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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell hoped that Tuesday’s donor conference on Syria will match last year’s pledge of 6 billion euros. In an extensive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the Europeans have provided some 20 billion euros to Syria since the eruption of its crisis in 2011.

“The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution,” he said. “We will continue to do our part.”

“As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254,” he added.

“During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people. The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions,” Borrell stated.

What do you expect of the donor conference in Brussels on June 30? How does this one differ from the previous ones?

Syria entered its tenth year of war. In the past nine years, half of the Syrian population had to flee their homes. Over half a million people died. An entire generation of Syrian children has only known war. They all deserve a better, peaceful future. The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution as called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254. This is the only way to bring back lasting peace and stability for Syrians.

The Conference will be 2020’s main pledging event for Syria and the region, addressing the critical needs generated by the crisis, but it goes way beyond a donor conference. It is about continuing to support, politically and financially, Syria's neighbors and their people, who have shown extraordinary solidarity towards Syrian refugees. It has also grown into a unique opportunity for Syria’s civil society to engage in direct dialogue with the donor community and refugee-hosting countries. We could not gather people physically this year but we built a week of events where Syria’s youth, women and civil society organizations could interact with the international community. This is crucial, not only because they are the voices of the Syrian people but also because they hold the key to a better future for Syria.

A few factors raise the stakes for this year’s Conference. The grave deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation, the recent military offensive from the part of the regime and its supporters, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, as well as the ongoing coronavirus crisis all further exacerbate already dire living conditions of the Syrians. They have had enough. Together with the United Nations, who play a crucial and leading role, we are sparing no efforts to remain at their side and live up to their hope for a brighter and peaceful future.

Last year’s conference provided aid worth 6.2 billion euros. Do you think that you would get the same pledges this year? Would you be able to respond to the United Nations appeal for humanitarian aid?

It is impossible to give a figure of likely pledging ahead of this year’s Conference. Amounts also vary from year to year, depending on donors’ approaches. We remain as ambitious as we are every year in support of the Syrian people and their host communities in neighboring countries. We are all working together, not least with our co-chair the United Nations, to ensure that Syrians across the whole of Syria, as well as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, can continue receiving the support and protection of the international community over the coming year. That is the least they should expect and the least we can do.

As the European Union, we have provided over 20 billion euros since the beginning of the crisis in humanitarian, stabilization, development and economic assistance. We are the biggest donor for Syrian people. Two thirds of all the money spent to help Syrians and Syria’s neighbors came from the EU and its member states. And we will continue to do our part.

On top of the unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis and all the suffering they have been going through, Syrians are now also enduring the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. This year’s Conference will also address this issue. As EU, we have been adapting our current assistance in response to this new and additional challenge, working hard to ensure that life-saving equipment reaches those in need in Syria.

Why was the Syrian government not invited to the Brussels conference?

As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254.

The resolution clearly states that “the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria”. This is not just nice words for the EU, it is our compass. Nobody should hold their future hostage. This is why we are ensuring a meaningful input and a very large involvement of Syria’s civil society, with extensive online consultations held ahead of the Conference in Syria and in the region. Days of Dialogue also took place virtually on 22 and 23 June, consisting of discussions between civil society, ministers and senior decision-makers from refugee-hosting countries, the EU, the United Nations and other international partners. These contributions will feed in the Ministerial meeting of the Conference on 30 June. Syria’s civil society, its aid workers, its women and youth organizations are the future of the country.

How would you explain Russia's participation in the conference despite its criticism of not inviting the Syrian government?

As in previous years, all those members of the international community with influence in the conflict in Syria and that have expressed a will to support diplomatic efforts, in accordance with UN Security Council relevant resolutions, have been invited. In this regard, the EU welcomes the participation of the Russian Federation.

The conference comes after the European Union renewed economic sanctions against Damascus and the start of implementing the US Caesar Act. Does it have any effect on Brussels conference?

One of the key objectives of the Conference is for the international community to come together behind the UN-facilitated and Syrian-led political process. International pressure on Damascus to fully and genuinely participate in negotiations in the framework of UN Security Council resolution 2254, which is also done through sanctions, is of course part of this effort.

