Do Trump’s Statements Greenlight Egyptian Military Action over Nile Dam?

This handout picture taken on July 20, 2020 and released by Adwa Pictures on July 27 shows an aerial view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River in Guba, Ethiopia. (AFP)
This handout picture taken on July 20, 2020 and released by Adwa Pictures on July 27 shows an aerial view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River in Guba, Ethiopia. (AFP)
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Do Trump’s Statements Greenlight Egyptian Military Action over Nile Dam?

This handout picture taken on July 20, 2020 and released by Adwa Pictures on July 27 shows an aerial view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River in Guba, Ethiopia. (AFP)
This handout picture taken on July 20, 2020 and released by Adwa Pictures on July 27 shows an aerial view of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile River in Guba, Ethiopia. (AFP)

US President Donald Trump’s recent remarks that Egypt may resort to military action to resolve the Nile dam dispute have addressed a point that Cairo has always officially been keen to avoid.

Ethiopia on Saturday summoned the US ambassador over what it called an “incitement of war” between Ethiopia and Egypt from Trump over their dispute about the filling and operation of a massive hydropower dam.

Trump called on Friday for an agreement between the countries, but added it was a dangerous situation and that Cairo could end up “blowing up that dam”.

Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have been locked in a bitter dispute over the filling and operation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which remains unresolved although the reservoir behind the dam began filling in July.

Egypt says it is dependent on the Nile for more than 90% of its scarce fresh water supplies, and fears the dam could have a devastating effect on its economy.

Observers interpreted Trump’s controversial remarks as a greenlight for Egypt to carry out military action over the dam.

However, member of Egypt’s parliamentary defense and national security committee, Kamal Amer said the American leader’s statements “do not reflect Egypt’s intentions.”

“Egypt distances itself from such remarks,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Egypt will continue to pursue a fair and binding agreement through all peaceful means - and they are many. It refuses to use force against its African brothers,” he stressed.

Expert at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Hani Raslan, said Trump’s statements were more of a “strong warning” and “violent message” to Ethiopia rather than a declaration of Egyptian military action.

Trump was urging the need to reach a negotiated solution “even though he implied that the American administration was not averse to military action and it does not rule it out should Ethiopia continue to refuse any agreement,” he added.

He lamented that Washington was so late in making such a strong statement, explaining that had it done so months ago, perhaps a deal over the dam could have been reached and Ethiopia would not have been so emboldened.

Ultimately, Raslan tied Trump’s statements to the upcoming November US presidential elections, which means “they have little impact in making any changes on the ground.”

Despite Egypt’s denials that it will not pursue military action over the dam dispute, media reports emerge ever so often that it may be taking steps in that regard.

In June, South Sudan denied reports that it has agreed to an Egyptian request to set up a military base in Pagak city that is close to the Ethiopian border.

Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi soon after urged media in his country to refrain from speaking of any military action against Ethiopia. On Saturday, he stressed that Cairo was “waging a long negotiations battle.”



What We Know About Hezbollah’s Shura Council

Lebanese in Beirut watch Naim Qassem deliver a speech. (Reuters)
Lebanese in Beirut watch Naim Qassem deliver a speech. (Reuters)
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What We Know About Hezbollah’s Shura Council

Lebanese in Beirut watch Naim Qassem deliver a speech. (Reuters)
Lebanese in Beirut watch Naim Qassem deliver a speech. (Reuters)

If it is confirmed that Hezbollah’s Shura Council has met and elected Sheikh Naim Qassem as the party’s new secretary-general, this would indicate two important developments, according to sources close to the group.

First, it shows that Hezbollah has restructured and revitalized itself after facing major setbacks, as it can now hold meetings with senior leaders despite significant security risks.

Second, it counters rumors that Tehran controls the party’s political and military leadership since the assassination of secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah last month.

Hezbollah’s organizational structure includes several councils: the Shura Council, Jihad Council, Executive Council, Political Council, Governmental and Parliamentary Work Council, and Judiciary Council.

The Shura Council is the most critical, as it leads the party.

It is made up of seven members, including the secretary-general, who is also its head—now Qassem.

Other members include Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek, head of the Judiciary Council; Sheikh Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, head of the Political Council; Hashem Safieddine, the recently assassinated head of the Executive Council and presumed Nasrallah successor; Hussein Khalil, the political assistant to the secretary-general; and Mohammad Raad, head of the Parliamentary Council and leader of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc in the Lebanese Parliament.

With the appointment of a new secretary-general, two positions on Hezbollah’s Shura Council remain unfilled: the deputy secretary-general and the head of the Executive Council.

Political analyst Dr. Qassem Qassir, who closely monitors the group, points out that a deputy has yet to be named. He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the appointment of a secretary-general is significant, sending a message that Hezbollah is strong and in control of its affairs.

“It is incorrect to say that Iran is running it,” he added.

Qassir believes the remaining council positions will be filled soon.

Other sources indicate that even if a deputy is appointed, their identity may not be disclosed right away.

This is because, like Qassem, they would become a key target for Israel, which aims to keep Hezbollah leaderless.

Hezbollah’s organizational structure comprises three main components. First, the secretary-general acts as the leader, holding significant regulatory authority.

Second, the Shura Council oversees four key councils: the Jihad Council, the Judiciary Council, the Parliamentary Work Council, and the Political Council.

Third, the Executive Council serves as the organizational core, functioning like a government and coordinating various operational units.