Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
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Amr Moussa: Mubarak Rejected Extending Abdel-Meguid’s Time in Office

Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
Former Arab League Chief Amr Moussa with the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

In the second excerpt extracted from the soon-to-be-published biography of former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League”, the veteran Egyptian diplomat recounts the details of how he was assigned to succeed Asmat Abdel-Meguid at the regional Arab organization.

Arab countries, at the time, were conflicted about appointing Moussa, who was still serving as Egypt’s foreign minister in 2001.

In his memoirs, which will soon be released by Dar El-Shorouk, Moussa recounts how Abdel-Meguid expressed to him his desire to remain secretary-general of the Arab League even after completing his term.

Nevertheless, the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refused Abdel-Meguid’s request saying that the Arab League was “asleep and dying out.”

Also, Moussa talks about how vital Gulf financial support, especially that given by Saudi Arabia, was to revamping the Arab League and granting the organization a more active role in all issues concerning the Arab world.

Four months into his tenure, Moussa was faced with the challenges and the fallout of the September 11 attacks which affected all Arabs and Muslims. Dealing with negative feelings surfacing towards Arabs and Muslims, Moussa’s efforts to manage the situation included making vigorous calls, releasing official statements, meeting with US officials, and organizing a conference entitled “Dialogue of Civilizations: An Exchange not a Clash.”

In the last days of November 2000, then chief of the Arab League Abdel-Meguid phoned Moussa and asked for a meeting to discuss important issues that included the future of his position at the organization.

Moussa agreed to Abdel-Meguid’s request and said he would see him at his office before the end of the week.

In that meeting, Abdel-Meguid expressed worry towards his term in office ending before he had given all he had to offer and suggested if he could be given an additional year or two.

Abdel-Meguid did not ask for renewing his contract for a third full term because he knew that Arab League member states would oppose the idea.

Moussa carried Abdel-Meguid’s proposal to President Mubarak the very same evening of the meeting but was faced by clear-cut rejection.

The senior diplomat even requested if Abdel-Meguid’s time in office could be renewed for a single year as a form of honoring his journey at the Arab League.

“Tell him enough is enough…there are important countries at the Arab League who told me that the organization is completely sleeping and will die,” Mubarak told Moussa, confirming that there will be no renewal for Abdel-Meguid.

Two days later, Moussa informed Abdel-Meguid of Mubarak’s refusal.

“He was understanding and showed his known calm and never recalled the subject,” Moussa recounts about Abdel-Meguid’s reaction.

Shortly after, Moussa was informed that it was time for Egypt to select its candidate for chief of the Arab League.

“One winter morning at the end of the year 2000, while I was sitting at a round table in my office at the foreign ministry reading a report, enjoying the winter sun, the presidential phone rang,” said Moussa.

“The presidential secretary for information, Ambassador Majed Abdel-Fattah, was the one speaking. He started by saying that the president was requesting that the minister provides him with one or more names of nominees suited for becoming the next secretary-general of the Arab League,” he added.

Mubarak’s Message

Abdel-Fattah went on to express that many, including the president, believed that Moussa was the right man for the job.

“I realized that it (the call) was a message from President Mubarak right away,” Moussa explained, adding that his response was accepting the offer.

“Egypt announced the news of my candidacy to succeed Abdel-Meguid officially on February 15, 2001.”

“This caused a great uproar in Egypt, as well as in a large number of Arab and even international capitals. I think Washington and Tel Aviv were very happy with the news.”

Moussa goes on to say that some Arab countries opposed his candidacy because staying at the helm of Egypt’s Foreign Ministry was more effective and more beneficial in serving higher Arab interests.

Saudi and Gulf Support

Then Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal conveyed the Kingdom’s support for Moussa whether he is Egypt’s foreign minister or the chief of the Arab League.

Moussa was told that he will receive all the needed support.

“I recall discussing with Prince Saud the financial standing of the Arab League which was edging on bankruptcy, and the need to back me as the new chief in a way that enabled me to reform the joint Arab action organization,” Moussa added.

Prince Saud, for his part, voiced his support and promised to take the matter to then Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz.

“In my view, I believed that the Arab League can be reformed if it was run by a modern administration and if sufficient funds were made available to give the organization’s employees a sense of security,” Moussa said about his strategy to reinvigorate the organization’s work.

“Indeed, I toured Gulf countries and received promises from high-level officials that the necessary funds will be made available in the form of special support for the Arab League,” he added, noting that he was ensured full-control over how the incoming money was to be spent.

“They trusted the new administration at the Arab League and its ability to move joint Arab action forward,” Moussa noted.

Day One at the Arab League Headquarters

“At 9:30 am on May 16, 2001, I left my house to find the Arab League’s secretary-general designated car waiting for me. The vehicle was old and worn out. What caught my eye was that the Arab League flag was raised over the car,” Moussa recalled.

