Al-Qaeda Under Zawahiri and the Challenge of ISIS

ISIS lost its last stronghold last year. Can al-Qaeda benefit from the absence of its rival ? AFP
ISIS lost its last stronghold last year. Can al-Qaeda benefit from the absence of its rival ? AFP
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Al-Qaeda Under Zawahiri and the Challenge of ISIS

ISIS lost its last stronghold last year. Can al-Qaeda benefit from the absence of its rival ? AFP
ISIS lost its last stronghold last year. Can al-Qaeda benefit from the absence of its rival ? AFP

Who remembers the last operation that al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for? For many people, the answer will need some thought.

This question aims to shed light on what appears to be a clear decline of Qaeda’s role in planning and carrying out terrorist attacks around the world.

Qaeda’s activity began to recede during the leadership of Osama bin Laden. But its waning became more evident in the nine years that followed the man’s killing by the US commando raid on his hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan on the first of May, 2011 (US time).

A review conducted by Asharq Al-Awsat on the press publications, which were issued by Qaeda under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri, showed that the “general leadership” of the “jihad base” has turned from a direct base for attacks around the world to a promoter of operations in the areas of the group’s deployment.

It also appears, based on these publications, that al-Zawahiri leads the organization with the help of another Egyptian leader named Hossam Abdel-Raouf, also known as Abu Mohsen, who is in charge of the media activities.

A report by a US research center mentioned that there was another leader in the organization’s leadership assisting al-Zawahiri. It is his son-in-law, Abdul-Rahman al-Maghribi, who was reportedly killed in Waziristan in 2006. The current reports by Qaeda leadership do not include any indication that al-Maghribi is still alive.

In addition to Al-Zawahiri and Abu Mohsen, Qaeda's publications highlight a series of audiotapes of Hamza bin Laden, Osama’s son, who in turn called for carrying out attacks in revenge for his father’s death. He also urged the organization’s supporters to launch “lone-wolves” attacks in western and Arab countries.

Back then, Hamza was assuming an increasingly important position in the organization, which reinforced reports that he was preparing to be a potential successor to al-Zawahiri.

In a statement issued by the White House in September 2019, US President Donald Trump announced that Hamza bin Laden was killed in a US counterterrorism operation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.

His killing was part of US efforts to combat Qaeda’s activity and to deprive the group of a long succession of leaders, who were killed by raids often launched by drones on their hideouts in Waziristan on the Pakistani border with Afghanistan.

Many thought that the Arab world’s revolutions, known as “the Arab Spring” would constitute an opportunity for Qaeda’s revival.

However, the organization’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, seemed unable to reap the “fruits of the spring”, not only as a result of US pressure, but also because of the emergence of a fierce competitor from within its environment: ISIS.

Al-Baghdadi…The Decline of al-Qaeda

The emergence of ISIS, led by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, reflected the waning of al-Qaeda stars under Al-Zawahiri.

In the years that saw the movement’s rise, precisely in 2012, Baghdadi refused to submit to al-Zawahiri’s orders, specifically regarding al-Nusra Front, and went as far as to destroy the organization and eliminate its presence in large areas of Syria, in addition to competing with Qaeda in its strongholds around the world.

ISIS gained further strength through the field victories achieved by its fighters in Iraq and Syria. They took control of an area equivalent to the size of Britain, and established a “state”, which they called the “caliphate” in 2014. These successes attracted thousands of people from around the world, who flocked to Syria and Iraq. Many of them brought their families along to live in the purported “confines of the caliphate”.

Also, Baghdadi has resorted to a series of massive attacks in Western countries, some of which were carried out directly, as happened in the Paris and Brussels attacks of 2015 and 2016; while others were perpetrated indirectly, through a long series of “lone-wolves” attacks, carried out by ISIS supporters, who were unable to join in Syria and Iraq, due to the launching of operations of the international coalition against the organization.

Through these attacks, ISIS became the world’s first terrorist organization in the eyes of the Americans, who had previously honored Qaeda with that title.

However, Qaeda was severely battered by ISIS in Syria, where al-Zawahiri was betting on reviving his organization’s activity through al-Nusra Front, which was led by Abu Muhammad al-Jolani.

Qaeda, as it turned out, sent a number of its most distinguished veteran leaders and well-known figures (some of whom were residing in Iran) to Syria to empower al-Nusra against ISIS, on the one hand, and allow it to attract other groups that were also fighting the Syrian regime under Islamic slogans.

But the Americans knew that al-Nusra was nothing but a branch of Qaeda. The leader of the group, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, was forced to reject his allegiance to al-Zawahiri.

