Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
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Putin’s Envoy, Syria’s Assad Hold ‘Secret Meeting’ on Political, Military Arrangements

Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)
Lavrentiev meets with Bashar Assad in Damascus in October. (Syrian presidency)

The Kremlin's special envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, who frequently travels Damascus, carried out a secret visit to the Syrian capital at the end of last week. Accompanied by “senior generals”, he met with president Bashar Assad, but why didn’t Moscow announce such a trip?

The obvious reason was because the Syrian Constitutional Committee was meeting in Geneva and because Damascus and Moscow are still trying to bridge the divide between them. The deeper reason has to do with the understandings in the Idlib province and ensuring that they hold amid the deteriorating military situation in southern and northeastern Syria. It is imperative that the ceasefire hold with the arrival of Joe Biden to the White House and as Syria prepares to hold presidential elections in July. Russia strongly supports the elections and wants it to serve as a turning point for Damascus’ ties with other countries.

Converging views
After meeting Assad in Damascus, Lavrentiev headed to Geneva to follow up on the Constitutional Committee talks. He also met with the “guarantors” of the Astana process and United Nations envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen.

The guarantors – Russia, Iran and Turkey – appeared to be on the same page regarding the developments in war-torn country. Their assessment of the Constitutional Committee talks was the same, with the three countries emphasizing the need that they continue despite the slow pace of work and failure to reach a breakthrough. They stressed the need to commit to this “political accomplishment”, refusing to set a timeframe for it to complete its work. The process, they said, is a purely “Syrian affair led by Syrian figures.”

Before their meeting, the guarantors assessed the results of the fifth round of the five-day constitutional talks, which amounted to a “cultural seminar” and not political negotiations, which are their main purpose.

The government delegation continued to stall by demanding “more discussions and preparations” before beginning to “draft the constitution.” It sought more talks on sovereignty, Syria’s borders, national symbols, Arabism, a secular state, decentralized governance and a stance on “Turkish and American occupation.”

Head of the opposition delegation, which lost its Moscow and Cairo platform representatives, had traveled to Geneva with the conviction that talks would get underway over the drafting of the principles of the constitution and reaching an agreement on the work mechanisms of the future committee talks.

Pedersen watched the disputes unfold, relaying his observations to the guarantors. At the end of the committee talks, he frankly spoke to the media about his disappointment with their failure to make any progress. The envoy, who is known for choosing his words well, was on the verge of openly blaming the government for the failure. Both delegations submitted documents with their proposals, with the government representative rejecting the opposition’s suggestions, to the envoy’s dismay.

Significantly, Pedersen did not set a meeting for the next round of committee talks. Rather, he opted to omit the date in an effort to exert some pressure on Moscow and Damascus to reach a “complete deal” that includes a date for the next round, work mechanisms, the drafting of the constitution and coordinating stances between the government and opposition delegations.

Military arrangements
Lavrentiev, meanwhile, was observing the gap widen between Syrian parties and the rapprochement between the three guarantors. He is aware that France is seeking to declare the failure of the Constitutional Committee and that the Biden administration is pushing for achieving political legitimacy to its Kurdish allies. He is also aware of the pressure being exerted on Pedersen to explore new options to implement UN Security Council resolution 2254. Damascus was supposed to play a more cooperative role, at least on the surface, which prompted his visit to the Syrian capital. The trip, however, was also related to developments on the ground and gains sought by the Russian army.

The frontlines remain unchanged in Idlib due to the understandings between Moscow and Ankara, but three fronts are heating up in other parts of Syria: Daraa, Sweida and al-Hasakeh.

In the western Daraa region, generals at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase attempted to mediate between the local negotiations committee and the Fourth Armored Division, of Bashar’s brother Maher, to reach an understanding that would avert a military operation against Tafas. Talks have stalled and deadlines have ended to reach an understanding in a region that is subject to the 2018 American-Russian agreements, with Israeli approval. These agreements were drafted by officials from the Barack Obama administration, and who are now part of Biden’s administration.

The predominantly Druze region of Sweida, meanwhile, is no stranger to tensions. This is the first time however that its grievances are so openly laid bare. Reports have said that head of the military security branch, Louay al-Ali, had insulted Druze spiritual leader Bahjat al-Hajri. Other reports said that Hajri had demanded an “official apology” and Ali’s dismissal. Another significant report said that Hajri and Bashar Assad had also held talks. That report was not officially announced, but pro-Damascus media confirmed that “Assad had inquired about Sheikh Hajri’s health, underscoring national unity.” He was also quoted as saying that the “offender only represents himself.” Ali was later allegedly sacked and replaced by Ayman Mohammed.

None of these developments were officially declared. Local sources in Sweida said that these issues go beyond the province’s borders. They explained that Damascus’ seeming “leniency and exposure of the tensions was prompted by Russia in an effort to win over the residents and factions of Sweida and steer them away from Iran and Hezbollah’s influence.” Tehran and the party are trying to impose their presence in the area, which diplomats believe will harm the greater picture in terms of relations between Washington, Moscow and Tel Aviv in their approach towards Iran.

In the northern Hasakeh region, tensions are high between the forces of the Kurdish autonomous administration and the regime. The Kurdish forces have surrounded Damascus’ troops in the “security zone” in Hasakeh, prompting the regime to retaliate by surrounding Kurds in Aleppo and Qamishli.

The Russian officers in Hmeimim again intervened to contain the tensions. They achieved some breakthroughs by persuading both sides to carry out a prisoner swap. However, tensions continue to persist. Taking in the broader picture, the situation in Hasakeh will weigh on relations between Moscow, Washington and Ankara. The situation does not bode well for Turkey because Biden has appointed officials to his administration who sympathize with the Kurds, have been hurt by Russia and are suspicious of Ankara.

Western officials believe that the abovementioned issues were on the table during the Syrian-Russian talks. Some were addressed during Lavrentiev’s visit. Damascus, meanwhile, continues to escalate its rhetoric against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and western sanctions as it prepares to hold the presidential elections in the summer. At the same time, it is mending relations with its “old allies”, demonstrated in Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad’s telephone talks with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, and the condemnation of the “illegal economic sanctions.”



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.