'End of the World': Massive, Self-Inflicted 'Bomb' in Beirut

In this Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2020 file photo, people evacuate the wounded after a massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon. It was 20 minutes before 6:08 p.m. when the Beirut fire brigade received the call from an employee at the nearby port reporting a big fire. Ten firefighters, including a female paramedic, piled into a fire engine and an ambulance and raced toward the scene, and their ultimate death. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar, File)
In this Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2020 file photo, people evacuate the wounded after a massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon. It was 20 minutes before 6:08 p.m. when the Beirut fire brigade received the call from an employee at the nearby port reporting a big fire. Ten firefighters, including a female paramedic, piled into a fire engine and an ambulance and raced toward the scene, and their ultimate death. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar, File)
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'End of the World': Massive, Self-Inflicted 'Bomb' in Beirut

In this Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2020 file photo, people evacuate the wounded after a massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon. It was 20 minutes before 6:08 p.m. when the Beirut fire brigade received the call from an employee at the nearby port reporting a big fire. Ten firefighters, including a female paramedic, piled into a fire engine and an ambulance and raced toward the scene, and their ultimate death. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar, File)
In this Tuesday, Aug. 4, 2020 file photo, people evacuate the wounded after a massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon. It was 20 minutes before 6:08 p.m. when the Beirut fire brigade received the call from an employee at the nearby port reporting a big fire. Ten firefighters, including a female paramedic, piled into a fire engine and an ambulance and raced toward the scene, and their ultimate death. (AP Photo/Hassan Ammar, File)

The 10 firefighters who received the call shortly before 6 p.m. - about a big fire at the nearby port of Beirut - could not know what awaited them.

The brigade of nine men and one woman could not know about the stockpile of ammonium nitrate warehoused since 2013 along a busy motorway, in the heart of a densely populated residential area - a danger that had only grown with every passing year.

They and nearly all the population of Beirut were simply unaware. They were not privy to the warnings authorities had received, again and again, and ignored: ammonium nitrate is highly explosive, used in fertilizer and sometimes to build bombs. The stockpile was degrading; something must be done.

They knew, of course, that they lived in a dysfunctional country, its government rife with corruption, factionalism and negligence that caused so much pain and heartbreak. But they could not know that it would lead to the worst single-day catastrophe in Lebanon´s tragic history.

Across the city, residents who noticed the grey smoke billowing over the facility were drawn to streets, balconies and windows, watching curiously as the fire grew larger. Phones were pulled out of pockets and pointed toward the flames.

The firefighters piled into a fire engine and an ambulance and raced to the scene - and to their doom.

Seven years ago, a ship named the Rhosus set out from the Georgian Black Sea port of Batumi carrying 2,755.5 tons of ammonium nitrate destined for an explosives company in Mozambique.

It made an unscheduled detour, stopping in Beirut on Nov. 19, 2013. The ship´s Russian owner said he struggled with debts and hoped to earn extra cash by taking on pieces of heavy machinery in Lebanon. That additional cargo proved too heavy for the Rhosus and the crew refused to take it on.

The Rhosus was soon impounded by Lebanese authorities for failing to pay port fees. It never left the port; it sank there in February 2018, according to Lebanese official documents.

The Port of Beirut is considered one of the most corrupt institutions in a country where nearly every public institution is riddled with corruption. Port officials are notorious for taking bribes. A bribe from an importer, for example, will ensure an incoming shipment is mislabeled to get lower customs duties - or escapes duties and taxes completely. Confiscated goods are sometimes sold off on the sly for a profit.

For years, Lebanon´s ruling political factions have divvied up positions at the port and handed them out to supporters - as they have ministries, public companies and other facilities nationwide.

The longtime head of customs is known to be a loyalist of President Michel Aoun, for example, while the head of the port is in the camp of Saad Hariri, the Sunni leader who has repeatedly served as prime minister. The Hezbollah militant group and, even more, its Shiite ally the Amal faction headed by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, also have loyalists at the port, though Hezbollah doesn´t have the same influence as it does at, for example, the airport, which it controls and uses to ferry in cash from Iran.

