Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
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Amr Moussa: Garang Wanted to Be President of Entire Sudan

Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang
Amr Moussa with the leader of the SPLM, John Garang

In this fifth episode of excerpts from the new book by former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa, “The Years of the Arab League,” Asharq Al-Awsat reviews the efforts deployed to solve the crisis in Sudan.

Moussa’s biography, which will soon be published by Dar El-Shorouk, dedicates two chapters of 44 pages to the Sudanese crisis. The first chapter talks about the dispute between northern and southern Sudan that ended with the secession of the South, while the second is devoted to the political and humanitarian crisis that the Darfur region experienced as of March 2003.

Amr Moussa reveals that the leader of the SPLM, John Garang, told him that he wanted to be the president of all of Sudan, asking: “What is the value of being the leader of a poor, weak and closed country in southern Sudan?”

He explains that he asked the leaders of Sudan to “work to entice southerners into unity, but they considered separation an inevitable fate.” He also considered that the peace agreement with the SPLM was an inspiration for all the rebel movements across all Sudanese regions.

Moussa narrates: “Sudan, and its merciless issues and conflicts, was one of my most important concerns since the beginning of my career in Egyptian diplomacy. This exceptional interest in Sudan was reinforced during my ten years as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt…”

The South Sudan Case

Moussa says that several factors have combined to create and fuel the conflict between the south and the north: ethnic and religious pluralism, the struggle over resources, and the distribution of shares.

Other factors include the policy of marginalization, which the central Sudanese governments have adopted towards all parties, and the failure of these successive governments to promote the values of citizenship.

Moussa also points to the role of the British colonialism in nurturing separatism and entrenching it among the people of southern Sudan, by strengthening the role of missionaries and the policy of weakening Arab culture, replacing northern employees, and preventing northern merchants from reaching the south.

The Arab League secretary-general recounts: “On July 20, 2002, the Sudanese government and the SPLM signed the Machakos Protocol in Kenya, which the Arab League accepted at the time after the Sudanese government signed it… The agreement included two documents: the first provides for the extension of the existing armistice until the end of March 2003, and the second covers a number of points that the two sides have accepted in principle, and they relate to the sharing of power and wealth, but without acknowledging any decisive position regarding them. The two parties agreed to abolish the application of Islamic law in areas inhabited by non-Muslims and to hold a referendum in the south on secession or unity after a six-year transitional period.”

Moussa says that after consulting with the concerned Arab governments, he specified the efforts of the Arab League regarding the conflict between North and South Sudan. Those were divided into two segments: advancing the peace process and the negotiations between the Sudanese government and the SPLM and supporting development and reconstruction in war-stricken areas.

“I had earlier received at the League’s headquarters in Cairo in March 2002, the leader of the popular movement, John Garang, who expressed unitary tendencies and demanded the Arab League’s support. I built on that fruitful meeting and sent an Arab mission headed by Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department of the Arab League, in April 2003 to the southern city of Rumbek, the headquarters of the Popular Movement in Southern Sudan. It was the first Arab mission to visit that region, to affirm the commitment of the Arab League and its institutions to actively contribute to the development of South Sudan and the areas affected by war, and to make unity an attractive voluntary option.”

Moussa stops to describe his relationship with Garang, with whom he had a “special agreement.”

“I met with him several times after his first visit to Egypt in 1997. His position has evolved gradually… from the struggle to achieve the secession of the South to the fight for equal rights among all Sudanese in all parts of the country, within the framework of the slogan he raised, which is the “New Sudan” that embraces all ethnicities and religions. Perhaps this development in the position of the SPLM leader was one of the reasons that contributed to his unfortunate disappearance from the Sudanese political scene.”

The former Arab League secretary-general continues: “Garang used to tell me in every meeting that brought us together: “What is the value of being the leader or president of the poor, weak, small and closed country of Southern Sudan?”

I applauded and supported that approach, but his vision was not welcomed by any of the Sudanese political actors, whether Africans, Arabs or Westerners, and even the leaders of the (northern) Sudan. But I think that if Garang could achieve a new beginning on the basis of the “New Sudan” with the opportunity to run for the presidency, events may have taken a completely different course, as this would have shaped different dynamics that none of the parties wanted to create.”

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement

“At the invitation of the Kenyan government, on January 9, 2005, I participated with many Arab and African leaders in the signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Nairobi. The agreement provided for a permanent ceasefire and the establishment of a 6-year transitional period during which the North and South would cooperate in governing the country. Garang was assigned the responsibilities of the Sudanese First Vice President. The agreement also stipulated the sharing of oil revenues, and the right of the SPLM and its southern allies to form a government for the south to fully manage its affairs for a period of 6 years, which ends with the votes of the people of the south and the oil-rich Abyei region in a referendum on January 9, 2011 on the secession or unity.”

