The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
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The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat

On April 20, Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, the maternal cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, began posting statements and videos on Facebook criticizing the regime. This was striking: in the past decades, it was uncommon to see anyone, whether a businessman, politician, or military commander, daring to criticize the security forces and the regime, directly or indirectly, while living in Syria. So, two questions must be asked: Why did Rami Makhlouf, a wealthy businessman and the president's cousin, rebel? How could one voicing such criticism from Damascus be still free? To answer those two questions, it is important to understand the historic relationship between the Makhlouf family and the Assad family.

Makhlouf himself is known for amassing massive wealth inside and outside the country. According to a former economy official in Syria, his wealth is equivalent to eight percent of Syria's GDP, which is $62 billion.

Economic-Social Context

In his media appearances, Rami Makhlouf tried to appeal to the Alawites by presenting himself as the voice of the Syrian coastal region, especially the poor, religiously-devout, and those loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. This region, a stronghold of the Assad regime, suffered in the nine-year-long war, reportedly incurring more than 100,000 deaths.

In order to understand the historic context, it is important to highlight the Makhlouf family’s history and relationships with others. The Makhlouf family belongs to the al-Haddadin tribe, which is mostly Alawite land-owners in the Syrian coastal region. They controlled villages, similar to other feudal families.

In 1958, the Makhlouf family made the difficult decision of agreeing to marry their young daughter to a young air force pilot named Hafez Al-Assad, who was from a different tribe, al-Kalbiyah, that descended from rural regions. Assad was a member of the military at the time Anisa was studying in a French-managed monastery.

Hafiz and Anisa's marriage would impact Syria's modern history for the next six decades. The Makhlouf family forged close relations with rising military men in the predominantly Alawite countryside, while Hafez al-Assad gained legitimacy among tribes and social circles in his birthplace.

After Assad ascended to the presidency in 1970, Anisa held the title of the first lady even though she never used that title and refrained from appearing in public events. Undoubtedly, this marriage spared the Makhlouf family from extinction, which was the fate of other feudal Alawite families.

One of the key cards that Hafez used to consolidate his power was ending classism. He sought to create alternative social classes composed of farmers and the marginalized who rose to power through the army and security forces. The Duba and Khuli families exemplified that: General 'Ali Duba took charge of the military intelligence, and General Muhammad Khuli commanded the air force. Similarly, Assad became closer to the clerics. The Haydar family, for example, gained influence General 'Ali Haydar was given control over the army's special forces.

Assad rose to power, taking control of the army, security, and political apparatus. His brother-in-law, on the other hand, took control of the economy. Muhammad Makhlouf, Anisa's brother, started at the state-owned tobacco company Regie, and went on to sponsor major business deals, mostly in oil production and exports in the mid-1980s. He became the secret godfather for the economy, among other things. All deals had to pass through Makhlouf, who distributed them among other Alawite and Sunni businessmen in the 1980s and 1990s.

With the generational change in the ruling family and elites, the role of the new generation of official's sons shifted from partnerships in companies to the leadership of the private business sector, especially in the second half of the 1990s. One of the most renowned figures was Rami Makhlouf, an engineer who at the end of the 1990s took over Ramak firm that specialized in duty-free zones at ground ports and airports.

When Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, Muhammad Makhlouf stepped down, allowing for the rise of his older son, Rami, in the business sector. Anisa, Assad's widow, took it upon herself to facilitate and encourage the rise of Rami, her favorite nephew, as she had done previously for her brother.

Rami focused on the promising telecommunication sector. In 2001, the Syrian government granted the company Syriatel and its competitor MTN a build, operate, and transfer permit (BOT), giving them a monopoly over the telecommunication sector and its revenues.

Syriatel's contract formed the foundation from which Makhlouf's diverse businesses and companies expanded. His companies operated in the fields of oil, finances, banking, tourism, and trade, keeping up with the selective economic openness in early 2000.

Some experts believe that this openness shrank the size of the middle class and concentrated wealth in the hands of a small number of people, mainly the Makhlouf family, thus, chipping away at the traditional support base of the regime and the ruling Baath Party and undermining the social contract that prevailed through three decades of Assad reign.

Makhlouf's domination over the Syrian economy reached a level that prompted the United States to impose sanctions against him early, at the beginning of 2008 — three years before the Syrian revolution — as part of the Syria sanctions program that began in 2004.

