US ‘Conditional Proposal’ to Assad and Netanyahu 2011: Abandon Iran in Exchange for Restoring Golan

Asharq Al-Awsat reveals details of last chapter in negotiations between Syria and Israel

President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
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US ‘Conditional Proposal’ to Assad and Netanyahu 2011: Abandon Iran in Exchange for Restoring Golan

President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo
President Bashar Assad meets with John Kerry when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Nov, 8, 2010. AP file photo

Syria and Israel, through American mediation, were on the verge of signing a peace agreement in February 2011, just before the “Arab Spring” protests broke out. The American mediator drafted an agreement that “went further than any previous document.” It included Damascus’ pledge to sever “military ties” with Iran and the Hezbollah party in Lebanon and “neutralizing” any Israeli threat, in exchange for its reclaiming of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, based on the June 4, 1967 border.

This was confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat by officials who were involved in the negotiations, which were held by Syrian President Bashar Assad and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and mediated by American envoy Frederic Hof. The negotiations also included at least two meetings with the participation of late Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem, legal advisor Riad Daoudi and former US Ambassador to Damascus Robert Ford. Then US President Barack Obama and his Vice President Joe Biden, the current president, were aware of these secret negotiations, which ex-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was also heavily involved in. No official statement over these negotiations was made by Damascus, which has long expressed its commitment to restoring all Golan territories and maintaining the “strategic relationship with Iran”.

Enticing offer

Former US Secretary of State John Kerry shed light on the secret talks. In his book “Every Day Is Extra”, he revealed that Assad had sent Obama a proposal to establish peace with Israel. When informed of the proposal, Netanyahu was very surprised with it. Kerry revealed that when he served as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he visited Damascus in 2009 where he met with Assad to tackle a number of issues including a peace deal with Israel given that previous attempts by the governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Ehud Barak and Netanyahu (1996-1999) ended in failure.

Kerry wrote: “Assad asked me what it would take to enter into serious peace negotiations [with Israel], in the hope of securing return of the Golan Heights, which Syria had lost to Israel in 1967. I told him that if he were serious, he should make a private proposal.”

“He asked what it would look like. I shared my thoughts. He instructed his top aide to draft a letter from Assad to President Obama,” he added. Assad, in his letter, had asked Obama to sponsor a fresh round of Syria-Israel peace talks, expressing his readiness “to take a number of steps in exchange for the return of the Golan from Israel”.

The next day, Kerry flew to Israel where he met with Netanyahu, who had returned to power. Netanyahu, recalled Kerry “was surprised that Assad was willing to go that far, significantly further than he’d been willing to go [previously].”

Kerry said that after meeting with Netanyahu, he returned to Washington with the “Assad offer”. The Obama administration tried to test the extent of the Syrian president’s seriousness by demanding “confidence-building measures” towards the US and Israel, including stopping some arms shipments to Hezbollah, which did not happen.

“I remember hearing that Assad was continuing with exactly the kind of behavior on Hezbollah that we told him needed to stop. It was disappointing but unsurprising,” wrote Kerry.

Iranian strikes

With the launch of peace negotiations in wake of the 1991 Madrid peace conference, overtures between Syria and Israel were made and peaked when Rabin held the so-called “four-legged table” negotiations. They focused on the withdrawal, peace relations, security arrangements and the timetable. Meetings included the Syrian and Israeli chiefs of staff, as well as secret and open negotiations that covered a commitment towards a “complete withdrawal” from the Golan and studying the possibility of “establishing normal peace relations”, security arrangements and opening embassies and border gates along the June 4, 1967 border.

After Rabin was assassinated in November 1995, Peres tried to “soar in the sky with a peace deal with Syria”, rushing to hold negotiations to reach a treaty. Indeed, in early 1996 bilateral negotiations were held but they collapsed after a series of suicide attacks in Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Jerusalem.

At the time, the Israeli delegation informed its Syrian counterpart during talks in the US that “Iran is behind the attacks because it wants the negotiations to fail” and that “Syria must condemn the terrorist operations,” revealed an informed source. The negotiations ultimately collapsed and Peres launched Operation Grapes of Wrath in Lebanon, which marked the end of his time in government.

