Egypt and the 'Arab Spring' … A Decade of Social, Political Changehttps://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2689781/egypt-and-arab-spring-%E2%80%A6-decade-social-political-change
Egypt and the 'Arab Spring' … A Decade of Social, Political Change
Tens of thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo’s Tahrir Square in January 2011. (Getty Images)
Two ousted presidents, thousands of civilian and military victims and wounded, three presidential and parliamentary elections, constitutional declarations without a vote, deep constitutional reform after a referendum, security calm after unrest and a neighbor that cannot find peace.
This is how the social and political scene took shape in Egypt in ten sometimes dramatic years of tumult as part of the so-called Arab Spring.
The developments began on January 25, 2011 with protest calls for better living conditions, freedom and social justice. They demanded the resignation of longtime President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 30 years, and had taken inspiration from the revolt in Tunisia where the people successfully ousted Zine El Abidine Ben Ali just days earlier.
Egyptians held daily protests with the Tahrir Square in the capital, Cairo, becoming an icon of their movement. Mubarak resigned in February 2011 and the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces was entrusted with leading the country. A constitutional referendum was successfully held on March 19 and presidential elections were set for 2012.
Amid the vacuum, the country’s most organized group came to the fore – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Islamist organization submitted a candidate for the elections and Mohamed Morsi was declared president on June 24, 2012. Instead of a “spring”, the election brought an “Islamist winter” as the Muslim Brotherhood put a halt to the natural course of political events and instead sought to cement its power over various state institutions.
Morsi soon issued a declaration immunizing his decrees from challenge and attempting to protect the work of the constituent assembly drafting the new constitution. Alarmed by the move, national and religious powers withdrew from the committee that was drafting the institution. Despite protests against Morsi, the constitutional referendum went ahead in December 2012, but garnered the support of only 63.8 percent of voters.
The tensions did not end there. The Muslim Brotherhood’s time in power fueled divisions and tensions as the organization continued to make missteps. Popular opposition against the group and Morsi continued to mount and peaked on June 30, 2013 when the army swept in an removed the president from power.
The ouster of the president and the Muslim Brotherhood sparked a wave of violence in the country, including a spate of bombings that targeted important security locations in Cairo and other parts of the country. Other attacks left dozens of soldiers, officers and civilians dead. Muslim Brotherhood supporters also staged protests in the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares despite Morsi’s ouster. In August 2013, the security forces were forced to intervene to disperse the protests. Several demonstrators and members of the security were killed in ensuing violence.
In the aftermath of Morsi’s ouster, Egypt needed a new constitution that would take into account the new reality in the country. The constitution declared by the Muslim Brotherhood had been suspended and a constitutional declaration, announced by then Defense Minister Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, was in place.
By January 2014, Egyptians approved their new constitution with an overwhelming 98.1 percent during a referendum. Due to his role in toppling the Muslim Brotherhood and meeting the demands of the people, Sisi submitted his candidacy for the presidential elections in March 2014 and would go on to achieve a resounding victory in June.
However, even with the election of a new president, terrorist attacks continued to persist in Egypt. The security instability on the inside were also challenged by unrest in neighboring Libya, which had become a platform for the arrival of gunmen and smuggling of weapons into Egypt. New challenges have also emerged in recent years, with tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the construction of the contentious Nile dam and Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the eastern Mediterranean.
Sisi met the challenges with his resolve to “cement the stability of the state”. He has largely been successful, with terrorist attacks on the decline. As for deep institutional change, the armed forces have been tasked with protecting the constitution and democracy, an added role to their existing duties of protecting the country.
Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafathttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5122443-toufic-sultan-recalls-asharq-al-awsat-mutual-hatred-between-hafez-al-assad-and
Toufic Sultan Recalls to Asharq Al-Awsat Mutual Hatred between Hafez al-Assad and Yasser Arafat
Arafat and Assad during a celebration of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli in 1988. (AFP)
Journalists sometimes hear shocking statements—ones they lock away in their memory, fearing their repercussions. Some are too violent, too damaging, or too costly to repeat. Others risk swift denial from those who made them.
