Daraa: Weary Syrians Wait for Salvation amid Despair, Destruction

Damaged buildings in opposition-held part of southern city of Daraa, Syria (File - Reuters)
Damaged buildings in opposition-held part of southern city of Daraa, Syria (File - Reuters)
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Daraa: Weary Syrians Wait for Salvation amid Despair, Destruction

Damaged buildings in opposition-held part of southern city of Daraa, Syria (File - Reuters)
Damaged buildings in opposition-held part of southern city of Daraa, Syria (File - Reuters)

Two years after the Syrian government took control over Syria's south, the city of Daraa, which was named "the cradle of the revolution" in 2011, appears melancholic, as fatigue and despair have overwhelmed its residents.

Upon entering the city through the international road connecting Damascus and Amman, one sees a single regular army checkpoint covered with pictures of President Bashar Al-Assad and signs that salute the army and notices the scarcity of cars moving toward the city center.

The side road leading to the city appears deserted on both its sides, although the areas are inhabited. The city is divided in two parts: The west, referred to as Daraa the station, and the east, referred to as Daraa the town (the old city). Its residents “sparked the revolution” in mid-March 2011, armed opposition factions took over the city in early 2012, and the government regained control of the city in July 2018, through the so-called "reconciliation agreement" sponsored by its ally, Russia, after it had carried out dozens of military operations against the factions that controlled the city.

While the city center had been extremely congested before the war, one is now immediately struck by the emptiness in the western part of the city in the afternoon, the limited number of cars passing through the main roads and the scarcity of pedestrians on the streets that are covered with Assad pictures, in addition to few posters of candidates for the People's Assembly (Parliament) elections.

Although most of the markets and stores are open, sales are extremely limited and the owners’ faces are cold.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat one of them said: “Most people are penniless. They only buy necessities. Two years ago, the situation was much better. God blessed us in the old days. People covered streets like dust. Daraa would smile at its people and its visitors. ”

While there appears to be few army checkpoints in the city center, the absence of the regular security forces and Russian police on the main and minor roads and streets is also noticeable.

A man in his fifties, after having described the situation in the city and the whole province as "uncomfortable", told Asharq Al-Awsat that "people’s souls have died."

"There is nothing to rejoice about, to say nothing of high costs. Many people and their children are detained, and we know nothing about them. Additionally, in the countryside, there are constant back and forth operations (launched by the militants who have reconciled/made a deal on one hand and the army and militias allied with it on the other). There are also kidnappings and killings by unknown perpetrators. It's bad, people are tired," he added.

For his part, a man in his thirties who also spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said: “The regime has imposed total control over the province, with the situation returning to the way it had been before the revolution erupted, and those who made the deals refuse this."

"The scene in the city gives the impression of calm and stability, but in truth, it is more akin to a dormant volcano that may erupt at any moment.”

Before 2011, the scenery along the Damascus-Amman Highway was one of farms, fruit-bearing trees, and vegetable fields, a delight for travelers and the many locals who would stroll there. The province with a population of about one and a half million people provided the country with a diversity of crops. Today, however, most of these fields have become barren; the trees are scarce, while the debris is abundant in the cities, villages and towns whose people protested.



Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
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Proposal of Merging Hezbollah Fighters with Lebanese Army Collides with Reality

Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)
Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of former Secretary-General Hashem Safieddine during his funeral on February 24, 2025. (AP)

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s proposal for Hezbollah fighters to be merged with the army has been met with skepticism and provided fodder for political debate.

Aoun had suggested that the members be merged into the military the same way militia members, who were active during the 1975-90 civil war, were merged into the army.

The proposal has not been widely welcomed given the army’s inability to accommodate so many new members for various reasons. Experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat dismissed the proposal as a “consolation prize for Hezbollah in exchange for it to lay down its weapons to the state.”

They stressed that it would be impossible for members of an ideological group, who have received ideological training, to be part of the army.