This disagreement prompted some of the Font’s senior members to declare their separation from al-Jolani and form another organization openly linked to Qaeda, under the name of “Guardians of the Religion”.

It was clear that the Syrian issue and the Islamists’ differences worried Zawahiri since the rise of Baghdadi in 2013.

In September 2015, Zawahiri called on his supporters to cooperate with ISIS in Syria and Iraq to counter the campaign launched by the international coalition against the organization. However, this did not lead to an improvement in relations between the two parties, but rather to its further deterioration.

Qaeda Branches

Apart from the Syrian defeat, Qaeda branch in East Africa, represented by the Somali al-Shabab movement, maintained the momentum of its activity, carrying out a series of attacks in the disintegrated Somalia and its neighbor, Kenya.

The US Command in Africa (AFRICOM) plays a pivotal role in facing al-Shabab, through a series of raids targeting the locations of the movement’s militants.

Since the beginning of 2020, AFRICOM has carried out more than 33 raids against al-Shabab, and has managed to kill many elements, including one of its founders, Yusuf Jiis, in April this year.

The Qaeda branch in the African Sahel region, represented by the Islamic and Muslim Front, was able to maintain the pace of its activities in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali - countries, where central governments suffer disintegration and their security forces, are unable to control large areas of their vast territories.

These countries also witness the activity of the ISIS branch, which has claimed responsibility huge operations in Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and the region surrounding Lake Chad. The future relationship between the two terrorist movements is still unclear, given that they are currently coexisting.

In Yemen, Qaeda lost its leader, Qasim Al-Rimi (Abu Hurairah Al-Sanani), in a US raid early this year. In February, Trump announced the killing of al-Rimi, who had taken over the leadership of Qaeda there since 2015. He was succeeded by Khaled Bin Omar Batarfi.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, Qaeda welcomed the US agreement with the Taliban movement, although this agreement clearly states the Taliban will not allow any activity launched from its territory against external parties, including the US

Qaeda Leadership After The Killing of Hamza Bin Ladan

Not much is currently known about those helping Zawahiri lead the organization, especially after the killing of Hamza bin Laden.

But Qaeda’s publications sometimes refer to another Egyptian figure, who appears to be playing an important role in the hierarchy of the organization: Hossam Abdel-Raouf, who is presented as Qaeda’s media official.

Last year, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) added him to the lists of most wanted people, noting that he was nicknamed “Abu Mohsen al-Masri,” born in Egypt in 1957.

In 2018, a US court charged him with conspiracy to provide material support and resources for a foreign terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, the relationship between Qaeda and ISIS is still mired in ambiguity in the wake of the US success in defeating the latter in Syria and the killing of Zawahri’s first rival, Baghdadi, in Idlib in October last year.

ISIS chose a new leader, Amir Muhammad Saeed Abdul Rahman al-Mawla (known as Abu Ibrahim al-Qurashi, Hajji Abdullah and Abu Omar al-Turkmani), who previously assumed a religious role in the ranks of Qaeda in Iraq.

Thus, Zawahiri will find himself now in confrontation with a new leader of ISIS, who emerged from the heart of Qaeda.



Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
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Eight Key Iranian Developments Following ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’

In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website
In December, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led the funeral prayer for Quds Force leader Razi Mousavi. Photo: Khamenei's website

As the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation by Hamas and the Gaza war began, Iran was already dealing with the fallout from protests sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, making the autumn of 2022 one of the bloodiest in the country’s recent history.

The war in Gaza erupted at a crucial time for Iran’s leadership, which was facing international pressure over its crackdown on protests, its drone supply to Russia, and stalled nuclear talks.

From the start, Tehran described Hamas’ attack as a “natural and spontaneous reaction” to what it called Israel's “provocative war policies” and actions by the far-right Israeli Prime Minister.

Iranian officials denied any role in planning the operation, but their diplomatic moves suggested they were prepared for the conflict’s impact on the region.

Less than a week after the attack, Iran’s late Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, began a regional tour, meeting with leaders of countries and groups allied with Iran, including in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar.

His aim was to coordinate efforts and send regional messages.

Iran also warned Israel that it could face multiple fronts if its military actions in Gaza didn’t stop.

Tehran has since worked to strengthen the image of armed groups in the region, pushing to legitimize its support for these factions amid the ongoing political and regional unrest.

This marked a key moment for Iran, as Tehran claimed it had elevated the “Resistance Axis” groups from a regional to a “global” level, referring to this shift as a move from the “World of Resistance” to the “Global Resistance.”

In doing so, Iran, which had been trying to ease tensions with its neighbors, adopted a more aggressive stance towards groups linked to it. Many saw this as part of Iran’s broader strategy to expand its influence across the region.