The result is a port divided into factional fiefdoms that don´t necessarily work together and are sometimes outright rivals. Individual port authorities are sometimes more concerned with their scams than with proper functioning. And government officials avoid looking too closely at goings-on at the port to protect their loyalists.

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The first known warning came on Feb. 21, 2014, three months after the ship docked at the port.

In a letter to the customs authority´s anti-smuggling department, senior customs official Col. Joseph Skaff wrote that the material on board was "extremely dangerous and endangers public safety."

It is not known if Skaff ever received a response or if he sent other letters. He was found dead outside his house near Beirut under mysterious circumstances, shortly after he retired in March 2017. At least one medical report suggested he might have been murdered.

Skaff´s son, Michel, said he was killed by a blow to the head. He said his father dealt with other sensitive matters, including drug trafficking. "Someone maybe was trying to hide what is happening at the port," he said by telephone from his home in New York City.

In the years that followed, Skaff´s letter was followed by other correspondence that went back and forth between top customs and port officials and members of the judiciary and the army.

On June 27, 2014, with the ammonium nitrate still aboard the Rhosus, Jad Maalouf, a judge for urgent matters, warned the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation in correspondence that the ship was carrying dangerous material and could sink. He said the ministry should deal with the ship, remove the ammonium nitrate and "place it in a suitable place that it (the ministry) chooses, and it should be under its protection."

It is not clear if there was ever a reply. Ministry officials did not respond to requests from The Associated Press asking for comment.

In October 2014, the ammonium nitrate was moved into the port´s Warehouse 12, which holds impounded materials.

A chemical forensic expert, commissioned by the courts and the owners of the ammonium nitrate, got a look at the stockpile soon after. It was "in terrible shape," she said in her February 2015 report. Most of the sacks - she estimated more than 1,900 of the 2,750 sacks- were torn open, their contents spilling out. Some of the crystals had darkened, a sign of decomposition. The sacks were piled so haphazardly that she could not count them to be sure all were still there.

The inspector recommended the chemicals be disposed of according to environmental guidelines. Her report was uncovered by Riad Kobaissi, an investigative reporter with Al Jadeed TV who has followed corruption at the port and within the customs authorities since 2012.

On Oct. 26, 2015, the army command asked customs to sample the material and check the level of nitrogen "and based on that we can give a suggestion regarding them."

The then-head of the customs department, Shafeeq Merhi, wrote back in February 2016, saying an expert found the nitrogen level was 34.7%, a very high and dangerous level, well above the acceptable concentration of around 11%.

The army command responded the following April, saying it didn´t need the ammonium nitrate. It asked customs to contact Lebanese Explosives Co. - a maker of explosives for construction of roads and tunnels and for imploding structures - to see if that private company could use it.

If not, the material should be exported at the expense of the ship owner who brought it to Lebanon, the army said in its letter.

An administrator at Lebanese Explosives told the AP that it was "not interested in buying confiscated material because we did not know where they were brought from, what is the quality nor its expiry."

Merhi and his successor as customs chief, Badri Daher, sent multiple letters in the following years to the Courts of Urgent Matters, warning of the danger and seeking permission to sell the material or a ruling on another way to get rid of it.

Daher told the AP and other media that he never received any reply from the court. But Kobaissi, the investigative reporter, found documents showing the court responded each time that it didn´t have jurisdiction and that the Public Works Ministry had to decide.

Over the years, Lebanese built and bought luxury property opposite the port, a nearby Beirut Marina including restaurants, cafes and retail shops was built up, concerts were held, children rode their bicycles and workers went about their daily business, oblivious to the massive "bomb" waiting to explode.

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At some point, someone battered open a door to Warehouse 12 and knocked a hole in one of its walls.