Netanyahu then came to power in 1996. Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad “negotiated” with him through an American mediator, businessman Ronald Lauder, over a “very advanced” detailed agreement in 1998. Netanyahu was succeeded by Ehud Barak, who resumed the negotiations and held a meeting with former Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. The talks were sponsored by former US President Bill Clinton. Barak offered an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan towards the June 4 border in exchange for peace and security arrangements. Intense work meetings were held in Shepherdstown near Washington, with attention focused on the thorny water file. The Israelis said that the issue was a “red line” and the Americans offered a “working paper” equivalent to a draft peace treaty.

In early 2000, Barak informed the Americans at the conclusion of another round of negotiations that he could not strike a peace deal because of the “complicated internal situation” that demanded he head back to Israel. He pledged to return to Shepherdstown, but never did.

The final shot at negotiations by a then ailing Hafez Assad was made in March 2000 when he met with Clinton in Geneva. Those talks also collapsed after 20 minutes due to a dispute over Syria’s access to the shores of Lake Tiberias and Clinton’s proposal of a map, which was previously rejected by Assad, of the June 4 border and Tiberias shore.

President Bashar Assad came to power in mid-2000. When Syria was confronted with international isolation following the assassination of Lebanese former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005, Damascus started to show some flexibility in its desire to hold negotiations with Tel Aviv. It sought to “end the isolation imposed by Washington by holding negotiations with Tel Aviv.” Turkey sponsored the talks, which were held in 2008. The discussions were advanced enough to begin considering the possibility of arranging direct telephone negotiations between Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Assad and then Israeli PM Ehud Olmert in late 2008. The efforts collapsed when Israel launched an operation against the Gaza Strip in December of that year.

The European and American isolation eventually ended. Robert Ford was then appointed ambassador to Damascus in 2010. Washington built on previous efforts, including those exerted by Ankara, and on the Obama administration’s desire to activate the peace path. To that end, it had appointed envoy George Mitchell to test the waters in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, which remained secret and whom very few figures in each of the involved countries knew about.

On the American side, everyone from Obama, Biden, Clinton, national security advisor Tom Donilon, American Ambassador to Tel Aviv Dan Shapiro and Ford in Damascus knew of the talks. On the Syrian side, the officials who were informed of the talks, in varying degrees, included Assad, Muallem and Daoudi. The latter two had held rounds of talks with Hof and Ford. In Israel, Hof’s meetings were limited to Netanyahu at the official residence of the prime minister. The meetings were attended by then Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

Assad-Hof

The final meeting held as part of this mediation took place between Assad and Hof on February 28, 2011, at the height of the “Arab Spring” that had ousted regimes in Libya and Egypt and whose protests had started to break out in Damascus. Hof, who had worked on drafting the agreement, recalled that some proposals included Damascus’ abandoning of “military relations” with Tehran and Hezbollah in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from the Golan towards the June 4 border.

Hof is a former US military commander and expert in the demarcation of borders of disputed areas. Back in the early 1990s, he was the first official to draw the June 4 border on the ground. Ford told Asharq Al-Awsat that upon his arrival in Damascus, Hof requested that the ambassador not attend his meeting with Assad. Ford agreed on condition that “that Hof sleep at the ambassador's residence”.

“I telephoned him on an open line so that Syrian intelligence could overhear our conversation. I said, ‘I agree on condition that you and your aide sleep at the ambassador’s residence, so that the Syrians know that we are a single team.’ And this is indeed what happened. Hof later informed me of the details of the meeting, I leave it to him to disclose” what took place during talks with Assad and with the negotiations as a whole.

According to Israeli reports in 2012, Hof’s documents revealed that the negotiations were based on Netanyahu’s readiness to return to the June 4 border, allowing Damascus complete control over the Golan, in exchange for a comprehensive peace deal that includes an Israeli “expectation” that Syria would sever ties with Iran.

Officials who were informed of the talks said Hof was “confident that peace was possible, whereby Assad would end his relations with Iran and Hezbollah and shift his alliances towards America and moderate Arab countries.”

One official told Asharq Al-Awsat: “I did not see the peace agreement draft. It was the beginning of negotiations, not the end.” Another official said: “It was not clear whether the two sides had agreed on a specific timetable or a resolution to the water issue in the Golan. Syria was saying that Israel had no claim over waters beyond the June 4 border. Israel, however, said that even if it could not deploy its military beyond that border, it wanted to maintain logistic presence that would allow it access to the water.”

