Will the Syrian-Israeli Negotiations Resume?

US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
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Will the Syrian-Israeli Negotiations Resume?

US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP
US President Bill Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa (R) in the Rose Garden at the White House in Washington, DC 15 December 1999 at the resumption of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. © AFP

Will the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations resume? Where is Russia and the United States from opening the channels between Tel Aviv and Damascus? What is the required price and the rewards offered? These questions have been raised for a long time, but they have returned intensely to the diplomatic corridors in recent weeks as a widespread belief emerged about the presence of secret negotiations between the two capitals.

There is a reasonable explanation for this belief: modern history showed that whenever Damascus was on the brink of major transformations or isolation, the only “way out” was to resume negotiations, according to the saying: “The road to Washington always passes through Tel Aviv.”

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the features of the new world order started to emerge, President Hafez al-Assad decided to participate in the Madrid Peace Conference at the end of 1991 and then enter into direct negotiations with Israel. Those were led by then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and then-Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa at the beginning of 2000.

Two decades of negotiations were sufficient to spare Damascus the throes of transformations in the region and the world. But Hafez al-Assad passed away in the mid-2000s without signing the peace agreement.

When former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005, Damascus was isolated from its regional and international entourage. All eyes turned to Tel Aviv. In 2008, a secret negotiation channel was opened between the two sides, the Syrian aim of which was to break this state of isolation.

This is what happened. Secret negotiations took place. President Bashar al-Assad was invited to international and Arab conferences, tours, and summits. In the end, the talks sponsored by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan collapsed, and in December 2008 Assad did not agree to direct negotiations.

In this regard, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert quotes former US President George W. Bush as saying: “For me, if you sign an agreement with Assad, it will make me very happy, because I want the Syrian president to know that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem.”

Damascus is now in the American “isolation ax”. Is repeating previous experiences the only way out?

The first explicit “peaceful signal” came from Damascus. After the signing of the Israeli agreements with the Emirates and Bahrain, Damascus has not issued any official condemnation statement, contrary to its ally, Tehran. It remained silent. Silence here is a political stance. Indeed, the Emirati-Israeli agreement coincided with the arrival of a shipment of UAE humanitarian aid to the Syrian capital.

In fact, this Syrian “peace signal” is based on a pivotal development that took place in mid-2018, when US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, sponsored an agreement guaranteeing the return of the Syrian government forces to the south of the country in exchange for the removal of Iranian fighters from the borders of Jordan and the Golan and the deployment of the UN Disengagement Observer Force.

The security and military arrangements in the Golan are in accordance with the disengagement agreement and UN Resolution 338, Putin said, meaning a return to pre-2011 arrangements.

But talks have recently emerged about a bigger step between Damascus and Tel Aviv, which should include answers to three elements: First, US-Russian sponsorship, as the US mediation alone is no longer sufficient for several reasons, including the Russian presence in Syria and the strong relationship between Moscow and Tel Aviv and Damascus.

Second, the Iranian presence. This file represents an American-Russian-Israeli intersection point. It was previously tested in the 2018 deal and has been a major dossier in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, when Tel Aviv’s interest shifted from convincing Damascus to “normalization” and “normal peace relations” to regional concessions regarding abandoning Tehran and Hezbollah. But is Damascus able/willing to abandon its alliance with Tehran, which is deeply involved in Syria? Can Russia make such a deal? Does the grand bargain include all foreign powers, including the American and Turkish forces? What is the internal political price required from Damascus for such arrangements?

Third, the future of the Golan. Trump had announced his support for Israel’s decision to extend its sovereignty over the Golan. But Damascus considered the decision “void”. Will Russia offer a “magic solution” that combines sovereignty, geopolitical interests, and security arrangements? What is the relationship of such a deal with the US election results and the questions of a “smooth transition” in the White House?



Winter Will Hamper, But Not Halt, Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon

A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
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Winter Will Hamper, But Not Halt, Israel’s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon

A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)
A destroyed Lebanese village as seen in a photo from Mount Adir in northern Israel. (Reuters)

The ground battles between Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon remain intense, with no end in sight for the coming weeks. The arrival of winter will bring weather changes that could slow down operations. but won't stop the fighting.

Experts say that while winter weather, especially rain and fog, can make it harder for fighters and vehicles to move, it has a limited impact on the overall conflict. Air operations, which rely on advanced technology, are less affected.

The region’s mild winter conditions, unlike harsher winters in other countries, will not be a decisive factor in the battle.

Retired General Abdul Rahman Shheitly believes that modern military equipment is designed to work in any weather.

However, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that fog and rain can give both sides an advantage by obscuring visibility, making it harder to spot each other.

This benefits the attacking side, Israel, which has superior technology, while Hezbollah’s movements could be hindered by muddy terrain.

Shheitly also noted that weather affects displaced civilians, which could put pressure on political negotiations to end the conflict.

Retired General Hassan Jouni, former deputy chief of staff of operations in the Lebanese Armed Forces, argued that weather conditions affect the attacker more than the defender. Since Hezbollah is defending its ground, it is less impacted by the cold and rain.

The weather only slightly affects vehicle movement, and does not stop the fighting.

Jouni noted that the region doesn’t experience severe winter weather, so air operations will be unaffected by rain or cold. Modern drones, missiles, and aircraft are designed to function in such conditions, with GPS ensuring precise targeting.

Both Hezbollah and Israel rely heavily on drones. Hezbollah’s drones are noted for their accuracy and ability to avoid Israel’s Iron Dome defense, while Israel uses drones for surveillance and targeted strikes.

More than a year has passed since the conflict began after Hezbollah opened its "support front” for Hamas on October 8, 2023. The fighting, mostly limited to airstrikes during the winter of 2023, escalated with Israel’s ground operation a month ago, though its full goals remain unclear.

As the ground battles continue, Israel seems focused on creating a buffer zone in the South rather than occupying towns. Israel has destroyed over 37 villages to achieve this goal.

The next steps remain uncertain.

Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi has stated that the military is preparing for further ground operations in southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah remains determined to hold its ground and prevent Israeli advances.