Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria
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Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

Jeffrey to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia Is Aware What Kind of Ally It Has in Syria

US Ambassador James Jeffrey, the State Department’s special representative for the Syrian war and the fight against ISIS, said the US supports "in every possible way", diplomatically and logistically, Israeli raids on Iranian sites in Syria.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Jeffrey said that "Iran has very established footholds in the Syrian state and within Syrian society, "noting that many Arab countries" will never be in harmony with a man like (President Bashar) Assad. They can claim that they can distance him from the Iranian orbit, but I see that this is absolutely not possible."

The American envoy emphasized that his country will continue to impose sanctions on Damascus, and "we support the entry into force of sanctions on the Syrian regime until its acceptance of a political solution," explaining: "Economic sanctions make the situation worse for the circle of people very close to the head of the regime, and this is what we are always trying to reach."

And we want to make it clear to these figures that there is no clear future for them if they continue to support Assad. They should rather press for political transition. ” He pointed out that the recent Russian media campaign against Damascus is evidence that Moscow is also aware of “what kind of ally” they have in Syria today. He said that Idlib is "the citadel of opposition” and will not return to Damascus soon.

Here is the text of the exclusive interview that Asharq Al-Awsat did by Phone Thursday:

· Let’s start with Covid-19. Could you give me your assessment? Also, yesterday in the Security Council the Russians once again rejected reopening Yarobiyeh, the crossing between Iraq and Syria. What is your assessment on that as well?

First of all, we’re following the situation of the coronavirus throughout Syria. We have to look at it in three different areas; the northeast where we have the best eyes on, the northwest where we rely on Turkish information, and of course the regime areas which are totally under-reported and under-represented. We have only notional information from the regime areas. We think that there’s a considerable amount of cases there, but we can’t measure it. We do not see at the moment a significant outbreak of the virus in the northwest, but of course with so many people jammed together and with such bad medical support, particularly as the Russians and Syrians have bombed most of the hospitals and other medical facilities there, that would be of great concern.

In the northeast, there have been one or two reports of infections but we are yet to see a significant outbreak.

To some degree the few reported cases are due to the limit on travel in and out of the country, other than for the Iranians who we think spread it initially in regime areas. So the effects of it have been limited but that can change at any time. The UN is worried about this, the WHO is worried about this, and we are as well.

The Russians and the regime by blocking the transfer of medical supplies to those areas where Assad does not hold sway of course have made the situation worse. It’s Assad’s fault. It’s his fault in his own areas for having devastated his own country and not caring about its people. He is even more at fault in those areas not under his control that he denies assistance to, even though that is his responsibility as the sovereign entity in Syria.

*Do you think being in this pandemic paves the way for renewal or updating of the UN Security Council resolution regarding the humanitarian border crossing? Because I think we’re supposed to be in June/July, and directions in December?

In July, UNSC 2504 has to be renewed. It is our hope that Russia will renew at a minimum the two crossings in the northwest. We are very, very insistent on that, and we would also like to see a new crossing to service the northeast. As you know the crossing there, the Rabia crossing, was blocked from being included in the new resolution by the Russians and Chinese so that is where we are.

· As you may know in the last few weeks, even months, since the beginning of the pandemic the Russians and the regime twisted the whole argument. They’re saying now that they’re blaming the US and the European sanctions. What is your reaction to that?

The collapse of the Lebanon monetary and financial system has nothing to do with our sanctions, and that is perhaps the biggest impact on Assad. Frankly his own bad management is the second reason he is in such dire economic shape, and then thirdly, it’s the fact that this country is still at war and important areas, including agriculture and energy-producing areas, are not under his control, nor should they be until he accepts a compromise political settlement. That is why he is faced with great economic difficulties that are impacting all of the people. Our sanctions do not include sanctions on humanitarian or medical goods, those items can flow freely. And the sanctions are carefully selected and packaged to target regime figures and not the average person.

· In May/June I think the Europeans, the EU are supposed to renew their sanctions, so what is your view on that?

We are very much in favor of these sanctions staying in place until the Regime accepts a political solution. We see the glimmer of hope in the longer-term ceasefire in Idlib and the regime’s acquiescence in a common agenda for the constitutional committee in Geneva. These things would not have happened without the tough position of the international community, be it the Turks in Idlib or all of our efforts maintaining our sanctions. So we are really happy that the EU is maintaining them.