Political Context

In the 1930s, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) also known as the Syrian Party, expanded from Lebanon to the Syrian coastal region and the Alawite's mountain region. The expansion is mainly because of geographic location, trade, and openness in those regions, which later became a breeding ground for secular parties like the Baath Party and the Communist Party in the second half of the 1940s.

If the Baath Party believes in Arab unity and Arab nationalism, the Syrian Party is known for promoting Syrian nationalism in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The party never got into power and existed in secrecy for most of its history.

The Makhlouf family, especially Muhammad and his sister Anisa, were closer to the Syrian Party ideology than to the Baath Party. On April 22, 1955, Colonel 'Adnan Al-Maliki, a powerful nationalist military figure, was assassinated in al-Baladi Arena in Damascus by three men, including Badi' al-Makhlouf, Anisa's cousin. The SSNP was held responsible despite denying involvement in the assassination. The head of the government at the time, Sabri al-'Asali, banned the party, prompting a crackdown on its members. Six months later, a military court in Damascus sentenced to death a number of the Syrian Party's members and leaders, which was the biggest blow to Syrian nationalists since Antwan Sa'ada was handed over to the Lebanese authorities and subsequently executed in 1949.

The party remained banned after the Ba'th Party took control of the government from 1963 to 1970. After Assad assumed power, he relaxed the crackdown because of the influence of his wife, Anisa, on him. The party was then allowed to join Parliament indirectly.

In 2000, Bashar Al-Assad assumed power and married Asma al-Akhras. The political history of her family was unknown and she appeared more focused on economy than ideology. Shafiq, the cousin of her father Fawwaz, was an economy professor, and another relative of hers was a businessman in Homs, while she herself worked at JP Morgan. Her father was a renowned cardiologist in London while her mother worked in the Syrian embassy in the British capital.

In 2011, the Syrian Party was allowed to join the Ba'th Party-led Progressive National Front, an alliance of parties in Damascus, as an observer. There was a common belief that Bashar al-Assad was closer to the Syrian Party's ideology because of the influence of his mother and uncle, which helped the party resume its activities and join Parliament.

Rami Makhlouf is described by people who met him as someone with "absolute belief in the ideology of the Syrian Party." Between 2005 and 2019, Makhlouf played the role of a behind-the-scenes leader for the SSNP. He pushed supporters of the party to assume high leadership positions before being elected to Parliament or appointed to the cabinet. Rami also participated in founding a branch for the party in 2011 and formed a militia under the name Eagles of the Whirlwind that is associated with the party. The militia fought alongside government security forces against the opposition factions. The party participated in the 2012 congressional elections with the support of al-Bustan Foundation, a charity through which Makhlouf has been able to channel funds, and won seats in Parliament. It came as no surprise that many of Makhlouf's supporters posted a whirlwind, the logo of the party, on their social media pages after his last appearance.

Declawing

By the mid-2019 and under the regime's nose, Rami accumulated tools and networks that were not available to anyone else: A historical, tribal, and class heritage, a financial and economic empire, a political party aspiring to govern, a charitable foundation, and an armed militia. Separately, new businessmen and warlords emerged, making their wealth from the fighting between 2012 and 2019 and from circumventing the US and European sanctions.

There were concerns about Rami Makhlouf, his apparatuses, his rivals’ increasing ambitions, regional, and international changes, and tension between Russia and Turkey. Last August, a campaign began to dismantle Makhlouf's networks, including banning certain activities by al-Bustan Foundation and disbanding its military wing, which paid fighters $350 a month -- a hefty sum compared to regular soldiers’ salaries.

In October 2019, the appeal court issued a decision to disband the al-Amana Wing of the Syrian Party, which Rami helped create. The decision excluded the Minister of Reconciliation 'Ali Haydar, who is a member of the party, due to his "friendship with Assad," according to a source in Damascus.

On December 19, a series of decisions were made to freeze the assets of Makhlouf, his wife, and his companies, accusing him of tax evasion. On March 17, 2020, the Ministry of Finance seized his assets because of his ties to an oil company.

The measures taken against Rami Makhlouf included arresting senior employees in his companies and organizations, seizing his assets in Syria, prohibiting state institutions from dealing with him for five years, in addition to a travel ban. He also lost all the security and economic privileges that he enjoyed since 1970 as the nephew of the president's wife.

Clearly Makhlouf is banking on his social, political, and economic stocks to protect him. The regime, however, is seeking to disband Makhlouf's networks and declaw him. This equation can change at any moment if a new factor, from the inside or the outside, emerges.



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.