Hafez Assad to Amin Gemayel: There are No State Institutions in Lebanon

Asharq Al-Awsat releases excerpts from the former Lebanese president’s memoirs

Syrian President Hafez Assad (L) sees of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel at Damascus airport.
Syrian President Hafez Assad (L) sees of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel at Damascus airport.
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Hafez Assad to Amin Gemayel: There are No State Institutions in Lebanon

Syrian President Hafez Assad (L) sees of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel at Damascus airport.
Syrian President Hafez Assad (L) sees of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel at Damascus airport.

In his upcoming memoir, Lebanese former President Amin Gemayel recounts details of three meetings he held with late Syrian President Hafez Assad, Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al-Kasm and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa in the 1980s when Lebanon was in the throes of its 1975-90 civil war. In December 1985, the Tripartite Accord was signed in Damascus between Lebanese Amal movement leader Nabih Berri, who would later become the country’s longest serving parliament speaker, Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt and then leader of the Lebanese Forces, Eli Hobeika.

Gemayel traveled to Damascus in January 1986 to express his reservations over the accord, which introduced major changes in Lebanon’s system of rule. The accord was reached among members of the Syrian leadership without consulting any Lebanese official. The agreement limits the jurisdiction of the president and transfers the executive authority to a “ministerial council” that is formed of militia leaders, who were involved in the war.

The following excerpts are part one of a three-part series on Gemayel’s memoirs:

On January 13, 1986, I traveled to Damascus to hold the 11th summit with the Syrian president. We held three work meetings that took up a total of ten and a half hours. The meetings were attended by Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al-Kasm and Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa.

The memoir published excerpts of the meetings, which have been verified by the Lebanese and Syrian presidencies.

“The first of the work meetings was held as soon as I arrived in Damascus. We first spoke of the developments in the al-Metn region” in Lebanon, before Gemayel briefed them on the details of his consultations in Beirut. He also briefed them on legal local and foreign consultations on the accord.

“The Lebanese people appreciate Syria’s efforts in ending the crisis. They are all convinced of the need to benefit from these efforts because the war has stretched for ten years, and it must end based on national constitutional and legal bases,” I said.

I relayed to them the reservations expressed by Lebanese parties on the Tripartite Accord, but they also were quick to explain that their rejection was “not directed against Syria, especially its president.”

“We are before a historic opportunity to primarily reach a solid and permanent solution to the Lebanese situation and secondly, address Lebanese-Syrian relations,” I stated. I was banking on Lebanese-Syrian cooperation and submitted my comments on the accord, which was delivered to me by Sharaa.

I noted that the accord “revises” Lebanese coexistence based on eliminating sectarianism. He told me: “The situation in Lebanon is charged with sectarianism. Syria itself, had experienced the same thing with the Muslim Brotherhood. I support liberating Lebanese society from this obstacle, but this demands finding the natural guidelines. I fear that the speedy and blunt treatment of this issue would backfire.”

“Lebanon is not Syria, which does not suffer from the same problem. Neither is it Iraq, where Islam is the religion of the state. We want to liberate Lebanon from this issue, without embarking on reckless adventures,” Sharaa said.

Assad added: “Does this mean that ending the sectarian system will lead us to the unknown? What does it entail to eliminate political sectarianism?

I responded: “We must find actual guidelines. Those who believe that the president of the republic is in control of the situation are wrong. The prime minister can stop it, and therein lies real partnership. I have no problem in eliminating it, but that will leave behind some problems.”

“What sort of problems?” asked Assad.

I responded: “We cannot accept the elimination of sectarianism as stipulated in the accord. Some consider sectarianism a privilege and others view it as a guarantee. I see it as a means of control.” The accord ultimately aims on ending the “Lebanese state or the Lebanese will.”

“Ending?” Assad asked incredulously.

I responded: “Yes, ending it. This system does not exist anywhere in the world, except in the Swiss cantons. If you do not have a strong ruling leadership, then you cannot implement the agreement. We have not held a vote at cabinet since 1943. It is unfortunate that those who took part in the agreement have never once been part of rule. One of its articles spoke of the jurisdiction of the ministerial council, which takes its decisions through complete quorum. What would happen if one member were absent?”

