Sudani to Asharq Al-Awsat: Iran Is Serious About a Deal with America

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
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Sudani to Asharq Al-Awsat: Iran Is Serious About a Deal with America

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief

In recent months, Iraq has navigated two difficult challenges. It avoided being drawn into the Israeli-Iranian conflict and managed to stay clear of the fallout from US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. Earlier, it had resisted the temptation to intervene in saving Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

Having passed these two challenges, Iraq is now facing a third: the elections scheduled for November, which will determine the shape of parliament and the identity of the next prime minister. We posed these and other questions to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani:

Q: Do you have the impression that we are witnessing new regional power balances after what happened in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran?

Absolutely. After the October 7 events and the subsequent aggression on Lebanon, the changes in Syria, and then the aggression against Iran, there are growing speculations about the region’s future amid these still-unfolding developments. The aggression on Gaza and Lebanon is ongoing. Discussions about arrangements in Gaza, and also about Israeli incursions into Syria are also ongoing. We’re also talking about a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, so we’re not yet looking at a stable political trajectory for the region’s structure, balance, and relationships.

These developments raise important questions that demand a clear vision: What do we want for this sensitive region economically, politically, and in terms of security, especially as it almost witnessed a full-scale regional war, not just clashes between Iran and Israel?

Iraq is part of the region’s geopolitical landscape. While prioritizing its own interests and those of its people, Iraq is also an active regional player, not a bystander. We leverage our relations and interests with neighboring countries to formulate positions that enhance security and stability, particularly since we reject wars, which we have suffered from for decades.

Q: What did you do when the Israeli raids on Iran began?

Everybody expected escalation and reciprocal strikes. All regional countries, including Iraq, interpreted it this way. After the Israeli aggression on Iran, which violated Iraqi airspace, Iraq faced the risk of being dragged into the war and into aggression against a neighboring state, which goes against our constitution and political principles. We do not allow any party or country to use Iraqi airspace or territories to launch attacks on others.

We expressed our rejection diplomatically. So we filed a complaint with the UN Security Council, contacted others to support our position, and condemned the aggression against a neighboring sovereign state under the pretext of preventive war, when in reality it was a clear act of aggression on a sovereign state that is a member of the United Nations.

The most important part was maintaining internal security and a unified national position on this crisis, which we thankfully achieved. We presented a unified national stance rejecting aggression and violations of our sovereignty and airspace, supporting the government’s effort to protect Iraqi interests and keep Iraq out of war. This internal position was crucial.

Q: Did the US assist you?

Yes, the United States was keen to keep Iraq away from the conflict. We had ongoing communication, especially regarding the airspace violation and the importance for a US role because it is part of the international coalition against terrorism. For ten years, there should have been support for Iraq’s air defense system to protect our skies.

Q: What did Iran ask of Iraq during the war?

There was no request. Rather, Iraq took the initiative to clarify the risks and exchange messages between parties to stop this war and return to negotiations. We were in constant contact with the presidency and all relevant channels. Negotiations were expected to start on Sunday, but the aggression began early Friday.

Iraq’s position was to push for a return to talks and halt the war. Iran’s view was: how can we negotiate while the aggression continues? Our discussions with regional countries and the US focused on this issue. Iran was ready to negotiate if the aggression stopped. That was Iran’s initial positive position.

Q: Was it difficult to manage relations with Iraqi factions backed by Iran?

Definitely. The region has faced unprecedented events in the past two years, yet Iraq has remained stable unlike in the past when the region was stable and Iraq was turbulent. We’ve managed to contain reactions and channel them into balanced political positions through political and security efforts.

Q: Do you feel you've implemented the "Iraq First" slogan?

Yes. It wasn’t just a slogan. It’s a doctrine we truly believe in: Iraq and the dignity of its people come first in our domestic and foreign policies.

Q: Are you concerned about a new round (of fighting) between Israel and Iran?

Yes, because everyone knows (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu hasn’t respected any ceasefires in Gaza or Lebanon. It’s likely he’ll carry out further aggression against Iran. His policy and strategy seem to be intending to keep the region in a state of conflict to maintain his political position.

Q: Were you worried the Iranian regime might falter and that the war would drag on? Did you prepare for prolonged instability?

Iran is a key regional country. If anyone thought a 12-day war could topple the regime, the repercussions would affect the entire region. Naturally, we were concerned about regional stability and that of any neighboring country. You can’t watch a neighboring country burn and expect the fire not to reach you.

What we believe in at this stage is pushing toward stability, security, peace and understanding. Our source of concern was for these repercussions to affect the region’s stability. But internally, we were sure of our capabilities and the awareness of our political forces and the Iraqi people on the importance of preserving internal security and keeping the political system stable.

Q: What did the Iraqi army conclude from this war?

This is currently under study. I don't think it's just the Iraqi army, but all the militaries of the region are studying it. We are facing a new type of warfare that uses modern technology. Therefore, we must be on par with this development and these technologies so that we preserve the security and stability of our country.

Q: Who destroyed the Iraqi radars after the end of the Iranian-Israeli war? Was there an investigation and what were its results?

There is an investigation by a specialized technical committee, and I am closely following this probe. It was a clear attack using drones. As you know, it's not easy to detect these aircraft. Today, this technology is used in attacks and to create instability. But this matter will definitely not pass without consequences.

Bases in Nasiriyah were targeted and sustained minor damage. However, the radar system in Taji was damaged. At other sites, the air defenses intercepted and shot down the drones. We will reach a conclusion, and whoever is responsible will be held accountable.

Q: Were the drones launched from inside Iraqi territory?