· What would you tell some Syrians who buy the narrative of the regime and blame the US for their suffering?

I cannot help anyone if after almost a decade of Assad’s terror, they still believe Assad over the international community.

· In this regard, we saw some new developments by some Arab countries who reconnected with Damascus and they took the pandemic as a pretext. Did you speak with those Arab countries? And if you did, what did you tell them?

That’s kind of vague without identifying which Arab countries. The Arab countries I am thinking of, and I do not want to disclose them publicly but we know who they are, we are talking to them constantly.

We think two things. First of all they will have no impact. They will not win any prizes from Assad. We saw when one of them, and this one I can name because it has been discussed in the media, the UAE extended diplomatic recognition and they got nothing from Assad. I think they barely got a thank you. We know as well that they’re not going to change his policies nor are they going to undercut our policy.

We think that some people in the region have the mistaken idea, even though I am in media all the time, and Secretary Pompeo and President Trump speak out frequently on Syria, that maybe there is another American policy that allows us to be friends with Assad. There is no such American policy. There will never be such an American policy. There wasn’t even such a policy under the Obama administration.

· In this regard what do you expect from the Arab Summit that is due in June but might be delayed a little bit. The Algerians are now working hard to bring the Syrians back to the Arab League.

Our question to the Arab League is: What has changed from when you took the decision (to freeze Syria membership in 2012)? Have fewer people died now had died then? We think the number now is almost 500,000 Arab citizens of Syria. That is not a very encouraging thing to invite them back. Has the Regime complied with any of the UN calls for reconciliation? No.

What percent of the population has been ridden from their homes or fled their homes due to the regime in 2012 when the Arab League took the decision? Perhaps 5-10 percent of the population. What percentage of that population today? 50 percent.

The Arab League has to ask itself: Does it just have as an interlocutor states or does it also have as an interlocutor people of those states? Because the people of this state, Syria, have shown repeatedly their courage and their commitment by half the population fleeing Assad’s rule.

· Some Arab countries believe that by bringing the regime back to the League, maybe they would distance it away from Iran. What do you think?

It’s a crazy idea. First of all, Iran is deeply embedded in the Syrian state and society. It’s not as bad as Hezbullah in Lebanon or with the Militias in Iraq, and I know both situations, particularly Iraq, very well. But it is very concerning, not just to us, we know it is also concerning to the regime and the Russians. You have militias that are created and paid for by the Iranian government and reports to the Iranian government.

But the other thing is, and people really need to think about this, Syria is a state where Assad’s brutality to his own people is unique in the world, even faced with Venezuela or North Korea. Assad only knows one tool, butchering his population, particularly the Sunni Arab population.

Now, does anybody think he’s going to change his ways? It is one thing to think he is going to change his alliance with Iran, I don’t think he can but at least theoretically it is possible. But does anyone think he is going to change the way he rules and the population is going to accept this mass murderer, this uber torturer as leader? No. He has to run an absolutely horrific brutal totalitarian state.

What country is willing to accept a partnership with a brute like that? We only know of two, Russia and Iran. We do not think the decent countries of the Gulf and the Arab World would be in the same bed with someone like him. They can claim they can wean him away from Iran, I doubt that very much. Will these countries provide the ground forces, the Hizbullah troops, and the Shia from Afghanistan and other countries to keep the Sunni Arab and many other ethnic groups in the opposition from attacking Assad? No, they won't go that far and I don’t think they will sign up to support a government as terrible as Assad’s. They won’t bear the responsibility. That is something Iran and Russia will have to do.

· Recently, there were a lot of Israeli airstrikes around Damascus, Damascus - Beirut highway, and in Palmyra. What is your view on this?

The US supports Israel’s efforts to secure its self-defense. Israel is facing an existential threat from Iran, as they have said a thousand times that their mission is to destroy Israel. The Iranians are in Syria in large numbers, passing on long-range weapon systems to Hezbullah that threaten Israel. We know probably two elements associated with the Iranians, also in Syria, and Israel has the right to take whatever action it needs, being careful about Syrian casualties which the Israelis are, for the goal of saving Israel. Therefore, we are supportive of them in any way we can.