Moussa recounts: “Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Egypt’s foreign minister at the time, was sitting next to me during the loud signing ceremony at Naivasha Stadium in Nairobi. During the ceremony, I drifted away. I thought that things were definitely moving towards the secession of the south. Aboul Gheit seemed to have the same thoughts. He cut short my distraction by telling me: I can tell you that by signing this agreement, the matter will end up in division.”

Moussa asserts that great work was achieved through the coordination meetings held by the Arab League to promote a joint Arab action to make the unity of Sudan an attractive option. Arab funds, specialized Arab organizations, and unions of Arab ministerial councils participated in these meetings.

“The Arab League has made concrete efforts and played active roles to help reach a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Sudanese crisis. However, the performance of the Arab system has suffered and still suffers from a clear gap between decision-making and implementation. The Beirut summit decided to establish the Arab Fund for the Development of South Sudan with financial contributions from Arab countries, but this fund did not receive any significant contributions. The League Council also adopted a resolution calling on the member-states to address Sudan’s Arab debts in order to enable the country to face the challenges of building peace and unity, but this did not happen either.”

The referendum on secession

“A referendum took place in southern Sudan and the people chose the secession. In fact, in my Egyptian capacity, and as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, I was against the division of Sudan. I spoke at length about this with (former President Omar) Al-Bashir, Sadiq Al-Mahdi, Othman Al-Mirghani, and others, encouraging the rejection of partition and calling for non-tolerance to the plans of separation.”

The political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur

“My assumptions on the signing of the Machakos Agreement between the Sudanese government and the separatist Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on July 20, 2002… proved to be true. This agreement was an inspiration for the rebel movements in Darfur, which saw that fighting alone is what brings the Bashir regime to the negotiating table.”

Moussa says that the conflict in Darfur began to heat up until the situation reached the point that led to a great human tragedy. That was in March 2003, when rebels revolted against al-Bashir, claiming they were marginalized. Two armed groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, declared their rebellion and attacked the city of Al-Fashir, the center of North Darfur State, destroying 7 aircraft at the city’s airport.

The former Arab League secretary-general recounts that the government has responded with the same strategy that the successive governments have adopted since the era of Sadiq al-Mahdi in the 1980s: mobilizing Arab militias known as the Janjaweed, who are known for their ferocity, to combat the rebels.

“Talking about the Darfur crisis and the factors that lead to it, it is necessary to point to the marginalization of the entire region by the central government and the lack of development projects and basic services such as education, health, etc.,” Moussa says.

The escalating developments in Darfur as of March 2003 attracted global interest. Criticism against the Sudanese government began to increase. On March 4, 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees announced that atrocities were being committed in the Darfur region and demanded the government to urgently open the door to dialogue with the rebels.

A fact-finding mission dispatched by the Arab League

Moussa recounts that he assigned Ambassador Samir Hosni, Director of the Africa Department at the Arab League, to preside over a fact-finding mission that would investigate the reality of the situation in the region. It was the first international mission of its kind to go to Darfur, and its mission included a visit to Sudan, from April 29 to May 15, 2004.

According to the senior Arab official, the mission was able to prove massive violations of human rights on both sides of the conflict, but completely ruled out genocide or ethnic cleansing. The same position was expressed by Alpha Oumar Konare, then-President of the African Union.

“The truth is that these moves on the part of the Arab League were able to open doors for discussion and then for an understanding with the government of Sudan on the importance of the role of the League and the wide scope of its movement,” he asserts.

“This has allowed freedom of movement on the part of the League, further coordination with the African Union, and more movement on the ground in Darfur, starting with an official visit, the first by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to the region.”

With a special agreement with Dar El-Shorouk. All rights reserved.



France Is Facing an Election like No Other. Here’s How It Works and What Comes Next

 Ballots are seen at a polling station inside the Petit Poucet school during France's crunch legislative elections at the Vallee du Tir district in Noumea, in France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on June 30, 2024. (AFP)
Ballots are seen at a polling station inside the Petit Poucet school during France's crunch legislative elections at the Vallee du Tir district in Noumea, in France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on June 30, 2024. (AFP)
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France Is Facing an Election like No Other. Here’s How It Works and What Comes Next

 Ballots are seen at a polling station inside the Petit Poucet school during France's crunch legislative elections at the Vallee du Tir district in Noumea, in France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on June 30, 2024. (AFP)
Ballots are seen at a polling station inside the Petit Poucet school during France's crunch legislative elections at the Vallee du Tir district in Noumea, in France's Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on June 30, 2024. (AFP)

French voters are being called to the polls on Sunday for an exceptional moment in their political history: the first round of snap parliamentary elections that could see the country’s first far-right government since the World War II Nazi occupation — or no majority emerging at all.

The outcome of the vote, following the second round on July 7 and a hasty campaign, remains highly uncertain as three major political blocs are competing: the far-right National Rally, President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist alliance, and the New Popular Front coalition that includes center-left, greens and hard-left forces.