The investigation is ongoing. We even sought assistance from the international coalition because there are highly technical matters to determine the launch area and the distance the drones traveled. All of these are details necessary to identify the culprit.

Q: Why do relations with Syria appear not yet completely normal?

On the contrary, I find them normal and on the right track. Since day one, Iraq's stance has been clear: to respect the choices of the Syrian people and the changes that occurred. We sent a delegation, initiated reciprocal visits and communication, including the Doha meeting, and communication is ongoing regarding different developments. We have also expressed our concerns.

Q: Concerns about what?

Our concerns come in the form of advice because Syria's experience is similar to Iraq's after 2003. The diversity that exists in Syria mirrors Iraq’s diversity... So first, there should be an inclusive political process that embraces everyone, guarantees their rights, and respects their beliefs and ideologies. There must also be a clear stance against extremism, terrorism, and violence and a clear position regarding ISIS, which poses a threat not just to Syria but to all countries in the region.

We also want to see a united Syria, without any foreign intervention or presence on Syrian territories because a strong and unified Syria is a strength for Iraq and the region. All of this falls in the interest of the Syrian people.

We are also ready for economic cooperation. Iraq and Syria share geography and history that can form a foundation for further cooperation and stronger bilateral relations. We have started studying the revival of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline to reach the Mediterranean Sea through Baniyas.

We’ve also expressed our willingness to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction through a conference. Today, Iraq chairs both the Arab League summit and the Arab Development Summit, so it is concerned with all Arab issues, especially Syria. We proposed an initiative that was adopted in the “Baghdad Declaration” to hold a national dialogue conference for all components of Syrian society.

So the relationship is moving in that direction, along with continued security coordination. The Coordination Committee held a meeting last Wednesday between Iraqi and Syrian security leaders to secure the borders.

Q: Are you satisfied with Syria's cooperation on security coordination?

Yes. At this level, both sides are satisfied with the exchange of information and security coordination, which is sufficient to ensure the security of Iraq and Syria, especially given the noticeable activity of ISIS, which has recently become more active, seized a large number of Syrian army weapons, and is planning operations, the latest of which was the terrorist attack on a church in Damascus. So we have a mutual interest in increasing security coordination.

Q: Have you also discussed with Syria the issue of foreign fighters who took part in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime?

Among our comments was the issue of granting citizenship to foreigners, and I believe this matter needs to be reviewed because there are reservations about it within Syria itself. We explained these points frankly and transparently out of concern for Syria’s stability as we’ve been through experiences post-2003 and we were keen to help the new administration avoid the mistakes we made.

Q: Would you have preferred that Syria remained under Bashar al-Assad’s rule?

That’s not my opinion; it's up to the Syrian people. They are the ones who decide the system that suits the Syrian state.

Q: Could we see President Ahmad al-Sharaa soon in Baghdad, or you in Damascus?

That depends on the circumstances.

Q: When did you realize that Bashar al-Assad's regime had collapsed?

Syria was exposed to years of suffering, turmoil, and instability. After the October 7 events and the subsequent aggression against Lebanon, our reading was that the region would witness a state of chaos, confusion, and security imbalance. The vulnerable side was Syria, given that large areas were not under the control of the regime at the time. So, within our regional communication efforts, we focused on how to maintain Syria’s stability to prevent a security collapse that could be exploited by ISIS terrorist mobs - this was the real threat.

This was one of the concerns of countries in the region, especially Iraq and Türkiye. Therefore, we launched an initiative to bring Türkiye and Syria closer together in order to resolve certain files that contribute to and support stability. This began early on, and these efforts continued. There was a clear and serious desire from Türkiye, and also cautious acceptance from Syria. There were several attempts, but unfortunately, they did not yield any positive steps.

Q: Was it a mistake for Assad not to meet with (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan?

In my estimation, yes. And this was not just Iraq’s attempt. From what I heard from leaders of other regional countries, all of them tried to achieve a meeting and some sort of de-escalation at the level of the border areas, which were experiencing unrest. We considered the refusal to meet a mistake. The meeting could have contributed to de-escalation and created an atmosphere of reconciliation with all parties within Syria, instead of the ongoing instability and confrontation that served no party.

Q: Has it become clear that the keys to solving crises in the region are with the United States, which allegedly wanted to disengage from the Middle East to focus on the China threat?

The US remains an important country in its relations with the countries of the region. But certainly, the greater role lies with the countries of the region themselves, which define their interests and the course of their ties. There is no ready-made formula for the countries of the region to achieve stability and sustainable peace. The people of the region are the most entitled to engage in dialogue based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Dialogue and understanding must be the approach, rather than seeking conflict or exclusion that threatens others. The language of war cannot be the path to achieving stability.

Q: President (Donald) Trump favors the “deal” approach. Is an American-Iranian deal in the coming phase possible?

It’s possible. The US president took the initiative to contain the recent war, and Iraq supported this move. This initiative was the reason a truce was achieved and this destructive war was halted. We hope this role continues, especially through bilateral negotiations on (Iran’s) nuclear program, to achieve a deal or agreement that lays the foundation for the stability of a vital region like the Middle East.

Q: Is there a planned visit to the United States?

Not at the present time.

Q: I’d like to ask about Iraq’s relations with regional countries. How would you describe your relationship with Türkiye?

It’s a relationship based on an understanding and awareness of its importance geographically, historically, in terms of shared interests, and the opportunities that lie ahead of us as two neighboring Muslim countries in a vital region. We've laid the foundation for a genuine new phase in this relationship through several files: security, economy, and issues of mutual concern, particularly water.

During this government’s term, we’ve established a significant strategic partnership with Türkiye, especially after launching the “Development Road” project, which is one of the most important economic corridors in the region. It will benefit both countries and lay the groundwork for a major economic axis in the region.

