The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
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The Political, Social Roots of the Makhlouf and Assad Families

Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat
Rami Makhlouf with Syrian businessmen in Damascus. Asharq Al-Awsat

On April 20, Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, the maternal cousin of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, began posting statements and videos on Facebook criticizing the regime. This was striking: in the past decades, it was uncommon to see anyone, whether a businessman, politician, or military commander, daring to criticize the security forces and the regime, directly or indirectly, while living in Syria. So, two questions must be asked: Why did Rami Makhlouf, a wealthy businessman and the president's cousin, rebel? How could one voicing such criticism from Damascus be still free? To answer those two questions, it is important to understand the historic relationship between the Makhlouf family and the Assad family.

Makhlouf himself is known for amassing massive wealth inside and outside the country. According to a former economy official in Syria, his wealth is equivalent to eight percent of Syria's GDP, which is $62 billion.

Economic-Social Context

In his media appearances, Rami Makhlouf tried to appeal to the Alawites by presenting himself as the voice of the Syrian coastal region, especially the poor, religiously-devout, and those loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. This region, a stronghold of the Assad regime, suffered in the nine-year-long war, reportedly incurring more than 100,000 deaths.

In order to understand the historic context, it is important to highlight the Makhlouf family’s history and relationships with others. The Makhlouf family belongs to the al-Haddadin tribe, which is mostly Alawite land-owners in the Syrian coastal region. They controlled villages, similar to other feudal families.

In 1958, the Makhlouf family made the difficult decision of agreeing to marry their young daughter to a young air force pilot named Hafez Al-Assad, who was from a different tribe, al-Kalbiyah, that descended from rural regions. Assad was a member of the military at the time Anisa was studying in a French-managed monastery.

Hafiz and Anisa's marriage would impact Syria's modern history for the next six decades. The Makhlouf family forged close relations with rising military men in the predominantly Alawite countryside, while Hafez al-Assad gained legitimacy among tribes and social circles in his birthplace.

After Assad ascended to the presidency in 1970, Anisa held the title of the first lady even though she never used that title and refrained from appearing in public events. Undoubtedly, this marriage spared the Makhlouf family from extinction, which was the fate of other feudal Alawite families.

One of the key cards that Hafez used to consolidate his power was ending classism. He sought to create alternative social classes composed of farmers and the marginalized who rose to power through the army and security forces. The Duba and Khuli families exemplified that: General 'Ali Duba took charge of the military intelligence, and General Muhammad Khuli commanded the air force. Similarly, Assad became closer to the clerics. The Haydar family, for example, gained influence General 'Ali Haydar was given control over the army's special forces.

Assad rose to power, taking control of the army, security, and political apparatus. His brother-in-law, on the other hand, took control of the economy. Muhammad Makhlouf, Anisa's brother, started at the state-owned tobacco company Regie, and went on to sponsor major business deals, mostly in oil production and exports in the mid-1980s. He became the secret godfather for the economy, among other things. All deals had to pass through Makhlouf, who distributed them among other Alawite and Sunni businessmen in the 1980s and 1990s.

With the generational change in the ruling family and elites, the role of the new generation of official's sons shifted from partnerships in companies to the leadership of the private business sector, especially in the second half of the 1990s. One of the most renowned figures was Rami Makhlouf, an engineer who at the end of the 1990s took over Ramak firm that specialized in duty-free zones at ground ports and airports.

When Hafez al-Assad died in 2000, Muhammad Makhlouf stepped down, allowing for the rise of his older son, Rami, in the business sector. Anisa, Assad's widow, took it upon herself to facilitate and encourage the rise of Rami, her favorite nephew, as she had done previously for her brother.

Rami focused on the promising telecommunication sector. In 2001, the Syrian government granted the company Syriatel and its competitor MTN a build, operate, and transfer permit (BOT), giving them a monopoly over the telecommunication sector and its revenues.

Syriatel's contract formed the foundation from which Makhlouf's diverse businesses and companies expanded. His companies operated in the fields of oil, finances, banking, tourism, and trade, keeping up with the selective economic openness in early 2000.

Some experts believe that this openness shrank the size of the middle class and concentrated wealth in the hands of a small number of people, mainly the Makhlouf family, thus, chipping away at the traditional support base of the regime and the ruling Baath Party and undermining the social contract that prevailed through three decades of Assad reign.