“I asked the guard to remove the flag; there was no need to roam the streets of Cairo in a car with the Arab League flag fluttering over it. Close to 10:00 am I arrived at the Arab League’s headquarters.”

Accompanied by Ambassador Samir Saif el-Yazal, a “good” executive figure that was hand-picked by Moussa to help in supervising financial and administrative affairs at the Arab League, Moussa headed to the office of the Arab League secretary-general on the first floor.

“First I sat in the office salon, appalled by the lights on the whole floor being dimmed and the paintwork on the walls being outdated! I told el-Yazal that this sight must change immediately.”

Moussa then ordered el-Yazal to open windows, paint the walls with light colors, and make the lighting bright so as not to encourage sleep.

Outraged by the cluttered job done on connecting phone cables at the office, Moussa summoned the manager of the administrative affairs and demanded that an overhaul takes place before the end of the week.

Slowly but surely, things began changing.

In terms of developing Arab League headquarters, the Kingdom of Morocco offered to develop one of the rundown halls, and China developed a second hall as a gift to Moussa.

Moussa also ordered a dramatic shift in the arrangement of how delegations are seated, introducing a fresh environment to representatives.

Arab League Teams

“My conviction was firm that there would be no development for the system of joint Arab action without first improving the human cadre working at the Arab League and its affiliated institutions. I started meeting with workers in groups, each group consisting of five or six members, to sort out those I could count on,” Moussa said about his early efforts to reform the Arab League.

During the first two months of meetings with employees, Moussa chose about 30 individuals from whom the Arab League can invest and rely on.

“I began assigning them tasks and found that their education was superior and that they were ready to develop and work. They were no less qualified than the workers of any other organization ... they just needed guidance and confidence,” said Moussa.

Published in special agreement with Dar Al Shorouk - all rights reserved.



Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
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Hezbollah’s ‘Statelet’ in Syria’s Qusayr Under Israeli Fire

Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)
Smoke billows from al-Qusayr in western Syria following an attack. (SANA)

Israel has expanded its strikes against Hezbollah in Syria by targeting the al-Qusayr region in Homs.

Israel intensified its campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon in September and has in the process struck legal and illegal borders between Lebanon and Syria that are used to smuggle weapons to the Iran-backed party. Now, it has expanded its operations to areas of Hezbollah influence inside Syria itself.

Qusayr is located around 20 kms from the Lebanese border. Israeli strikes have destroyed several bridges in the area, including one stretching over the Assi River that is a vital connection between Qusayr and several towns in Homs’ eastern and western countrysides.

Israel has also hit main and side roads and Syrian regime checkpoints in the area.

The Israeli army announced that the latest attacks targeted roads that connect the Syrian side of the border to Lebanon and that are used to smuggle weapons to Hezbollah.

Qusayr is strategic position for Hezbollah. The Iran-backed party joined the fight alongside the Syrian regime against opposition factions in the early years of the Syrian conflict, which began in 2011. Hezbollah confirmed its involvement in Syria in 2013.

Hezbollah waged its earliest battles in Syria against the “Free Syrian Army” in Qusayr. After two months of fighting, the party captured the region in mid-June 2013. By then, it was completely destroyed and its population fled to Lebanon.

A source from the Syrian opposition said Hezbollah has turned Qusayr and its countryside to its own “statelet”.

It is now the backbone of its military power and the party has the final say in the area even though regime forces are deployed there, it told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Qusayr is critical for Hezbollah because of its close proximity to the Lebanese border,” it added.

Several of Qusayr’s residents have since returned to their homes. But the source clarified that only regime loyalists and people whom Hezbollah “approves” of have returned.

The region has become militarized by Hezbollah. It houses training centers for the party and Shiite militias loyal to Iran whose fighters are trained by Hezbollah, continued the source.

Since Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the party moved the majority of its fighters to Qusayr, where the party also stores large amounts of its weapons, it went on to say.

In 2016, Shiite Hezbollah staged a large military parade at the al-Dabaa airport in Qusayr that was seen as a message to the displaced residents, who are predominantly Sunni, that their return home will be impossible, stressed the source.

Even though the regime has deployed its forces in Qusayr, Hezbollah ultimately holds the greatest sway in the area.

Qusayr is therefore of paramount importance to Hezbollah, which will be in no way willing to cede control of.

Lebanese military expert Brig. Gen Saeed Al-Qazah told Asharq Al-Awsat that Qusayr is a “fundamental logistic position for Hezbollah.”

He explained that it is where the party builds its rockets and drones that are delivered from Iran. It is also where the party builds the launchpads for firing its Katyusha and grad rockets.

Qazah added that Qusayr is also significant for its proximity to Lebanon’s al-Hermel city and northeastern Bekaa region where Hezbollah enjoys popular support and where its arms deliveries pass through on their way to the South.

Qazah noted that Israel has not limited its strikes in Qusayr to bridges and main and side roads, but it has also hit trucks headed to Lebanon, stressing that Israel has its eyes focused deep inside Syria, not just the border.