On the water issue, we’ve taken a strategic approach for the first time in the history of the Iraqi state through a bilateral framework agreement for cooperation on water management, signed in Baghdad during President Erdogan’s visit. These are all positive indicators of a strong relationship between the two countries.

Q: You spoke of a strong relationship with Türkiye. Can you describe your ties with Iran in two lines?

There’s a strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran based on shared religious, cultural, and social values and mutual interests. Iran has also stood with Iraq and the Iraqi people during various phases under the dictatorship, during the fight against terrorism, and in the political process. But we are certainly keen for this relationship to remain within a proper framework that serves mutual interests and prevents meddling in internal affairs. Iraq has its own independence and national decision-making, driven by the interests and priorities of its people.

Q: So there is no Iranian management of Iraqi affairs?

Absolutely not.

Q: Not even over any part of it?

Not over any part of it. Even the term itself is unacceptable and doesn’t exist in our vocabulary. A positive relationship today does not mean interference. Iraqis are highly sensitive about their independence and their love for their country and their national sovereignty. Iraq is not, and will not be, subordinate to anyone. That’s Iraq’s history.

Q: Is Iran helping you with the issue of "exclusive control of weapons"?

This issue is an Iraqi matter, and it is part of our program as a government. The Parliament voted on it, and we set a plan for it. The weapons we are talking about... we fought a war against terrorism for two decades. It was a war in every sense of the word. The war against terrorism and terrorist mobs like al-Qaeda and ISIS was not a war against a regular army but rather targeted citizens in every town, village, and city. These unstable conditions led to the presence of weapons to protect citizens in this or that region, reaching a stage of confrontation with ISIS.

After the victory, it is necessary to reorganize security and institutional reform, which we adopted through a committee chaired by the premiership. We set solutions for all these sensitive points related to the presence of arms outside the framework of state institutions. There is a clear plan, and everyone knows it; it is being implemented according to a decree.

We will not accept the presence of weapons outside the framework of state institutions. This is one of the important and fundamental pillars for building the Iraqi state. It is an opinion and principle supported by all religious forces. The religious authority’s statements are clear - not only the latest statement but throughout the past years, they have emphasized this principle. This goal is supported by religious leaders, political leaders, and also by our people. This is not a slogan but a goal for which we set a plan and are implementing in line with a government decree.

Q: Can we say that exclusive control of arms is a necessary condition to ensure stability and attract investment?

Investment is at its best. For the first time in two years, investments have exceeded $100 billion. A month ago, I spoke of $88 billion. A few days ago, the head of the National Investment Commission updated the figure and informed me that we have surpassed $100 billion over two years. Arab and foreign investments are now active in Iraq. So, the process of attracting investments is progressing within the existing safe and stable environment despite the region’s instability. Iraq is stable and cohesive, and it offers investment opportunities and welcomes Arab and foreign companies.

Q: Talking about investment compels me to ask about corruption. Can you say with certainty that corruption today is less, or significantly less, since you have taken office?

With full confidence, yes. As a government, we stopped the collapse that occurred in the abuse of public funds. You remember the “theft of the century” - more than 3.7 trillion dinars. That happened during the previous government’s term. This amount of cash was stolen as the Iraqi state and its security apparatus watched, and unfortunately, the theft took place under official cover.

Q: But wasn’t it the previous government that uncovered it?

For eight months, the funds were being stolen. But when the thieves disagreed among themselves over how to divide the shares, one of them stirred up the crisis, and that’s when things spiraled out of control. This is what happened in the investigation that was initiated at the time by the acting Minister of Finance. That investigation is ongoing and involves figures from the previous government, along with employees and wanted businessmen.

This is one of the most blaring examples of the corruption that occurred. Today, we’ve put a stop to that collapse. We’ve stopped the abuse of public funds in this way. But of course, we still have a long road ahead before we can fully eliminate corruption. What we have achieved as a government is, first, reforming the oversight institutions responsible for combating corruption because we found that an important part of those institutions themselves needed reform. That was our first step. Through the changes and accountability measures we took against officials in the Integrity Commission and the Board of Supreme Audit, we were able to reform these institutions.

We also introduced a new concept: the repatriation of wanted individuals involved in corruption cases, including those accused in the “theft of the century” and others. Most of them hold other nationalities. So, our relationships with countries around the world have been based on how much they cooperate with us in extraditing the wanted individuals

Q: Have you arrested any of the wanted individuals?

Yes, a significant number. And a large percentage of the wanted individuals themselves have started to come forward, because they realized they were being pursued, and they returned the stolen funds. We’ve recovered approximately more than $500 million. We’ve also begun legal procedures. Iraq is a member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which places an obligation and responsibility on all countries to cooperate with us in extraditing the wanted individuals and recovering stolen assets.

These measures are essential to fighting corruption. Corruption is a challenge faced by countries around the world. It’s recognized by the UN as one of the global challenges - not just for Iraq. But we have taken real steps and we are continuing until we eliminate this dangerous phenomenon that threatens all our development, investment, and reconstruction projects.

Q: Do the armed factions put pressure on the judiciary? Are judges scared?

No, certainly not. The judiciary enjoys independence, first and foremost, and it is respected. It is supported by state institutions in ensuring that it does not come under pressure or allow any party or entity to threaten it. The judiciary has proven, on multiple occasions, its independence and courage in making important decisions that ensure justice is upheld and the law is enforced.

Q: From your discussions with Iranian officials, did you deduce that there is a genuine Iranian desire to reach an agreement with the US?