That was the case in late January 1987, when Kuwait hosted the fifth Islamic Summit.
Among the leaders in attendance were Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin Abdulaziz, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, Lebanese President Amin Gemayel, and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat.
I had requested an interview with Arafat, and he agreed to meet. After an exchange of pleasantries, he delivered a series of startling remarks.
“What’s happening in Beirut?” he asked.
“You know the country is grappling with the aftermath of the war of the camps,” I replied.
“No, Ghassan,” he shot back. “This is not the ‘war of the camps.’ The real name is the ‘war on the camps.’ It was personally ordered by Hafez al-Assad. Regrettably, the Amal Movement, led by Nabih Berri, is carrying out the decision, aided—unfortunately—by the Lebanese Army’s Sixth Brigade.”
Arafat must have noticed my surprise at his bluntness, because he raised his voice in anger.
“Assad is trying to finish what Ariel Sharon started in the 1982 invasion but failed to achieve. This is a continuation of Sharon’s mission to eliminate the PLO,” he charged.
Veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan speaks to Asharq Al-Awsat. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Assad: A Souk Al-Hamidiya merchant
I pointed out that his accusations were grave, targeting Syria’s head of state. His frustration only grew.
“Assad is not Syria’s president,” Arafat fumed.
“He is a merchant from Souk al-Hamidiya. If only he focused on reclaiming the Golan instead of blocking Palestinian independence to please America and Israel. Mark my words: time will prove me right. Hafez al-Assad does not recognize Palestine, nor Lebanon. He loathes Iraq under the guise of hating Saddam Hussein.”
Stunned, I listened as he went on.
“What they call an ‘uprising’ within Fatah is a conspiracy orchestrated by Assad and funded by [Libyan leader Moammar] al-Gaddafi. Assad’s only dream is to turn the Palestinian cause into a bargaining chip and to dominate Lebanon.”
As Arafat’s anger subsided, our conversation shifted to other topics.
A few days ago, I met with veteran Lebanese politician Toufic Sultan—a man who carries the collective memory of two cities. Born in Tripoli, he has also witnessed Beirut’s political twists and turns, having been a close associate of Kamal Jumblatt and his son, Walid, as well as former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and his son, Saad.
He maintained ties with Arafat and participated in meetings with Assad and other Arab leaders. His recollections are rich with pivotal moments, particularly from his time as deputy leader of the National Movement, a coalition of leftist and nationalist forces led by Kamal Jumblatt.
Rocky start: Assad and Arafat’s strained relationship
Arafat’s relationship with Damascus was troubled from the outset. After a bloody internal dispute within Fatah, he was briefly detained in Syria, where the defense minister at the time was Hafez al-Assad.
Following the violent clashes between Palestinian factions and the Jordanian army in 1970, Assad came to view the presence of armed Palestinian groups as a source of chaos. This belief shaped his stance toward Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement for years to come.
Assad grew uneasy when Palestinian factions relocated to Beirut and forged a broad alliance with Lebanon’s leftist parties and nationalist forces. He closely monitored Arafat’s rise as the dominant player on the Lebanese scene.
Despite Syria’s attempts to control the Palestinian file, Damascus struggled to rein in Fatah’s overwhelming influence and Arafat’s growing stature. His power extended to Lebanon’s southern border with Israel, where he effectively held decision-making authority.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Sultan recalled: “Hafez al-Assad never truly respected the idea of Palestinian resistance. I heard it from him directly and from those around him. His prevailing view was that there was no real resistance—just armed groups operating in coordination with intelligence agencies. The divide between Assad and Arafat was clear from the start.”
Sultan recounted an episode that underscored the deep divide between Assad and Arafat.
“One day, Assad told Arafat that Palestine did not exist—it was simply southern Syria. Arafat fired back, saying there was no such thing as Syria, only northern Palestine. There was an attempt to mask the exchange with humor, but the reality was that Assad genuinely viewed the issue through this lens,” Sultan said.