Officially, Iran told the international community that these groups act independently, make their own decisions, and produce their own weapons.

However, several Iranian officials have acknowledged the role of Gen. Qassem Soleimani and the Revolutionary Guards in supplying weapons and technology to these groups.

Iran’s second significant move after the Al-Aqsa Flood came a month into the Gaza war when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called for cutting off Israel’s “economic lifelines,” especially oil and energy routes.

Iranian-backed groups, especially the Houthis, began attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, disrupting shipping for months.

At the same time, Iran-aligned militias in Iraq launched drone attacks on Israel and US bases in the region.

The US responded after one of its bases in Syria was attacked, striking positions held by these militias.

Politically, Iran insisted that its allied groups’ demands be met for any Gaza ceasefire, and it opposed international peace proposals, especially the “two-state solution.”

In December, Iran’s foreign minister even noted that both Iran and Israel rejected the two-state plan.

In the third phase, Israel ramped up airstrikes against Iranian forces in Syria. In December, an Israeli strike killed Razi Mousavi, a key Iranian logistics officer.

A month later, the Revolutionary Guards confirmed the death of their intelligence chief in Syria. The biggest blow came in April, when an Israeli airstrike on a meeting at the Iranian consulate killed Gen. Mohammad Reza Zahdi, Iran’s top military commander in Syria and Lebanon.

In its fourth major escalation, Iran nearly went to war with Israel after responding to the bombing of its consulate by launching hundreds of missiles and drones directly from its territory.

Israel claimed it intercepted the attack but retaliated by striking a radar system at a military airport in Isfahan, near a key nuclear site.

This clash heightened fears of a shift in Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with growing talk in Tehran about developing deterrent weapons and Israel threatening to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities.

The fifth key moment for Iran followed the deaths of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in a helicopter crash near the Azerbaijani border. Authorities quickly denied conspiracy theories, ruling out an Israeli attack.

Three months later, Iran’s military confirmed the crash was caused by bad weather, but some questions remained unanswered.

During this period, Iran’s political focus shifted away from the Gaza war due to the presidential election and efforts to form a new government.

Candidates in the election avoided discussing the Gaza conflict or Iran’s support for Hamas, despite criticism over ignoring pressing issues like sanctions and stalled nuclear negotiations.

Most candidates only praised Iran’s missile program and vowed to strengthen deterrence against Israel.

The sixth major event occurred during the inauguration of Iran's new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, on July 30, when Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated at a Quds Force facility in northern Tehran, marking a significant turn in the Gaza war.

Khamenei promised to respond to the “violation of Iranian sovereignty” following the assassination of a “guest of Iran.”

Officials and military leaders varied in their tone and language of threats but consistently stressed the need for a response as time passed and doubts about Iran’s actions increased.

Haniyeh's assassination in Tehran raised significant questions about the operation, especially regarding potential security breaches.

The seventh key moment was marked by the “Pager Bombings,” alongside a message of de-escalation from Pezeshkian, particularly towards the US and Israel.

Before traveling to New York, Pezeshkian stated at a press conference that Iran does not want to destabilize the region or export its revolution. He expressed a willingness to engage with the US if it shows it is not hostile, even referring to the US as “brotherly.”

During meetings at the UN General Assembly, he reiterated, “Iran is ready to set aside its weapons if Israel does the same,” according to an audio recording.

Pezeshkian explained that the delay in Iran’s response to Haniyeh’s assassination was due to indications that a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas was imminent, expressing frustration over the lack of progress and ongoing Israeli attacks.

Pezeshkian downplayed Hezbollah’s ability to confront Israel independently, challenging the narrative from officials close to Khamenei.

His remarks, along with concerns about possible security breaches during the “Pager Bombings” and the targeting of Hezbollah leaders, raised suspicions in Tehran about vulnerabilities in Iran’s defense and heightened fears of internal security lapses.

The eighth and most critical phase began with the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, a key figure in Iran’s regional strategy, second only to Gen. Soleimani.

The Israeli airstrike on Nasrallah’s headquarters also led to a significant loss for the Revolutionary Guards.

Nasrallah is highly regarded among Iran’s leaders, especially conservatives. His name has occasionally been mentioned as a potential successor to Khamenei, but such a candidacy would likely face opposition from various political factions due to his non-Iranian status.

In response to the assassinations of Haniyeh and Nasrallah, Iran launched its second direct missile attack on Israel.

This prompted Israel to threaten retaliation, indicating it could target various facilities, including oil refineries, fuel stations, and nuclear and military sites.

The situation between Israel and Iran remains highly volatile, with the potential for further escalation.