Yes, our impression from a series of contacts and meetings is that there is a serious desire from the Iranian state to reach an agreement that secures Iran’s interests while also addressing the concerns of the international community. There is no decision in Iran, either religious or official, to acquire nuclear weapons, which is the main global concern. Therefore, the path is clear to reach an understanding that would close this file, which has been a key source of tension and escalation in the region.

Q: How would you describe relations with Lebanon?

It is a strong relationship, marked by keenness on Lebanon’s stability, especially during these challenging times. Our position is to support Lebanon’s sovereignty and its state institutions as they face ongoing aggression and repeated violations by the Israeli occupation authorities.

The Lebanese president recently visited Baghdad. Various political and economic issues were discussed, particularly the revival of the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon pipeline and the operation of the Iraqi refinery in Tripoli. We also reaffirmed our support for Lebanon and its reconstruction.

Q: There are common stances, such as both governments calling for the “exclusive control of weapons.”

Yes, this is certainly one of the most important issues. In Lebanon, the issue of arms in a state confronting the Israeli entity is, of course, subject to considerations that are assessed by the Lebanese people and the active forces within the country.

Q: How would you describe relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

They are at their best in terms of alignment of views on the various issues that have shaken the region. Throughout this period, there has been high-level and continuous coordination regarding various developments.

On bilateral relations and cooperation, there are electrical interconnection projects with Saudi and US companies. There are also upcoming projects on opening additional border crossings to facilitate the movement of pilgrims and Umrah performers from Central Asia through Iran and Iraq, and then on to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, there is clear cooperation between institutions and investment funds in both countries to facilitate Saudi investments in Iraq.

Q: Does that mean there is consultation with the Saudi leadership?

There is continuous communication, consultation, and coordination on various issues. We have had visits, in addition to ongoing contact.

Q: It is said that Baghdad is accused of trying to starve the Kurdistan Region...What is your response?

This is an accusation without any basis - neither legal nor constitutional. The people of Kurdistan are part of our people. And this government, in particular, has been keen to fulfill its moral and constitutional obligations, as well as the political agreement that included resolving the outstanding issues.

But we are talking about the Budget Law, and we are talking about the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, both of which are binding legal grounds that the Prime Minister cannot override.

Since the approval of the Budget Law and later its amendment, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not complied with delivering all oil produced within the region, as stipulated by the law and affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court. The KRG also did not commit to handing over non-oil revenues to the public treasury. This constitutes a violation of the law and of the Court's ruling.

Therefore, the Ministry of Finance cannot fund any budget unless the KRG complies. As a result of our efforts to find solutions, we have ended up disbursing funds beyond the allocated share in the Budget Law, based on the Federal Court’s ruling.

These are clearly legal and technical matters and not political decisions as evidenced by the ongoing discussions now, which are centered around the quantity of oil being delivered.

Q: Could we say that the crisis has nothing to do with political parties in Baghdad wanting to undermine the Kurdistan Region?

Not at all. The Region is a constitutional entity respected by the Iraqi state, with all its components and authorities. We are committed to the stability of the Region. We supported, helped, and contributed to the holding of the Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections, which took place about eight to nine months ago. Unfortunately, the political forces in the Region have so far not been able to form a government.

The federal government was keen to support the electoral commission and allocate a budget. After the elections, I visited all the winning political forces in the Region, urging them to form a new regional government and for the parliament to exercise its powers in line with the framework of the constitution.

All political forces are committed to the Region’s stability because it is part of Iraq’s overall stability. There is no political interference in this issue.

Q: Is the salary issue going to be resolved soon?

The issue was discussed during last Tuesday’s Cabinet session. The document submitted by the federal ministries and the one submitted by the KRG were reviewed. We formed a committee headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, along with five other ministers, to develop a consensual proposal that aligns with the constitution, the law, and the Federal Supreme Court's decision. The committee will make its recommendations to the Cabinet for approval, after receiving confirmations that the KRG is committed to it.

Q: Has your relationship with President Masoud Barzani deteriorated?

Definitely not ... President Masoud Barzani is a respected national figure. We have built a good relationship over the past period, and we believe in the partnership with him in managing political affairs. As I mentioned, the recent disagreement or divergence is legal and technical, not political. He knows well that we are fully committed to the interests of our people whether in the Kurdistan Region or in other provinces. But we certainly do not have absolute authority to override the constitution and the law. We are entrusted with the public funds of all Iraqis, and it is our duty to achieve justice and equality without any discrimination.

Q: Why hasn’t the Oil and Gas Law been passed?

It was part of the government’s program. We began forming a technical committee made up of the Federal Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Natural Resources in the Kurdistan Regional Government, along with a political committee. We held two or three meetings, then the Region stopped sending its delegation, despite our requests to finalize a draft. We believe that this law is a fundamental and essential part of solving the issue of oil, its contracts, and the powers of the Region and the provinces.

Q: Will you personally run in the elections scheduled for November?

Yes, definitely. We have a national plan and a broad electoral and political alliance. We will run in the elections in most provinces with a national - not sectarian - approach.

Q: Do you expect to win a large parliamentary bloc? What are your estimates?

Putting numbers and estimates aside, there is certainly a positive impression about the chances of this alliance in the upcoming parliamentary elections. We are counting on the awareness of the citizens and the precision of their choices in selecting a path that ensures the continuation of this approach in managing the state in a way that secures the interests of Iraq and Iraqis.

Q: Is power tempting? Does the holder of power grow attached to it?

