Sudani to Asharq Al-Awsat: Iran Is Serious About a Deal with America

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
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Sudani to Asharq Al-Awsat: Iran Is Serious About a Deal with America

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's editor-in-chief

In recent months, Iraq has navigated two difficult challenges. It avoided being drawn into the Israeli-Iranian conflict and managed to stay clear of the fallout from US strikes on Iran’s nuclear sites. Earlier, it had resisted the temptation to intervene in saving Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria.

Having passed these two challenges, Iraq is now facing a third: the elections scheduled for November, which will determine the shape of parliament and the identity of the next prime minister. We posed these and other questions to Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani:

Q: Do you have the impression that we are witnessing new regional power balances after what happened in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran?

Absolutely. After the October 7 events and the subsequent aggression on Lebanon, the changes in Syria, and then the aggression against Iran, there are growing speculations about the region’s future amid these still-unfolding developments. The aggression on Gaza and Lebanon is ongoing. Discussions about arrangements in Gaza, and also about Israeli incursions into Syria are also ongoing. We’re also talking about a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, so we’re not yet looking at a stable political trajectory for the region’s structure, balance, and relationships.

These developments raise important questions that demand a clear vision: What do we want for this sensitive region economically, politically, and in terms of security, especially as it almost witnessed a full-scale regional war, not just clashes between Iran and Israel?

Iraq is part of the region’s geopolitical landscape. While prioritizing its own interests and those of its people, Iraq is also an active regional player, not a bystander. We leverage our relations and interests with neighboring countries to formulate positions that enhance security and stability, particularly since we reject wars, which we have suffered from for decades.

Q: What did you do when the Israeli raids on Iran began?

Everybody expected escalation and reciprocal strikes. All regional countries, including Iraq, interpreted it this way. After the Israeli aggression on Iran, which violated Iraqi airspace, Iraq faced the risk of being dragged into the war and into aggression against a neighboring state, which goes against our constitution and political principles. We do not allow any party or country to use Iraqi airspace or territories to launch attacks on others.

We expressed our rejection diplomatically. So we filed a complaint with the UN Security Council, contacted others to support our position, and condemned the aggression against a neighboring sovereign state under the pretext of preventive war, when in reality it was a clear act of aggression on a sovereign state that is a member of the United Nations.

The most important part was maintaining internal security and a unified national position on this crisis, which we thankfully achieved. We presented a unified national stance rejecting aggression and violations of our sovereignty and airspace, supporting the government’s effort to protect Iraqi interests and keep Iraq out of war. This internal position was crucial.

Q: Did the US assist you?

Yes, the United States was keen to keep Iraq away from the conflict. We had ongoing communication, especially regarding the airspace violation and the importance for a US role because it is part of the international coalition against terrorism. For ten years, there should have been support for Iraq’s air defense system to protect our skies.

Q: What did Iran ask of Iraq during the war?

There was no request. Rather, Iraq took the initiative to clarify the risks and exchange messages between parties to stop this war and return to negotiations. We were in constant contact with the presidency and all relevant channels. Negotiations were expected to start on Sunday, but the aggression began early Friday.

Iraq’s position was to push for a return to talks and halt the war. Iran’s view was: how can we negotiate while the aggression continues? Our discussions with regional countries and the US focused on this issue. Iran was ready to negotiate if the aggression stopped. That was Iran’s initial positive position.

Q: Was it difficult to manage relations with Iraqi factions backed by Iran?

Definitely. The region has faced unprecedented events in the past two years, yet Iraq has remained stable unlike in the past when the region was stable and Iraq was turbulent. We’ve managed to contain reactions and channel them into balanced political positions through political and security efforts.

Q: Do you feel you've implemented the "Iraq First" slogan?

Yes. It wasn’t just a slogan. It’s a doctrine we truly believe in: Iraq and the dignity of its people come first in our domestic and foreign policies.

Q: Are you concerned about a new round (of fighting) between Israel and Iran?

Yes, because everyone knows (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin) Netanyahu hasn’t respected any ceasefires in Gaza or Lebanon. It’s likely he’ll carry out further aggression against Iran. His policy and strategy seem to be intending to keep the region in a state of conflict to maintain his political position.