“I believe during the transitional period,” said Assad.

“Who knows when the transitional period ends! The accord speaks of taking major decisions through the ministerial council and the regular ones through the government. The state ministers who make up the ministerial council are naturally members of the cabinet. Jurisdictions will thereby contradict each other, which will consequently obstruct all state agencies.”

“The accord cannot possibly be implemented and it will produce the exact opposite goals it wants to achieve, which is Lebanon’s unification. It will lead to the emergence of cantons,” I warned.

I then listed other reservations, to which the Syrian president remarked: “So you are baulking at eliminating sectarianism, the collective or consensual leadership and the ministerial council.”

I explained that I had reservations over “collectiveness and consensus. We need a strong authority that can back constitution-building and lead to a strong state. The accord aborts the role of the head of state. Why? The constitution stipulates that the president enjoys wide jurisdiction, as if he were a dictator, but in practice, the situation is very different. Ever since the time of President Riad al-Solh, it is the prime minister who holds procedural authority. No decree can pass without the approval of the prime minister and concerned minister. This is the constitution.”

Khaddam objected to this.

Assad urged me to continued.

“If we want to defend democracy in Lebanon, then it would be a major mistake to have the cabinet appoint lawmakers, especially since we would be naming 200 MPs. We would be subjecting parliament to the will of government,” I continued.

I listed yet another reservation, saying that the accord allows the people who have ruined the country to become its protectors. “This does not resolve the country’s problem,” I noted. “If we allow them to resolve all problems, then we won’t reach a solution. The fighters told us what they want from us, but have we told them what we want from them? Take for example their weapons. Did they buy them from their own money or did they collect the money from the port revenues, state resources and civilian pockets?”

“You bought them and we are buying them from you,” responded Assad.

I continued: “As for bilateral relations … I have reservations over the bilateral relations article stipulated in the accord. Relations should be ratified through bilateral agreements.”

Assad replied, however: “We have been clear. It is through consensus from all parties. We have not asked this since 1976. This is a consensual demand from all Lebanese leaderships.”

“We agree on bilateral relations between a state and another. We are talking here about a constitutional document that should not address these issues, which should be limited to the foreign ministers of both countries. Agreements would then be ratified and submitted to a vote at parliament.”

“So, the relationship with Syria should not be included in this document?” asked Assad.

“It can be referred to, but the details should be included in bilateral agreements,” I urged. “Syria respects itself and as does Lebanon. It is not overeager to impose any relationship with Lebanon … There are no differences over the core issues in this matter.”

This concluded the first round of talks. The second round was resumed later that day at 7:15 pm.

Assad kicked off the meeting by saying: “We tolerated a lot for Lebanon throughout 11 years. We have never dealt with it as a card to control, but approached it from a principled and sentimental position. One people and one country. All the Arab nation is a single country. The colonialists produced these entities. Some 500,000 Lebanese sought refuge in Syria during the latest unrest.”

“Eight hundred thousand,” interjected al-Kasm.

“We contacted the fighters and militias. You recall how I told them to reach an agreement,” said Assad. “The fighters met. You should not be led to believe that we set the agreement. Had we done so, neither Hobeika, Berri, Jumblatt nor Amin Gemayel would have liked it. They agreed and differed. We relayed messages between them … I told them to meet in Beirut and I think they did. They then approached us and the accord was born. I have reservations over it, but I will repeat again that if we were the ones who drafted it, no one would have liked it,” revealed Assad. “Sectarianism? We in Syria have rejected it a while ago. Does the accord call for its immediate elimination?”

“No. That will take place after the transitional period,” replied Khaddam.

“The gatherers agreed on what they described as jurisdictions. We agree to any accord that ends the war, including its good and bad articles. Any attempt to impose a point of view will abort an agreement. This is our political and military view. We sent you the accord when they agreed on it. The accord does not reflect the position of the president, prime minister, ministers, Amal, the Lebanese Forces or PSP. The accord only reflects a form of rapprochement and represents the warring parties,” stated Assad.

He later informed me that he will take my reservations into consideration and relay them to the fighters. He then said: “Sheikh Amin, no Lebanese president has even exercised his authority, neither Franjieh nor Sarkis. You have exercised more than both of them. No one can ignore the historic ties between Syria and Lebanon. They spoke of special relations, so how can you go against a popular agreement? God does not separate Lebanon from Syria.”