When is not known. It was reported when State Security inspected the site this summer. In a July 20 report, it warned that the warehouse´s "Door Number 9 has suffered a blow in the middle, knocking it away from the wall enough to allow anyone to enter and steal the ammonium nitrate." It also noted the hole in the wall and pointed out that there was no guard at the warehouse, "making theft even easier."

The report to President Michel Aoun and then-Prime Minister Hassan Diab warned that thieves could steal the material to make explosives. Or, it said, the mass of material could cause an explosion "that would practically destroy the port." Kobaissi shared the report with the AP.

Aoun has been in office since 2016. After the explosion, he said the State Security report was the first time he´d heard of the dangerous stockpile. He said he immediately ordered military and security agencies to do "what was needed" - though he added he had no authority over the port.

After being criticized by rival politicians and on social media for not doing more, Aoun´s office issued a further statement saying that his military adviser had immediately forwarded the State Security report to the Higher Defense Council, the top defense body in the country.

But a government official said security agencies had repeatedly sent warnings directly to the government.

"The same memo was sent roughly every year basically since that ship arrived, and it became clear the stuff wasn´t moving. So, it was like a tradition and it wasn´t marked as priority," the official told AP, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasn´t authorized to talk to the media.

Kobaissi, the investigative reporter, said all political factions in the country benefited from using the port for patronage, and most overlooked dubious dealings. He said many people knew about the initial warning by Skaff, including Hezbollah's former point man at the port.

Port and customs officials "are a gang, a mafia, appointed by a mafia gang that has come to office through an election process," Kobaissi told the AP.

He believes officials at the port were trying to find a legal cover to sell off the ammonium nitrate and skim off some of the money. He noted a similar scheme was run in the past when containers of confiscated asbestos were auctioned off. He said there were many instances of port officials profiting off impounded shipments, even keeping some goods - like Mini Coopers - for themselves.

Both the customs chief Daher and the head of the port, Hassan Koraytem, are among those detained in the wake of the explosion.

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On the afternoon of Aug. 4, security officials say, three metalworkers who had been working for several days to weld the broken Door Number 9 of Warehouse 12 finished work and left the facility.

The cause of the original fire has still not been determined and is at the heart of the current investigation. Some have questioned whether the welding may have sparked stocks of flammable liquids used in making detergents, as well as tons of fireworks that were also being kept in Warehouse 12. Other possibilities such as sabotage are also being investigated. The metalworkers, who were hired to fix the door by the port authorities in response to the security report, have been detained for questioning, according to security officials.

Shortly after the 10 firefighters arrived at the port, they sent an urgent call back to headquarters, asking for reinforcements. Photos they sent from their mobile phones to their colleagues showed them trying to open the gate of Warehouse 12.

"When they called us, they said they are hearing the sound of fireworks," Beirut fire chief Nabil Khankarli told the AP.

No one told the emergency responders that dangerous material was stored in the warehouse. No port officials were even there to help them open the gate, Khankarli said.

A second team jumped into their vehicles and headed toward the port. All across the city, flames and the pillar of black smoke could be seen pouring into the sky, lit up by popping fireworks. Many residents would later report hearing a jet or a drone and presuming it was Israeli, since Israel sends reconnaissance flights over Lebanon on an almost daily basis. No evidence has yet emerged of warplanes.

There was an initial explosion, sending shredded debris into the air. That first blast, survivors would recount later, sent some who had been watching the fire scurrying for cover.

Twelve seconds later, at 6:08 p.m., the ammonium nitrate detonated in one of the biggest non-nuclear explosions ever recorded.

In an instant, a blast with the force of hundreds of tons of TNT sucked in the air - one video showed a luxury store window exploding outward from the suction, spraying a bride and groom taking their wedding video on the sidewalk outside - and then unleashed its power across the city.

It blew a crater nearly 200 meters (yards) wide out of the port where Warehouse 12 once stood, and seawater poured in to fill it. The port was leveled. A grain silo right next to the warehouse was shredded and sheared in half - though its massive bulk partially shielded sections of the city from the blast. For miles around, in people´s homes and in shops and hospitals, windows were shattered, doors knocked off their hinges, ceilings or walls blown in a vicious whirlwind onto those inside.