Q: Were you worried the Iranian regime might falter and that the war would drag on? Did you prepare for prolonged instability?

Iran is a key regional country. If anyone thought a 12-day war could topple the regime, the repercussions would affect the entire region. Naturally, we were concerned about regional stability and that of any neighboring country. You can’t watch a neighboring country burn and expect the fire not to reach you.

What we believe in at this stage is pushing toward stability, security, peace and understanding. Our source of concern was for these repercussions to affect the region’s stability. But internally, we were sure of our capabilities and the awareness of our political forces and the Iraqi people on the importance of preserving internal security and keeping the political system stable.

Q: What did the Iraqi army conclude from this war?

This is currently under study. I don't think it's just the Iraqi army, but all the militaries of the region are studying it. We are facing a new type of warfare that uses modern technology. Therefore, we must be on par with this development and these technologies so that we preserve the security and stability of our country.

Q: Who destroyed the Iraqi radars after the end of the Iranian-Israeli war? Was there an investigation and what were its results?

There is an investigation by a specialized technical committee, and I am closely following this probe. It was a clear attack using drones. As you know, it's not easy to detect these aircraft. Today, this technology is used in attacks and to create instability. But this matter will definitely not pass without consequences.

Bases in Nasiriyah were targeted and sustained minor damage. However, the radar system in Taji was damaged. At other sites, the air defenses intercepted and shot down the drones. We will reach a conclusion, and whoever is responsible will be held accountable.

Q: Were the drones launched from inside Iraqi territory?

The investigation is ongoing. We even sought assistance from the international coalition because there are highly technical matters to determine the launch area and the distance the drones traveled. All of these are details necessary to identify the culprit.

Q: Why do relations with Syria appear not yet completely normal?

On the contrary, I find them normal and on the right track. Since day one, Iraq's stance has been clear: to respect the choices of the Syrian people and the changes that occurred. We sent a delegation, initiated reciprocal visits and communication, including the Doha meeting, and communication is ongoing regarding different developments. We have also expressed our concerns.

Q: Concerns about what?

Our concerns come in the form of advice because Syria's experience is similar to Iraq's after 2003. The diversity that exists in Syria mirrors Iraq’s diversity... So first, there should be an inclusive political process that embraces everyone, guarantees their rights, and respects their beliefs and ideologies. There must also be a clear stance against extremism, terrorism, and violence and a clear position regarding ISIS, which poses a threat not just to Syria but to all countries in the region.

We also want to see a united Syria, without any foreign intervention or presence on Syrian territories because a strong and unified Syria is a strength for Iraq and the region. All of this falls in the interest of the Syrian people.

We are also ready for economic cooperation. Iraq and Syria share geography and history that can form a foundation for further cooperation and stronger bilateral relations. We have started studying the revival of the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline to reach the Mediterranean Sea through Baniyas.

We’ve also expressed our willingness to contribute to Syria’s reconstruction through a conference. Today, Iraq chairs both the Arab League summit and the Arab Development Summit, so it is concerned with all Arab issues, especially Syria. We proposed an initiative that was adopted in the “Baghdad Declaration” to hold a national dialogue conference for all components of Syrian society.

So the relationship is moving in that direction, along with continued security coordination. The Coordination Committee held a meeting last Wednesday between Iraqi and Syrian security leaders to secure the borders.

Q: Are you satisfied with Syria's cooperation on security coordination?

Yes. At this level, both sides are satisfied with the exchange of information and security coordination, which is sufficient to ensure the security of Iraq and Syria, especially given the noticeable activity of ISIS, which has recently become more active, seized a large number of Syrian army weapons, and is planning operations, the latest of which was the terrorist attack on a church in Damascus. So we have a mutual interest in increasing security coordination.

Q: Have you also discussed with Syria the issue of foreign fighters who took part in toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime?

Among our comments was the issue of granting citizenship to foreigners, and I believe this matter needs to be reviewed because there are reservations about it within Syria itself. We explained these points frankly and transparently out of concern for Syria’s stability as we’ve been through experiences post-2003 and we were keen to help the new administration avoid the mistakes we made.

Q: Would you have preferred that Syria remained under Bashar al-Assad’s rule?