Moscow and Damascus say that these sanctions will harm the flow of the humanitarian and medical aid. What’s your reply?

EU sanctions are neither new nor aimed at the civilian population. They target individuals and entities that have been supporting the repression and the regime, financing them or benefitting from the war economy. They are designed not to impede the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, including crucial support in the current situation of the coronavirus pandemic. They do not prohibit the export of food, medicines or medical equipment. Even for potentially dangerous dual-use goods, for example chemicals also needed for pharmaceutical use, a number of exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes.

The EU has been and remains the largest humanitarian donor to the Syria crisis with over 20 billion euros mobilized since 2011. During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people.

The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions. On the contrary, it is mostly thanks to international assistance that healthcare, food, education or protection can still be delivered to people in need inside Syria. I could also add that trade has also continued throughout the war between the EU and Syria. We have never placed Syria under any kind of embargo.

What are the conditions that the European Union can lift the sanctions against Damascus?

EU sanctions concerning Syria have been in place since 9 May 2011 in response to the Syrian regime’s violent repression against its own people, including human rights violations, the use of live ammunition against peaceful protesters and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. These were not imposed lightly. They are the consequence of grave human rights violations and potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, which must be accounted for.

Our list now includes 273 individuals and 70 entities. The goal of these measures is to put pressure on the Syrian regime to halt repression and negotiate a lasting political settlement of the Syrian crisis in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, under UN auspices. Without a change of behavior and a constructive and genuine commitment to the political process, sanctions will remain. They are part and parcel of the EU’s wider approach to the Syria crisis. We also review them constantly to assess, inter alia, effects and developments on the ground.

EU has linked any contribution to the reconstruction of Syria with the success of the political process in Syria. What is your position on the reconstruction of Syria now?

The EU has been very clear on this. Europeans are willing to support the future of the Syria population and help them reconstruct their country but there are parameters for the EU's engagement. The EU will only participate in Syria's reconstruction when a genuine political transition in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254 is firmly underway. If this is not the case, all efforts will be in vain. Reconstruction requires minimal conditions in terms of stability, governance, public accountability, and representativeness of the governing authorities. Syria currently fulfils none of these criteria.

The EU’s reconstruction support cannot be invested in a context that would exacerbate pre-war inequalities and grievances and would not lead to reconciliation and peace building. The focus of reconstruction is not simply to rebuild infrastructure and housing – it is about restoring Syria’s social fabric, rebuilding trust and creating conditions that will mitigate or prevent the recurrence of violence, as well as responding to the grievances that sparked the conflict. Syrians deserve to live in a country where they all feel safe and protected by an impartial judiciary and by the rule of law and where human dignity is ensured.

The Brussels conference is co-chaired by the United Nations. What is your position on the efforts of the UN Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen?

Our position remains that only a political solution achieved in the framework of UN-brokered Geneva negotiations can guarantee a peaceful future for Syria. We fully support the work of the United Nations and of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. The Brussels Conferences aim at rallying the international community behind the UN efforts to advance a political solution.

The Conference will also back the calls by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Special Envoy Pedersen towards a nationwide ceasefire and the release of detainees, especially in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia announced its willingness to negotiate with America to reach a political solution in Syria. What is your position on the American-Russian dialogue on Syria?

Any progress towards the political resolution of the Syria conflict is to be welcomed. We insist that there should be no compromise on certain principles. Both Russia and the US support UN Security Council resolution 2254 and any solution to the Syria conflict must be in line with that resolution. For us in the EU, there can be no normalization of relations with the Syrian regime, and by extension no commitment of international funding for reconstruction, until there is real engagement in a genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process. Also, the return of refugees to Syria could only be supported by the international community only under the condition that they would be guaranteed to be safe, voluntary and dignified.

Do you think a US- Russia deal, will be enough? How does it look like for you?

Again, the future of Syria is for the Syrians to decide. This is what UN Security Council resolution 2254 says. The political negotiations on Syria's future must be Syrian-owned and Syrian-led. Both the US and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, have committed to support the genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process set out in UN Security Council resolution 2254.