· What kind of support? Political or Logistical? Through the Tanf military base?

We give the support that is needed for effective Israeli actions to protect itself, and in protecting itself it is protecting all neighbors of Assad: Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon.

· The Israeli Minister of Defense said recently that this is to finish, not limit, the Iranian influence on Syria. Do you think that is possible?

Our policy is that all Iranian-commanded forces have to leave Syria, along with frankly all other military forces that entered after 2011. This includes the United States, if all of the reports are correct about the Israeli Air Force that would include the Israelis, and it would include the Turks.

· And the Russians?

The Russians entered before 2011, therefore they are exempt. Everyone else came after the war had begun. If there is a political solution to the war, and neighbors such as Israel and Turkey no longer feel threatened by the situation in Syria, we think they would be willing to let the country return to normal. As far as we are concerned, returning to normal is our goal and that means, among others, all Iranian-commanded forces have to leave.

· You said earlier that the sanctions are working, and that there are indications proving that. What are they?

Given the incompetence of the Assad administration, who is good at sucking the blood, literally and figuratively, in terms of money, goods, and property from its own people and in running a corrupt financial and economic system, but are not good at holding the country together and attracting foreign investments, they have done much of the damage themselves. Who would invest in a country Assad runs? They have also destroyed much of their own infrastructure, driven away a large percentage of the country’s doctors, and on and on.

It’s hard to say if you look at the unlimited fall of the Syrian pound (now 1300 to the US dollar) and the claims by people who are trying to support the regime that they have lost $244 billion, four times the GDP of the country, in the last few years because of the war, it is very hard to say what is due to the Regime’s own actions and what part of it is due to the sanctions. I would say that in general, in terms of the economy, it is mainly what the Regime has done to itself. Sanctions make life hard for those people in the inner circle, and that is what we are trying to get at. To make it clear to them that they don’t have an economic future by supporting Assad. They need to push for a political transition in Syria.

· You say the sanctions will push the regime to change its behavior?

We think it is a combination of everything. The 50 percent of the population that’s fled, stripping the country of most of its demographic resources, or much of it. The major swaths of territory that are not under Assad’s hand and unlikely to come into his hands because significant outside powers, including the US, who are on the ground. The pummeling (attacks) that the Iranians and the Syrians are getting from the air (Israeli Strikes) with ever more aggressive and effective airstrikes. The lack of reconstruction assistance. The ostracism of the Regime by the Arab League and by the Europeans.

We think that at the end of the day this formula will push the regime to eventually seek a negotiated settlement rather than claim a military victory and no compromise, which is what they have been doing up until now.

· You just said that keeping regime out of Idlib is a strategic thing. Right?

Yes. That is correct

· And you said that you want Turkey to fight extremists in Idlib?

Yes, we do. And we see signs that they are, more effectively.

How can you combine those two goals, keep Idlib out of the regime’s control and fight terrorism? And what do you think of the Turkish Russian deal over Idlib?

I think the deal will maintain as long as Turkey continues pressure on HTS. We do not see HTS as a serious threat to Russian forces, as they claim. It is a threat to all of us because it is a terrorist organization, and it is a threat to the more moderate and armed opposition in Idlib, which is of concern to us.

We see no reason, no excuse, no justification for this offensive (regime in Idlib) to start up again. By the same token, we are happy that the Turks are dealing independently with HTS. They committed to that in September 2018 and in the most recent agreement and that is a good thing.

· And you think that deal is holding?

I think that it will hold for the next few months, at least.

· Let move to North East of Syria which is where the American forces are. Recently we have noticed the Russians sending more military enforcement and they took a Qamshli military base and are getting closer and closer to the Americans. What is your assessment of the situation?

The Russians have some lightly armed military police units, they travel around in three, four, five vehicles, and sometimes they’re here, sometimes they’re there, but there is no Russian significant military force on the ground. There is no Russian occupation. Frankly, the Syrian government, other than in a few bases in Qamishli and the city of Deir El Zoor, has no real presence either. There are a few outposts and a few patrols. The people with the large, tens of thousands forces on the ground is the SDF, our partner against ISIS.

