European Confusion Over Traditional Iranian Weapons

UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
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European Confusion Over Traditional Iranian Weapons

UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)
UN Security Council virtual meeting on 30 June (AFP)

Once again, the three European countries that are directly concerned with Iran's nuclear program (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) have found themselves in a difficult position between the need to comply to US pressures to extend the ban of arms trade with Iran starting this October and also their caution to maintain a line of communication with Tehran and keep the 2015 Nuclear Deal alive despite the battering it has already taken.

They are trying to reconcile positions that appear either contradictory or incomprehensible. For instance, the European trio considers that lifting the United Nations’ arms embargo on Iran, which the UN has imposed on traditional weapons through Resolution 2231, "may have a major implications for regional security and stability”, agreeing to follow the US position.

Meanwhile, Paris, Berlin, and London rejected the draft resolution that Washington presented to the Security Council last Tuesday, which was also firmly opposed by the Chinese and Russian delegates.

European sources in New York told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Europeans had "advised" the Americans not to submit the Draft, they believed that it would not pass for two reasons: First, it would not receive the nine votes needed for approval in the event of the absence of a veto, second, the Russians and the Chinese would use their veto if the US project were to reach the nine vote threshold. This implies that the five Europeans who are currently in the Security Council, according to what the aforementioned sources said, “will not go as far as voting against the draft resolution, to avoid upsetting the US and creating tension between the two sides of the Atlantic; rather, they would abstain.” The sources added: “If things remain the same and positions do not shift, it is likely that Washington will not put its project to a vote and will resort to an alternative method instead. ”

The alternative method is the so-called "snapback" measure; a process outlined in the nuclear deal that allows for the reimposition of international sanctions that were lifted under the 2231 Resolution at the behest of a signatory to the agreement if the six signatories (5 + 1) and Iran are unable to resolve their differences through negotiations.

The Europeans deny Washington's claim that the latter is still party to the agreement despite its exit from it in the spring of 2018. Olaf Skoog, the European Union's representative to the United Nations, said this week that Washington “has not participated in any meetings or activities within the framework of the 2015 Nuclear Agreement, which means that it cannot claim to still be inside it despite its exit from it.”

In a statement issued after their meeting in Berlin, foreign ministers of France, Germany and Britain had previously rejected "any unilateral (US) attempt to reimpose UN sanctions against Iran."

Thus, the precariousness of the European position is obvious: The rejection of the two US proposals aimed at extending the embargo on conventional weapons sales to Iran and the assertions that lifting the embargo "will have major implications for regional security and stability".

The sources admit that the Europeans "are in a far more awkward position" today, and they had angered both Iran and the US. However, it seems that they have "discovered" a way out that would allow them to distance themselves from this complex problem, at least temporarily. They are privy to a European decision to ban arms sales to Iran that is extended annually and is valid until the spring of 2021. The Europeans thereby assert that the US draft “is not their concern”, while the refusal to re-impose international sanctions on Iran stems from the desire to maintain the agreement.

Earlier this week, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, took advantage of the Security Council meeting to exert more pressure on the Europeans by linking the lifting of the arms embargo to his country committing to the agreement, despite the widespread violations that have made it void.

In light of all of these complications, the whispers are growing louder in the corridors of the Security Council about a US alternative plan, which may be the "last way out" for Washington to reach its goals in terms of re-imposing international sanctions, including the extension of the arms embargo on Iran.



Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
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Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot

Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo
Hosni Mubarak and Amr Moussa during a summit in Cairo in 2000. AFP file photo

Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country.

Mubarak and Hereditary Rule

Asked about Mubarak’s ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: “Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.”

Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak’s term was painful. Moussa replied: “Yes of course. He wasn’t as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn’t at all naïve.”

“The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It’s a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,” Moussa said.

Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking

Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.”

“He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.”

"He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,” said Moussa.

"He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters."

Policymaker

Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. “First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,” said Moussa.

“This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.”

Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout

Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon’s Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don’t know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.”

But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. “I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,” according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media.

Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa’s claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement.

Asked about the reasons for Hariri’s assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was “bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.”

Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria’s relationship with him.