Alaa Saad and his friends were out diving, about 2.5 kilometers (1.5 miles) off the coast of Beirut, when they started hearing noises from the direction of the port and saw the smoke. Was it fireworks? Ammunition?

"There were lots of flashes going off inside the smoke," he said. He heard some kind of eruption, like a volcano. "Something that was boiling very much," he said.

"Five seconds passed, and this is when I saw the cloud or the wave that was coming toward us at very high speed," he said. "It was insane speed. I could not even think if I wanted to jump in the water or stay on the boat."

Saad fell on the deck. A friend tumbled into the water.

"After that," he said, "I thought it was the end of Beirut or the end of the world or the war has started."

More than 6,000 people were injured, and at least 180 were killed - among them the 10 first responders. It would take days of searching before colleagues found all their bodies in the rubble.

Nearly three weeks later, theories abound. In the deeply polarized country, some have turned their suspicion to Hezbollah, which maintains a huge weapons stockpile in the country and dominates its politics. A member of the militant group was sentenced to six years in prison after he was arrested in Cyprus in 2015 in connection with the seizure of nine tons of ammonium nitrate at a house where he was staying.

An investigative team that includes Kobaissi, working with The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, found that the shadow owner of the Rhosus was actually a Cypriot who owed money to a Lebanese bank linked to Hezbollah - raising speculation that he brought in the ammonium nitrate for the group. The businessman, Charalambos Manoli, denied the report, insisting to the AP that he sold the ship in May 2012.

Others have peddled a theory that rivals of the group had sought to accrue the fertilizer for use as explosives in the war in neighboring Syria.

The documents show clear negligence and failure; the question of whether something more triggered the blast depends on an investigation that so far has seemed predictably slow and ineffectual.

The fire chief, Khankarli, is furious. So much destruction. So much bloodshed. All of it avoidable.

"We are waiting for the investigation," he said. "But what is gone cannot be recovered."



As US and Iran Talk Truce, Israel Digs in for a 'Forever War'

An Israeli soldier gestures from an Israeli armored personnel carrier (APC), as they leave southern Lebanon and enter Israel, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Ayal Margolin
An Israeli soldier gestures from an Israeli armored personnel carrier (APC), as they leave southern Lebanon and enter Israel, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Ayal Margolin
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As US and Iran Talk Truce, Israel Digs in for a 'Forever War'

An Israeli soldier gestures from an Israeli armored personnel carrier (APC), as they leave southern Lebanon and enter Israel, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Ayal Margolin
An Israeli soldier gestures from an Israeli armored personnel carrier (APC), as they leave southern Lebanon and enter Israel, as seen from the Israeli side of the border, April 8, 2026. REUTERS/Ayal Margolin

Even as the US and Iran seek to cement a ceasefire, Israel is seizing more territory from its neighbors in preparation for a long, drawn-out conflict across the Middle East.

Israel's creation of "buffer zones" in Gaza, Syria and now Lebanon reflects a strategic shift after the attacks of October 7, 2023, one that puts the country in a semi-permanent state of war, six Israeli military and defense officials told Reuters.

The approach also acknowledges a reality the officials said had become increasingly clear after two-and-a-half years of conflict: Iran's clerical leadership, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and militias across the region cannot be eliminated outright.

"Israel's leaders have concluded that they are in a forever war against adversaries who have to be intimidated and even dispersed," said Nathan Brown, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The US and Iran agreed on Wednesday to a pause in fighting while they negotiate a broader end to the war, which erupted on February 28. Israel agreed to halt its attacks on Iran but says it will not stop its campaign against Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

Hezbollah joined the war on March 2 by firing rockets at Israel, which then launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon to clear a buffer zone up to the Litani River - a broad swathe of land that makes up about 8% of Lebanese territory.