· In December, President Trump spoke of withdrawing from the North East of Syria and the Americans are there now. How long will they remain?

We will remain there until we have completed our military mission of the enduring the defeat of ISIS.

· Can we say it is an open-ended presence there?

I would never say the word open-ended. I would say only what I have just said.

· What would you tell your allies, the SDF, in advance before pulling out?

Pulling out of northeast Syria is not on the agenda, as we have not seen yet the enduring defeat of ISIS.

· Back to the current relationship between Washington and Moscow. There were some talks between some American officials and Russian officials in Washington, Moscow, and Vienna. Where are we in that regard? Is the step-by-step approach still valid?

As you know, we have various levels of talks with the Russians. We maintain generally our radio silence on these talks. One exception was when Mike Pompeo traveled to Sochi to meet with FM Lavrov and President Putin to talk about Syria and to talk about our efforts to get a compromised solution. We laid the whole thing out to both Putin and Lavrov and we did a joint press conference with Lavrov. It’s all on the record.

What do you make of the Russian media criticism of Assad?

We think that Russia knows very well what’s going on in the country. We think Russia knows what sort of ally they have in the Syrian President. And we think those articles speak for themselves.

· Do you think the Russians are upset with Damascus?

I think the articles speak for themselves. You are a journalist and when you write your articles, you want us to read what you write. Right? Then, believe what is printed in the papers.

· Did the Russians convey the same thing with you?

We do not share the details of diplomatic exchanges with our valued Russian interlocutors.

· We Know the OPCW report blamed Damascus for Ltamneh (Hamah) chemical attack in 2017 and we know that Damascus dined that. What is the next step?

The OPCW is reporting its findings to the UN Security Council, which were dramatic, and talk not just about Regime forces using chemical weapons but that the decisions were taken at the highest levels of the government to do so.

Meanwhile, the Security Council is also dealing with the UN Board of inquiry that found the regime, and to some degree the Russians, culpable for exploiting the UN’s passing of coordinates of humanitarian installations that should be on a no strike list, but in fact were deliberately struck.

We see the UN, from OCHA Chief Mark Lowcock to Secretary-General Guterres himself, speaking out in very clear and tough terms of the humanitarian risks of closing these border crossings from Iraq and eventually Turkey and the failure of the regime to allow crossline transfers of humanitarian goods to those areas. We see German courts pursuing Assad’s torturers who had gone after Syrian citizens. These citizens and their torturers now find themselves in Germany with cases open against them.

This is just the tip of the iceberg of all of the accountability efforts that we, the UN, the international community, and the media are doing to expose, that’s the word I would use, expose the absolute moral bankruptcy of that regime and those who are associated with it.

· What about the UN peace process? We hear UN special Envoy Mr. Gier Pederson saying that he made a deal between regime and opposition about agenda of the constitutional committee?

Pederson has this account and we support him 150 percent, including his call for a nationwide ceasefire. We support his efforts to build on the agreement on the agenda. That is a small, but important step forward.

· Do you think that it is realistic to talk about presidential elections under UN auspices in 2021?

We think the elections are the right way to go. If Assad holds his elections, this year or next year, they will have none, zero international credibility. They will be dismissed by the international community. The international community will redouble its efforts to pursue real elections monitored by the UN. That is the way forward. That is what the US supports.

The policy that we are pursuing is not going to change. We look very much forward to working with the media and the voices and people of the entire Middle East in speaking as one to call for a political solution and an end to the fighting.

· It this realistic?

Some people think it is not realistic. I don’t know but two years ago people thought that it was unrealistic to think that the last citadel of the armed opposition in Idlib would hold out for very long. Two years later there it is. Some people thought it was impossible for the Syrian Opposition and representatives of the Syrian government could meet together in Geneva, they have done so. Trust us that we are not only pursuing this policy, we think it has had some limited success and we think it has the potential to have a great deal more success.



Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967

Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Amr Moussa: I Lost Faith in Nasser on June 5, 1967

Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Amr Moussa speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Some politicians fade into isolation after losing the blessing of powerbrokers and surrendering their office keys. A rare few retain their presence and shine, even without official seals. Amr Moussa is among the latter.

Now in his late 80s, Moussa remains an active observer of events and transformations. For more than half a century, he was a key player or close witness to milestones that reshaped the Arab world.