Currently, Syria has three spheres of influence: North East of Syria, North west, and the rest of the country. Does the European Union have the same vision for these zones?

The European Union will not waver in its commitment to the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Syria. Precise governance arrangements within Syria are a matter for the Syrians to decide.

In 2021 there will be presidential election in Syria. How do you see that? How do you see Syria in one year from now?

Meaningful elections in Syria will be those held on the basis of a new Syrian Constitution, as foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 2254. They will mark the opening of a new chapter for the country and for its people.

If other elections are held before that, I encourage the Syrian regime to demonstrate its commitment to genuine political openness, for instance by making sure they are open to all Syrians, including those abroad, and that they are free and fair. However, in no way will this replace the need for real engagement in a political process and for the full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254.

How Syria will look a year from now will depend on the commitment of the regime to the implementation of that resolution as the only internationally accepted way forward. Not for our benefit, not for theirs or their supporters’, but for the benefit of all Syrians.

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Interviews

Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
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Al-Khanbashi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Warn Against Incitement, Hadramout Has Room for All

Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)
Governor of Hadramout, Salim Al-Khanbashi delivers a press conference in the city of Mukalla in Yemen's coastal southern Hadramout province on January 19, 2026. (Photo by FADEL SENNA / AFP)

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) member and Governor of Yemen's eastern Hadramout province Salem al-Khanbashi says he believes that “Hadramout triumphed for itself,” and that what took place there in December 2025 and early January 2026 marked a decisive moment in which Hadhramis reclaimed their right to protect their identity and blocked any political project seeking to dissolve the “Hadhrami self” under the slogans of outsiders.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat Podcast, recorded in Riyadh on February 9, 2026, al-Khanbashi advised the new Yemeni government led by Dr. Shayea al-Zindani to steer clear of partisanship, raise performance levels, and combat corruption. During the discussion, he presented his account of events, framing the operation as a “takeover of military camps,” not the “ignition of a war.” He broadened the discussion to what he views as the priority of the current phase: consolidating stability, activating development, and opening the door to long-awaited Hadhrami investments returning home.

“Liberate us" from ourselves?

In describing the outcome of the confrontation, the deputy rejects reducing the picture to who won and who lost. He says the real victory was achieved when the people of Hadramout rejected the notion that someone could arrive and say, “We came to liberate you,” asking: “Liberate you from whom? From ourselves?” He stresses that the governorate, with its history stretching back “thousands of years,” cannot have another identity imposed upon it. He records his appreciation for those who stood in defense of this distinctiveness, while at the same time extending explicit thanks to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its leadership and role, which he said was a key player in containing last month’s events.

On the moment he was tasked with the governorship at an extremely sensitive time, al-Khanbashi recounts that he was residing in Hadramout and did not leave except when necessary, before receiving a call from President Rashad al-Alimi and from parties including Saudi officials and colleagues on the Leadership Council, asking him to assume responsibility for the governorate “because we need you.”He says he tried to decline, but accepted under the pressure of “necessity,” emphasizing that he is a son of Hadramout who spent most of his life there, and that he accepted the post fully aware of the weight and complexity of the phase.

The picture becomes heavier as al-Khanbashi moves to his successive roles: governor, then commander of the National Shield Forces in Hadramout , then a member of the Leadership Council with the rank of vice president. He deliberately labels the January operation a “battle to take over the camps,” so that it would not be understood as targeting civilian society or as a search for settling scores.

Al-Khanbashi says his overriding concern was to spare Hadramout street fighting, protect civilian infrastructure, and minimize human losses. He describes the operation as “swift and decisive,” with a limited number of casualties.

Securing withdrawals... and a political outlet

Asked whether the military operation in Hadramout ended with reprisals against opponents, al-Khanbashi is keen to deny this. He says the withdrawal of departing forces was secured and that they were not subjected to any military or popular harassment. “We instructed that no one who was in the Southern Transitional Council, whether military or civilian, be harmed,” he says. At the same time, he explains that he took decisions to dismiss certain security and military leaders accused of involvement in looting weapons and ammunition or of poor performance, and that they will be referred for accountability in accordance with what they committed against the governorate.