Israel has ordered the area's hundreds of thousands of residents to flee and is in the early stages of destroying homes in Shi'ite Muslim villages that it believes have been used by Hezbollah to store weapons or stage attacks.

A senior ‌military official, who requested ‌anonymity to discuss security matters, said the aim was to "clear" an area stretching 5-10 km beyond the border, putting Israeli border towns out ‌of range ⁠of Hezbollah rocket-propelled ⁠grenade fire.

In some Lebanese villages close to the border, Israeli troops found evidence that nearly 90% of homes contain weapons or equipment linking them to Hezbollah, the official said.

That means the homes are viewed as enemy military positions that must be destroyed, according to the official who said that many southern Lebanese villages sat on hilltops, giving them a direct line of sight into Israeli towns or army positions.

The use of buffer zones represents a new security doctrine that "border communities cannot be protected from the border", according to Assaf Orion, a retired Israeli brigadier general and former head of military strategy.

"Israel no longer waits for the attack to come," he added. "It sees an emerging threat and it attacks it preemptively."

Once the buffer against Hezbollah is secured, Israel will have seized or occupied territory in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where it remains in control of over half the territory after an October ceasefire with Hamas.

Under the ceasefire, Israel is meant to withdraw from all of Gaza as Hamas disarms, though ⁠the chances of that happening in the near future appear slim.

"We have established security belts deep beyond our borders," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin ‌Netanyahu said in a video message released by his office on March 31.

"In Gaza - more than half of the Strip's ‌territory. In Syria, from the Mount Hermon summit until the Yarmuch River. In Lebanon - a vast buffer zone that thwarts the threat of invasion and keeps anti-tank fire a distance away from our communities."

The Lebanese buffer ‌zone plan has yet to be presented to Netanyahu's cabinet, according to a member of the cabinet and two of the officials.

The Israeli military referred queries about the buffer zones to ‌Netanyahu's office, which didn't immediately respond to a request for comment.

DEFENCE MINISTER VOWS TO RAZE VILLAGES

Israel has long held territory beyond its borders, including the occupied West Bank and Gaza, as well as the Golan Heights in southern Syria, territories captured in a 1967 regional war. Israel subsequently annexed the Golan Heights in 1981.

Hundreds of thousands of Israeli settlers now live in the West Bank among about 3 million Palestinians, who seek the territory as the heartland of a future state.

To many displaced Lebanese and Palestinian people, Israel's seizure of their land and destruction of their villages signals further territorial expansion, an interpretation reinforced by rhetoric from some far-right members ‌of Netanyahu's cabinet.

Bezalel Smotrich, Netanyahu's finance minister, said in March that Israel should extend its border up to the Litani River. He has made similar comments about Gaza, saying the territory should be annexed and settled by Israelis.

However, another Israeli military official, who also ⁠spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss operational ⁠planning, said the Litani would not mark a new border. Rather, the buffer zone would be monitored with ground troops carrying out raids as needed, without necessarily holding positions along the river.

Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz likened the devastation exacted on southern Lebanon to the scorched-earth policy used against Hamas in Gaza that saw entire cities depopulated.

"The village homes adjacent to the border, which serve as Hezbollah outposts for all intents and purposes, will be destroyed according to the Rafah and Khan Younis model in Gaza, to remove the treat from Israeli towns," he said on March 31.

Eran Shamir-Borer, an international law expert at the Israel Democracy Institute, said the destruction of civilian property was largely unlawful, with exceptions that include the property being used for a military purpose.

"Sweeping destruction of houses in southern Lebanon that is not based on individual analysis would be unlawful," he added.

ISRAELIS SCEPTICAL OF LONG-TERM PEACE DEALS

Israeli leaders' preference for a strategy led by the use of buffer zones follows decades of failed attempts to secure long-term peace agreements with the Palestinians, Lebanon and Syria.

The Israeli public is deeply skeptical of negotiated peace agreements with the Palestinians. A 2025 poll from the Pew Research Center found that just 21% of Israelis believe Israel and a potential future Palestinian state could coexist peacefully.