Makhlouf's domination over the Syrian economy reached a level that prompted the United States to impose sanctions against him early, at the beginning of 2008 — three years before the Syrian revolution — as part of the Syria sanctions program that began in 2004.

Political Context

In the 1930s, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) also known as the Syrian Party, expanded from Lebanon to the Syrian coastal region and the Alawite's mountain region. The expansion is mainly because of geographic location, trade, and openness in those regions, which later became a breeding ground for secular parties like the Baath Party and the Communist Party in the second half of the 1940s.

If the Baath Party believes in Arab unity and Arab nationalism, the Syrian Party is known for promoting Syrian nationalism in Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon. The party never got into power and existed in secrecy for most of its history.

The Makhlouf family, especially Muhammad and his sister Anisa, were closer to the Syrian Party ideology than to the Baath Party. On April 22, 1955, Colonel 'Adnan Al-Maliki, a powerful nationalist military figure, was assassinated in al-Baladi Arena in Damascus by three men, including Badi' al-Makhlouf, Anisa's cousin. The SSNP was held responsible despite denying involvement in the assassination. The head of the government at the time, Sabri al-'Asali, banned the party, prompting a crackdown on its members. Six months later, a military court in Damascus sentenced to death a number of the Syrian Party's members and leaders, which was the biggest blow to Syrian nationalists since Antwan Sa'ada was handed over to the Lebanese authorities and subsequently executed in 1949.

The party remained banned after the Ba'th Party took control of the government from 1963 to 1970. After Assad assumed power, he relaxed the crackdown because of the influence of his wife, Anisa, on him. The party was then allowed to join Parliament indirectly.

In 2000, Bashar Al-Assad assumed power and married Asma al-Akhras. The political history of her family was unknown and she appeared more focused on economy than ideology. Shafiq, the cousin of her father Fawwaz, was an economy professor, and another relative of hers was a businessman in Homs, while she herself worked at JP Morgan. Her father was a renowned cardiologist in London while her mother worked in the Syrian embassy in the British capital.

In 2011, the Syrian Party was allowed to join the Ba'th Party-led Progressive National Front, an alliance of parties in Damascus, as an observer. There was a common belief that Bashar al-Assad was closer to the Syrian Party's ideology because of the influence of his mother and uncle, which helped the party resume its activities and join Parliament.

Rami Makhlouf is described by people who met him as someone with "absolute belief in the ideology of the Syrian Party." Between 2005 and 2019, Makhlouf played the role of a behind-the-scenes leader for the SSNP. He pushed supporters of the party to assume high leadership positions before being elected to Parliament or appointed to the cabinet. Rami also participated in founding a branch for the party in 2011 and formed a militia under the name Eagles of the Whirlwind that is associated with the party. The militia fought alongside government security forces against the opposition factions. The party participated in the 2012 congressional elections with the support of al-Bustan Foundation, a charity through which Makhlouf has been able to channel funds, and won seats in Parliament. It came as no surprise that many of Makhlouf's supporters posted a whirlwind, the logo of the party, on their social media pages after his last appearance.

Declawing

By the mid-2019 and under the regime's nose, Rami accumulated tools and networks that were not available to anyone else: A historical, tribal, and class heritage, a financial and economic empire, a political party aspiring to govern, a charitable foundation, and an armed militia. Separately, new businessmen and warlords emerged, making their wealth from the fighting between 2012 and 2019 and from circumventing the US and European sanctions.

There were concerns about Rami Makhlouf, his apparatuses, his rivals’ increasing ambitions, regional, and international changes, and tension between Russia and Turkey. Last August, a campaign began to dismantle Makhlouf's networks, including banning certain activities by al-Bustan Foundation and disbanding its military wing, which paid fighters $350 a month -- a hefty sum compared to regular soldiers’ salaries.

In October 2019, the appeal court issued a decision to disband the al-Amana Wing of the Syrian Party, which Rami helped create. The decision excluded the Minister of Reconciliation 'Ali Haydar, who is a member of the party, due to his "friendship with Assad," according to a source in Damascus.

On December 19, a series of decisions were made to freeze the assets of Makhlouf, his wife, and his companies, accusing him of tax evasion. On March 17, 2020, the Ministry of Finance seized his assets because of his ties to an oil company.