Yes. This is one of the afflictions of governance and authority. It requires a strong degree of faith and principled integrity to prevent the one in the seat of power from being swept away by its temptations. One of God’s blessings upon us is that we have enough moral immunity to resist the allure of this transient authority. We view power as an honor bestowed upon us to serve our people, and so we treat it as a responsibility to keep working for a nation that has sacrificed greatly through the past phase.

Q: We are now sitting in a place where Saddam Hussein once sat... Do you ever feel like you wish you had his absolute powers?

Absolutely not. The political system since 2003 is based on the philosophy of people ruling themselves through a parliamentary system we believe in. Sometimes, administrative and executive hurdles complicate the delegation of powers, but overall this is a political path built on partnership and peaceful power rotation. Iraq has proven its commitment to this approach.

We’re now talking about parliamentary elections for the sixth term, spanning two decades, despite all internal and external challenges. We support this direction. We continue to adhere to this principle and this democratic path. A one-man rule or dictatorship does not bring justice, nor security, nor stability, nor development. We’ve seen where all the dictatorships have ended.



El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Was Shocked by Deputy’s Role in Mubarak Assassination Plot

Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

This happens only in thrillers. A religious leader summons an obscure army officer and meets him for the first time two days before a planned coup. He appoints him president with an unprecedented line, “You will go to the palace as president, and I will go to prison as a detainee.”

That is what happened on June 30, 1989. The officer, Omar al-Bashir, went to the presidential palace while security forces took Dr. Hassan Al-Turabi to the notorious Kober Prison along with other political leaders.

Al-Turabi’s “ruse” aimed to conceal the Islamic nature of the coup so that near and distant governments would not rush to isolate it. Intelligence agencies in neighboring states, including Egypt, fell for the deception and assumed that Bashir had seized power at the head of a group of nationalist officers. Cairo recognized the new regime and encouraged others to follow.

This happens only in stories. A young man landed at Khartoum airport carrying a passport that said his name was Abdullah Barakat. He arrived from Amman. One day he would knock on Al-Turabi’s office door, though Al-Turabi refused to see him.

Soon after, Sudanese security discovered that the visitor was a “poisoned gift,” in Al-Turabi’s words. He was the Venezuelan militant known as Carlos the Jackal, a “revolutionary” to some and a “notorious terrorist” to others.

He led the 1975 kidnapping of OPEC ministers in Vienna under instructions from Palestinian militant Dr. Wadie Haddad, an architect of aircraft hijackings. One night, and with the approval of Al-Turabi and Bashir, French intelligence agents arrived in Khartoum. Carlos awoke from sedatives aboard the plane taking him to France, where he remains imprisoned for life.

Bashir’s government was playing with explosives. In the early 1990s, it also hosted a prickly young man named Osama bin Laden, who after Afghanistan was seeking a base for training and preparation. He arrived under the banner of investment and relief work. Mounting pressure left bin Laden with no option but to leave.

This happens only in thrillers. The leadership of the National Islamic Front gathered with its top figures, Bashir, and security chiefs. The occasion was the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

Ali Osman Taha, Al-Turabi’s deputy, stunned attendees by admitting that Sudanese security services were linked to the attempt. Those present understood that he had been one of its sponsors. Neither the sheikh nor the president had prior knowledge.

After the attempt, some proposed killing the operatives who had returned from the Ethiopian capital to eliminate any trail that could incriminate the Sudanese regime. Al-Turabi opposed the assassinations. The impression spread that Bashir supported the killings and signs of a rift between him and Al-Turabi began to appear.

The split later became formal in what came to be known as the “separation” among Islamists. Power is a feast that cannot accommodate two guests. Bashir did not hesitate to send to prison the man who had placed him in the palace. Al-Turabi did not hesitate to back Bashir’s handover to the International Criminal Court. Al-Turabi tasted the betrayal of his own disciples. Disciples, after all, are known to betray.

This happens only in thrillers. Through Al-Turabi’s mediation, Osama bin Laden agreed to meet an intelligence officer from Saddam Hussein’s regime named Farouk Hijazi. The meeting produced no cooperation, but it became one of the early arguments George W. Bush used in 2003 to justify the invasion of Iraq.

Hijazi also met senior Sudanese security officials who later visited Baghdad and were warmly received, and it became clear that Ali Osman Taha was among Saddam’s most enthusiastic admirers.

Sudanese blood now flows like the waters of the Nile. Bodies scattered on the streets of el-Fasher are almost making the world forget the bodies buried under the rubble of Gaza. Hard men are pouring fire onto the oil of ethnic and regional hatreds. Making corpses is far easier than making a settlement, a state, or institutions.

Since independence, Sudan has been a sprawling tragedy. Because the present is the child of the recent past, searching for a witness who knows the game and the players, and journalism leads to meeting and interviewing the experienced politician and researcher Dr. El-Mahboub Abdul Salam.

For a decade he served as Al-Turabi’s office director. For another decade, he wrote some of Bashir’s speeches.

In recent years, his bold conclusions stood out, including that Sudan’s Islamic movement has exhausted its purposes, that it shares responsibility with other elites for the country’s condition, and that it erred in dealing with others just as it erred when it chose the path of coups, violence, ghost houses, and contributed to pushing the South outside Sudan’s map.

Abdul Salam does not hesitate to scrutinize Al-Turabi’s own mistakes and his passion for wielding power. I sat down for an interview with him, and this is the first installment.

Abdul Salam was a first-year university student when Al-Turabi’s ideas caught his attention. Al-Turabi then appeared different, moving outside Sudan’s traditional social divides. He also knew the West, having studied in Paris and London. In 1990, Abdul Salam became Al-Turabi’s office director until the end of that decade.