A poll from the Tel Aviv-based Institute for National Security Studies found that just 26% of Israelis believed the October ceasefire in Gaza would lead to many years of calm. Most expected a swift resumption of fighting, the poll showed.

Ofer Shelah, a research program director at the institute, said that in the absence of a negotiated peace settlement with Lebanon, having a buffer zone in the north would prevent the threat of attacks or a ground incursion by Hezbollah forces.

But he said the increased personnel needed to patrol fronts across Lebanon, Gaza, Syria and the occupied West Bank would eventually put major strain on the military's forces.

"We would be better off eventually going back to the international border and maintaining a mobile active defenses beyond the border, without having outposts there," Shelah added.


Lebanon Becomes an Alternate Arena for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards after Assad’s Fall

A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
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Lebanon Becomes an Alternate Arena for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards after Assad’s Fall

A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)
A view of a damaged building following an Israeli strike near the Rafik Hariri University Hospital (RHUH), in the Jnah District of Beirut, Lebanon, 06 April 2026. (EPA)

A multi-layered structure run by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards is taking shape in Lebanon, spanning Lebanese and Palestinian arms across intertwined security, military, and political roles.

The model echoes Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2024, raising fears that Lebanon is shifting from a traditional battleground into a more complex hub for managing conflict and influence.

As signs of this overlap grow, Israel Defense Forces Radio said on Monday that an attempted assassination on Sunday in a Beirut apartment targeted a member of the “Palestine Corps,” linked to the Revolutionary Guards’ external arm, the Quds Force.

Israel has previously said it killed several Iranian figures in Lebanon, including two strikes on “central commanders in the Lebanon Corps,” affiliated with the Quds Force and operating in Beirut. One strike hit the Ramada Hotel in Raouche.

On March 11, the Israeli military said it targeted Hisham Abdel Karim Yassin, describing him as “a senior commander in Hezbollah’s communications unit, and in the Palestine Corps of the Quds Force.”

A Palestinian source in Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat the Iran-linked structure resembles a parent body branching into multiple formations, with the Quds Force at its core. Local and Palestinian arms operate under different names for organizational and media purposes.

The structure extends beyond the Shiite base tied to Hezbollah, incorporating groups from other communities, including Sunni elements integrated into parallel formations similar to the Resistance Brigades, alongside carefully organized Palestinian frameworks.

“The Palestinian cover is essential,” the source said, adding that the aim is to avoid portraying Hezbollah as acting alone, instead projecting a broader alliance of Palestinian and Islamic factions to boost legitimacy and reduce Hezbollah’s domestic isolation.

Concealment

Names such as “Lebanon Corps” and “Palestine Corps” reflect composition, and are not arbitrary, the source said. The Lebanon Corps refers to Lebanese members from outside the Shiite community, while the Palestine Corps includes fighters from Palestinian factions, both Islamist groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and non-Islamist factions.

The labels also serve as concealment tools, adopted after older structures were exposed, allowing networks to reorganize and evade monitoring.

With Iran’s reduced ability to use Syria as before, in terms of movement and deployment, the base of operations was moved to Lebanon, the source said.

Lebanon is now used as an alternative arena in practice, an advanced platform for managing confrontation, not just a support front. Its geography next to Israel, its complex environment offering multiple Lebanese, Palestinian, and Sunni covers, and an existing military structure all support this shift.

The change has moved the role from logistical support in Syria to direct operational management from inside Lebanon. The country is now treated as “the most sensitive and valuable geography in this axis,” both for confrontation with Israel and as a pivot for escalation or negotiations.

Multiple structures, unified command

Political writer Ali al-Amine said Iran-linked structures in Lebanon span multiple levels and labels but converge under the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly through the Quds Force.

Some groups are directly tied to the Quds Force, while others operate under a Palestinian banner, often composed of Palestinian members, each with its own role and title.