That’s not my opinion; it's up to the Syrian people. They are the ones who decide the system that suits the Syrian state.

Q: Could we see President Ahmad al-Sharaa soon in Baghdad, or you in Damascus?

That depends on the circumstances.

Q: When did you realize that Bashar al-Assad's regime had collapsed?

Syria was exposed to years of suffering, turmoil, and instability. After the October 7 events and the subsequent aggression against Lebanon, our reading was that the region would witness a state of chaos, confusion, and security imbalance. The vulnerable side was Syria, given that large areas were not under the control of the regime at the time. So, within our regional communication efforts, we focused on how to maintain Syria’s stability to prevent a security collapse that could be exploited by ISIS terrorist mobs - this was the real threat.

This was one of the concerns of countries in the region, especially Iraq and Türkiye. Therefore, we launched an initiative to bring Türkiye and Syria closer together in order to resolve certain files that contribute to and support stability. This began early on, and these efforts continued. There was a clear and serious desire from Türkiye, and also cautious acceptance from Syria. There were several attempts, but unfortunately, they did not yield any positive steps.

Q: Was it a mistake for Assad not to meet with (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan?

In my estimation, yes. And this was not just Iraq’s attempt. From what I heard from leaders of other regional countries, all of them tried to achieve a meeting and some sort of de-escalation at the level of the border areas, which were experiencing unrest. We considered the refusal to meet a mistake. The meeting could have contributed to de-escalation and created an atmosphere of reconciliation with all parties within Syria, instead of the ongoing instability and confrontation that served no party.

Q: Has it become clear that the keys to solving crises in the region are with the United States, which allegedly wanted to disengage from the Middle East to focus on the China threat?

The US remains an important country in its relations with the countries of the region. But certainly, the greater role lies with the countries of the region themselves, which define their interests and the course of their ties. There is no ready-made formula for the countries of the region to achieve stability and sustainable peace. The people of the region are the most entitled to engage in dialogue based on mutual interests and mutual respect. Dialogue and understanding must be the approach, rather than seeking conflict or exclusion that threatens others. The language of war cannot be the path to achieving stability.

Q: President (Donald) Trump favors the “deal” approach. Is an American-Iranian deal in the coming phase possible?

It’s possible. The US president took the initiative to contain the recent war, and Iraq supported this move. This initiative was the reason a truce was achieved and this destructive war was halted. We hope this role continues, especially through bilateral negotiations on (Iran’s) nuclear program, to achieve a deal or agreement that lays the foundation for the stability of a vital region like the Middle East.

Q: Is there a planned visit to the United States?

Not at the present time.

Q: I’d like to ask about Iraq’s relations with regional countries. How would you describe your relationship with Türkiye?

It’s a relationship based on an understanding and awareness of its importance geographically, historically, in terms of shared interests, and the opportunities that lie ahead of us as two neighboring Muslim countries in a vital region. We've laid the foundation for a genuine new phase in this relationship through several files: security, economy, and issues of mutual concern, particularly water.

During this government’s term, we’ve established a significant strategic partnership with Türkiye, especially after launching the “Development Road” project, which is one of the most important economic corridors in the region. It will benefit both countries and lay the groundwork for a major economic axis in the region.

On the water issue, we’ve taken a strategic approach for the first time in the history of the Iraqi state through a bilateral framework agreement for cooperation on water management, signed in Baghdad during President Erdogan’s visit. These are all positive indicators of a strong relationship between the two countries.

Q: You spoke of a strong relationship with Türkiye. Can you describe your ties with Iran in two lines?

There’s a strategic partnership with the Islamic Republic of Iran based on shared religious, cultural, and social values and mutual interests. Iran has also stood with Iraq and the Iraqi people during various phases under the dictatorship, during the fight against terrorism, and in the political process. But we are certainly keen for this relationship to remain within a proper framework that serves mutual interests and prevents meddling in internal affairs. Iraq has its own independence and national decision-making, driven by the interests and priorities of its people.

Q: So there is no Iranian management of Iraqi affairs?

Absolutely not.

Q: Not even over any part of it?