Abdul Salam recalled: “I am often asked this question, are you a disciple of Al-Turabi? I have told them more than once, yes, I am a disciple of Al-Turabi, a devoted one. But I graduated from this school and became an independent person with my own ideas and experiences, perhaps broader than those of the Islamic movement’s earlier leaders.”

Asked about when he discovered Al-Turabi’s mistakes and developed a critical sense toward his experience Abdul Salam said that it was “perhaps in 2011, with the ‘Arab Spring’, and the Egyptian revolution in particular and the change that took place in Egypt.”

A tense beginning

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi’s relationship with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak began on polite terms when they met in 1986 during an Al-Azhar conference on the Prophet’s biography. At the time, he recalled, Cairo was hostile or deeply wary of the Sudanese government under Sadiq al-Mahdi. The meeting, in his words, “was more courtesy than substance.”

According to Abdul Salam, relations later deteriorated sharply because of the deception surrounding the 1989 coup, then worsened further after the 1995 assassination attempt against Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

The Addis Ababa shock

Abdul Salam recounted that a major political meeting was convened after the failed attempt, held at the home of Ali Osman Mohammed Taha and attended by Al-Turabi, Bashir and all senior leaders. He said that during this gathering, both Bashir and Al-Turabi learned “for the first time” that Sudanese security services and Al-Turabi’s own deputy had been involved in the operation without informing them, describing the moment as a “huge shock” to the leadership.

He said Taha admitted at the meeting that the security services were involved and that it later became clear he himself was implicated. When a proposal emerged to kill the operatives returning from Ethiopia to erase evidence, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi “rose in fierce opposition,” calling the idea outside both politics and Sharia. He cited Dr. Ali al-Haj as saying this moment “marked the beginning of the split.”

Egyptian intelligence reassesses Sudan

Abdul Salam describes how the Sudanese and Egyptian intelligence services eventually moved toward reconciliation. He said Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief, sent a message through French intelligence stating that the attack had been carried out by Egyptian Islamist groups.

According to Abdul Salam, Suleiman maintained that Sudan had only provided what he described as logistical support including money, shelter and weapons, rather than planning or executing the attack. This understanding, he says, prevented Egypt from responding harshly.

The communication opened a door for “major repair” of relations, Abdul Salam added, as Sudan began presenting itself as a pragmatic government after distancing itself from Al-Turabi.

After 1999: Rapprochement with Cairo

The reconciliation with Egypt and the region, Abdul Salam noted, took shape after 1999. He recalled that Taha’s visit to Cairo came after that date, followed by a visit from intelligence chief Salah Gosh. Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman regularly traveled to Egypt and maintained a friendship with his Egyptian counterpart, further improving ties.

The memorandum that shifted power

Abdul Salam described the turning point in relations between Bashir and Al-Turabi as the “Memorandum of Ten” in October 1998. During a major Shura gathering attended by hundreds of party, state and tribal leaders, ten members presented a document calling for the removal of Al-Turabi and the installation of Bashir as both head of state and leader of the movement.

He said the memorandum included reform language, but its essence was ending dual leadership. Bashir, according to Abdul Salam, “conspired with the ten” and accepted the proposal, calling the conspiracy “clear and very public.”

Abdul Salam recounted that Bashir wanted to confine Al-Turabi to a symbolic role and that some officers close to Bashir even asked Al-Turabi to remain as a spiritual figure who would bless decisions made elsewhere. “Al-Turabi would not accept this,” he stressed.

Al-Turabi’s influence and gradual reemergence

Reflecting on the early years of the Salvation regime, Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi authored all strategic decisions while the government handled daily business independently. He avoided public appearances during the first five years, he recalls.

Abdul Salam added that Al-Turabi gradually reemerged and became speaker of the National Assembly in 1996. He said Al-Turabi’s influence “never truly faded” because of his charisma, knowledge and strong presence, and diminished only when he was imprisoned after the split.

The 2001 Memorandum and South Sudan

Abdul Salam said Al-Turabi was arrested after the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in February 2001. He confirmed he personally signed the document.

Asked whether he felt responsible for South Sudan’s independence, Abdul Salam rejected the suggestion. He said his position was clear and aligned with Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, who argued that unity required suspending the hudud laws introduced under President Jaafar Nimeiri. Abdul Salam told southern leaders that unity should take precedence over maintaining those laws, adding that Islamic legislation, like all legal systems, is shaped by its psychological and historical context.

Complicated relationship

Abdul Salam described the relationship between Al-Turabi and his deputy Ali Osman Taha as complex and shaped by long-standing philosophical differences. He recalled a sharp split within the Islamist movement in 1968 when Taha aligned with figures who believed Al-Turabi had grown too dominant.

He cited Taha’s personal doctrine as follows: if an individual disagrees with the organization he sides with the organization, if the organization disagrees with the state he sides with the state, and if the state disagrees with Islam he sides with Islam. Al-Turabi, Abdul Salam said, did not operate that way and pursued his own ideas regardless of circumstance.

Abdul Salam recalled that during the Salvation regime, Ahmed Osman Maki had originally been prepared to succeed Al-Turabi but later moved to the United States. He stated that Maki’s strong charisma may have made him unsuitable as number two, while Taha excelled at concealing his emotions and functioning as deputy. He said the two leaders worked in outward harmony during the early years of the regime before deep differences surfaced later.

Abdul Salam added that Taha admired Saddam Hussein’s model of governance and believed Sudanese society was not ready for liberalism or pluralism.

The Arab Spring and the Islamic movement’s decline

According to Abdul Salam, the Arab Spring was “harsh on the Islamic movement.” Although the regional wave ended around 2012, Sudan’s version of it erupted in 2019. He said the uprising struck Islamists hard and reflected the real sentiment of the Sudanese street.