Amid this, al-Khanbashi reiterates a message he wants widely understood: “Hadramout has room for all.” He calls for civic conduct that avoids incitement, and warns against marches he believes target civil peace and provoke the local scene.

He again urges adherence to civil behavior without incitement, citing gatherings that took place in early February 2026 in Seiyun. He suggests they were not spontaneous, saying: “We have evidence that these people were paid, and we want them not to force us to take measures involving a degree of coercive force against those who want to practice such acts. We are still under a state of emergency, and all measures can be taken.”

In the broader political context, al-Khanbashi speaks of moves to convene a broad Hadhrami meeting in Saudi Arabia bringing together political and social components, including Hadhramis from the Southern Transitional Council, with the aim of preparing a unified vision in the name of Hadramout to be presented to the Southern Dialogue Conference. He notes that a preparatory committee was formed in Mukalla to draft a position reflecting “all societal and political forces” in the governorate, alongside a parallel desire to represent the voice of Hadhrami expatriates within a single vision.

Electricity and investment

Electricity tops the services file, according to the governor. He places it at the head of priorities, explaining that the needs of the coast and the valley differ, but the headline is the same: energy that does not meet demand, especially in summer, with humidity and heat on the coast and harsh desert conditions in the valley.

He speaks of support projects to generate 300 megawatts for the coast, and other projects for the valley, alongside proposals for gas-powered plants and private-sector solar energy options with capacities that could reach 150 megawatts. He believes that a medium-term solution is not a substitute for a long-term strategic project for a large gas plant capable of covering Hadramout's future needs.

From energy he turns to investment as the other face of stability. Al-Khanbashi lists opportunities he sees as promising: tourism, real estate, the export of high-purity gypsum, potential minerals, coal in specific areas, black sands and heavy elements, fisheries, and the idea of aquaculture. He recalls his participation in a Hadhrami investment conference, calling on businessmen to balance their external investments with investing in Hadramout, while pledging to provide facilitation and an attractive environment.

On government affairs, al-Khanbashi describes the discussions that preceded the formation of the new government as having focused on criteria of competence, experience, and geographic balance, while rejecting the principle of quota-sharing. He then offers three pieces of advice he places at the core of the government’s test: moving away from ego and partisan drift, combating entrenched corruption in several ministries, and raising the level of revenue collection and transferring it to the central bank, especially in revenue-generating ministries. He highlights the need to regulate the financial relationship between the center and the governorates in accordance with the Local Authority Law, arguing that strict application would ease many chronic problems.

He recalls Hadramout's experience with oil revenues before exports were halted, noting that the governorate received 20 percent of the value of exported oil and used it for development projects such as electricity, roads, health, and education, before this resource stopped after the Houthis targeted export facilities.

"No barriers" with Saudi Arabia

In assessing Saudi development support, al-Khanbashi links relief and reconstruction as a single window for enabling Yemen to overcome its crisis, pointing to packages of projects in electricity, roads, health services, and others within Hadramout.

He places this within a relationship he describes as intertwined, difficult to separate socially, economically, and politically, invoking the extended borders, shared tribes, and cultural ties, to conclude that it is not possible to erect a “barrier” between Hadramout and the Kingdom.

Asked about the moment that remained most vivid in his memory during the 48 hours of the operation, al-Khanbashi says he feared the forces might not withdraw easily and what that could entail in terms of destruction and casualties, before the operation ended in record time with limited losses. He says this is what he will continue to take pride in: that Hadramout succeeded in avoiding internal fighting. In his message to the people of Hadramout, he calls for unity, abandoning the causes of division, and prioritizing security and development, pledging that the expansion of stability will lead to a “bright development era” reflected in the lives of the governorate’s residents.

Interviews

Iraqi Justice Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: ISIS Prisoners Held at a Fortified Site, Escape Impossible

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
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Iraqi Justice Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: ISIS Prisoners Held at a Fortified Site, Escape Impossible

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani told Asharq Al-Awsat that Iraq will not repatriate foreign prisoners affiliated with ISIS to their home countries if their involvement in crimes against Iraqi citizens is proven. He said a heavily fortified Iraqi prison currently holds thousands of ISIS members transferred from Syria, stressing that security breaches, escapes, smuggling, or internal unrest are not possible, despite what he described as enormous pressure on judicial institutions and the presence among the detainees of some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists.

