In Birthplace of Tunisia's Revolution, Few Jobs and Little Hope

The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
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In Birthplace of Tunisia's Revolution, Few Jobs and Little Hope

The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)
The Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid was key in helping to trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world 10 years ago. (AFP)

Khouloud Rhimi sits sipping a latte with friends in Sidi Bouzid, ground zero of the Tunisian uprising, and laments 10 years of disappointment and economic woes.

The town, which helped trigger a wave of revolts across the Arab world, now has a swimming pool, a plush new cafe where young men and women mingle, enjoying the complementary wifi, and freedom of speech.

But Rhimi, 25, is unimpressed. "There are no jobs in Sidi Bouzid," she said.

It was unemployment, along with alleged police harassment, that prompted street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi to set himself alight outside a nearby government building on December 17, 2010.

The act proved a tipping point for Tunisia's long-marginalized interior.

Within weeks, vast demonstrations had spread to the capital and swept long-time ruler Zine El Abidine Ben Ali from power, setting off a domino-like string of revolts across the Middle East and North Africa.

Tunisia has been praised for its democratic transition with its first free and fair parliamentary elections in 2011 and presidential poll in 2014.

But many in Sidi Bouzid say life in the past decade has become worse.

"Lots of people we know have tried to get to Europe," said Rhimi.

"Some have died at sea. Other people have set themselves on fire. Some people can't afford to eat."

Rhimi completed a professional diploma in computer science in 2015.

But in a region where some jobs -- in factories, clothes shops or agriculture, for example -- pay just 150 dinars (46 euros) a month, it took her four years to save start-up funds for a small restaurant.

When she approached banks and micro-credit lenders for more, she was rejected.

"There are so many conditions. They make it really difficult to get a loan," she said.

"I started my project, but after six months I closed it down. I've been unemployed ever since," added Rhimi, currently an unpaid volunteer with civil society groups who continues to apply for public sector jobs.

Investors flee
Her story is a far cry from Rachid Fetini's early career.

In 1990, two decades before the revolution, he returned from studying in France and established his first textile factory.

"I had no experience in the world of business," he said. "But in one month I managed to set up a factory with 50 workers. After a year and a half, I had 300 staff."

By the eve of the uprising, Fetini was a major employer with 500 staff.

But "after the revolution, bit by bit, all my clients fled Sidi Bouzid," he said. "They were afraid."

Fetini bemoaned media coverage of the region as being perennially on strike, "which is not true at all."

But he also blamed the lack of laws and government strategies to boost investment, as well as Tunisia's clunky, politicized bureaucracy.

"There's a fratricidal struggle between political parties, which means that even local officials can't take decisions," he said.

"Nobody dares sign a document without having political cover... just in case."

The coronavirus pandemic dealt another crushing blow to his business.

Today, his factory near the town center sits empty, rows of sewing machines idle in the dusty light.

Across town in an industrial zone, Fetini walks among the dark concrete columns of an abandoned building site, set to be a pharmaceuticals factory.

Like Rhimi's restaurant, the project was suspended because the banks would not lend to the owner, an associate of Fetini.

"Their demands and the guarantees they ask for are endless," Fetini said.

Many investments "are blocked... for lack of finance, or because of certain lobbies who don't want such-and-such a factory to be created."

State projects blocked
A huge, empty plot of land on the fertile plain outside Sidi Bouzid vividly illustrates the problem.

Surrounded by prickly pears and olive groves, this is the site of Somaproc, a processing hub to help the region's struggling farmers tackle a key barrier -- access to markets.

It will include vegetable and livestock markets, an abattoir and a research facility, strategically located near major roads to other Tunisian towns, ports and coastal cities including the capital.

Set to employ 1,200 people and benefit some 130,000, the state-backed project has secured millions of euros in foreign funding and the support of Tunisian President Qais Saied.

But eight years since it was conceived, nothing has been built.

Director Lotfi Hamdi listed legal and administrative obstacles and described a complex web of government bodies involved.

"The project was designed in 2012," he said. "Sadly, there have been a lot of delays."

'Deep crisis'
The Covid-19 pandemic has brought even more economic misery to Tunisia.

Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi, the country's ninth head of government since the revolution, announced in early November a record budget deficit of 14 percent of GDP.

"Our country has never experienced such a deep crisis," he said.

Unemployment in the country was just over 15 percent in May, the most recent figure available, according to the INS national statistics office.

But despite the economic setbacks and other difficulties they have faced, some in Sidi Bouzid still praise the uprising's achievements.

"The revolution was more than necessary, and well overdue," said Hayet Amami, the regional head of an association for unemployed graduates.

Today, "you're free to do activism, in political parties, in society and in unions."

Since 2011, many young Tunisians have been elected to both local and national authorities, in part thanks to a post-revolution quota system.

And despite the hardships, there are visible changes in Sidi Bouzid -- including the cafe where Rhimi sat with her friends.

Roads have been fixed and government buildings refurbished.

But for Rhimi's friend Hanin Kadri, also an activist, those changes mean little when jobs are scarce and state institutions riddled with corruption.

"Sure, they did up the municipality building and the governorate," she said.

"But that's not what we had a revolution for."

Rhimi is more emphatic.

"As far as I'm concerned, the revolution didn't bring me anything," she said.



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.