He argued that during its years in power, the Islamic movement held a barely concealed hostility toward civil society, youth, women and the arts. Sudanese intellectual and cultural life, he said, naturally opposed the regime’s long authoritarian rule. The revolution’s slogans of peace, freedom and justice were not part of the movement’s vocabulary, and over time the movement evolved into a posture “contrary to Sudanese society.”

The Communist Party’s influence

Abdul Salam said the Sudanese Communist Party helped shape opposition to the Salvation regime. After the execution of its leaders in 1971, the party underwent major transformation, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union it fully embraced liberalism. He remarked that many young Sudanese seeking freedom, justice and an expanded role for women found the Communist Party closer to their aspirations than the conservative Islamist movement.

Responsibility for Sudan’s political impasse

Abdul Salam rejected the narrative that Sudan’s decades of military rule make the military solely responsible for the country’s crises. He stressed that responsibility also lies with the civilian elite. Officers were part of this elite, and civilians who supported them in government shared responsibility. Sudan’s civilian parties, he argued, lacked clear programs to address longstanding distortions inherited from the colonial era.

One of Abdul Salam’s most sensitive moments with Al-Turabi occurred on the eve of the Islamist split. He said he personally succeeded in arranging a meeting between Al-Turabi and Bashir after months of estrangement, trying to avoid complete rupture. Bashir proposed turning the party conference into a political showcase while setting aside differences. Al-Turabi agreed, but according to Abdul Salam, disagreements reappeared by the end of the day.

Writing Bashir's speeches and choosing a side

Abdul Salam described his relationship with Bashir as very good and said he wrote the president’s speeches from early 1990 until the late 1990s. The speeches reflected the movement’s overall positions.

When the split occurred, Abdul Salam aligned with Al-Turabi not on personal grounds, but because he shared his positions on democracy, public freedoms, federal governance and adherence to agreements with the South.

Abdul Salam said the relationship between Al-Turabi and Bashir resembles other regional cases involving a sheikh and a president only to a limited extent. Bashir was originally a member of the Islamist movement led by Al-Turabi and obeyed him even after becoming president.

The split emerged naturally once the visible authority of the presidency clashed with the hidden authority of the movement, “which was the one truly governing,” he said.


UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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UK Chancellor to Asharq Al-Awsat: Strengthening Partnership with Saudi Arabia a Top Priority

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves affirmed that strengthening relations and economic partnership with Saudi Arabia represents a top priority for her government, noting that under the ambitious Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia finds in the United Kingdom an ideal partner thanks to Britain’s stability, regulatory flexibility, and global expertise.

She revealed her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, starting with the expansion of Heathrow Airport and extending to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion ($958.7 billion) over the next decade.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat from Riyadh, Reeves said her participation in the Future Investment Initiative (FII) Conference stems from a key goal: deepening mutual investment and trade. She confirmed that this visit, the first by a UK Chancellor to the Gulf in six years, reflects London’s seriousness in strengthening regional relations.

“This visit marks the first time a UK Chancellor has travelled to the Gulf in six years, which reflects just how seriously this government takes our relationship with Saudi Arabia and the wider region,” Reeves said.

“I’m here with one of the largest UK business delegations to the Gulf in recent years, and our participation is driven by our number one priority: growth.”

“At a time of global uncertainty, the UK offers stability, regulatory agility and world-class expertise – qualities that make us an ideal partner for Saudi Arabia's ambitious Vision 2030 transformation,” she added.

Reeves emphasized the economic complementarity between the two nations, noting that her delegation includes UK business leaders in key sectors such as financial services, life sciences, AI, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing.

She pointed out that Britain’s expertise in these fields uniquely positions London to support Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification, while Gulf investment helps drive growth and create jobs across the UK. According to her, joint trade and investment deals exceeded £10 billion over the past 18 months alone, creating more than 4,100 jobs in the United Kingdom.

Reeves and her accompanying delegation meet with Saudi Minister of Commerce Majid Al-Qasabi at the National Competitiveness Center in Riyadh (Ministry)

Deepening Mutual Investment and Trade

The Chancellor said: “My discussions are focused on deepening the two-way investment and trade that benefits families and businesses in both our countries. The £6.4 billion ($8.4 billion) package we've announced this week demonstrates the tangible results of this approach.”

According to Reeves, the package includes £5 billion in Saudi-backed exports supporting British manufacturing, alongside major investments by Barclays, HSBC and others, strengthening their presence in Saudi Arabia.

Key Priorities

Reeves said that one of her top priorities is accelerating progress on a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement, noting that such a deal could boost bilateral trade by 16 percent and represents the kind of forward-looking partnership that creates prosperity for both sides.

“My vision is straightforward: I want Britain and Saudi Arabia to be partners of choice for each other. We regulate for growth, not just risk. We're backing key infrastructure projects like Heathrow expansion – where the Saudi Public Investment Fund holds a 15 percent stake,” she said.

She added: “We’re creating opportunities for co-investment, particularly through our National Wealth Fund and pension reforms that will unlock tens of billions for infrastructure and innovation.”

“My message at the FII this week was clear – I'm championing the UK as a stable investment destination,” she stressed, referring to Britain’s “ironclad commitment to fiscal rules and our modern Industrial Strategy focused on the sectors of the future.”

Reeves speaks during the Future Investment Initiative Conference in Riyadh (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi–British Cooperation

On the most prominent areas and nature of cooperation between Riyadh and London, Reeves said: “Our partnership – built on mutual respect and shared ambition – spans multiple high-value sectors and continues to deepen.”