Iraq agreed to receive thousands of prisoners suspected of affiliation with ISIS starting January 21. Although the international coalition transferred them in batches from prisons previously overseen by the Syrian Democratic Forces following military operations by the Syrian army in northeastern Syria, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani confirmed that “the decision to receive the prisoners was purely an Iraqi one.”

Since then, Shwani says he has been “working intensively with judicial, government, and security officials” to manage a highly sensitive and dangerous operation aimed at accommodating a large number of prisoners in a way that prevents them from becoming a “ticking time bomb,” and at returning most of them to their countries so that their detention does not turn into a new school for producing extremism.

The Minister was born in the city of Kirkuk, north of Baghdad, in 1975. He has served as Iraq’s justice minister since 2022. He is a lawyer and constitutional expert, and a member of the political bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Pavel Talabani.

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the Iraqi Minister said that taking custody of ISIS prisoners in such large numbers came after major efforts to ease prison overcrowding, but that Iraqi authorities bore the burden in order to safeguard regional security.

According to Shwani, the Justice Ministry has long experience in managing terrorist inmates and confronting extremism. It relies on a program known as the “Moderation Program,” which aims to strip inmates of extremist ideology through multiple means, including vocational training. For this reason, he said, the international community trusts Iraq to house the most dangerous terrorists in its prisons. The following is the full text of the interview:

When the decision was announced to transfer prisoners from Syria to Iraq, was the Justice Ministry ready to receive this number of inmates?

After the Iraqi government agreed to receive the prisoners, the National Security Council of Ministers convened, and preparations began to take custody of them. Certainly, receiving such a large number is neither easy nor simple. It requires large prison facilities, equipment, and security protection, in addition to everything inmates need in correctional institutions, whether for the prisoners themselves or the security requirements to protect the prisons.

Our prisons were already overcrowded. But because we believe in the importance of this issue, and because it is related to protecting regional security from prisoners of an extremely dangerous level, urgent measures had to be taken to prepare prison sections to receive and house them. With the support provided by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, and the relevant bodies in government and the judiciary, we were able to succeed. All prisoners received were placed in jail, and we have now provided all prison-related requirements, as well as the security requirements to protect it.

What do you mean by those requirements?

The detainees are now housed in standard prisons with air conditioning, bathrooms, and cleaning supplies. They receive three meals a day and are guarded by a professional staff of guards and investigators. I can say that the judicial institution is dealing with them professionally, likely different from the situation in Syria. Their conditions are now better than they were before their transfer to Iraq.

An ISIS member at Al-Karkh Prison in Baghdad (AP)

Has overcrowding increased after the addition of these prisoners? How are they distributed?

Because of the exceptional circumstances Iraq went through, including the occupation of areas by ISIS, earlier bombings by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, as well as organized crime, the prison overcrowding rate when I took office three years ago stood at 300 percent. We put in place a systematic plan and managed to reduce overcrowding to 25 percent above normal capacity.

However, receiving 5,704 prisoners at once caused overcrowding again, because accommodating nearly 6,000 inmates required placing additional strain on other prisons, undermining efforts to ease overcrowding.

Where were they housed?

They were placed in a single prison. The operation is complex because their classification requires housing them in a prison that is tightly secured, fortified, and protected- security-wise, militarily, and intelligence-wise.

How were they housed while in pretrial detention, given that the Justice Ministry deals only with convicted prisoners?

Under Iraqi law, when a detainee is dangerous, a judge has the authority to place him in a secure location from which escape is impossible or feared, and where his protection can be guaranteed. This is not an exceptional case; it is purely legal. They are detainees under judicial decisions, and because of the danger they pose, they were placed in this prison, where they are held away from other prisoners.

How do you bear the burden? How is such a large number of prisoners managed?

