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4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
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4 Pieces of Advice from Russia to its ‘Difficult Ally’ Syria

Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)
Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov, left, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, right, and Syrian president Bashar Assad, center, during their meeting in Damascus on September 7. (AFP)

Weeks ago, an American official remarked that Russian President Vladimir Putin needed to ask himself, that five years since his direct military intervention in Syria, does he want the Syria of 2025 to be the same as Syria of 2020?

There is no doubt that the Russian delegation’s visit to Syria has this question in mind. The delegation carried with it economic promises and diplomatic advice to its “difficult ally” with the hopes of receiving different answers than what some Syrian officials desire.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and intelligence officials’ visit to Syria in early 2012 kicked off the phase of protecting the “allies” in Damascus through diplomatic and economic means. The intervention in late September 2015 paved the way for military intervention to “save the regime” and Damascus. So, yesterday’s “significant visit” is the beginning of the shift from military action towards politics, economy and diplomacy in the heart of Damascus, ultimately paving the way for different solutions in Syria.

Before departing Syria, the Russian delegation leaves behind four pieces of advice to its “difficult ally”:

‘American sword’
The United States has now entered a complicated electoral phase ahead of November’s presidential elections. At the moment, there are no serious indications that American forces will withdraw from northeastern Syria, even if Joe Biden were to win the polls.

From Moscow’s perspective, the upcoming weeks will witness the announcement of new American sanctions as part of the Caesar Act. The last batch had targeted president Bashar Assad, his wife and their son. It also targeted his senior aides and businessmen. The new sanctions will include more businessmen, lawmakers and military officials. The Caesar Act enjoys bipartisan support in the US, meaning they are here to stay for the foreseeable future. Confronting them, therefore, demands coordination between Moscow and Damascus. To that end, it appears that the Russian delegation brought with it attractive financial and economic promises to Damascus in the shape of loans or grants worth billions of dollars that will give the regime some sanctions and economic relief in the near future.

Iranian ‘crescent’
In return for these pledges, Moscow “advised” Damascus of the need to “help us so we can help you” in breaking its diplomatic-political isolation and kicking off the reconstruction process. How? By taking some tangible steps in reorganizing its internal affairs, implementing constitutional reform according to United Nations Security Council resolution 2254 and reassessing its ties with Iran. Damascus is demanded to “decrease its role in the ‘Iranian crescent’” that stretches from Tehran, passing through Baghdad and Damascus, and ending in Beirut. The “crescent” is coming under frequent Israeli strikes with American blessing and Russian silence, reflecting the implementation of the Russian-American agreement that calls for keeping Iran away from southern Syria.

All of this will pave the way for Arab and European countries to “normalize” relations with Syria and help in its reconstruction. In return, Damascus must accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Washington over the regions east of the Euphrates River. It must also accept the understandings reached between Moscow and Ankara over northwestern Syria. In other words, Syria must yield to the strategic understandings reached between Russia and Turkey that go beyond the frontlines in northwestern Syria. Moscow had, after all, received days ahead of Lavrov’s Damascus trip a Turkish delegation to discuss the latest developments in the deal struck with Russia in March.

Decentralization
Moscow recently hosted the signing of an agreement between head of the Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Elham Ahmed, and head of the Russia-backed People's Will Party, Qadri Jamil. Lavrov met with Ahmed and Qadri after the agreement was signed.

The deal stipulated that the “new Syria will enjoy a democratic constitution that achieves a modern relationship between decentralization and centralization in main (foreign, defense and economic) affairs.” It also underscored a “fair democratic solution to the Kurdish issue”. Moreover, it stressed that the “Syrian army is the sole national institution with the right to carry arms and that it is barred from meddling in politics.” The SDF must be incorporated in the army, it added.

Lavrov informed Ahmed and Jamil of his complete support of the agreement, saying he will relay its details to officials in Damascus.

New Syria
The “new Syria” addressed in the agreement is one that Russia is keen to achieve through resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee. It is clear, however, that Damascus is not on board to seriously join this venture. During its latest meeting two weeks ago, the government delegation at the committee may have changed its approach, but its goals remain the same. The delegation refused to be referred to as the “government delegation” or “government-backed delegation” Rather, it reneged on a previous agreement, reached with the opposition representatives at the committee, on “procedural regulations”, saying it is an “independent entity”.

Such behavior is only aimed at buying time until after the presidential elections set for mid-2021, because Damascus wants the polls to be held according to the current constitution. It is, therefore, hoping for talks on the constitution to be postponed until after the elections. It is also insisting on holding a referendum on the results of the Constitutional Committee meetings.

UN envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen traveled to Moscow to brief Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on the third round of committee talks, which were attended by a Russian representative, who saw for himself the government delegation’s behavior. Lavrov pledged to address the issue with the “difficult ally”. It is believed that his “advice” would be for Damascus to alter its behavior at the Constitutional Committee meetings and speed up its efforts to reach a breakthrough ahead of the presidential elections.

The coming days and weeks will, therefore, act as a test to see just how much Damascus heeded this “advice” and whether it will prove wrong remarks by a former Russian diplomat, who noted: “Damascus takes everything from us, but advice.”

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.