He served as Egypt’s ambassador to the United Nations before becoming foreign minister, and later took on the arduous role of Secretary-General of the Arab League.

The position placed him at the heart of regional diplomacy, navigating divergent leaders and unpredictable politics — from Saddam Hussein and Hafez al-Assad to Muammar Gaddafi and Yasser Arafat.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Moussa opened up his rich memory vault, reflecting candidly on pivotal events and prominent figures. His remarks were marked by unease about Egypt’s future.

“Mistakes have been piling up. Egypt is paying the price for 70 years of poor governance,” he said.

He recalled the morning of June 5, 1967 — the start of the Six-Day War — as the moment he stopped believing in President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “At 9 am, I realized the official statements were lies. Egypt was in danger.”

Moussa praised former President Anwar Sadat for what he called a “very sound” decision to regain all Egyptian land lost in the war, noting that the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, remain under Israeli occupation.

He was not asked about the ongoing Israeli military campaign in Gaza, a topic on which he has been outspoken. His condemnation of Israeli actions has been clear in his public statements and regular contributions to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Good Governance

Asked whether he was worried about Egypt’s future, Moussa did not hesitate.

“Of course I’m worried—and worry is a good thing,” he said. “Not being worried means you’re living in a fantasy. With all these crises we’re facing—global, regional, and local—how could anyone not be concerned? I am among those who are.”

Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister and Arab League chief, said Egypt’s most pressing challenge is its rapidly growing population. He voiced support for the slogan of the “New Republic” often seen on state television, saying the country urgently needs a fresh start—but one rooted in genuine reform.

“We need a new republic, and that can only be built through full implementation of good governance,” he said.

Explaining what that means, Moussa invoked the principle of communicating vessels: “The education sector, healthcare, defense, foreign policy, food supply, even sports and civil administration—they must all be treated with equal importance, and developed in parallel.”

Moussa noted that Egypt’s path to revival lies in managing its wealth—not in claiming poverty.

“We need to focus on people, on buildings, and on agriculture,” Moussa said. “And by buildings, I don’t just mean roads. I mean roads, hotels, architecture, and beautiful cities. Urban elegance matters.”

He pointed to Cairo’s historical neighborhoods as examples of past glory.

“When you walk through Old Cairo, Fustat, or the city of Al-Muizz, you see a grandeur from another time,” he said. “And when you look at Khedival Cairo, you see the elegance of the late 19th century that lasted through the 1950s. But today, there is no real interest in cities—or villages.”

Moussa rejected the notion that Egypt is poor.

“Egypt is not a poor country. It’s a mismanaged one,” he said. “What we need is better wealth management, better resource extraction, and stronger trade. These ideas are on the table now. There’s a new government in place, and we hope it brings new policies that reflect today’s realities. This is possible.”

The Day Faith in Nasser Died

Moussa’s reflections on governance brought him back to a deeply personal turning point—June 5, 1967, the day Israel launched a devastating surprise attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

“It was a painful day in Egypt’s history, in Arab history, and for Nasser’s leadership,” he said.

At the time, Moussa was a young diplomat and a passionate supporter of Nasser.

“I was part of the Vanguard Organization, following Egypt’s political path closely—non-alignment, rejection of foreign alliances, Arab unity. All of it embodied in what Nasser stood for,” he recalled.

Though raised in a liberal Wafd Party family in rural Egypt, Moussa said his early political consciousness was shaped by the Palestinian cause.

“We’d talk about Palestine in the village. It was the first political issue I ever heard of,” he said. “I remember hearing Abdel Wahab’s song: ‘My brother, the oppressors have gone too far’—I’ll never forget it.”

That sense of solidarity, combined with Egypt’s political narrative and artistic expression, drew Moussa toward Nasserism. But it all came crashing down on that June morning in 1967.

“I was on my way to work, hearing reports on the radio of Israeli planes being downed, bold statements from Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi about nearing Tel Aviv—massive declarations,” he said.

When he arrived at the Foreign Ministry, the picture changed dramatically.

“There was a flood of real information—and it was completely different. We were being lied to,” Moussa said. “It was a mutual delusion: I lie to you, and you lie to me. But this wasn’t a game. The country was in danger.”