There is a heavy burden on us at all levels. We need human resources to run this prison, infrastructure, additional manpower, military and security forces for protection, as well as the costs of housing, maintenance, and providing services to 5,704 prisoners. This is not easy. We face challenges, especially financial ones. But there is communication with the international coalition to bear the costs, and they have expressed readiness in this regard.

How is this matter funded?

There is understanding and communication with the international coalition, which has expressed readiness to bear financial burdens related to housing those prisoners, providing infrastructure and prison supplies, and some security requirements. We prepared a comprehensive project and sent it to the coalition, and we are awaiting their response and procedures.

How many investigators handle the prisoners’ cases?

About 150 investigators are working through the files of thousands of prisoners. They are carrying out enormous work, assisted by a large number of employees and specialized experts.

How are they classified?

We have among them the most dangerous terrorists. They are classified according to security criteria and internationally approved standards for dealing with prisoners. Highly dangerous inmates and those with terrorist ideology do not mix with ordinary prisoners. Our prisons are classified by type of crime, the severity of the offense, and age groups.

How likely is a breach or internal mutiny?

This prison is fortified and cannot be breached. I will not disclose further details, but the site is protected and cannot be penetrated. Nor can we speak of internal mutiny, because the security agencies supporting the Justice Ministry have taken their precautions with full professionalism. This cannot happen.

How are prisoners’ affairs managed inside the prison, and what measures are taken to prevent some from becoming potential hubs for terrorist activity?

First, we are in contact with their countries to repatriate them according to their nationalities once investigations are completed, provided they are not among those who fought Iraq, killed Iraqis, or participated in terrorist activities inside Iraq. Those exceptions will not be returned even if requested. We are working to repatriate the remaining detainees, and the international coalition is working with us to expedite the process.

As for their management, the Justice Ministry has long experience in this field. Other prisons of the same security classification hold dangerous terrorists, including ISIS leaders captured during operations to liberate Iraqi territory from the group. They have been placed in rehabilitation and reform programs.

This includes the “Moderation Program,” which aims to remove extremist ideology through intellectual, cultural, social, sports, and artistic approaches, in addition to vocational training. The program has achieved significant results. We seek to ensure their stay is temporary pending deportation, and during their time in custody we apply established programs and expertise in dealing with high-risk terrorist inmates.

What if efforts to return them fail? What would the situation be if they remain in Iraqi prisons for a long period?

What has been agreed with countries and with the international coalition is to return them as quickly as possible. There is clear coordination on this matter, with the exception of those who fought Iraqi security forces or committed crimes against Iraqis, as I said earlier. Those will be tried and will remain in Iraq.

ISIS members as they are placed in custody at Al-Karkh Central Prison in Baghdad (AP)

Are there countries that refuse to take back their nationals?

The matter is still in its early stages, as are the attempts. The international coalition and the United States are working with us to urge countries that have prisoners to receive them, and we will continue these efforts.

Why did the international coalition transfer ISIS prisoners to Iraq?

There may be a political aspect unrelated to the Justice Ministry, but I will highlight clear points: there is trust in the Iraqi defense and security system, trust that Iraq is a partner and an influential state within the international coalition to combat ISIS, and a reliable system to house these prisoners.

Interviews

Ukrainian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia’s Demands to Annex Territory are a Red Line

Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
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Ukrainian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia’s Demands to Annex Territory are a Red Line

Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)

A senior Ukrainian official said Kyiv is concentrating its negotiating efforts with Russia on achieving an unconditional ceasefire, while stressing the need for full international security guarantees to ensure that any future attack on Ukraine does not recur. He underscored that Russia’s demands to annex Ukrainian territory represent a red line.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ukraine’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia Anatolii Petrenko reaffirmed his country’s commitment to peace, saying: “We take every opportunity to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Russia to deescalate the ongoing military standoff as a key prerequisite for inclusive political solution in order to achieve just and lasting peace.”

He added that “real breakthrough in current negotiations would be to achieve the unconditional ceasefire.” He also stressed the urgency of making progress on the return of abducted Ukrainian children and prisoners of war, noting that “If promptly agreed these would pave the way for much broader and deeper dialogue between Ukraine and Russia potentially leading to a comprehensive political decision.”