Not over any part of it. Even the term itself is unacceptable and doesn’t exist in our vocabulary. A positive relationship today does not mean interference. Iraqis are highly sensitive about their independence and their love for their country and their national sovereignty. Iraq is not, and will not be, subordinate to anyone. That’s Iraq’s history.

Q: Is Iran helping you with the issue of "exclusive control of weapons"?

This issue is an Iraqi matter, and it is part of our program as a government. The Parliament voted on it, and we set a plan for it. The weapons we are talking about... we fought a war against terrorism for two decades. It was a war in every sense of the word. The war against terrorism and terrorist mobs like al-Qaeda and ISIS was not a war against a regular army but rather targeted citizens in every town, village, and city. These unstable conditions led to the presence of weapons to protect citizens in this or that region, reaching a stage of confrontation with ISIS.

After the victory, it is necessary to reorganize security and institutional reform, which we adopted through a committee chaired by the premiership. We set solutions for all these sensitive points related to the presence of arms outside the framework of state institutions. There is a clear plan, and everyone knows it; it is being implemented according to a decree.

We will not accept the presence of weapons outside the framework of state institutions. This is one of the important and fundamental pillars for building the Iraqi state. It is an opinion and principle supported by all religious forces. The religious authority’s statements are clear - not only the latest statement but throughout the past years, they have emphasized this principle. This goal is supported by religious leaders, political leaders, and also by our people. This is not a slogan but a goal for which we set a plan and are implementing in line with a government decree.

Q: Can we say that exclusive control of arms is a necessary condition to ensure stability and attract investment?

Investment is at its best. For the first time in two years, investments have exceeded $100 billion. A month ago, I spoke of $88 billion. A few days ago, the head of the National Investment Commission updated the figure and informed me that we have surpassed $100 billion over two years. Arab and foreign investments are now active in Iraq. So, the process of attracting investments is progressing within the existing safe and stable environment despite the region’s instability. Iraq is stable and cohesive, and it offers investment opportunities and welcomes Arab and foreign companies.

Q: Talking about investment compels me to ask about corruption. Can you say with certainty that corruption today is less, or significantly less, since you have taken office?

With full confidence, yes. As a government, we stopped the collapse that occurred in the abuse of public funds. You remember the “theft of the century” - more than 3.7 trillion dinars. That happened during the previous government’s term. This amount of cash was stolen as the Iraqi state and its security apparatus watched, and unfortunately, the theft took place under official cover.

Q: But wasn’t it the previous government that uncovered it?

For eight months, the funds were being stolen. But when the thieves disagreed among themselves over how to divide the shares, one of them stirred up the crisis, and that’s when things spiraled out of control. This is what happened in the investigation that was initiated at the time by the acting Minister of Finance. That investigation is ongoing and involves figures from the previous government, along with employees and wanted businessmen.

This is one of the most blaring examples of the corruption that occurred. Today, we’ve put a stop to that collapse. We’ve stopped the abuse of public funds in this way. But of course, we still have a long road ahead before we can fully eliminate corruption. What we have achieved as a government is, first, reforming the oversight institutions responsible for combating corruption because we found that an important part of those institutions themselves needed reform. That was our first step. Through the changes and accountability measures we took against officials in the Integrity Commission and the Board of Supreme Audit, we were able to reform these institutions.

We also introduced a new concept: the repatriation of wanted individuals involved in corruption cases, including those accused in the “theft of the century” and others. Most of them hold other nationalities. So, our relationships with countries around the world have been based on how much they cooperate with us in extraditing the wanted individuals

Q: Have you arrested any of the wanted individuals?

Yes, a significant number. And a large percentage of the wanted individuals themselves have started to come forward, because they realized they were being pursued, and they returned the stolen funds. We’ve recovered approximately more than $500 million. We’ve also begun legal procedures. Iraq is a member of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, which places an obligation and responsibility on all countries to cooperate with us in extraditing the wanted individuals and recovering stolen assets.

These measures are essential to fighting corruption. Corruption is a challenge faced by countries around the world. It’s recognized by the UN as one of the global challenges - not just for Iraq. But we have taken real steps and we are continuing until we eliminate this dangerous phenomenon that threatens all our development, investment, and reconstruction projects.