The water dispute and shore of Tiberias Lake were one of the reasons of the collapse of the Assad-Clinton summit in 2000. Assad at the time had insisted that he wanted to “dip his feet” in the lake, which Barak rejected at the time. In fact, the Israelis paved a road around the shore, making it virtually impossible for the Syrians to access it without a clear agreement.

Some said that the Hof mediation was “conditional-hypothetical”, similar to what had taken place in the mid-1990s when then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher led negotiations by posing “hypothetical” questions to Hafez Assad. “What if Rabin pledged to withdraw fully from the Golan? Are you ready to forge peace (normalize) ties?” At the time, Rabin had placed a “deposit” with Christopher that included the readiness to pullout completely from the Golan if Assad agreed to demands that included peace relations and security arrangements.

One of the officials informed of the Hof mediation said that Netanyahu was “prepared to withdraw completely from the Golan if the Syrians agreed to a peace agreement that includes changing regional approaches and severing ties with Iran.”

A former American official, who is informed of the file, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There can be no doubt on the seriousness. The negotiations were conditional. The Israelis wanted strategic change in the Syrian approach. Syria wanted to reclaim all territories until the June 4 border. A lot of progress had taken place between both sides.”

“America had no doubt over the seriousness of the negotiations. Assad and Netanyahu were serious in finding out how far the other would go,” he added. “Moreover, great progress, more than ever before, was achieved with Netanyahu over the issue of territories. Hof’s meeting with Assad on February 28 gave a clear signal of what Assad could offer.”

The Americans are keen on stressing that the written draft of the agreement was American. “This is important because envoy George Mitchel did not draft any paper between Netanyahu and [Palestinian] President Mahmoud Abbas (Abou Mazen).” The Americans are also keen to stress that no direct Syrian-Israeli meeting had taken place, but the negotiations had been held through Hof.

Confidence-building

The last attempt at negotiations gains importance on the eve of the tenth anniversary of the eruption of the Syrian protests, especially for Moscow, the main player in Syria that is leading a “confidence-building” mediation between Damascus and Tel Aviv. This meditation includes a prisoner swap, repatriating the remains of Israeli soldiers, sponsoring a return to working with the “disengagement agreement” in the Golan of 2018 and keeping Iran and its militias away from southern Syria.

Another area of significance is word that some Arab countries are interested in opening channels between Damascus and Israel or holding secret meetings to test the possibility of striking a peace agreement and keeping Iran away in exchange for financial “incentives” related to reconstructing Syria and resolving its economic problems.

Tel Aviv did not openly express interest in the political negotiations, especially after President Donald Trump announced in 2019 his support for “Israeli sovereignty” over the Golan and as it has continued to carry out raids against “Iranian positions” in Syria. Damascus, for its part, has not openly expressed interest in peace that does not include a “complete withdrawal” from the Golan and that may “jeopardize its strategic relations with Iran.”

Ford, meanwhile, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “It will be difficult for Assad to presently sign a peace deal with Israel unless he receives a lot in return, because he currently needs the support provided by Iran, its militias and Hezbollah. If they pull out from Syria, who will help the regime control the Syrian Badia, Homs, Sweida and parts of Daraa?”

“Will Damascus obtain western financial aid even if Assad were to sign a peace agreement and open an Israeli embassy in Damascus? It is difficult for the money to flow and for the sanctions to be removed after all the crimes that have taken place in Syria,” he remarked. “Some American sanctions may be removed, such as those related to the blacklisting of terrorist organizations, meddling in Lebanon or the arrival of Arab or European aid. However, the Caesar Act (which came into effect in mid-2020) cannot be simply undone.”

“Assad will not receive any sympathy in America even if a peace agreement is signed. There are limits to what can be offered in exchange to any peace deal,” he added.

Meanwhile, an Arab official, who is informed of Damascus’ position, said: “It is difficult for the regime to agree to sign a peace agreement without receiving a clear guarantee that it will reclaim the whole of the Golan. It is also difficult for the regime to completely disassociate itself from Iran.”