Moments later, he heard a BBC report claiming Israeli forces had reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

“I was stunned,” he said. “A young man, just beginning to understand the world, already inside the diplomatic corps—and suddenly, everything I believed in collapsed.”

“That was it,” he added. “At 9 a.m. on June 5, 1967, I stopped believing in Nasser.”

Despite his political break with the late Egyptian president, Moussa admits he still finds himself captivated by Nasser’s voice.

“I still follow what’s published about Nasser on social media and listen to his speeches,” Moussa said.

“Whenever one comes on, I stop everything to hear it—even though I know how the story ends. We’re in the 21st century, and I know the outcome. But I still feel a kind of sympathy, as if hoping that what he promised would come true. I know it didn’t. But his charisma still holds me.”

The former diplomat said Nasser’s appeal remains stronger for him than even Egypt’s greatest musical icons.

“If there’s a beautiful song by Umm Kulthum or Abdel Wahab playing at the same time as a Nasser speech, I turn off the music and listen to Nasser,” he said. “That’s the first part.”

A Costly Gamble

But Moussa draws a sharp line between personal admiration and political accountability.

“My belief—or lack of belief—in Nasser comes down to responsibility,” he said. “When a national disaster like that happens, the responsibility lies with the head of state. No question.”

He sharply criticized Egypt’s military posture in the lead-up to the 1967 war with Israel, when much of the army was tied down in Yemen.

“You’re playing a dangerous game on both the regional and international level with Israel, while a large part of your army is deployed in Yemen—and your forces aren’t ready?” he asked. “At the very least, you should have considered the possibility of being attacked. Who’s going to defend the country?”

Moussa added: “This was a massive miscalculation. No one should gamble with their country’s fate. War and peace decisions cannot rest in the hands of one man. Many of us hold Nasser responsible and are deeply saddened by what happened. In contrast, what Sadat did afterward was, in my view, absolutely the right thing.”

The Swiss Food Controversy

Moussa also addressed past controversy over his remark that Nasser had special food sent from Switzerland while Egyptians were enduring hardship.

“To be clear, if you go back to the original wording, I never said it like that,” he said. “I was speaking more broadly about how people—especially the poor—can be taken in by a leader with great charisma.”

He explained that, during his diplomatic posting in Switzerland, certain items were brought for Nasser, who was diabetic.

“There were specific food products meant for people with diabetes. This wasn’t about indulgence,” Moussa said. “Perhaps there were other luxurious items added, but the original purpose was medical, not pleasure.”

Moussa has stood by his controversial comments about Nasser receiving diabetic-friendly food from Switzerland, insisting the issue was misunderstood and politically weaponized.

“This happened in the 1960s, and at the time, Cairo didn’t have access to such medical food,” Moussa said. “As president, of course, he had the right to obtain special dietary items due to his diabetes. But my point was about the perception of leadership—how ordinary people can view their leader as the greatest in the world.”

Moussa recalled an Egyptian envoy who collected the food supplies and spoke of Nasser with unwavering reverence. “He would say things like, ‘Mr. Amr, we have the greatest president in the world.’ It was a reflection of the aura Nasser had,” he added.

He said his remarks were intended to highlight how a leader’s image can become idealized, especially among the public. But they sparked backlash from Nasser loyalists.

“Some of them twisted it, asking: ‘Could Nasser, the champion of the poor, really be importing food from Switzerland?’ No, he wasn’t ordering gourmet meals,” Moussa said. “This was food for a diabetic patient—unavailable in Cairo at the time.”

He insisted he never changed his account of what happened. “Recently, Ambassador Mounir Zahran confirmed the same details in an interview with Al Arabiya,” Moussa said. “We have no reason to fabricate anything.”

Crossing the Bar Lev Line: A Nation's Pride Restored

Reflecting on Egypt’s 1973 war against Israel, Moussa described the crossing of the heavily fortified Bar Lev Line as a moment of national catharsis.

“It was overwhelming happiness—not personal joy, but national pride,” he said. “The Egyptian army, our soldiers and officers, performed brilliantly. It was the first time Israel’s army, long touted as invincible, was defeated in battle. That crossing, that breach of the Bar Lev Line—it was monumental.”