Q: Do the armed factions put pressure on the judiciary? Are judges scared?

No, certainly not. The judiciary enjoys independence, first and foremost, and it is respected. It is supported by state institutions in ensuring that it does not come under pressure or allow any party or entity to threaten it. The judiciary has proven, on multiple occasions, its independence and courage in making important decisions that ensure justice is upheld and the law is enforced.

Q: From your discussions with Iranian officials, did you deduce that there is a genuine Iranian desire to reach an agreement with the US?

Yes, our impression from a series of contacts and meetings is that there is a serious desire from the Iranian state to reach an agreement that secures Iran’s interests while also addressing the concerns of the international community. There is no decision in Iran, either religious or official, to acquire nuclear weapons, which is the main global concern. Therefore, the path is clear to reach an understanding that would close this file, which has been a key source of tension and escalation in the region.

Q: How would you describe relations with Lebanon?

It is a strong relationship, marked by keenness on Lebanon’s stability, especially during these challenging times. Our position is to support Lebanon’s sovereignty and its state institutions as they face ongoing aggression and repeated violations by the Israeli occupation authorities.

The Lebanese president recently visited Baghdad. Various political and economic issues were discussed, particularly the revival of the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon pipeline and the operation of the Iraqi refinery in Tripoli. We also reaffirmed our support for Lebanon and its reconstruction.

Q: There are common stances, such as both governments calling for the “exclusive control of weapons.”

Yes, this is certainly one of the most important issues. In Lebanon, the issue of arms in a state confronting the Israeli entity is, of course, subject to considerations that are assessed by the Lebanese people and the active forces within the country.

Q: How would you describe relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?

They are at their best in terms of alignment of views on the various issues that have shaken the region. Throughout this period, there has been high-level and continuous coordination regarding various developments.

On bilateral relations and cooperation, there are electrical interconnection projects with Saudi and US companies. There are also upcoming projects on opening additional border crossings to facilitate the movement of pilgrims and Umrah performers from Central Asia through Iran and Iraq, and then on to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, there is clear cooperation between institutions and investment funds in both countries to facilitate Saudi investments in Iraq.

Q: Does that mean there is consultation with the Saudi leadership?

There is continuous communication, consultation, and coordination on various issues. We have had visits, in addition to ongoing contact.

Q: It is said that Baghdad is accused of trying to starve the Kurdistan Region...What is your response?

This is an accusation without any basis - neither legal nor constitutional. The people of Kurdistan are part of our people. And this government, in particular, has been keen to fulfill its moral and constitutional obligations, as well as the political agreement that included resolving the outstanding issues.

But we are talking about the Budget Law, and we are talking about the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, both of which are binding legal grounds that the Prime Minister cannot override.

Since the approval of the Budget Law and later its amendment, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not complied with delivering all oil produced within the region, as stipulated by the law and affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court. The KRG also did not commit to handing over non-oil revenues to the public treasury. This constitutes a violation of the law and of the Court's ruling.

Therefore, the Ministry of Finance cannot fund any budget unless the KRG complies. As a result of our efforts to find solutions, we have ended up disbursing funds beyond the allocated share in the Budget Law, based on the Federal Court’s ruling.

These are clearly legal and technical matters and not political decisions as evidenced by the ongoing discussions now, which are centered around the quantity of oil being delivered.

Q: Could we say that the crisis has nothing to do with political parties in Baghdad wanting to undermine the Kurdistan Region?

Not at all. The Region is a constitutional entity respected by the Iraqi state, with all its components and authorities. We are committed to the stability of the Region. We supported, helped, and contributed to the holding of the Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections, which took place about eight to nine months ago. Unfortunately, the political forces in the Region have so far not been able to form a government.

The federal government was keen to support the electoral commission and allocate a budget. After the elections, I visited all the winning political forces in the Region, urging them to form a new regional government and for the parliament to exercise its powers in line with the framework of the constitution.

All political forces are committed to the Region’s stability because it is part of Iraq’s overall stability. There is no political interference in this issue.

Q: Is the salary issue going to be resolved soon?