“All that is needed is finding factors that preserve the unity of the country. I am not clinging to maintaining sectarianism … The accord stripped the president of his privileges. Regardless of this, a non-harmonious government, possibly one hostile to the president, may be formed. What then happens to binding parliamentary consultations? I would then act as a ballot box? Let parliament do that. I do not understand the point of equally sharing power among three entities. Are we punishing sectarianism in the country? Are the Maronites being punished for supporting the honest Arab position on Syria?” I asked.

Khaddam said the accord will be implemented immediately and that it will be introduced as a “new constitutional norm.”

“The accord has been institutionalized,” echoed Assad.

“Three people have drafted this treaty? Are they now a constitutional entity?” I wondered.

“Under normal circumstances, this would not be acceptable. But given that the current circumstances are not, then anything goes,” remarked al-Kasm.

“Will the constitution be suspended?” I asked.

“The constitution is already suspended,” responded Khaddam.

“This is completely unacceptable,” I declared.

To this al-Kasm asked: “Does the constitution stipulate any where that the president must be Maronite?”

“No, this is just a norm,” said Khaddam. “The accord stipulates that the president will act as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces. He decides over war and peace, dissolves parliament, approves the budget, issues amnesty … this accord transformed the president from a ruler to a leader.”

“You are practicing more jurisdiction that the Syrian president,” Assad told me.

“The accord will be submitted to parliament, which will approve it and it will become a constitutional norm. This is a political settlement,” added Khaddam. “An agreement can be reached or the fighting will continue. The conflict first emerged as Christian-Muslim, but it has now changed. We can either speak of a settlement or declare one party victor over the other, which would spell disaster.”

At this, I relented for the accord to be submitted to parliament, saying that I will agree to it if the lawmakers do.

“The accord aborts constitutional institutions. This is my opinion and I will stick to it. I am asking the president to keep the bare minimum of this state. Collective leadership will lead to cantons on the ground and eliminating the president from procedural authority will paralyze the state,” I warned.

At this Assad, reiterated that I was exercising more jurisdiction that he does.

The third work meeting was held the next day. I reiterated my objection of the accord, saying it weakens the state. “I cannot agree to it without first referring to the legitimate constitutional authorities.”

“Do these authorities still stand?” asked Assad. “There are no institutions in Lebanon. There is no police and no army. Rather there are several armies. We are not imposing anything. We are not demanding anything. The gatherers reached an agreement. They believe that those who were present when the accord was signed are Lebanon and the state. Why don’t you accept this? They represent 80 or 90 percent of the fighters. According to my information, the majority of leaders in Lebanon are Muslim, except for the heads of the Kataeb party, and Lebanese Forces, which is affiliated with the Kataeb, as well as some Christian and Muslim clergy. Sheikh Amin, the opportunity at hand may not be repeated. The more blood is shed, the wider the divide will grow.”

I replied: “If we consider the notes I submitted yesterday, you will find that they can be applied and that way, we would ease some of the negative aspects of the accord. If my request embarrasses anyone, then we will submit it to parliament, which will relieve me of this responsibility. If the fighters want to occupy Baabda, then I don’t mind. It would be a revolt. I am keen on my duties and I will not take on a responsibility that I do not agree to.”

“If parliament approves it, then will you agree?” asked Assad.

“It will become law and I am bound to implement it,” I replied.

“There are now two options: Discussing it with the fighters or sending it to parliament,” said Assad.

“I will study the accord with you because discussing it with the fighters is pointless. They may not want it and hold me responsible for, which would lead to the resumption of the shelling and fighting,” I noted. “I am ready for any policy you decide on.”

“This is not a policy, but a treaty,” clarified Assad. “We will submit it to the ‘brothers’, because this is an accord between Lebanese parties, not with Syria.”

Before departing, Gemayel said: “I would like to declare my solidarity and sympathy with you. I did not receive anything after my election and now I am being held accountable for everything. We must succeed. Despite this, my conscience is clear because I have performed my duties to my country.”

