Syria to Receive Russian, Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines in April

Children wearing masks inside the classroom in one of Syria’s schools. (File photo: Reuters)
Children wearing masks inside the classroom in one of Syria’s schools. (File photo: Reuters)
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Syria to Receive Russian, Chinese COVID-19 Vaccines in April

Children wearing masks inside the classroom in one of Syria’s schools. (File photo: Reuters)
Children wearing masks inside the classroom in one of Syria’s schools. (File photo: Reuters)

The Chinese and Russian coronavirus vaccines are expected to arrive in Syria in April, announced the head of the Syrian Doctors Syndicate, Kamal Assad Amer.

Amer stated that the government has devised a plan to start administering the vaccine next April, and additional quantities will be ordered later if needed, based on the plan of the Health Ministry.

The plan aims to bring two million doses with a priority to the front liners, such as medical teams and doctors.

Over the past few months, authorities confirmed that 100 doctors had died after contracting the COVID-19 infection, while about 30 others died of various diseases or suspected coronavirus cases.

Most of the doctors who died were between 50 and 60 years old, with the majority of them in Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs, according to a previous statement issued by the Doctors Syndicate.

The statement also indicated that many medical staffers contracted the coronavirus and were treated inside the country, without specifying the exact number.

A week ago, the government approved a mechanism devised by the Health Ministry to import coronavirus vaccines.

Syria is one of the 92 countries that will receive the vaccines as part of an economic aid initiative launched by COVAX.

COVAX is a global initiative launched by the World Health Organization and the Vaccine Alliance to ensure rapid and equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, targeting up to 20 percent of the world population in all member countries.

The program concluded agreements to access two billion doses of several vaccine candidates, provided that the first doses will start arriving in mid-February.

Earlier, Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad expressed Damascus's hope to obtain the Russian vaccine for free when starting negotiations with Moscow to buy the vaccine.

The Syrian people have more confidence in Russian vaccines than Pfizer and other vaccines, he announced, adding: “We are confident that the Russian people are generous enough to take these aspects into consideration, especially amid the exceptional economic and social circumstances that Syria is going through.”



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.