He explained that several Arab regimes sought to control the Palestinian cause, hoping to benefit from it without bearing its consequences.
“From the Baathist perspective, both in Baghdad and Damascus, there was a belief that the issue was too significant for the PLO to unilaterally determine its fate.”
Crackdown on Palestinian media
Sultan recalled a particularly tense moment in the PLO’s relationship with the Syrian regime.
“The organization operated a radio station in Syria. One day, it aired a segment quoting Arafat, including the phrase ‘There is water in my mouth’—a cryptic remark hinting at unspoken grievances. Syrian authorities responded swiftly, sending bulldozers to demolish the station and arresting several staff members.”
That night, Palestinian officials approached Sultan, urging him to speak with Kamal Jumblatt.
“Jumblatt suggested we arrange a meeting with Assad. It was Ramadan, so I contacted Hikmat al-Shihabi, then head of Syrian intelligence and our liaison,” recalled Sultan.
As the meeting neared sunset, Jumblatt sat across from Assad, with Sultan seated beside the Syrian president. The discussion quickly turned hostile toward Arafat.
“The conversation was filled with insults. Phrases like ‘We’ll bring him in’—implying they’d arrest him—and ‘We’ll flip him over’—a reference to how prisoners were beaten—were thrown around. Jumblatt, always polite and measured, stopped eating. Sensing his discomfort, Assad turned to me and asked me to intervene.”
Sultan responded: “Mr. President, the Palestinian fighters are not our schoolmates. We are committed to the Palestinian cause, and today, the PLO and Arafat represent that cause. These men have endured extreme hardships.”
Assad listened and then conceded: “Abu Rashid is right. Consider it settled, Kamal Bey.” The detainees were subsequently released.
A meeting between Kamal Jumblatt and Arafat attended by Toufic Sultan, George Hawi, Mohsen Ibrahim, and Yasser Abed Rabbo. (Courtesy of Toufic Sultan)
Deep-seated mutual hatred
Asked whether the animosity between Assad and Arafat was evident at the time, Sultan did not hesitate.
“Of course. It was well known,” he said. “One way to ingratiate oneself with Assad was to openly attack Arafat.”
He recalled a meeting with Walid Jumblatt, Assem Kanso—the head of Lebanon’s Baath Party—and Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam.
“When Arafat’s name came up, Khaddam abruptly declared, ‘Yasser Arafat is an Israeli spy.’ I remained silent. He turned to me and asked for my opinion. I simply said, ‘I heard you.’”
Khaddam pressed further: “What do you think?”
Sultan replied: “I respect your opinion, and this is your office. But if you want my honest view, it won’t please you.”
The atmosphere surrounding Assad was particularly hostile toward Fatah. Syrian authorities used every means at their disposal to infiltrate the group.
After years of effort, they succeeded in orchestrating major defections, the most notable led by Abu Saleh, Abu Musa, and Abu Khaled al-Omleh. Damascus provided these factions with logistical support, training camps, and other resources.
“Syria had the power to shrink or amplify political movements,” remembered Sultan.
Despite knowing that geography gave Assad a strategic advantage, Arafat was not an easy adversary.
He countered Syria’s animosity with his trademark defiance—flashing the victory sign and invoking phrases like “the Palestinian bloodbath” and “the longest Arab-Israeli war.”
These references underscored the resilience of Palestinian fighters and their Lebanese allies during Israel’s 1982 siege of Beirut, led by then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon.
At the time, many believed that Arafat’s relentless emphasis on “independent Palestinian decision-making” was aimed more at Assad than at any other party.
Damascus, in turn, saw Arafat as dismissive of the sacrifices made by the Syrian army during Israel’s invasion of Beirut.
Syrian officials also suspected that he was waiting for an opportunity to join peace negotiations with Israel—an option that had eluded him after he failed to follow in the footsteps of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the late 1970s.
