minister-designate. The development revived the rivalry between the March 8 forces, which includes Hezbollah, Amal and the FPM, and the March 14 forces, which had abstained from naming Diab as PM.

However, the March 14 camp’s decision to distance itself or its deliberate exclusion from the government has not prompted its members to regroup. Conflicts of interests among its members and their own personal agendas have fragmented the camp that has championed Lebanon’s sovereignty away from foreign meddling.

Prominent members of the camp have doubted that a new political reality would be introduced in Lebanon even though the March 14 forces support the popular uprising that erupted on October 17.

Mustaqbal Movement politburo member, former MP Mustafa Alloush said: “The ties that have been broken between the March 14 forces cannot be mended.”

“Experience in recent years has proven that every party has its own agenda and prioritizes partisan and sectarian interests above the national ideals of the March 14, 2005 revolution,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, he did not rule out the possibility of some March 14 parties striking settlements with Hezbollah and its allies, “as they have done in the past.”

“In politics, everything is possible. There can be no permanent rivalry and no permanent alliance. Everything is based on interests,” he stated.

“The March 14 forces may return to their former unity should they receive strong regional support,” he remarked.

The March 14 camp does share some of the demands of the ongoing popular protests, most significant of which is limiting the possession of weapons to the military and state security forces and restricting the decision of war and peace to the state.

The factors that forced the camp out of power are incapable of reuniting it, said a leading member of the Lebanese Forces of the March 14 forces.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat on condition of anonymity, he was frank in blaming the current division in the camp on the 2016 presidential settlement that eventually led to Michel Aoun’s election as president.

“The settlement dashed all hopes for reuniting the March 14 forces,” he stressed.

“Unfortunately, we deliberately chose suicide because we opted for a settlement with a camp that has no agenda but to reach power,” he said in reference to Aoun and the FPM.

“Such a camp has displayed so much disloyalty. It struck a settlement with partners and no sooner had it sucked all of their blood, that it abandoned all agreements with them,” he went on to say.

“The whole of Lebanon is today paying the price of the presidential settlement that allowed Hezbollah to impose its control over Lebanon, which is now isolated from its Arab surroundings and international community,” said the LF member.

As it stands, the international community and Arab world have yet to make a stance over the Diab’s appointment as PM-designate. Their positions will emerge once the upcoming political phase in Lebanon begins to take shape.

Advisor to the Progressive Socialist Party chief, Rami al-Rayyes said: “Reviving the March 8 and 14 fronts is the thing of the past due to the various developments that have taken place.”

He cited the shift in priorities, the fundamental difference between the 2005 and 2019 revolts and the reshuffling of political cards after the collapse of the presidential settlement.

The March 14 camp is still committed to its slogan of sovereignty, independence and freedom, but it is too soon to speak about returning to the former political divisions, he told Asharq Al-Awsat. The positive cooperation and the political relationship between the Mustaqbal Movement, LF and Kataeb party will, however, remain.



Why Does Israel Insist on Hezbollah to Withdraw North of Litani River?

Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
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Why Does Israel Insist on Hezbollah to Withdraw North of Litani River?

Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)
Israeli tanks on the Lebanese-Israeli border (AP)

Lebanese fears became reality early Tuesday when the Israeli military announced a “limited ground operation” in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah.

This move comes after 15 days of escalating violence, which began with the explosion of Hezbollah’s pagers and communication devices and the assassination of key leaders, culminating in the killing of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah.

Israeli officials stated their intent to “do everything necessary to return northern residents” to their homes and to use “all means” to push Hezbollah “beyond the Litani River.”

These remarks are viewed as serious threats.

The issue of the Litani River gained attention again on August 11, 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701.

This resolution called for a complete ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel, ending the July war pitting Hezbollah against the Israeli army.

Resolution 1701 established a zone between the Blue Line, the border between Lebanon and Israel, and the Litani River in southern Lebanon, banning all armed groups and military equipment except for the Lebanese Armed Forces and UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL).

Hezbollah initially accepted the resolution but later violated it by fully redeploying in southern Lebanon.

Israel has also repeatedly breached the resolution, failing to withdraw from the occupied Lebanese territories of Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shouba Hills.

It has conducted numerous air violations and recently bombarded southern villages, displacing over a million Lebanese residents.

Retired military analyst Brig. Gen. Saeed Kozah told Asharq Al-Awsat that

Israel aims to push Hezbollah fighters beyond the Litani River, believing this would reduce the threat by about 40 kilometers from its settlements.

Meanwhile, as Israel ramped up its military actions against Lebanon, air raid sirens continued to sound in Israeli settlements near the border.

This followed Hezbollah’s launch of dozens of rockets at military sites and settlements, including the city of Haifa.

The area of southern Lebanon around the Litani River covers about 850 square kilometers and is home to around 200,000 residents, 75% of whom are Shiite.

Observers believe this is a key reason why Hezbollah is unwilling to withdraw from the region.

Kozah noted that Hezbollah’s refusal to retreat is tied to its desire to “declare victory,” similar to its stance after the 2006 July war, as it does not want to admit defeat.

Kozah stated that while a Hezbollah withdrawal would reduce direct ground and rocket attacks, it would not eliminate the risk of missiles launched from the Bekaa Valley and other parts of Lebanon.

He emphasized that Hezbollah’s ballistic missiles could be fired from various locations, including Syria.