Assad insisted on accompanying me to the airport despite his poor health. I seized the opportunity while we were alone in the car to assert to him that I was not opposed to reform, on condition that it take into consideration Lebanon’s interests and that they pass through a more representative official authority, rather than an alliance of militias.

Assad listened to me attentively and I believe I convinced him of my great keenness to find a solution to the crisis and maintain good relations with Syria. Khaddam, however, who is less courteous in behavior, declared to reporters at the airport: “Amending the accord is out of the question and those behind it are the ones in control in Lebanon.”

He then added with deliberate goading: “There won’t be a 12th or 13th summit.”

Part two continues on Saturday.



Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
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Egypt, Trump Reaffirm Strategic Alliance in 2025 amid Regional Turmoil

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meets President Donald Trump ahead of a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. (Reuters)

After months of speculation over the trajectory of Egyptian-US relations, fueled by persistent talk of strain and an impending rift, a high-level meeting between President Donald Trump and President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Sharm el-Sheikh reaffirmed the resilience of the strategic alliance between Cairo and Washington, even as the region remains in turmoil.

The meeting followed a turbulent period marked by Trump’s adoption of a proposal to relocate Gaza’s population, an idea firmly rejected by Sisi and one that prompted warnings of a diplomatic crisis between the two longtime allies.

The subsequent signing of a Gaza peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh sent a clear signal that, despite sharp disagreements over policy, the foundations of the bilateral relationship remain intact.

Early in Trump’s second term, media reports said Sisi had scrapped plans to visit Washington. As the year draws to a close, speculation has said that the visit may happen. Trump has acknowledged Sisi as a friend and said he would be happy to meet him as well.

Trump’s election victory late last year raised Egyptian hopes of strengthening the strategic partnership. Sisi voiced that expectation in a congratulatory post on X, stating that he looked forward to working together with Trump to achieve peace, preserve regional peace and stability, and strengthen the strategic partnership.

Those hopes were tested when Trump floated a plan to “clean out Gaza” and relocate its residents to Egypt and Jordan. Cairo rejected the idea outright, mobilized international opposition, unveiled an alternative plan for Gaza’s reconstruction and hosted an emergency summit on the issue in March.

Limited public engagement

David Butter, a research fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, noted that the striking feature of Egypt-US ties over the past year has been their low public profile.

Aside from Trump’s appearance in Sharm el-Sheikh, there was not much happening in the open, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Amr Hamzawy, an Egyptian political scientist and director of the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the first year of Trump’s second term as difficult for bilateral relations.

He said it began with talk of displacement and a “Middle East Riviera” in Gaza, but Egyptian diplomacy succeeded in shifting the trajectory.

Trump’s peace plan, he said, ultimately signaled rejection of displacement and spoke of security and political tracks for Gaza and a broader political process for the Palestinian issue, though details remain unclear.

Hamzawy added that the year opened from a tough starting point that followed what he called President Joe Biden’s hesitant stance on Gaza, when displacement was first discussed.

After nearly a year of Egyptian political and diplomatic effort, he said, displacement dropped from Washington’s agenda, even if it remains a risk that cannot be ignored.

Historically, Egypt has been a pivotal state for US national security, given its geography, demographic weight and diplomatic role, according to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service.

Gaza, the main test

The Gaza war shaped Egyptian-US relations during Trump’s first year back in office. Washington backed Egyptian-Qatari mediation to halt the war. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio thanked Cairo after a truce was reached between Israel and Hamas in January.

When hostilities resumed, however, Egypt faced complex diplomatic choices with both Washington and Israel. It rejected Trump’s call to resettle Gaza’s population, while its reconstruction plan failed to gain US or Israeli acceptance.

Cairo also drew criticism from Trump for declining to join US strikes against Yemen’s Houthis, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) revealed.

Butter noted that ties with the Trump administration were strained over Gaza after Sisi canceled a Washington visit early in the year, following Trump’s “Middle East Riviera” remarks, which left contacts at a minimum.

He said Trump’s Sharm el-Sheikh visit, the signing of the Gaza agreement and the celebration of his plan’s success offered a chance to reset relations. Egypt, he added, has become indispensable to Trump’s administration in Gaza.