The issue was discussed during last Tuesday’s Cabinet session. The document submitted by the federal ministries and the one submitted by the KRG were reviewed. We formed a committee headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning, along with five other ministers, to develop a consensual proposal that aligns with the constitution, the law, and the Federal Supreme Court's decision. The committee will make its recommendations to the Cabinet for approval, after receiving confirmations that the KRG is committed to it.

Q: Has your relationship with President Masoud Barzani deteriorated?

Definitely not ... President Masoud Barzani is a respected national figure. We have built a good relationship over the past period, and we believe in the partnership with him in managing political affairs. As I mentioned, the recent disagreement or divergence is legal and technical, not political. He knows well that we are fully committed to the interests of our people whether in the Kurdistan Region or in other provinces. But we certainly do not have absolute authority to override the constitution and the law. We are entrusted with the public funds of all Iraqis, and it is our duty to achieve justice and equality without any discrimination.

Q: Why hasn’t the Oil and Gas Law been passed?

It was part of the government’s program. We began forming a technical committee made up of the Federal Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Natural Resources in the Kurdistan Regional Government, along with a political committee. We held two or three meetings, then the Region stopped sending its delegation, despite our requests to finalize a draft. We believe that this law is a fundamental and essential part of solving the issue of oil, its contracts, and the powers of the Region and the provinces.

Q: Will you personally run in the elections scheduled for November?

Yes, definitely. We have a national plan and a broad electoral and political alliance. We will run in the elections in most provinces with a national - not sectarian - approach.

Q: Do you expect to win a large parliamentary bloc? What are your estimates?

Putting numbers and estimates aside, there is certainly a positive impression about the chances of this alliance in the upcoming parliamentary elections. We are counting on the awareness of the citizens and the precision of their choices in selecting a path that ensures the continuation of this approach in managing the state in a way that secures the interests of Iraq and Iraqis.

Q: Is power tempting? Does the holder of power grow attached to it?

Yes. This is one of the afflictions of governance and authority. It requires a strong degree of faith and principled integrity to prevent the one in the seat of power from being swept away by its temptations. One of God’s blessings upon us is that we have enough moral immunity to resist the allure of this transient authority. We view power as an honor bestowed upon us to serve our people, and so we treat it as a responsibility to keep working for a nation that has sacrificed greatly through the past phase.

Q: We are now sitting in a place where Saddam Hussein once sat... Do you ever feel like you wish you had his absolute powers?

Absolutely not. The political system since 2003 is based on the philosophy of people ruling themselves through a parliamentary system we believe in. Sometimes, administrative and executive hurdles complicate the delegation of powers, but overall this is a political path built on partnership and peaceful power rotation. Iraq has proven its commitment to this approach.

We’re now talking about parliamentary elections for the sixth term, spanning two decades, despite all internal and external challenges. We support this direction. We continue to adhere to this principle and this democratic path. A one-man rule or dictatorship does not bring justice, nor security, nor stability, nor development. We’ve seen where all the dictatorships have ended.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.


Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
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Microsoft Saudi Head Affirms Kingdom Entering AI Execution Phase

Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)
Saudi Arabia shifts from AI pilots to live deployment in key sectors (Shutterstock)

Riyadh’s hosting of the Microsoft AI Tour this week delivered a headline with concrete weight: customers will be able to run cloud workloads from a local Azure data center region starting in the fourth quarter of 2026.

The announcement was more than a technical update. It marked a shift in posture. Saudi Arabia is no longer testing artificial intelligence at the margins. It is moving decisively into execution, where infrastructure, governance, skills development, and enterprise adoption align in a single direction.

For Turki Badhris, president of Microsoft Saudi Arabia, the timing reflects years of groundwork rather than a sudden push.

“Confirming that customers will be able to run cloud workloads from the Azure data center region in the fourth quarter of 2026 gives organizations clarity and confidence as they plan their digital and AI journeys,” Badhris told Asharq Al-Awsat on the sidelines of the event.

“Clarity and confidence” may sound procedural, but they are strategic variables. Government entities and large corporations do not scale AI based solely on pilot projects.

They move when they are assured that local infrastructure is available, regulatory requirements are aligned, and long-term operational continuity is secured. The announcement of the new Azure region signals that the infrastructure layer is no longer a plan, but a scheduled commitment nearing implementation.