Moussa said the 1973 war helped Egypt begin to recover from the humiliation of its 1967 defeat.

“We had to respond to the insult, and that was the first step,” he said. “The Egyptian people would never have accepted continued occupation.”

He praised President Sadat for charting a strategic path that combined military precision with diplomatic foresight.

“Sadat made the right call,” Moussa said. “He ensured the army was properly trained, understood the limitations, and complemented the battlefield effort with political and diplomatic moves. This comprehensive approach led to Israel’s full withdrawal from Sinai. As an Egyptian, I could never accept that a small country like Israel should occupy such a large part of our land. I never accepted that defeat.”

Nasser vs. Sadat: A Clash of Leadership Styles

Asked about the enduring rivalry between supporters of Nasser and Sadat, Moussa acknowledged a clear divide.

“Of course, there’s competition between their followers—both in style and substance,” he said. “Nasser’s model was centered on the individual leader. Sadat, too, had a strong personal streak. He even described himself as the ‘last of the pharaohs.’”

Moussa’s reflections reveal a deep reverence for the history he witnessed—along with a willingness to reassess Egypt’s leadership legacy with a critical eye.

Sadat was deeply motivated by a sense of responsibility to reclaim Egyptian territory and restore the dignity of the military after the 1967 defeat by Israel, said Moussa.

“Sadat felt it was his duty to recover the land and to avenge the humiliation of the Egyptian army. That emotional drive was a powerful psychological force,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Quoting his longtime friend and former diplomat Mostafa El-Feki, Moussa drew a sharp distinction between Egypt’s two most iconic post-revolution presidents: “Nasser was a great leader, but Sadat was a true statesman. He thought in terms of the state and how to govern it.”

“Sadat’s top priority,” Moussa added, “was responding to what happened on June 5, 1967—and he was absolutely right.”

While Sadat approached leadership from the perspective of governance and national interest, Moussa said Nasser’s identity was inseparable from his charismatic style of leadership. “For Nasser, leadership wasn’t just a role—it was a core part of who he was.”

Sadat’s Visit to Knesset ‘Felt Like a Moon Landing’

Moussa recalled the moment Sadat addressed the Israeli Knesset in 1977—an unprecedented move that stunned the Arab world and paved the way for the Camp David Accords.

“It was a very complex moment emotionally,” he said. “I was working at the Foreign Ministry in Cairo at the time. Some parts of Sadat’s speech were actually drafted there. But the initiative itself—it felt like the moon landing.”

He remembered being in Alexandria when the visit took place, coinciding with an upcoming holiday.

“The streets were empty. Just like the day humans first set foot on the moon,” he said. “It was bold. No words were needed to describe the courage behind it.”

Moussa described the speech as carefully worded, balanced, and free of unnecessary concessions.

“There was strength in that address,” he said. “It was not about surrender—it was about taking control of our destiny.”

Sadat’s historic 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset was penned by two of Egypt’s most prominent political minds at the time—journalist Moussa Sabri and senior diplomat Osama El-Baz—according to former foreign minister Amr Moussa, who worked closely with El-Baz.

“The main contributors to the speech were Moussa Sabri, then editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, and Osama El-Baz, who headed the Foreign Minister’s office. I was working with El-Baz at the time,” Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The message in the speech was clear: Egypt was ready for peace—but not at any cost. Peace had to be based on principles, definitions, and conditions,” he said. “That’s the approach we adopted—negotiating along two tracks: one focused on Egypt and its occupied territories, the other on Palestine.”

Ceausescu’s Quiet Influence

Moussa dismissed the idea that Sadat’s decision to visit Israel was suggested by the United States. “The idea came from Sadat himself,” he said. “He developed it on his own. He wanted to take a bold step that would shake the world and push Israel toward a peaceful resolution—primarily to secure its withdrawal from Egyptian territory.”

However, Moussa did not rule out the influence of some Eastern European leaders close to Israel at the time—particularly Romanian Communist leader Nicolae Ceausescu.

“It’s possible Ceausescu encouraged Sadat or was consulted. We read that Sadat specifically asked about (Israeli Prime Minister) Menachem Begin—who he was, and whether it would be worthwhile to meet him,” Moussa said.