Here’s a closer look:

How does it work? The French system is complex and not proportionate to nationwide support for a party. Legislators are elected by district. A parliamentary candidate requires over 50% of the day’s vote to be elected outright Sunday.

Failing that, the top two contenders, alongside anyone else who won support from more than 12.5% of registered voters, go forward to a second round.

In some cases, three or four people make it to the second round, though some may step aside to improve the chances of another contender — a tactic often used in the past to block far-right candidates.

Key party leaders are expected to unveil their strategy in between the two rounds. This makes the result of the second round highly uncertain, and dependent on political maneuvering and how voters react.

The far-right National Rally, ahead in all preelection opinion polls, hopes to win an absolute majority, or at least 289 out of the 577 seats.

The National Assembly, the lower house, is the more powerful of France’s two houses of parliament. It has the final say in the law-making process over the Senate, dominated by conservatives.

Macron has a presidential mandate until 2027, and said he would not step down before the end of his term.

A person casts their vote at a polling station in the Magenta district during the first round of France's crunch legislative elections in Noumea in the first constituency of the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia, on June 30, 2024. (AFP)

What's cohabitation? If another political force than his centrist alliance gets a majority, Macron will be forced to appoint a prime minister belonging to that new majority.

In such a situation — called "cohabitation" in France — the government would implement policies that diverge from the president’s plan.

France’s modern Republic has experienced three cohabitations, the last one under conservative President Jacques Chirac, with Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, from 1997 to 2002.

The prime minister is accountable to the parliament, leads the government and introduces bills.

"In case of cohabitation, policies implemented are essentially those of the prime minister," political historian Jean Garrigues said.

The president is weakened at home during cohabitation, but still holds some powers over foreign policy, European affairs and defense because he is in charge of negotiating and ratifying international treaties. The president is also the commander-in-chief of the country’s armed forces, and is the one holding the nuclear codes.

"It’s possible for the president to prevent or temporarily suspend the implementation of a certain number of the prime minister’s projects, since he has the power to sign or not sign the government’s ordinances or decrees," Garrigues added.

"Yet the prime minister has the power to submit these ordinances and decrees to a vote of the National Assembly, thus overriding the president’s reluctance," he noted.

A car drives past electoral posters, Thursday, June 27, 2024 in Strasbourg, eastern France. (AP)

Who leads defense and foreign policies? During previous cohabitations, defense and foreign policies were considered the informal "reserved field" of the president, who was usually able to find compromises with the prime minister to allow France to speak with one voice abroad.

Yet today, both the far-right and the leftist coalition's views in these areas differ radically from Macron’s approach and would likely be a subject of tension during a potential cohabitation.

According to the Constitution, while "the president is the head of the military, it's the prime minister who has the armed forces at his disposal," Garrigues said.

"In the diplomatic field also, the president’s perimeter is considerably restricted," Garrigues added.

The National Rally’s president, Jordan Bardella, said that if he were to become prime minister, he would oppose sending French troops to Ukraine — a possibility Macron has not ruled out. Bardella also said he would refuse French deliveries of long-range missiles and other weaponry capable of striking targets within Russia itself.

If the leftist coalition was to win the elections, it could disrupt France's diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.

The New Popular Front's platform plans to "immediately recognize the Palestinian state" and "break with the French government’s guilty support" for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government.

Macron previously argued the recognition of the Palestinian state should take place at a "useful moment," suggesting the Israel-Hamas war doesn't not allow such a move at the moment.

French member of parliament and previous candidate for French presidential election Marine Le Pen (R) attends French extreme right party Rassemblement National (RN, National Front) press conference ahead of legislative elections, Paris, France, 24 June 2024. (EPA)

What happens if there's no majority? The president can name a prime minister from the parliamentary group with the most seats at the National Assembly — this was the case of Macron’s own centrist alliance since 2022.

Yet the National Rally already said it would reject such an option, because it would mean a far-right government could soon be overthrown through a no-confidence vote if other political parties join together.

The president could try to build a broad coalition from the left to the right, an option that sounds unlikely, given the political divergences.

Experts say another complex option would be to appoint "a government of experts" unaffiliated with political parties but which would still need to be accepted by a majority at the National Assembly. Such a government would likely deal mostly with day-to-day affairs rather than implementing major reforms.

If political talks take too long amid summer holidays and the July 26-Aug. 11 Olympics in Paris, Garrigues said a "transition period" is not ruled out, during which Macron's centrist government would "still be in charge of current affairs," pending further decisions.

"Whatever the National Assembly looks like, it seems that the Constitution of the 5th Republic is flexible enough to survive these complex circumstances," Melody Mock-Gruet, a public law expert teaching at Sciences Po Paris, said in a written note. "Institutions are more solid than they appear, even when faced with this experimental exercise."

"Yet there remains another unknown in the equation: the population’s ability to accept the situation," Mock-Gruet wrote.