US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
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US Threatens to Sink Russia Deeper in Syrian ‘Quagmire’

American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)
American soldiers patrol on the M4 highway in the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Syrian Hasakeh province on the border with Turkey on January 24, 2020. (AFP)

American officials have been clear in their message to Russia over Syria: We must either work together to reach a settlement, which includes a change in the regime’s behavior and implementation of six key conditions, or raise the cost of the Syrian “quagmire”. The second option is a reminder to Moscow of the American experience in Iraq and the Soviet experience in the Afghan conflict, which has been raging since 1979.

Six conditions
In early 2018, US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, James Jeffrey, and his deputy, Joel Rayburn, presented President Donald Trump with a number of suggestions on the Syrian conflict. They agreed on six American points that would lead to normalizing relations with the Syrian government: 1) Ending support for terrorism, 2) cutting military ties with Iran and its militias, 3) ending hostile acts against neighboring countries, 4) abandoning weapons of mass destruction and the chemical weapons program, 5) the Damascus government must introduce changes on the ground that will allow refugees to voluntarily return home – effectively the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 2254, and 6) putting war criminals on trial.

Speaking at a seminar earlier this week, Rayburn said the first four conditions have been demanded by Washington even before the anti-regime protests erupted in 2011. These are conditions that are demanded from any Syrian government. People come and go, but any Syrian government must commit to these conditions because they impact American national security.

In May, Jeffrey said: “I've never seen a regime that poses more threats to its region and to the American idea of how the world should be organized.”

These six conditions have become a central part of the Caesar Act that was approved by Congress, signed by Trump and went into effect in June.

Pressure tools
Washington holds a number of pressure cards to achieve its demands:

1) It has troops deployed in northeastern Syria. Rayburn had encouraged Trump to keep some 500 soldiers deployed east of the Euphrates River and more than a hundred at the al-Tanf base shortly after he announced in October 2019 that he wanted to withdraw troops from Syria

2) It provides logistic and intelligence support for Israeli raids on Iranian positions in Syria.

3) It is exerting pressure on the European Union to keep its economic sanctions on Damascus and preventing it from normalizing diplomatic ties with it.

4) It is preventing Arab countries from restoring Syria’s membership in the Arab League and also discouraging them from restoring political or diplomatic ties with it.

5) It is supporting Ankara’s efforts to bar regime forces from returning to northwestern Syria and trying to turn the Idlib ceasefire into a nationwide ceasefire.

6) It is coordinating with western and Arab countries at the UN over the Syrian chemical weapons file and human rights violations. It is also seeking to hold regime officials to account over their crimes. A Security Council meeting will be held to that end.

7) It is supporting the peace process, led by UN special envoy Geir Pedersen, aimed at introducing constitutional reform and implementing resolution 2254.

8) It is increasing economic sanctions, the last of which was the implementation of the Caesar Act.

Caesar messages
American officials believe the Caesar Act delivered four key messages. They noted the significance of it being approved by both Republicans and Democrats at Congress. Rayburn said that pressuring Bashar Assad’s regime was not a point of contention in Washington, rather there was consensus over the issue. The consensus has dashed the hopes of parties of dreaming or promoting potential American policy change. Nothing will change even after the presidential elections in November, he added.

The Act also eliminated dreams of a military victory for the regime. Rayburn said that the regime and its loyalists believed that once they achieve military victory on the ground, then the money will begin to flow in Syria and they will all reap the benefits. This is not true, he said. There is no light at the end of the tunnel and the situation will not go back to how it was.

The Act was also message to regional countries to discourage them from investing in regime-held regions in Syria, Rayburn said. Anyone making such a move will risk being slapped with sanctions and being left out of the American financial system. Washington has, however, been trying to exempt northeastern and northwestern Syria from the sanctions. American officials have been clear in addressing “Arab and regional friends”, continued Rayburn, saying that no one was exempted from sanctions.

The last message is aimed at deterring the military machine. Rayburn explained that the process of reaching justice and accountability is often slow, but the American message is clear: It will never forget. Regime loyalists will now realize that the day when they will be held to account will come sooner or later. This should prompt them to change their calculations.

Syrian ‘quagmire’
American officials believe that these “tools” will persuade Russia to change its course in Syria on the medium- and long-terms. They will therefore, continue to impose economic sanctions under the Caesar Act. Rayburn said this will be the “summer of Caesar” with some one hundred individuals and entities set to be blacklisted in order to raise the cost of the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had previously said that the Russians did not have a “political way out” of their problems in Syria. “Our job is to present them through the UN and our support for the UN, with a way forward, but that requires them distancing themselves to some degree from Assad and from the Iranians,” he added.

Rayburn believes that the Russian can influence Damascus. Pressure can also push Moscow towards joining serious negotiations aimed at implementing the above-mentioned six conditions. The alternative would see it sink even deeper in the Syrian quagmire.

Jeffery had on more than one occasion said that his mission when he assumed his post two years ago was to transform Syria into a quagmire for the Russians. “We are pursuing what we think is a smart policy,” he stated, saying the American military presence is aimed at cracking down on ISIS and supporting military operations carried out by other countries, such as Israel and Turkey, while also focusing on economic and diplomatic pressure.

“This isn't Afghanistan, this isn't Vietnam,” he explained. “This isn't a quagmire. My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians.”

Rayburn explained this position further. When the Russians intervened militarily in Syria five years ago, they did not believe that they would have such a result today, he said. He echoed Jeffery’s statements on the quagmire, wondering if Russia would still want to have the same result five years from now. Military involvement is very costly and there is no light at the end of the tunnel.

He added that when the regime captured eastern Aleppo in late 2016, it believed that military victory and the end of the war were near. It thought that it could reap the rewards of the victory. He said that this was not true. The conflict cannot be resolved through the military machine, but with politics. Anything other than that would mean the war will last forever, he warned, citing the conflict in Afghanistan which is still ongoing.



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
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Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.