“Over the past 18 months alone, we've secured over £10 billion in two-way trade and investment, creating more than 4,100 UK jobs and many others in Saudi Arabia. Over 1,600 UK companies also now have a presence in the Kingdom – this is a partnership that works to the benefit of families and businesses on both sides,” she added.

“In financial services, London remains a world-leading international financial centre. We’ve launched a new concierge service – the Office for Investment: Financial Services – to help international firms establish and expand in the UK, while banking giants like Barclays and HSBC are expanding their operations in Riyadh,” Reeves explained.

She highlighted that Riyadh Air’s first-ever flight landed in London this past weekend, powered by UK-manufactured wings and Rolls-Royce engines – showing how British engineering is integral to Gulf aviation ambitions.

According to Reeves, UK firms like Quantexa are launching new AI services in the region, while Saudi cybersecurity firm Cipher is investing $50 million to open its European headquarters in London, demonstrating a partnership at the forefront of technology and innovation.

She added: “We are also collaborating closely in areas like sustainable infrastructure, clean energy, education and the life sciences. But I feel we can and must go further – a UK–GCC Free Trade Agreement would unlock huge mutual benefits, including boosting bilateral trade by 16 percent.”

Reeves and the UK business delegation at the British Residence in Riyadh (Ministry)

A British Plan to Contain Financial Challenges

On her government’s plan to address the financial challenges facing the United Kingdom, Reeves said: “After years of decline – from austerity to Brexit to the mini-budget – we inherited significant challenges. But we've moved decisively to address them whilst investing in our future.”

“We have an ironclad commitment to robust fiscal rules. This provides the stability and certainty that investors need. The IMF now projects that, after the US, the UK will be the fastest-growing G7 economy. This didn't happen by accident – it's the result of tough choices and disciplined economic management,” she added.

Reeves emphasized that “growth is our number one priority, because it's how we overcome challenges and put more money in working people's pockets. Our modern Industrial Strategy focuses on key sectors of the future – AI, life sciences, financial services, clean energy – where Britain has genuine competitive advantages, many of which are shared by our partners in the Gulf.”

She continued: “We're catalysing private investment through our National Wealth Fund, which is driving over £70 billion in investment, and pension reforms unlocking up to £50 billion for infrastructure and innovation. This creates opportunities for co-investment with partners like Gulf sovereign wealth funds.”

Reeves confirmed that the United Kingdom offers strength in uncertain times by combining stability with ambition. She referred to her government’s plan to support major projects that unleash growth, from Heathrow Airport expansion to infrastructure spending exceeding £725 billion over the next decade.

“We're open for business, but we're being strategic about building partnerships that create good jobs, boost business and bring investment into communities across the UK – from the North East to the Oxford–Cambridge corridor. That's how we build an economy that works for, and rewards, working people in Britain,” she said.

The minister concluded by stressing that “turning inwards is the wrong response to global challenges.” She affirmed that Britain remains open for business and is taking a strategic approach to building partnerships that create jobs and benefit working people across the United Kingdom.

“After landmark deals with the US, EU and India, we're accelerating progress with the GCC,” she said.


Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
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Yemen’s Interior Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah Members Arrested in Aden

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili
Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan. Photo: Turky Alagili

Yemeni Interior Minister Major General Ibrahim Haydan said that security forces have arrested members of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, as well as Syrians and Iranians involved in drug trafficking and supporting the Houthi militias.

The detainees are connected to drug smuggling networks that moved to Yemen after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, he told Asharq Al-Awsat in an interview.

The minister stated that security forces arrested two individuals at Aden International Airport. One is affiliated with Hezbollah and the other is a Syrian national.

The arrests took place after the Houthi-controlled Sanaa airport was bombed by Israel, disrupting flights and prompting the two to try to enter through Aden Airport as tourists. He added that “the suspects remain in custody in Aden.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the minister also said that a Yemeni court has recently sentenced six Iranians to death for smuggling tons of narcotics, after convicting them of taking part in large-scale smuggling operations linked to regional networks that fund the Houthis.

Haydan accused Iran of sending military experts and transferring drug factories and drone production facilities to Yemen after the collapse of some of its traditional proxies in the region.

The minister believes that the Houthi group has reached its “weakest point,” saying that the latest Israeli strikes that targeted militia leaders have created divisions within the movement’s ranks.

Haydan hailed the security partnership between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, saying it has made great achievements in arresting terrorists and criminals.

He described the partnership as a “great example of productive security cooperation.”

The minister said the security cooperation between the two sides has “yielded significant successes on the ground,” most notably the joint security operation in Al-Mahra Governorate, which “resulted in the arrest of a cell affiliated with ISIS and several of its most dangerous members, thanks to direct coordination with Saudi security agencies through special units.”

The minister said that “the exchange of intelligence information between the Yemeni Interior Ministry and the relevant security authorities in the Kingdom has also been a decisive factor in the recent successes in combating drug smuggling.”

“Security forces have managed to thwart several operations and seize large quantities of illegal substances,” he told his interviewer.

He also stressed that Saudi support is not limited to field operations, but also includes training and capacity building of security personnel.

One of the most prominent forms of this support, he said, was the training programs implemented last year to qualify personnel working at land, air, and sea border crossings.

Haydan also described security ties between Yemen and the US as “excellent,” saying it is witnessing a “gradual progress toward restoring the level of partnership that existed before the Houthi coup in 2014.”

He noted that cooperation between the two sides “is gradually returning to its normal course after years of interruption.”

“We have already begun receiving training opportunities for counterterrorism personnel in a number of friendly countries under US sponsorship,” he said, pointing out that his country is “working to develop this cooperation to include equipping the Interior Ministry with advanced specialized devices for counterterrorism efforts.”