“These individuals are organizationally linked to the Revolutionary Guards, but are not necessarily Iranian,” he said. “They can be Lebanese or Palestinian, while their direct leadership reference lies within the Guards, not local frameworks.”

He added that some figures classified within Hezbollah are in fact closer organizationally to the Revolutionary Guards, highlighting overlap between Lebanese and Iranian roles.

The Palestine Corps manages ties with Iran-linked Palestinian factions, while the Lebanon Corps handles the Lebanese arena.

“What is known as the Lebanon Corps is not a traditional military force, but an administrative, coordinating and supervisory body directly linked to the Revolutionary Guards, while field execution remains with Hezbollah,” he said.

He added that the Revolutionary Guards have long maintained a direct presence inside Hezbollah through representatives across financial, security, military, and social sectors, ensuring oversight and influence. These figures typically fall under the Quds Force, responsible for operations outside Iran.

Al-Amine said Lebanon has become a primary arena for the Revolutionary Guards after Iran’s loss of the Syrian theater, explaining Tehran’s strong commitment to maintaining its influence.

“Iran will strongly defend this influence, because losing Lebanon would be a strategic blow and would directly affect its regional position,” he said.

He said a key part of the current conflict centers on Iran’s efforts to entrench its influence in Lebanon and prevent its erosion, whether through the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, or affiliated networks, as it seeks to preserve its regional role and leverage.


Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
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Majid Khademi: Brief Tenure at Helm of Embattled IRGC Intelligence Ends in Assassination

A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 
A photo published by the Iranian Supreme Leader’s website from an interview with Khademi, February 18. 

Majid Khademi’s rise to the top of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence apparatus was as abrupt as his fall.

During the 12-day war in June 2025, Khademi was appointed head of the IRGC Intelligence Organization following the killing of his predecessor, Mohammad Kazemi, at a time when Iran’s security establishment was under intense pressure from external strikes, internal unrest and mounting concerns over infiltration.

Less than a year later, on April 6, 2026, Israel announced it had assassinated Khademi in an air strike. The IRGC later confirmed his death.

His killing marked the second time in under a year that the head of one of Iran’s most sensitive intelligence bodies had been eliminated in a targeted strike, underscoring both the exposure of the apparatus and the strain on its ranks.

Khademi, a career security officer, was not among the IRGC’s publicly prominent figures. Unlike commanders known for battlefield roles or political visibility, he emerged from the opaque world of internal protection and counterintelligence, a domain focused on safeguarding the system from within.

His appointment reflected that background and came at a moment when the IRGC was grappling with assassinations, intelligence breaches, and operational setbacks that raised questions about its internal cohesion.

A parallel apparatus

To understand Khademi’s role, it is necessary to situate the body he led within Iran’s broader intelligence architecture. Iran operates two major intelligence services with overlapping mandates.

The Ministry of Intelligence is the state’s official civilian agency, while the IRGC Intelligence Organization has evolved into a powerful parallel structure, particularly since 2009. More closely aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the ideological core of the system, the IRGC’s intelligence arm operates with a mandate that blends security, political oversight and military intelligence.

Within this ecosystem, the IRGC’s Intelligence Protection Organization, where Khademi spent much of his career, plays a critical internal role. It is tasked with counterintelligence inside the corps, including preventing leaks, monitoring discipline and loyalty among personnel, and detecting infiltration before it develops into a broader crisis.

In recent years, the IRGC intelligence apparatus has expanded beyond its traditional military remit to include monitoring protests, cyberspace operations, influence campaigns and surveillance of political and social actors, alongside pursuing external adversaries.

This expansion has effectively transformed it into a hybrid political-security institution, requiring its leadership to possess detailed knowledge of the IRGC’s internal networks of loyalty and control. Khademi’s career trajectory, rooted in protection and internal oversight, aligned closely with these demands.

