‘Affiliation to Kurdistan’ Poses Predicament to Syrian Kurdish Parties

Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
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‘Affiliation to Kurdistan’ Poses Predicament to Syrian Kurdish Parties

Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)
Women hold stacks of bread as they walk along an empty street after restrictions are imposed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus in Qamishli, Syria, March 23, 2020. (Reuters)

Posters of prominent Kurdish leaders can be seen at a traditional Kurdish clothes store in Qamishli, in northeastern Syria. Posters of the late Mala Mustafa Barzani, his son former president Masoud Barzani and Abdullah Ocalan, founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, can be seen alongside the banners of various Kurdish organizations from Iraq and Turkey.

Ocalan’s posters are seen at the autonomous region’s institutions that were established by the Syrian Democratic Union Party in early 2014. Barzani posters are seen at the offices and headquarters of the Kurdish national council.

After nearly two months of talks in April and May, the two main Kurdish factions reached, through the sponsorship of US envoy to Syria William Roebuck, a form of political vision. More discussions will continue during future rounds of talks with the aim of reaching a united stance.

The Kurds in Syria, however, appear pessimistic about the possibility of the Kurdish parties being able to “lead them out of the dark tunnel that they have dragged them into.”

A local activist said that the affiliation of Kurdish parties in Syria to Kurdistan have played a role in the success of understandings, but they have negatively impacted the interests of Syria’s Kurds.

She explained that each foreign power has its own “vision, ideology and alliances that are so far removed from the interests and aspirations of Syria’s Kurds.”

If the Kurdish parties in Syria do not abandon their affiliation to Kurdistan, then the intra-Kurdish talks will fail, just like previous ones, she said.

She attributed the successive failures to the “weak political personality” of Syria’s Kurdish officials.

“They must open their eyes and realize the suffering of their people. They must realize that their main problem lies with Damascus, not Baghdad or Ankara,” she stressed.

The “Kurdistan affiliation” predicament is among the pain problems driving a wedge between Syria’s various Kurdish parties.

A resident of Dayrik on the border with Turkey and Iraq said that the affiliation of local Kurdish parties to Kurdistan leaderships in neighboring countries has been “unwavering” for decades.

He doubted that the various parties would be able to reach a comprehensive and final agreement due to their conflicting foreign relations and alliances.

Any agreement would be “limited” and fall short of the people’s expectations, he predicted.

A pharmacist in the town of Amouda shared a different opinion. She said that the affiliation with Kurdistan has had a positive impact on the first round of talks.

She stated that the people are more concerned with economic concerns and developments on the ground than the political talks.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.