In the fourth episode of excerpts from the biography of former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa - published by Dar El-Shorouk and edited and documented by Khaled Abu Bakr – Asharq Al-Awsat reviews Moussa’s efforts and the work of the Arab League on the Palestinian file.
In his upcoming book, “The Years of the Arab League”, Moussa dedicates two chapters of 66 pages to talk about the birth of the Arab Peace Initiative at the 2002 Beirut Summit, launched by the late Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, the Palestinian division between Fatah and Hamas over the Palestinian file, the Annapolis conference for peace, and then the Arab division in light of the aggression on Gaza in 2009.
In these excerpts of the first chapter, Moussa narrates the details of the Arab Peace Initiative and his role in drafting some of its provisions to overcome some of the differences over it.
He says that he assumed the position of Arab League Secretary-General while the second Palestinian Intifada was ongoing. The Israeli intransigence was continuous and even escalating, so was the stalemate paralyzing the “peace process.” Since US President George W. Bush officially assumed office on Jan. 20, 2001, until the events of Sep.11 of the same year, his administration did not present any political initiative to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moussa says that the US administration regarded the Palestinian uprising as acts of violence, which should be only addressed with security measures.
However, things changed after 9-11, Moussa recounts.
He says that after the attacks in New York, while the American forces were completing their preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan and the US administration was busy mobilizing a wide international coalition to support the “war on terror”, Bush declared that the “establishment of a Palestinian state has always been part of the American vision as long as Israel’s right to exist is respected…”
The former Arab League secretary-general says in this regard: “In fact, as soon as I heard those statements, which are the first by Bush on a Palestinian state, I considered them as nothing more than a flawed operation, with its meanings and goals; at that time, I was aware that the man needed the support of Arabs and Muslims in his next war against some of their countries, and therefore, he had no objection to flirting with them on the central issue, which is the Palestinian cause. What confirmed my conclusion is that nearly five days after these statements, specifically on Oct. 7, 2001, the United States began its war on Afghanistan.”
Friedman and the Birth of the “Arab Initiative”
Moussa recounts that Thomas Friedman, a famous columnist for The New York Times, published on Feb. 6, 2002, a letter to Arab leaders purportedly on behalf of US President George W. Bush - under the title, “Dear Arab League.”
The letter says: “You’re the ones with the power to really reshape the diplomacy, not me. And here is my advice for how to do it. You have an Arab League summit set for March in Lebanon. I suggest your summit issue one simple resolution: “The 22 members of the Arab League say to Israel that in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines -- in the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, and on the Golan Heights -- we offer full recognition of Israel, diplomatic relations, normalized trade, and security guarantees. Full peace with all 22 Arab states for full withdrawal.”
Moussa says that less than a week later, Friedman met Prince Abdullah, then crown prince, on his ranch near Riyadh. The American journalist wrote the details of that interview, which included the announcement for the first time of what was known as the “Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative in the Middle East”, before it was adopted by 22 Arab countries at the Beirut Summit on March 28, 2002, to become the “Arab Peace Initiative.”
“For my part, I say that the content of Friedman’s letter was preceded by a long discussion that extended throughout my last year as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt and first year as Secretary-General of the Arab League, between me and him (Friedman) in Davos, on the best and most effective ways to lay the foundations for a balanced peace that takes into account the basic needs of both parties.”
Moussa adds: “Prince (King) Abdullah was the only one who had the status that qualifies him to present the Arab initiative… He had tremendous credibility with Arab public opinion, all Arab governments, and the world, and hence his proposal or initiative was a historic step that deserves full support.”
Syrian-Lebanese pressure to dicker over the initiative
Moussa says that the Syrians were not comfortable with the initiative of Prince Abdullah, as he did not consult with them before announcing it in The New York Times.
“I think that the Emir set his sights on (the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s) experience with the Syrians. He decided not to consult or coordinate with them before formulating the initiative, for fear that they would hamper it before its announcement.
Moussa adds that the Syrians did not openly declare their anger, but focused their efforts on criticizing the “full normalization”, which was mentioned in the initiative.