The measures taken against Rami Makhlouf included arresting senior employees in his companies and organizations, seizing his assets in Syria, prohibiting state institutions from dealing with him for five years, in addition to a travel ban. He also lost all the security and economic privileges that he enjoyed since 1970 as the nephew of the president's wife.

Clearly Makhlouf is banking on his social, political, and economic stocks to protect him. The regime, however, is seeking to disband Makhlouf's networks and declaw him. This equation can change at any moment if a new factor, from the inside or the outside, emerges.



Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.


How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
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How Have US Presidents Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserves During War?

GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP
GILLETT, TEXAS - MARCH 11: Pump jacks operate in a field on March 11, 2026 in Gillett, Texas. Brandon Bell/Getty Images/AFP

The US plans to release 172 million barrels of oil from its Strategic Petroleum Reserve, more than 40% of a wider release coordinated with allies, to help dampen prices spiked by supply disruptions from the US-Israeli war on Iran.

The US sale, announced late on Wednesday, is part of a 400-million-barrel release by members of the International Energy Agency. The US Department of Energy said the US drawdown would begin next week and take about four months.

The SPR currently holds about 415 million barrels, most of which is high sulfur, or sour ‌crude, that US ‌refineries are geared to process. The crude is ‌held ⁠underground in hollowed-out salt ⁠caverns on the coasts of Texas and Louisiana that can store 714 million barrels.

Here is how US presidents have tapped the SPR in times of war:

RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE

In March 2022, the month after Russia invaded Ukraine, former President Joe Biden ordered the release of 180 million barrels over six months - the largest sale ever from the emergency stash. Biden, ⁠and later President Donald Trump, slowly bought some oil ‌to replenish the reserves, but little ‌has been added back as Congress needs to provide more money to ‌do so.

LIBYA CIVIL WAR

In ⁠June 2011, former ⁠President Barack Obama ordered the release of 30 million barrels of oil from the reserve to offset disruptions to global markets from civil war in oil producer Libya. That sale was coordinated with the Paris-based IEA, resulting in an additional 30-million-barrel release from other member countries.

OPERATION DESERT STORM

In 1990-1991, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, former President George H. W. Bush sold about 21 million barrels in two phases. In October 1990, the US ordered a 3.9-million-barrel test sale. In January 1991, after US and allied warplanes began attacks against Baghdad and other military targets in OPEC-member Iraq as part of Operation Desert Storm, Bush ordered the sale of 34 million barrels, of which half was sold.


How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
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How Trump and his Advisers Miscalculated Iran’s Response to War

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times
Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out. Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Mark Mazzetti, Tyler Pager, Edward Wong

On Feb. 18, as President Trump weighed whether to launch military attacks on Iran, Chris Wright, the energy secretary, told an interviewer he was not concerned that the looming war might disrupt oil supplies in the Middle East and wreak havoc in energy markets.

Even during the Israeli and US strikes against Iran last June, Wright said, there had been little disruption in the markets. “Oil prices blipped up and then went back down,” he said.

Some of Trump’s other advisers shared similar views in private, dismissing warnings that — the second time around — Iran might wage economic warfare by closing shipping lanes carrying roughly 20% of the world’s oil supply.

The extent of that miscalculation was laid bare in recent days, as Iran threatened to fire at commercial oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic choke point through which all ships must pass on their way out of the Arabian Gulf.

In response to the Iranian threats, commercial shipping has come to a standstill in the Gulf, oil prices have spiked, and the Trump administration has scrambled to find ways to tamp down an economic crisis that has triggered higher gasoline prices for Americans.

The episode is emblematic of how much Trump and his advisers misjudged how Iran would respond to a conflict that the government in Tehran sees as an existential threat.

Iran has responded far more aggressively than it did during last June’s 12-day war, firing barrages of missiles and drones at US military bases, cities in Arab nations across the Middle East, and on Israeli population centers.

US officials have had to adjust plans on the fly, from hastily ordering the evacuation of embassies to developing policy proposals to reduce gas prices.

After Trump administration officials gave a closed-door briefing to lawmakers on Tuesday, Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut, said on social media that the administration had no plan for the Strait of Hormuz and did “not know how to get it safely back open.”

Inside the administration, some officials are growing pessimistic about the lack of a clear strategy to finish the war. But they have been careful not to express that directly to the president, who has repeatedly declared that the military operation is a complete success.

Trump has laid out maximalist goals like insisting that Iran name a leader who will submit to him, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have described narrower and more tactical objectives that could provide an off-ramp in the near term.

Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary, said the administration “had a strong game plan” before the war broke out, and vowed that oil prices would drop after it ended.

“The purposeful disruption in the oil market by the Iranian regime is short term, and necessary for the long-term gain of wiping out these terrorists and the threat they pose to America and the world,” she said in a statement.

This article is based on interviews with a dozen US officials, who asked for anonymity to discuss private conversations.

‘Show Some Guts’

Hegseth acknowledged on Tuesday that Iran’s ferocious response against its neighbors caught the Pentagon somewhat off guard. But he insisted that Iran’s actions were backfiring.

“I can’t say that we anticipated necessarily that’s exactly how they would react, but we knew it was a possibility,” Hegseth said at a Pentagon news conference. “I think it was a demonstration of the desperation of the regime.”

Trump has displayed growing frustration over how the war is disrupting the oil supply, telling Fox News that oil tanker crews should “show some guts” and sail through the Strait of Hormuz.

Some military advisers did warn before the war that Iran could launch an aggressive campaign in response, and would view the US-Israeli attack as a threat to its existence. But other advisers remained confident that killing Iran’s senior leadership would lead to more pragmatic leaders taking over who might bring an end to the war.

When Trump was briefed about risks that oil prices could rise in the event of war, he acknowledged the possibility but downplayed it as a short-term concern that should not overshadow the mission to decapitate the Iranian regime. He directed Wright and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to work on developing options for a potential spike in prices.

But the president did not speak publicly about these options — including political risk insurance backed by the US government, and the potential of US Navy escorts — until more than 48 hours after the conflict started. The escorts have not yet taken place.

As the conflict has roiled global markets, Republicans in Washington have grown concerned about rising oil prices damaging their efforts to sell an economic agenda to voters ahead of the midterm elections.

Trump, both publicly and privately, has been arguing that Venezuelan oil could help solve any shocks coming from the Iran war. The administration announced on Tuesday a new refinery in Texas that officials said could help increase oil supply, ensuring that Iran does not cause any long-term damage to oil markets.

A Potential Off-Ramp

Trump has said both that the war could go on for more than a month and that it was “very complete, pretty much.” He also said the United States would “go forward more determined than ever.”

Rubio and Hegseth, however, appear to have coordinated their messaging for now on three discrete goals that they began laying out in public remarks on Monday and Tuesday.

“The goals of this mission are clear,” Rubio said at a State Department event on Monday before Trump held his own news conference. “It is to destroy the ability of this regime to launch missiles, both by destroying their missiles and their launchers; destroy the factories that make these missiles; and destroy their navy.”

The State Department even laid out the three goals in bullet-point fashion, and highlighted a video clip of Rubio stating them on an official social media account.

The presentation by Rubio, who is also the White House national security adviser, appeared to be setting the stage for the president to bring an end to the war sooner rather than later. In his news conference, Trump boasted of how the US military had already destroyed Iran’s ballistic missile capability and its navy. But he also warned of even more aggressive action if Iranian leaders tried to cut off the world’s energy supply.

Matthew Pottinger, who was a deputy national security adviser in the first Trump administration, said in an interview that Mr. Trump had indicated he could decide to pursue ambitions war goals that would take weeks at least.

“In his press conference, I could hear him circling back to a rationale for fighting a bit longer given that the regime is still signaling it won’t be deterred and is still trying to control the Strait of Hormuz,” said Pottinger, now the chair of the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a group that advocates a close US partnership with Israel and confrontation with Iran.

“He doesn’t want to have to fight a ‘sequel’ war,” Pottinger added.

The search for pathways out of the war has gained urgency since the weekend, as global oil prices surge and as the United States burns through costly munitions.

Pentagon officials said in recent closed-door briefings on Capitol Hill that the military used up $5.6 billion of munitions in the first two days of the war alone, according to three congressional officials. That is a far larger amount and munitions burn rate than had been publicly disclosed. The Washington Post reported on the figure on Monday.

Iranian officials have remained defiant, saying they will use their leverage over the world’s oil supply to force the United States and Israel to blink.

“Strait of Hormuz will either be a Strait of peace and prosperity for all,” Ali Larijani, Iran’s top national security official, said in a social media post on Tuesday. “Or it will be a Strait of defeat and suffering for warmongers.”

The New York Times