From pilots to production

Saudi Arabia’s AI story has unfolded in phases. The first focused on expanding digital infrastructure, developing regulatory frameworks, and strengthening cloud readiness. That phase built capacity. The current phase centers on activation and use.

Badhris said the conversation has already shifted. “We are working closely across the Kingdom with government entities, enterprises, and partners to support readiness, from data modernization and governance to skills development so that customers can move from experimentation to production with confidence.”

The distinction is fundamental. Pilots test potential. Production environments reshape workflows.

Companies such as Qiddiya Investment Company and ACWA Power illustrate that transition. Rather than treating AI as isolated pilot initiatives, these organizations are embedding it into daily operations.

ACWA Power is using Azure AI services and the Intelligent Data Platform to optimize energy and water operations globally, with a strong focus on sustainability and resource efficiency through predictive maintenance and AI-driven optimization.

Qiddiya has expanded its use of Microsoft 365 Copilot to enable employees to summarize communications, analyze data, and interact with dashboards across hundreds of assets and contractors.

AI is no longer operating at the margins of the enterprise. It is becoming part of the operating core, a sign of institutional maturity. The technology is shifting from showcase tool to productivity engine.

Infrastructure as strategic signal

The Azure data center region in eastern Saudi Arabia offers advantages that go beyond lower latency. It strengthens data residency, supports compliance requirements, and reinforces digital sovereignty frameworks.

In highly regulated sectors such as finance, health care, energy, and government services, alignment with regulatory requirements is not optional; it is essential.

Badhris described the milestone as part of a long-term commitment. “This achievement represents an important milestone in our long-term commitment to enable real and scalable impact for the public and private sectors in the Kingdom,” he said.

The emphasis on scalable impact reflects a more profound understanding: infrastructure does not create value on its own, but enables the conditions for value creation. Saudi Arabia is treating AI as core economic infrastructure, comparable to energy or transport networks, and is using it to form the foundation for productivity gains.

Governance as accelerator

Globally, AI regulation is often seen as a constraint. In the Saudi case, governance appears embedded in the acceleration strategy. Adoption in sensitive sectors requires clear trust frameworks. Compliance cannot be an afterthought; it must be built into design.

Aligning cloud services with national digital sovereignty requirements reduces friction at scale. When organizations trust that compliance is integrated into the platform itself, expansion decisions move faster. In that sense, governance becomes an enabler.

The invisible constraint

While generative AI dominates headlines, the larger institutional challenge often lies in data architecture. Fragmented systems, organizational silos, and the absence of unified governance can hinder scaling.

Saudi Arabia's strategy focuses on data modernization as a foundation. A structured and integrated data environment is a prerequisite for effective AI use. Without it, AI remains superficial.

Another global challenge is the skills gap. Saudi Arabia has committed to training three million people by 2030. The focus extends beyond awareness to practical application. Transformation cannot succeed without human capital capable of integrating AI into workflows.

Badhris underscored that skills development is part of a broader readiness ecosystem. Competitiveness in the AI era, he said, is measured not only by model capability but by the workforce’s ability to deploy it.

Sector transformation as economic strategy

The Riyadh AI Tour highlighted sector use cases in energy, giga projects, and government services. These are not peripheral applications but pillars of Vision 2030. AI’s role in optimizing energy management supports sustainability. In major projects, it enhances execution efficiency. In government services, it improves the citizen experience.

AI here is not a standalone industry but a horizontal productivity driver.

Positioning in the global landscape

Global AI leadership is typically measured across four pillars: compute capacity, governance, ecosystem integration, and skills readiness. Saudi Arabia is moving to align these elements simultaneously.

The new Azure region provides computing. Regulatory frameworks strengthen trust. Partnerships support ecosystem integration. Training programs raise skills readiness.

Saudi Arabia is entering a decisive stage in its AI trajectory. Infrastructure is confirmed. Enterprise use cases are expanding. Governance is embedded. Skills are advancing.

Badhris said the announcement gives institutions “clarity and confidence” to plan their journey. That clarity may mark the difference between ambition and execution. In that sense, the Microsoft tour in Riyadh signaled that infrastructure is no longer the objective, but the platform on which transformation is built.