European Confusion Over Traditional Iranian Weapons

UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
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European Confusion Over Traditional Iranian Weapons

UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)

Once again, the three European countries that are directly concerned with Iran's nuclear program (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have found themselves in a difficult position between the need to comply to US pressures to extend the ban of arms trade with Iran starting this October and also their caution to maintain a line of communication with Tehran and keep the 2015 Nuclear Deal alive despite the battering it has already taken.

They are trying to reconcile positions that appear either contradictory or incomprehensible. For instance, the European trio considers that lifting the United Nations’ arms embargo on Iran, which the UN has imposed on traditional weapons through Resolution 2231, "may have a major implications for regional security and stability”, agreeing to follow the US position.

Meanwhile, Paris, Berlin, and London rejected the draft resolution that Washington presented to the Security Council last Tuesday, which was also firmly opposed by the Chinese and Russian delegates.

European sources in New York told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Europeans had "advised" the Americans not to submit the Draft, they believed that it would not pass for two reasons: First, it would not receive the nine votes needed for approval in the event of the absence of a veto, second, the Russians and the Chinese would use their veto if the US project were to reach the nine vote threshold. This implies that the five Europeans who are currently in the Security Council, according to what the aforementioned sources said, “will not go as far as voting against the draft resolution, to avoid upsetting the US and creating tension between the two sides of the Atlantic; rather, they would abstain.” The sources added: “If things remain the same and positions do not shift, it is likely that Washington will not put its project to a vote and will resort to an alternative method instead. ”

The alternative method is the so-called "snapback" measure; a process outlined in the nuclear deal that allows for the reimposition of international sanctions that were lifted under the 2231 Resolution at the behest of a signatory to the agreement if the six signatories (5 + 1) and Iran are unable to resolve their differences through negotiations.

The Europeans deny Washington's claim that the latter is still party to the agreement despite its exit from it in the spring of 2018. Olaf Skoog, the European Union's representative to the United Nations, said this week that Washington “has not participated in any meetings or activities within the framework of the 2015 Nuclear Agreement, which means that it cannot claim to still be inside it despite its exit from it.”

In a statement issued after their meeting in Berlin, foreign ministers of France, Germany and Britain had previously rejected "any unilateral (US) attempt to reimpose UN sanctions against Iran."

Thus, the precariousness of the European position is obvious: The rejection of the two US proposals aimed at extending the embargo on conventional weapons sales to Iran and the assertions that lifting the embargo "will have major implications for regional security and stability".

The sources admit that the Europeans "are in a far more awkward position" today, and they had angered both Iran and the US. However, it seems that they have "discovered" a way out that would allow them to distance themselves from this complex problem, at least temporarily. They are privy to a European decision to ban arms sales to Iran that is extended annually and is valid until the spring of 2021. The Europeans thereby assert that the US draft “is not their concern”, while the refusal to re-impose international sanctions on Iran stems from the desire to maintain the agreement.

Earlier this week, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, took advantage of the Security Council meeting to exert more pressure on the Europeans by linking the lifting of the arms embargo to his country committing to the agreement, despite the widespread violations that have made it void.

In light of all of these complications, the whispers are growing louder in the corridors of the Security Council about a US alternative plan, which may be the "last way out" for Washington to reach its goals in terms of re-imposing international sanctions, including the extension of the arms embargo on Iran.



Trump Carves Up World and International Order with It

Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
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Trump Carves Up World and International Order with It

Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP
Analysts say talks to end the war in Ukraine 'could resemble a new Yalta'. TASS/AFP

By casting doubt on the world order, Donald Trump risks dragging the globe back into an era where great powers impose their imperial will on the weak, analysts warn.
Russia wants Ukraine, China demands Taiwan and now the US president seems to be following suit, whether by coveting Canada as the "51st US state", insisting "we've got to have" Greenland or kicking Chinese interests out of the Panama Canal.
Where the United States once defended state sovereignty and international law, Trump's disregard for his neighbors' borders and expansionist ambitions mark a return to the days when the world was carved up into spheres of influence.
As recently as Wednesday, US defense secretary Pete Hegseth floated the idea of an American military base to secure the Panama Canal, a strategic waterway controlled by the United States until 1999 which Trump's administration has vowed to "take back".
Hegseth's comments came nearly 35 years after the United States invaded to topple Panama's dictator Manuel Noriega, harking back to when successive US administrations viewed Latin America as "America's backyard".
"The Trump 2.0 administration is largely accepting the familiar great power claim to 'spheres of influence'," Professor Gregory O. Hall, of the University of Kentucky, told AFP.
Indian diplomat Jawed Ashraf warned that by "speaking openly about Greenland, Canada, Panama Canal", "the new administration may have accelerated the slide" towards a return to great power domination.
The empire strikes back
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has posed as the custodian of an international order "based on the ideas of countries' equal sovereignty and territorial integrity", said American researcher Jeffrey Mankoff, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
But those principles run counter to how Russia and China see their own interests, according to the author of "Empires of Eurasia: how imperial legacies shape international security".
Both countries are "themselves products of empires and continue to function in many ways like empires", seeking to throw their weight around for reasons of prestige, power or protection, Mankoff said.
That is not to say that spheres of influence disappeared with the fall of the Soviet Union.
"Even then, the US and Western allies sought to expand their sphere of influence eastward into what was the erstwhile Soviet and then the Russian sphere of influence," Ashraf, a former adviser to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, pointed out.
But until the return of Trump, the United States exploited its position as the "policeman of the world" to ward off imperial ambitions while pushing its own interests.
Now that Trump appears to view the cost of upholding a rules-based order challenged by its rivals and increasingly criticized in the rest of the world as too expensive, the United States is contributing to the cracks in the facade with Russia and China's help.
And as the international order weakens, the great powers "see opportunities to once again behave in an imperial way", said Mankoff.
Yalta yet again
As at Yalta in 1945, when the United States and the Soviet Union divided the post-World War II world between their respective zones of influence, Washington, Beijing and Moscow could again agree to carve up the globe anew.
"Improved ties between the United States and its great-power rivals, Russia and China, appear to be imminent," Derek Grossman, of the United States' RAND Corporation think tank, said in March.
But the haggling over who gets dominance over what and where would likely come at the expense of other countries.
"Today's major powers are seeking to negotiate a new global order primarily with each other," Monica Toft, professor of international relations at Tufts University in Massachusets wrote in the journal Foreign Affairs.
"In a scenario in which the United States, China, and Russia all agree that they have a vital interest in avoiding a nuclear war, acknowledging each other's spheres of influence can serve as a mechanism to deter escalation," Toft said.
If that were the case, "negotiations to end the war in Ukraine could resemble a new Yalta", she added.
Yet the thought of a Ukraine deemed by Trump to be in Russia's sphere is likely to send shivers down the spines of many in Europe -- not least in Ukraine itself.
"The success or failure of Ukraine to defend its sovereignty is going to have a lot of impact in terms of what the global system ends up looking like a generation from now," Mankoff said.
"So it's important for countries that have the ability and want to uphold an anti-imperial version of international order to assist Ukraine," he added -- pointing the finger at Europe.
"In Trump's world, Europeans need their own sphere of influence," said Rym Momtaz, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace.
"For former imperial powers, Europeans seem strangely on the backfoot as nineteenth century spheres of influence come back as the organising principle of global affairs."