Hamzawy said Gaza dominated the first year of Trump’s term, giving Egypt a chance to restore its standing with US and European decision-makers as a key mediator. Cairo put its vision on the table, he said, shifting US thinking toward parallel security and political tracks and from talk of disarmament to limiting weapons.

Throughout the year, Egypt publicly counted on Trump to end the Gaza war. In July, Sisi urged him in a televised address to press for a halt, saying Trump was capable of doing so.

Analysts Daniel Byman and Jon Alterman wrote in Foreign Policy that Egypt is indispensable to international responses to the Gaza war, even if it remains a difficult partner for Washington and Israel. The conflict, they said, restored diplomatic focus on Egypt and strengthened its leverage.

Sara Kira, director of the European North African Center for Research, said relations in Trump’s second term differ from his first. The earlier term saw broad alignment and personal warmth from Trump, particularly on counterterrorism, she said. The second term has been marked by divergence.

That surfaced in April when Trump called for free passage for US commercial and military vessels through the Suez Canal in exchange for US efforts to protect the waterway.

Positive signals despite differences

Despite disagreements over Gaza, there were positive signs elsewhere. Early in the year, the US State Department froze new funding for most aid programs worldwide, exempting humanitarian food programs and military aid to Israel and Egypt.

Washington did not include Egypt on a travel ban list issued in June. Trump said Egypt was a country with which the United States dealt closely and that things there were under control. Egypt was also spared higher US tariffs. Cairo has repeatedly stressed the depth and resilience of the strategic relationship.

Kira said Egypt exerted maximum pressure to achieve peace and stop the Gaza war, eventually convincing Washington of its approach and reaching a peace agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh. She said Egypt acted pragmatically and astutely, reading Trump’s personality and US interests.

As talks on the second phase of the Gaza agreement stall, Egypt continues to rely on the Trump administration to advance its plan. Cairo remains in contact with Washington and is working with it to prepare a donor conference for Gaza’s reconstruction, which has yet to receive sufficient momentum from the Trump administration.

The dialogue extends beyond Gaza to Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Iran, as well as water security, led by Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Egypt fears could affect its Nile water share.

GERD

In mid-June, Trump stirred controversy in Egypt when he wrote on Truth Social that the United States had “stupidly” funded the dam Ethiopia built on the Blue Nile, triggering a severe diplomatic crisis with Egypt.

In August, the White House released a list of Trump’s foreign policy achievements, which included a purported agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia over the dam.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of his administration’s efforts to resolve the dispute, but those claims have yet to translate into concrete action.

Hamzawy said there is an opportunity for Washington to mediate and revive an agreement reached near the end of Trump’s first term.

Charles Dunne of the Arab Center Washington DC wrote recently that Trump’s stance may please Cairo but could also produce adverse outcomes if Washington does not assume a mediation role.

The United States hosted talks with the World Bank in 2020 during Trump’s first term, but they failed after Ethiopia refused to sign the draft agreement.

Military ties endure

Military cooperation continued largely as usual. Since 1946, the United States has provided Egypt with about $90 billion in aid, with a sharp increase after 1979, which successive administrations have framed as an investment in regional stability, according to the CRS.

For more than a decade, Congress has imposed human rights conditions on part of Egypt’s aid.

Between fiscal years 2020 and 2023, the Biden administration and Congress withheld approximately $750 million in military funding. Trump’s technical annex to the proposed fiscal 2026 budget seeks $1.3 billion in military assistance for Egypt without conditions, the CRS said.

Hamzawy said the administration is far from imposing conditionality, noting that relations rest on mutual interests between a major power and a positively influential middle power.

Since the Gaza war, the Biden and Trump administrations have accelerated US arms sales to Egypt. The State Department notified Congress of military sales totaling $7.3 billion. In July, the Pentagon announced that the State Department had approved the sale of an advanced air defense missile system to Egypt, valued at approximately $4.67 billion. Egypt also hosted the Bright Star military exercises in September.

Kira said ties with Washington are driven by interests and that Cairo has positioned itself as a core regional player.

Hamzawy said Egypt occupies a central place in US Middle East thinking, as Washington needs a spectrum of allies, with Egypt at the heart of that network.


Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
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Why Metal Prices are Soaring to Record Highs

A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP
A salesman displays gold chains at an Indian jewelry store in September. Idrees MOHAMMED / AFP

Precious and industrial metals are surging to record highs as the year ends, driven by economic and geopolitical uncertainty, robust industrial demand and, in some cases, tight supply.

Below AFP examines the reasons for the surge in demand.

- Safe havens -

Gold and silver are traditionally seen as safe-haven assets, and demand has soared amid mounting geopolitical tensions, from US President Donald Trump's tariffs onslaught to wars in Ukraine and Gaza, as well as recent pressure by Washington on Caracas.

Investors are also uneasy about rising public debt in major economies and the risk of a bubble in the artificial intelligence sector.

These uncertainties are driving up gold and silver, with other metals now starting to see the impact as investors seek to diversify their portfolios, explained John Plassard, an analyst at Cite Gestion Private Bank.

"Metal is once again becoming insurance rather than just a speculative asset," he told AFP.

- A weak dollar -

Traditional safe havens like the dollar and US Treasuries have become less attractive this year.

Uncertainty around Trump's presidency and the prospect of further Federal Reserve interest rate cuts, have weakened the dollar, reducing its appeal to investors.

As a result, many investors are turning to gold and silver.

Gold has climbed more than 70 percent this year and passed $4,500 an ounce for the first time on Wednesday, while silver reached a record high of $72 an ounce, with prices up about 2.5 times since January.

A weak dollar is also boosting industrial metals, since commodities priced in dollars become cheaper for buyers when the currency falls.

- Fresh demand -

Industrial demand has surged in recent months, driven by the rise of artificial intelligence and the energy transition.

Copper, used for solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries and data centers, has seen strong gains as a result.

Prices hit a record on Wednesday, topping $12,000 a ton, helped further by China, the world's largest copper consumer, announcing new measures to boost demand.

Aluminium, a cheaper alternative to copper, and silver are also benefiting from the AI boom and the shift to renewable energy.

Platinum and palladium, used in car catalytic converters, have also risen, reaching a record high and a three-year high respectively, after the European Union decided to allow sales of new internal combustion vehicles beyond 2035.

- Tight supply -

Copper prices have been lifted this year by fears of US tariffs, prompting companies to stockpile ahead of their introduction, with duties imposed on semi-finished products and potentially extending to refined copper.

Supply risks from disruptions at mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia have added to the price surge.

Physical markets for silver, platinum, and aluminium are also tight.

According to Ole Hansen, an analyst at Saxo Bank, thin holiday trading, which increases volatility, and investor fear of missing out have further amplified the rise at the end of the year.


How Trump’s Decisions Reshaped Syria

A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
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How Trump’s Decisions Reshaped Syria

A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)
A photo of US President Donald Trump meeting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in Washington on Nov. 10 (AFP)

In a crowded regional and international landscape shaped by overlapping security, strategic, economic, and political pressures, the administration of US President Donald Trump has moved since its return to the White House in January 2025 to recalibrate its approach to Syria.

After years of US policy marked by hesitation and competing agendas, particularly under the administrations of Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Washington is now pursuing a more direct and openly pragmatic course, one focused on achieving tangible results on the ground and managing delicate balances, rather than ideological commitments or long-term strategic gambles.

The shift reflects profound changes inside Syria itself, led by the collapse of the former regime and the emergence of a new government seeking to consolidate domestic legitimacy and secure international recognition.

These developments coincide with the persistent threat posed by ISIS, a retreat in Iranian influence, and the expanding regional roles of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar.

Within this evolving landscape, Washington is repositioning its policy in line with what officials describe as Trump’s Middle East doctrine, centered on enforcing stability, limiting the costs of direct military involvement, and opening pathways for reconstruction, development, and investment.

Interests before ideology

Commenting on this shift, Firas Fahham, a researcher at the Abaad Studies Center, said President Trump’s policy toward Syria could be described as “decidedly pragmatic,” focusing primarily on international and economic interests while setting aside the ideological or intellectual background of Syria’s new government.

Fahham said the central pillar of the emerging convergence between Washington and Damascus was preventing the return of Iranian influence to Syria, a goal that sits at the top of the current US administration’s priorities.