Anatolii Petrenko, Ukraine’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Embassy of Ukraine in Riyadh)

Petrenko said that, in this complex process, Ukraine is supported by its international partners who stand firmly on the principles of international law, Ukraine’s sovereignty, and its territorial integrity. He said: “We are convinced that unconditional ceasefire would be top testament of Russia’s genuine readiness for lasting peace.”

At the same time, he expressed regret that “daily realities of Russian strikes against Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure against the backdrop of ongoing diplomatic efforts reflect fundamental gap we are to bridge using every compelling leverage in possession of international community.”

Petrenko went on to stress that “the issue of Russia’s demands for territorial annexation are illegitimate and represent our red line in accordance with Ukraine’s Constitution.” He added that “It cannot be considered as a matter of a technical compromise for the sake of ongoing negotiations with Russia,” noting that “Ukraine’s delegation has a clear mandate to pursue further diplomatic negotiations strictly based on our national interests.”

The American Role

Petrenko described the US role in any political settlement as central, saying: “The United States’ role remains central. This is our strategic partner, and we rely on our partnership to achieve a strategic solution for Ukraine’s sovereignty.”

He said this partnership includes “steadfast support to ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Russia, vital commitment to sustained combat readiness of our defense forces with tangible security guarantees and clear common vision for economic recovery of Ukraine once the war is terminated.”

Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy during at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22 (Reuters)

Petrenko stressed that “United States’ leadership in maintaining world security should deliver an effective political solution to stop war against Ukraine thus undoubtedly generating global stability much needed across all continents and regions.”

On another front, he said Ukraine aspires to join the European Union in the foreseeable future, saying: “Ukraine has always been a part of Europe.” He added: “Our national ambition is to become a new member of the European Union in foreseeable future.”

He said “the European Union is our strongest partner to maintain macro-economic stability, develop Ukraine’s defense industry and contribute to future security guarantees,” noting that “our joint approach to ending the war has always been unified – politically, economically and militarily.”

Petrenko added that “European Union has to be part of diplomatic negotiations for peace as we all understand the European security remains undivided and Ukraine is the cornerstone of that security.”

Russia’s Exhaustion

Petrenko spoke about Russian losses since the war began on 24 February 2022, saying: “Since 24 February 2022, Russia has lost around 1.3 mln personnel, with 11,654 tanks, 24,013 armored vehicles, 435 aircraft and 28 warships destroyed.” He said “These figures illustrate not only a tragic human toll but also a profound degradation of Russia’s warfighting capacity.”

On the economic front, he noted: “Russia’s wartime economy shows clear signs of running aground,” stressing that “GDP growth has slowed to near stagnation at around 1% in 2025 and projected to remain minimal in 2026 due to sanctions, declining oil and gas revenues and rising structural imbalances.” He added: “Annual inflation reached around 7% with key interest rate at 16%, the budget is expected to run a noticeable deficit.”

Petrenko said: “War brings no prosperity to any nation in the world.” He added that “Russia should take this very seriously and reverse the aggression into civilized neighborly relationship with Ukraine as a responsible member of the United Nations and its Security Council.”

Saudi–Ukrainian Partnership

On relations with Saudi Arabia, Petrenko said: “Ukraine and Saudi Arabia experience a dynamic phase of consistent political and economic engagement.”

He said: “Last year President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia which resulted in the adoption of a Joint Statement showcasing the strong political will of the leaders to deepen and expand cooperation in the prospective fields.”

Volodymyr Zelenskyy holding talks with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah on March 10, 2025 (EPA)

Petrenko reaffirmed the two countries’ determination to strengthen investment relations through partnerships in priority sectors, including energy, food industries, and infrastructure, with a shared desire to continue exploring opportunities for cooperation in oil, gas, their derivatives, and petrochemicals.

He added: “Particular value is attached to the Kingdom’s practical efforts to provide a conducive environment for diplomatic engagement within the Ukraine–US–Russia triangle last year, underscoring the Saudi Monarchy’s sincere commitment to contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in a meaningful and practical way.”

Petrenko expressed his country’s deep gratitude for the humanitarian and energy assistance provided by Saudi Arabia.