Baghdad Blasts Expose Gaps in Iraq's Strained Military

Security forces stand guard after twin suicide blasts in Baghdad on January 21, 2021. (AFP)
Security forces stand guard after twin suicide blasts in Baghdad on January 21, 2021. (AFP)
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Baghdad Blasts Expose Gaps in Iraq's Strained Military

Security forces stand guard after twin suicide blasts in Baghdad on January 21, 2021. (AFP)
Security forces stand guard after twin suicide blasts in Baghdad on January 21, 2021. (AFP)

Twin suicide blasts in Baghdad claimed by the ISIS group have exposed gaps within Iraq's security forces, weakened by the Covid-19 pandemic, rival armed groups and political tensions, reported AFP.

At least 32 people were killed and more than 100 wounded in the double-tap suicide attack that targeted a commercial district in Baghdad on Thursday.

It was the deadliest attack in three years in the capital, which has been relatively calm since ISIS's territorial defeat in late 2017.

But it has also illustrated accumulating shortfalls in Iraq's patchwork of security forces, experts said.

"ISIS isn't coming back. The fact that this is news shows how good the situation has become compared to the past," said Jack Watling, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

"But there are some very clear problems in the Iraqi security sector, and this is reflective of that."

Following the US-led invasion in 2003, Iraq's security forces had to be effectively rebuilt from the ground up, relying heavily on training by foreign armies.

The Covid-19 pandemic put an abrupt halt to that.

Living together at bases with little social distancing, Iraqi troops were some of the country's first coronavirus victims.

In March 2020, the US-led coalition announced it was pulling out foreign trainers to stem the pandemic's spread.

"The decreased training over the past year because of Covid-19 (created) a gap there," a top US official in Baghdad told AFP last month.

It also meant Iraq's security services had decreased access to the coalition's communications surveillance -- "an early warning system" that was crucial to nipping ISIS attacks in the bud, said Watling.

'Gap to exploit'
Many of those withdrawals became permanent.

The US-led coalition announced last year that Iraq's army was capable of fighting ISIS remnants on its own and pulled out of eight bases across the country.

At the same time, citing the improving security situation, Baghdad's authorities lifted the concrete blast walls and checkpoints that had congested the city for years.

Battle-hardened units were moved out of cities to chase down ISIS sleeper cells in rural areas, with less-experienced units taking over urban security.

Security analyst Alex Mello said those rotations combined with less-reliable intelligence may have eventually granted ISIS "a gap to exploit".

The US official said Iraqi forces were at times unwilling to tackle ISIS fighters head-on, allowing small cells to flourish into larger groups.

One coalition air strike near Mosul in December killed 42 ISIS extremists -- an unusually large number.

"The senior commanders in Baghdad were extremely angry at the local forces. They had to know those guys were there," the US official said.

But the core challenge may not be technical.

Iraq's security forces include army troops, militarized police units and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a network of armed forces incorporated into the state after 2014.

Many were backed by Iran, which generated a mutual distrust with some forces trained by its arch enemy, the United States.

Tensions spiked following the US drone strike last year that killed top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and PMF deputy chief, Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

"The real strain has been political," said Watling.

"During the fight against ISIS, there was a lot of informal information sharing between the PMF, the coalition and others. That's just not there anymore, which reduces situational awareness," he said.

'No one is clean'
Navigating those tensions has been a major challenge for Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi.

He rose to the premiership in May while retaining his previous post as head of Iraq's intelligence service.

Kadhimi has relied heavily on the US-trained Counter-Terrorism Service for a range of missions: hunting down ISIS cells, arresting corrupt officials and even reigning in groups launching rockets on the US embassy.

Observers say it is because he trusts so few other units.

But it has also forced the CTS into uncomfortable confrontations with pro-Iran factions that have often ended with the former backing down.

"Constantly retreating on orders and apologizing to the targeted groups only weakens the CTS, the commander-in-chief, and the Iraqi state," said Marsin Alshamary, a Brookings Institute research fellow.

Following Thursday's attack, Kadhimi announced an overhaul of Iraq's security leadership, including a new federal police commander and chief of the elite Falcons Unit.

Kadhimi is hoping those changes will not only plug holes that Thursday's attackers exploited, but could also resolve the deeper issues of trust and coordination.

