Egypt and the 'Arab Spring' … A Decade of Social, Political Change

Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. (Getty Images)
Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. (Getty Images)
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Egypt and the 'Arab Spring' … A Decade of Social, Political Change

Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. (Getty Images)
Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. (Getty Images)

Two ousted presidents, thousands of civilian and military victims and wounded, three presidential and parliamentary elections, constitutional declarations without a vote, deep constitutional reform after a referendum, security calm after unrest and a neighbor that cannot find peace.

This is how the social and political scene took shape in Egypt in ten sometimes dramatic years of tumult as part of the so-called Arab Spring.

The developments began on January 25, 2011 with protest calls for better living conditions, freedom and social justice. They demanded the resignation of longtime President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 30 years, and had taken inspiration from the revolt in Tunisia where the people successfully ousted Zine El Abidine Ben Ali just days earlier.

Egyptians held daily protests with the Tahrir Square in the capital, Cairo, becoming an icon of their movement. Mubarak resigned in February 2011 and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces was entrusted with leading the country. A constitutional referendum was successfully held on March 19 and presidential elections were set for 2012.

Amid the vacuum, the country’s most organized group came to the fore – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamist organization submitted a candidate for the elections and Mohamed Morsi was declared president on June 24, 2012. Instead of a “spring”, the election brought an “Islamist winter” as the Muslim Brotherhood put a halt to the natural course of political events and instead sought to cement its power over various state institutions.

Morsi soon issued a declaration immunizing his decrees from challenge and attempting to protect the work of the constituent assembly drafting the new constitution. Alarmed by the move, national and religious powers withdrew from the committee that was drafting the institution. Despite protests against Morsi, the constitutional referendum went ahead in December 2012, but garnered the support of only 63.8 percent of voters.

The tensions did not end there. The Muslim Brotherhood’s time in power fueled divisions and tensions as the organization continued to make missteps. Popular opposition against the group and Morsi continued to mount and peaked on June 30, 2013 when the army swept in an removed the president from power.

The ouster of the president and the Muslim Brotherhood sparked a wave of violence in the country, including a spate of bombings that targeted important security locations in Cairo and other parts of the country. Other attacks left dozens of soldiers, officers and civilians dead. Muslim Brotherhood supporters also staged protests in the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares despite Morsi’s ouster. In August 2013, the security forces were forced to intervene to disperse the protests. Several demonstrators and members of the security were killed in ensuing violence.

In the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster, Egypt needed a new constitution that would take into account the new reality in the country. The constitution declared by the Muslim Brotherhood had been suspended and a constitutional declaration, announced by then Defense Minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, was in place.

By January 2014, Egyptians approved their new constitution with an overwhelming 98.1 percent during a referendum. Due to his role in toppling the Muslim Brotherhood and meeting the demands of the people, Sisi submitted his candidacy for the presidential elections in March 2014 and would go on to achieve a resounding victory in June.

However, even with the election of a new president, terrorist attacks continued to persist in Egypt. The security instability on the inside were also challenged by unrest in neighboring Libya, which had become a platform for the arrival of gunmen and smuggling of weapons into Egypt. New challenges have also emerged in recent years, with tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the construction of the contentious Nile dam and Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the eastern Mediterranean.

Sisi met the challenges with his resolve to “cement the stability of the state”. He has largely been successful, with terrorist attacks on the decline. As for deep institutional change, the armed forces have been tasked with protecting the constitution and democracy, an added role to their existing duties of protecting the country.



Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
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Yemeni Platform Warns of Houthis Expanding Influence to Horn of Africa

Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)
Yemenis lift placards and flags during a rally in the Houthi-controlled capital Sanaa in solidarity with Palestinians on July 26, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement. (AFP)

A Yemeni platform focused on organized crime and money-laundering, PTOC, has warned of the dangers of the Iran-backed Houthi militias expanding their activities and influence to the Horn of Africa.

In a report, it said the militias were actively seeking to expand their operations there with the direct supervision of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and in coordination with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which is also backed by Tehran.

This is the first time that a report is filed about the Houthi plans in the Horn of Africa.

Asharq Al-Awsat received a copy of the report that details the Houthis’ expansionist plans at Iran’s direction. It discusses the Houthis’ smuggling and armament operations, recruitment and training of Africans, and identifies the officials responsible for the militias’ project in the Horn of Africa.

Overseeing the foreign expansion are leading Houthi officials Abdulwahed Abu Ras, Al-Hassan al-Marrani and Abu Haidar al-Qahoum, as well as head of the so-called security and intelligence agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani and foreign operations agency official Hassan al-Kahlani, or Abu Shaheed.

The report also highlighted the role played by deputy Houthi foreign minister Hussein al-Azzi through diplomatic sources and figures in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya to forge intelligence, security, political and logistical ties.

Training

The report said the Houthis were keen on establishing “sensitive intelligence centers” throughout the Horn of Africa and countries surrounding Yemen. They are working on training cadres “as soon as possible” so that they can be “effectively activated at the right time to achieve the Quranic mission and common interests of all resistance countries, especially Iran, Gaza and Lebanon.”

The report obtained documents that reveal how the Houthis have established ties with African figures to “complete preparations and operations in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa to support the Houthis should they come under any international political or diplomatic pressure.”

Leading officials

The report identified several Houthi figures who are overseeing these operations, starting with IRGC official “Abu Mahdi” to the owner of the smallest boat that is used for smuggling weapons in the Red Sea.

It also spoke of the relations forged with the al-Shabaab al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia and the African mafia to smuggle Africans to Yemen in what the report described as one of the most dangerous human trafficking and organized crimes.

The PTOC report said the Houthis have recruited Africans from various countries, especially in wake of the militias’ coup in Sanaa in 2014. They have been subjected to cultural and military training and deployed at various fronts, such as Taiz, the west coast, Marib and the border.

Some of the recruits have returned to their home countries to expand the Houthi influence there.

Abu Ras and al-Kahlani

The report named Abdulwahed Naji Mohammed Abu Ras, or Abu Hussein, as the Houthis’ top official in expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa. A native of the Jawf province, he was tasked directly by top Iranian political officials and the IRGC in running this file.

Among his major tasks is coordinating with the IRGC and Houthis and directly overseeing the smuggling of IRGC and Hezbollah members from and to Yemen.

Abu Ras has avoided the spotlight for several years during which he has handled the Houthis’ most dangerous intelligence and political files.

He served as secretary of foreign affairs at the security and intelligence agency until Hassan al-Kahlani's appointment to that post. Abu Ras was then promoted to his current position at the recommendation of Houthi leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi and the IRGC leadership.

Al-Kahlani, also known as Abu Shaheed, was born in the Hajjah province in 1984. He is a known Houthi security operative as he grew up among the Houthis in Saada and Sanaa and joined the militias at a young age.

The report said al-Kahlani was part of the Sanaa terrorist cell that carried out several bombings and assassinations in wake of the killing of Houthi founder Hassan al-Houthi in 2004. He was also among the Houthi leaderships that took part in the coup in Sanaa.

Al-Kahlani now works directly under Abu Ras. He is known for his close ties to the IRGC and has been using this relationship to impose himself as the top official in the security and intelligence agency, exposing the struggle for power between him and the actual head of the agency Abdulhakim al-Khiwani.