“At the same time, the Syrians brilliantly rushed to use the card of the “Palestinian refugees” and “the right of return”, which was not mentioned in the published details of the initiative. They were well aware of the Palestinian and Lebanese sensitivity to this issue because some Lebanese sects believe that the settlement of about 350,000 Palestinian refugees, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, distorts the demographic balance in Lebanon.”
Moussa continues: “On March 3, 2002 (prior to the Beirut summit and perhaps a prelude to it), Bashar Al-Assad made an official visit to Beirut. It was the first visit of a Syrian head-of-state to the Lebanese capital in more than fifty years. During the visit, Assad and Lebanese President Emile Lahoud issued a joint statement in which they did not explicitly refer to Prince Abdullah’s initiative, but said: “A comprehensive settlement with Israel must allow the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes and the removal of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.”
After Assad’s visit, the Saudis quietly withdrew the term “full normalization” from the official statements paving the way for the initiative. In this context, on March 10, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal described the initiative as offering Israel “complete peace” in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 borders.
The 2002 Beirut Summit
“On the morning of the opening of the Beirut Summit on March 27, 2002, Prince Saud Al-Faisal invited me to an early breakfast (about an hour before the arrival of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Syria, Faruq Al-Sharaa, for the same invitation). I noticed that he wanted to be alone with Saud… I had to formulate the initiative in its final form, leaving the issue of refugees and normalization until the end of the Syrian-Saudi talks. I sat writing at a distant table, but in the same hall. I intended to write the text in the presence of Syria, and to present the text to Saud in the presence of Sharaa.”
Moussa continues: “We were on the sixth floor of the famous Phoenicia Hotel in Beirut, and in the hall dedicated for VIP guests… I saw tension on Farouk Al-Sharaa’s face and little patience with Saud…”
“The truth is that Syria’s position added to the initiative and did not weaken it. I do not see that Syria was opposed to the idea of the initiative in itself, and I also assert that it was keen not to clash with (King) Abdullah. The important thing is that after the understanding that took place between Prince Saud and Farouk Al-Sharaa, I joined them… A discussion took place about the final wording, and Prince Saud said that Amr Moussa would be in charge of finalizing it.”
“I said that I will quickly prepare it and present it to each of them - perhaps while they are sitting here - before we print it and present it to the other ministers… Saud quickly viewed it and agreed to it, while Farouk al-Sharaa read it carefully, then stopped at the expression, “normal relations”, in a paragraph that says: “Establishing normal relations with Israel within the framework of this comprehensive peace.”
I told him: This is less than the complete normalization, which you have reservations about.” So he kept silent and did not comment, which I considered as a consent to the wording.”
Moussa recounts how Syria and Lebanon were opposed to the broadcasting of a speech by Yasser Arafat, who was besieged in Ramallah. He says he was frustrated when he saw that the position of the summit or some of its members was not sound at all, neither in terms of form nor in content, and made Israel smile sarcastically at the attitude of the Arabs towards the Palestinian President.
A negative Israeli-American response
Moussa says he did not expect a positive response from the Israelis to the Arab initiative.
“Because it will lure them into negotiating with the Arabs as a group on the Palestinian issue, a position that they have always rejected. The second reason that made me rule out a positive response from Israel is that the initiative is selling them “full normalization”… in exchange for the Arab land and the borders of June 4, 1967. In fact, based on my experience, the Israeli strategy seeks to win “free normalization” from the Arabs without the need to forfeit the land that is important to its national security.”
The former Arab League secretary-general says that he was surprised by the tepid American response to the initiative “even though many US sources and institutions were pushing for its issuance from the 2002 summit so that the Israelis could be “reassured” and the peace process moved forward.”
“Yes, the initial American reaction to the initiative was tepid, with State Department spokesman Richard Boucher describing it as just “an important and positive step.” A few days later, in the same tone, Secretary of State Colin Powell described it as an “important step,” but he stressed the need for more details about it (as if they were not aware of it!)”
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