“Ceausescu apparently told Sadat: ‘If you get a deal with a right-wing leader like Begin, it will hold. But if it’s someone from the left, the right will turn against him.’ That was part of the reasoning—but again, it was not an American idea.”

Moussa added: “If something else happened behind the scenes that neither I nor Osama El-Baz knew about, I highly doubt it.”

Would He Have Gone to Jerusalem?

When asked if he would have joined Sadat on the trip to Jerusalem had he been foreign minister at the time, Moussa paused.

“I don’t know,” he said. “I was working with Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, who refused to go. Others, like Boutros Ghali and Mostafa Khalil, did go—Khalil later became both foreign minister and prime minister.”

“Opinion in Egypt was split. Sadat wasn’t going to Israel for tourism or normalization just to please others—he went because Egyptian land was still under occupation,” Moussa said. “It came after the October War and the diplomatic complications that followed. I can’t say yes or no with certainty.”

Arafat, Assad and the Camp David Opportunity

Moussa believes Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat missed a historic opportunity by not joining Sadat in the peace process that culminated in the Camp David Accords.

“I think Arafat was afraid,” Moussa said in a wide-ranging interview. “Had he aligned with Sadat, Egypt would have supported him, and he might have gained something significant.”

Moussa argued that the Palestinian section of the Camp David framework—offering full autonomy as a prelude to negotiations on a Palestinian state—could have laid the groundwork for a very different future.

“Imagine if that had been implemented back then,” he said. “Of course, you could argue—and I still tell myself—that Israel’s strategy to prevent the creation of a Palestinian state has been in place since the partition plan was first issued.”

On Assad and the Missed Golan Opportunity

Asked whether Syrian President Hafez al-Assad made a mistake by not joining Sadat’s peace initiative, Moussa said Sadat never actually asked Assad to participate—only to wait and see what might come of it.

“Sadat told him: ‘If I succeed, everyone will benefit. If I fail, I’ll bear the responsibility,’” Moussa recalled.

He also addressed long-standing rumors that Assad contemplated detaining Sadat during a visit to Damascus. “No, that was never going to happen—although, according to reports we’ve read, some hotheads may have entertained the idea. But that’s not based on confirmed information.”

Turning to the strategic importance of the Golan Heights, Moussa stressed that Israel’s continued occupation remains a major obstacle to regional peace.

“You cannot build a new regional order with Israel expanding into the Golan or controlling most of it,” he said. “This is not feasible—it will continue to be a source of anxiety, tension, and regional instability.”

Moussa dismissed nationalist slogans, saying his stance stemmed from a desire for peace and regional cooperation.

“There should be no occupation in Syria, Palestine, or Lebanon,” he said. “Let’s be honest: which of us would willingly gift land to Israel, for no reason and with no justification?”

The Day Sadat Was Assassinated

Reflecting on the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, Moussa recalled the shock and sorrow he felt.

“I was then deputy head of Egypt’s delegation to the United Nations,” he said. “Ambassador Esmat Abdel Meguid, who led the delegation, had gone on pilgrimage, so I was acting head when the assassination happened.”

Worried about how the UN would respond, Moussa immediately called Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

“I told him there had been a major attack on Sadat—I couldn’t confirm his death yet—but we should prepare a memorial session for later that day. If we wait until tomorrow, political interference might get in the way.”

As news of Sadat’s death emerged from the White House, Moussa called Cairo again. “I said: the Americans are announcing that the president is dead. Either confirm this or tell me to remain silent—but I can’t ignore an official statement from the US.”

Minutes later, Cairo confirmed the news.

Diplomatic Tensions and a Handshake Dodged

As the UN prepared for the memorial, Moussa received another challenge: Israel wanted to speak during the tribute.

“I couldn’t stop them,” he said. “The president [of the General Assembly] would give them the floor.”

Moussa anticipated that the head of the Israeli delegation would try to shake his hand.

“I asked one of our delegates to stand a few meters away. If the Israeli ambassador approaches, greet him and accept the condolences,” he said. “And that’s exactly what happened—the ambassador hugged him and got it out of his system.”

When the Israeli envoy reached Moussa, he offered a handshake. “I shook his hand dryly to avoid an embrace. The cameras were rolling. He gave his condolences and left.”