Aoun, the former commander of the army, said it wouldn’t be possible to form a new military unit for the Hezbollah members, so they should instead join the army and sit for training, similar to the training former militants sat for at the end of the civil war.

Member of the Lebanese Forces’ parliamentary bloc MP Ghayath Yazbeck said the army simply cannot accommodate 100,000 Hezbollah fighters.

“Even if Hezbollah had 25,000 fighters, it would be impossible to merge them into the army, whose wages are being paid through foreign assistance,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Moreover, Lebanon needs a national defense strategy that should be drafted by the military with the president and government, he went on to say. The strategy does not stipulate how many members of the army and security forces are needed to protect Lebanon.

“Once the borders are demarcated and the reasons for the war are removed, we can embark on a political solution in Lebanon and ultimately, the current number of officers and soldiers will be enough,” Yazbeck said.

Former Lebanese officer and expert in security and military affairs Khaled Hamadeh said Aoun is trying to appease Hezbollah with his proposal and persuade it to lay down its arms in line with the ceasefire agreement.

The agreement was negotiated with Hezbollah ally parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, so it has the party’s approval.

There are several obstacles to Hezbollah members being merged into the army, Hamadeh said.

“Yes, the Lebanese state had succeeded in stopping the civil war and making hundreds of militia fighters join the army and security forces. But we cannot compare that situation to the one we now have with Hezbollah,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

At the end of the civil war, militias leaders signed and recognized the national pact and announced the dissolution of the militias. They then voluntarily handed over their arms to the state and became part of the political process, he explained.

Today, Iran-backed Hezbollah does not acknowledge the ceasefire agreement and has not agreed to turn over its weapons, he noted. The party does not even recognize that it is part of the political process and that its military wing has been destroyed by Israel, so the idea of merging with the army is “out of place.”

Yazbeck also noted Hezbollah’s ideology, saying it was the “greatest obstacle to its fighters’ merging with the army.”

“The party views Lebanon as a geographic extension of Iran. This ideology still stands, and was demonstrated with Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem’s declaration that the party will not disarm and that it is not concerned with talk about the state’s monopoly over arms,” he added.

Hamadeh echoed these remarks, saying that the civil war militias were Lebanese and took their orders from their Lebanese leaders. They chose to lay down their weapons and abide by Lebanese laws and the country's constitution.

As for Hezbollah, its takes orders from Iran and “has played dangerous military or security roles inside Lebanon and beyond,” he continued.

“Hezbollah has not declared its disengagement from Tehran. It has not declared that it will transform itself into a local political party and that it will dissolve its military wing. Once it does so, then we can talk about accommodating its fighters in the military,” stressed Hamadeh.

“How can we reconcile between a military group that follows the Wilayet al-Faqih ideology (...) and another that works under the constitution and according to democratic mechanisms?” he wondered.

Moreover, he asked: “Was the experience of merging the militias into the state’s civil and security agencies so successful that we should even be repeating it?”

Yazbeck noted that civil war militants were not really merged with the army as some would like to claim.

He explained that those who joined the security and military institutions were in a fact close to the Syrian regime, which was controlling Lebanon at the time.

“The fighters who were fighting for state sovereignty and who confronted Syrian occupation were persecuted and thrown in jail, so many were forced to flee Lebanon,” he revealed.

Furthermore, the level of discipline showed by the army does not apply to Hezbollah fighters. “Militias simply do not gel with army and the army does not gel with them either,” he stated.

Ultimately, said Hamadeh, whatever happens, Hezbollah must first hand over its weapons to the state. “Only then can its members choose to sit for assessments to enter state administrations – placing them on equal footing as other Lebanese citizens,” he added.

Hezbollah members are not isolated from society, and they must be merged, however, proposing their merger in an attempt to persuade them to lay down their arms will ultimately fail, he said.

Above all else, the party must first recognize the state and its right to monopoly over arms and decisions of war and peace, he urged.