Tunisia Parties Announce National Conference to ‘Salvage’ the Country

Tunisians demonstrate in front of the Court of First Instance, demanding the release of those arrested during recent demonstrations in Tunis, Tunisia, 17 February 2021. EPA/MOHAMED MESSARA
Tunisians demonstrate in front of the Court of First Instance, demanding the release of those arrested during recent demonstrations in Tunis, Tunisia, 17 February 2021. EPA/MOHAMED MESSARA
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Tunisia Parties Announce National Conference to ‘Salvage’ the Country

Tunisians demonstrate in front of the Court of First Instance, demanding the release of those arrested during recent demonstrations in Tunis, Tunisia, 17 February 2021. EPA/MOHAMED MESSARA
Tunisians demonstrate in front of the Court of First Instance, demanding the release of those arrested during recent demonstrations in Tunis, Tunisia, 17 February 2021. EPA/MOHAMED MESSARA

General coordinator of the Tunisian opposition’s Soumoud Coalition Hussam Al-Hami has revealed plans to hold a “popular national conference” by July as an attempt to “salvage” the country.

The conference would follow local and regional conferences, in addition to economic, political and social workshops in cooperation with national organizations, associations and parties.

Its purpose is to come out with practical recommendations to resolve Tunisia’s crises.

The revelation was made during a meeting held by representatives of parties, associations and organizations in Tunis on Wednesday to discuss preparations for the conference and to present their initial visions on it.

Hami told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that the conference would bring together all civil society components for proposals on Tunisia’s main issues, and to find solutions to the economic, social and political crises in the country.

He hoped that parties working on reform programs for years would consider the conference as an “opportunity” to press for their demands.

The session was attended by partisans and politicians, mostly from the left-wing, in addition to deputies, syndicate figures and representatives of associations.

In a related matter, head of Ennahda Movement's Shura Council Abdelkarim Harouni called for Prime Minister Hisham Al-Mashishi to chair a political dialogue among parties and organizations to overcome the political deadlock caused by the dispute between the two heads of the executive authority.

For his part, Mashishi approved a cabinet reshuffle that includes 11 portfolios to hinder any potential coalition between the president and the Tunisian General Labor Union.

A constitutional crisis erupted when the president rejected this amendment.



Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
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Netanyahu’s Messages: Beyond Türkiye, Closer to Tel Aviv

Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 
Men inspect the site of an Israeli airstrike on Thursday morning, following the bombing in southern Hama Province (AFP). 

Following a series of intensified Israeli airstrikes on Damascus and the airports in Homs and Hama, as well as a ground incursion into the city of Nawa near Daraa, Israeli officials on Thursday escalated their rhetoric, issuing fresh threats to the Syrian leadership and warning of further military action—this time citing concerns over Turkish military activity in the region.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar voiced particular alarm over Türkiye’s growing role in Syria, Lebanon, and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in Paris, he said: “They are doing everything they can to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. That is clearly their intention.”

Defense Minister Israel Katz echoed this sentiment, stating that Israel “will not allow Damascus to become a security threat” to Israel.

Rising Concern Over Türkiye’s Military Footprint in Syria

Military officials in Tel Aviv confirm that Israel sees Türkiye’s growing military presence in Syria as a serious concern. Their fear stems from two key issues: first, Ankara’s reported efforts to rebuild the Syrian army along the lines of its own modernized military model; and second, its apparent goal of establishing a long-term military foothold inside Syrian territory.

Israeli defense sources point out that Türkiye’s armed forces operate based on a traditional ground warfare doctrine, featuring large-scale armored divisions and well-equipped infantry units—similar in style to the Russian military. This stands in contrast to the Israeli military, which relies heavily on air superiority and has long underinvested in ground forces.

Given this disparity, any significant Turkish deployment in Syria could pose a direct challenge to Israeli operations and raise the risk of confrontation.

While the recent Israeli airstrikes targeted mostly long-defunct Syrian military sites—many of which have been hit repeatedly over the years—the attacks signal a broader strategic shift.

In the wake of the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel, the Israeli military has moved away from a defensive posture of deterrence and containment. In its place, the army has embraced a more aggressive doctrine built around preemptive action.

This shift was further underscored by the appointment of a new chief of staff from the Armored Corps—the first in three decades—signaling a renewed emphasis on ground operations and offensive initiatives.

Not Just a Message to Türkiye

Despite the messaging around Türkiye’s presence, analysts say the recent wave of Israeli military action also serves broader geopolitical aims.

After failing to persuade Washington to pressure Ankara to scale back its involvement in Syria, Israel now appears determined to assert its own red lines militarily. The airstrike on the Scientific Studies and Research Center in Damascus—a facility already destroyed multiple times since 2018—was widely viewed as symbolic.

Israeli officials say the intended audience for that particular strike was Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa, whom Israeli intelligence continues to refer to by his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. By launching the attack during the Eid al-Fitr holiday, Israel aimed to send a clear message: there will be no return to normalcy in Syria without accounting for Israeli interests.

Among those interests is normalization. Last month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his desire to see Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic ties with Israel.

Hardline figures within Netanyahu’s coalition believe Israel currently holds a strategic upper hand. As right-wing think tank head Meir Ben-Shabbat recently wrote: “Israel is in its strongest position ever. It is transforming the Middle East, expanding its military capabilities, and pushing back the Iranian axis—while Syria is at its weakest.”

For many in Israel’s ruling right, this is an ideal moment to push for a peace agreement with Syria, possibly even one involving Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Golan Heights.

The Real Audience: Domestic Israel

Still, perhaps the most significant message behind the military campaign is directed not at Ankara, Damascus, or even Tehran—but at Tel Aviv.

As protests against Netanyahu’s leadership have grown louder in recent months, military escalation has served as a convenient political shield. The wars in Gaza, the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon dominate public attention and have largely sidelined anti-government demonstrations.

“Netanyahu’s government must go, but we won’t take to the streets while our sons are fighting,” has become a common refrain among many Israelis who oppose his leadership but remain reluctant to protest during wartime.

By maintaining a state of conflict, Netanyahu is not only securing his coalition’s survival but also enabling his allies to advance a hardline agenda—particularly on the Palestinian issue—that would have faced greater resistance in peacetime.

Critics warn that this strategy, while politically expedient, comes at a steep cost to Israel’s democratic institutions, its judiciary, and the long-term stability of the region.