But observers were skeptical of how far that could go given widespread graft in Iraq's security forces.

"When you're dealing with a corrupt bureaucracy, no one is clean," said Watling.



Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
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Iran’s Centrifuges: The Long Road Towards a Nuclear Bomb

This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)
This photo released on Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP, File)

The UN nuclear agency has confirmed that Iran plans to install around 6,000 new centrifuges to enrich uranium, according to a report seen by AFP on Friday.

“Iran informed the Agency that it intended to feed” around 6,000 centrifuges at its sites in Fordo and Natanz to enrich uranium to up to five percent, higher than the 3.67 percent limit Tehran had agreed to in 2015.

The Iranian decision came in response to a resolution adopted on November 21 by the UN nuclear watchdog that censures Tehran for what the agency called lack of cooperation.

On Thursday, Iran had threatened to end its ban on acquiring nuclear weapons if Western sanctions are reimposed.

The country’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, said in an interview that the nuclear debate inside Iran is likely to shift towards the possession of its own weapons if the west goes ahead with a threat to reimpose all UN sanctions,

What are centrifuges?

They are precise devices with cylinders that rotate much faster than the speed of sound, to collect enriched uranium atoms.

To explain how centrifugation works, rotating cylinders are much like medical laboratory equipment used to test blood.

The high rotation speeds exert a rotational force that separates the various components of blood as a function of their density and quantity in the sample.

In the case of uranium, the centrifuge operates using the familiar principle of centrifugal force. This force separates two gases of unequal masses in a spinning cylinder or tube. The heavier uranium-238 isotope collects at the outer edges of the cylinder while the lighter uranium-235 collects near the axis of rotation at the center.

Around 20 kg of uranium enriched to a 90% purity level would be needed for a single nuclear weapon. It would take about 1,500 SWU to produce a weapon-equivalent of 90 percent-enriched uranium from this enriched uranium.

At Fordo, Iran is currently using the two only operating cascades of IR-6 centrifuges there to enrich to 60% from 20%.

There are 1,044 centrifuges active at the Fordo uranium enrichment plant, Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian said.

He had earlier asked the Iran Atomic Energy Agency to begin inserting uranium gas into newly activated advanced centrifuges.

Early this month, a spokesperson for the US State Department said Iran's expansion of uranium enrichment activities in defiance of key nuclear commitments is "a big step in the wrong direction”.

His statement came after Tehran announced it would start injecting uranium gas into centrifuges at Fordo.

Dispute

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in 2015 between Tehran and Western countries, says advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment could operate until January 2027.

The difference between the first generation of centrifuges (IR-1) and the other generations is speed. The latest generation, IR-6, could enrich uranium up to 10 times faster than the first-generation IR-1, according to Iranian officials.

During the heyday of its nuclear program, Iran operated a total of 10,204 first-generation IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz and Fordo facilities. But under the deal, Iran's commitments included operating no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges for a period of 10 years.

Although the centrifuges that Iran installed before the 2015 nuclear deal were of the first generation, Tehran’s recent uranium enrichment activity at nuclear sites has reached disturbingly advanced levels, potentially increasing the nuclear proliferation risk.

Major centrifuge activities in Iran

May 2008: Iran installed several centrifuges including more modern models.

March 2012: Iranian media announced 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.

August 2012: The International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran had installed large parts of the centrifuges at Fordo.

November 2012: An IAEA report confirmed that all advanced centrifuges had been installed at Fordo, although there were only four working centrifuges, and another four fully equipped, vacuum tested, and ready to go.

February 2013: IAEA says Iran has operated 12,699 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz site.

June 2018: Iran’s supreme leader revealed Tuesday that it ultimately wants 190,000 nuclear centrifuges — a figure 30 times higher than world powers allowed under the 2015 deal.

September 2019: Iran mounted 22 IR-4, one IR-5, 30 IR-6, and three IR-6 for testing, outside the treaty boundaries.

September 2019: Iran announced it started operating advanced and fast centrifuges to enrich uranium.

November 2024: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announces that his country will operate several thousand advanced centrifuges.

November 2024: Iranian state television broadcasts AEOI Chief Mohammad Eslami announcing that “gasification of a few thousands of new generation centrifuges has been started.”