He added that this approach could not be separated from the positions of Arab states allied with the United States, which have openly supported the new Syrian government, led by Saudi Arabia, followed by Türkiye and Qatar.

Fahham said the Trump administration had shown a willingness to respond to these positions, viewing them as a key foundation for rebuilding regional alliances.

Comparing the approach with previous administrations, Fahham said the policies of Obama and Biden had been closer to allowing Iran a free hand in the region and supporting minority influence, particularly through close cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces, known as the SDF.

He said this had complicated the landscape and weakened prospects for establishing a strong central state capable of maintaining security and preventing the return of extremist groups.

From Riyadh to Washington...turning points

Fahham traced key milestones in Trump’s new policy, saying the starting point came during meetings held in Riyadh in June, when the US president, at the request of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, announced the lifting of sanctions on Syria.

He described the move as the first positive signal from Washington toward Damascus. This was followed by a trilateral meeting bringing together Trump, the Saudi Crown Prince, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, during which the US president offered notable praise for his Syrian counterpart, reflecting Washington’s desire for political openness.

The most important moment, Fahham said, came at the Washington summit held in November, when Trump received President al-Sharaa at the White House in what he described as a pivotal turning point.

Following the meeting, the US administration began concrete efforts to pressure Congress to repeal the Caesar Act, while announcing Syria’s inclusion in the international coalition against ISIS.

This, Fahham said, shifted the relationship from limited coordination to something resembling an alliance.

The SDF and the future of eastern Syria

On the issue of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Fahham said the Trump administration was dealing with the matter from a strictly practical standpoint, balancing its interests with Syria’s new government, reflected in reduced support for the SDF compared with the Biden era, and its interests with its Turkish ally.

Washington, he said, now views Damascus as the most effective actor in the fight against ISIS.

This assessment, he said, was based on recommendations from US research centers. They concluded that previous reliance on the Kurdish component alone, and practices associated with it in eastern Syria, had created a sense of grievance that ISIS later exploited for recruitment.

As a result, the administration became convinced that cooperation with Damascus was more effective.

In a related context, Fahham said Washington viewed Israeli incursions in southern Syria with dissatisfaction, considering them destabilizing and contrary to Trump’s vision for regional development.

The United States, he added, fears that weakening the Syrian government could reopen the door to renewed Iranian influence and ISIS activity.

As for the southern province of Sweida, Fahham said the US administration supports integrating the province into the state, citing remarks by US envoy Tom Barrack, who stated that decentralization had failed in the Middle East, reflecting a preference for backing a unified Syria.

A parallel reading from the military establishment

From another angle, researcher on armed groups Raed al-Hamed offered a complementary reading of the US position.

He said that although Trump, during his first term, had moved toward withdrawing forces and ending the partnership with the SDF, warnings from senior military commanders about a possible ISIS resurgence after the battle of Baghouz in March 2019 prompted him to keep about 2,000 troops in Syria.

Al-Hamed noted that the partnership with the SDF dated back to the battle of Kobani in 2015, when Washington relied on the group as a ground force.

However, he said the new policy following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Syria’s entry into the international coalition was now based on refusing to recognize any independent entity east of the Euphrates and rejecting federal formulas similar to Iraq’s Kurdistan region.

Al-Hamed said the new policy offered no real US guarantees to the SDF in the face of Türkiye and coincided with pressure to integrate the group into Syria’s military and security institutions, in line with the vision of the Syrian government, which rejects any armed presence outside the framework of the state.

This, he said, is still rejected by the SDF as the deadline approaches for implementing the March agreement with the government in Damascus, scheduled for the end of this year.

Overall, the Syrian scene appears to have entered a pivotal phase that goes beyond traditional conflict equations, laying the groundwork for a new reality governed by the language of interests and reciprocal security arrangements.

While Washington and its regional allies, particularly Riyadh and Ankara, are betting on the ability of the new leadership in Damascus to impose stability and end years of chaos, observers say the success of this path will depend on developments on the ground in the coming months.

The ability of the “new republic” to balance the demands of internal reconciliation with the conditions of external alliances will be the decisive test in determining whether this turn truly marks the opening chapter of an end to years of US hesitation in the region.