A closed biography

Information about Khademi remains limited, reflecting the nature of his roles. His name appears in various forms in Iranian sources, including Majid Khademi, Majid Khademi Hosseini and Majid Hosseini. He is reported to have been born in the village of Amir Hajilu, in Fasa county in the southern province of Fars. He belonged to an early generation of IRGC cadres who rose through internal security structures, particularly within the protection apparatus.

By at least 2014, Khademi was serving as a deputy to Hossein Taeb, then head of IRGC intelligence. He later held senior positions within the Intelligence Protection Organization. In May 2018, he was appointed head of intelligence protection at the Ministry of Defense.

He returned to the IRGC’s protection apparatus in 2022 as its chief, succeeding Mohammad Kazemi, who had been promoted to lead IRGC intelligence after Taeb’s removal. Following Kazemi’s killing in June 2025, Khademi was elevated to head the IRGC Intelligence Organization.

“Security contamination”: the post-Taeb phase

Khademi’s rise was closely tied to a broader reshuffle within Iran’s security establishment. In 2022, Hossein Taeb was removed from his post after a period marked by a string of security breaches, assassinations, and reported intelligence failures. His replacement, Kazemi, was drawn from the protection apparatus, signaling a shift toward tightening internal control. Khademi’s appointment to head intelligence protection formed part of this restructuring, which also affected other security bodies close to the core of power.

The changes took place amid growing concern among officials over what was described in Iranian discourse as “security contamination”, referring to infiltration, leaks and compromised networks within sensitive institutions. Statements by senior political and security figures indicated that these concerns had moved from theoretical risk to a central element of the security crisis.

Between 2022 and 2025, Khademi oversaw one of the most sensitive portfolios in the IRGC at a time when fears of infiltration were intensifying within the organization itself. Some Iranian analysts associated his rise with the camp of Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, a senior security figure later appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

While the precise alignments remain unclear, the reshuffle was widely seen as part of an internal rebalancing within the IRGC’s conservative security current. Khademi’s advancement came during a period of shifting trust and authority within the apparatus rather than institutional stability.

His career placed him at the core of the IRGC’s internal control mechanisms, overseeing secrecy, discipline, and loyalty. His tenure at the Ministry of Defense between 2018 and 2022 added another dimension. The ministry sits at the nexus of military industries, sensitive programs and technical infrastructure, as well as the complex relationship between the IRGC, the regular army and other agencies. Its intelligence protection arm is regarded as a key component of Iran’s security system, responsible not only for personnel oversight but also for safeguarding strategic projects and documentation.

During this period, the IRGC, through networks associated with Khademi, consolidated its role in protecting institutions linked to Iran’s nuclear program. This included expanded responsibilities for securing nuclear facilities and affiliated centers, as well as protecting nuclear officials and scientists, an area long targeted by foreign intelligence operations.

His security discourse

Khademi’s public statements offer insight into his approach. In an interview published on February 18, 2026, on the official website of the Supreme Leader’s office, he framed recent unrest in Iran in explicitly security terms. He argued that the disturbances in January were not simply protests driven by economic or social grievances, but rather an organized project involving foreign intelligence services, domestic networks and coordinated mobilization through digital platforms.

He described the events as closer to a “coup attempt” than a protest movement, a characterization consistent with the narrative advanced by Iran’s leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Khademi spoke of infiltration at the level of individuals and factions and alleged the involvement of at least 10 foreign intelligence agencies. He outlined what he described as staged phases of unrest, including “cognitive warfare” and digital mobilization.

He cited figures to illustrate the scale of the response by his apparatus, including the summoning of 2,735 individuals, the “advising” of around 13,000 others, and the seizure of 1,173 weapons. Central to his analysis was the role of cyberspace. He linked what he termed “cognitive warfare” to weaknesses in internet governance, which he said created vulnerabilities exploited for organization, mobilization and incitement.

He also referred to a meeting with Ali Khamenei prior to the unrest, saying the leader had stressed the importance of intelligence work and vigilance against infiltration, drawing parallels with the early years following Iran’s 1979 revolution.