Between these two stances, a senior official, who is informed of the position in Syria, Israel, the region and the US, said: “Perhaps this was the final chapter in efforts to reach a peace agreement between Syria and Israel in the form we have been familiar with in past decades. At best, a new agreement or understanding may be reached, but it will be different than what we have read about and negotiated over for decades.”



Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Jamal Mustafa: Saddam and Other Iraqi Officials Headed to the Gallows with Heads Held High

Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saddam Hussein’s entourage never expected that they would one day find themselves in jail. It never occurred to them that the American military machine would use all of its might to oust Saddam’s regime and overthrow the ruling party and army. They never believed that forces allied to Iran would assume positions of power in the new regime.

Times changed and Saddam, who controlled the fate of the nation and its people, found himself in prison where he counted the days until his execution. The man was unyielding until his last breath and his will remained unbroken.

The men who made up the Revolutionary Command Council or government soon found themselves in prison. They were interrogated by the Americans and Iraqis and a death sentence was always going to be their fate.

In the second installment of his interview to Asharq Al-Awsat, Dr. Jamal Mustafa al-Sultan, late Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and second secretary, recalled the execution of his colleagues and relatives. He also recalled how he married Hala, the youngest of Saddam’s daughters, and how the late president acted around his family, away from state affairs.

Other officials who were held along with Saddam included “Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, my uncle and member of the Revolutionary Command Council Ali Hussein al-Majid, my other uncle Abed Hassan al-Majid, head of the Revolutionary Command Council Awad al-Bandar, Saddam’s half-brother Barzan Ibrahim al-Hassan, Secretary Abed Hammoud and aide to the intelligence chief Farouk Hijazi,” said Mustafa.

He showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video that recently came to light of Khodair al-Khozaei, the former vice president during the American occupation. “In it, he said that he saw no justification for the death sentence against Abed Hammoud. Most dangerous of all, he confessed that he visited Iran and consulted with a judicial official, who encouraged him to sign the death sentence, which he did,” added Mustafa.

“The truth is that we sensed from the beginning that our trial was a means of revenge acting at Iran’s orders. One day, Abed Hammoud was informed that he was going to be moved to hospital and later that day the guards informed us that he was executed,” he continued.

“Mr. President (Saddam) expected to be executed. The truth is that his very existence, whether in jail or otherwise, was a source of concern for them. I can firmly attest that the members of the leadership bravely faced their death sentence. None of them showed any weakness or faltered,” he revealed.

He recalled the day they informed Barzan and Awad that they were going to be executed. “I was working out with al-Bandar when we received the news. I am not exaggerating when I say that he maintained his optimism even in that moment. They were executed the next day. Days later, I learned that Abed Hassan al-Majid, Farouk Hijazi and Hadi Hassan, an intelligence officer, were executed,” Mustafa said.

“Let me tell you what used to happen. One day, they came up with false charges that before the US occupation, I gave Mr. Khamis al-Khanjar (a Sunni politician) a sum of 250,000 dollars. Of course, the charge is baseless. They told me that I would remain in jail for life if I did not confess to the charge. I refused and told them that I enjoyed normal relations with Khanjar,” he went on to say.

“They later came up with a different scenario. They told me that they would take me to the Iraqi embassy in Jordan if I confessed to the charge and that I would late be released in Amman with a hefty sum of money. I told them that I would reject whatever they have to offer because I would not abandon my values to betray Khanjar, who was a friend,” he stated.

“They later accused me of complicity in the draining of the Mesopotamian Marshes, which I had nothing to do with,” he added.

Saddam Hussein with his daughter Hala in this undated photo. (Getty Images)

First call after Saddam’s execution

Mustafa recalled the first telephone call he had with his wife Hala and her mother, Sajida Khairallah Talfah, right after Saddam’s execution. “Five days after Mr. President’s martyrdom, I contacted my family. I spoke with my wife, and she was in very good spirits. She had very high faith and patience. I asked her about her mother, and she reassured me that she was also doing very well despite the pain,” he said.

“I pray that Gold Almighty will give her health and a long life. We have always derived our strength from her. My mother-in-law lost her two sons, Uday and Qusay, and then her husband. She had played a major role in supporting her husband from the beginning of his struggle. She always used to support him and stood by him throughout his career,” he remarked.

First meetings with Saddam

Mustafa recalled the early days of his meeting with Saddam. “They started when I began working for his special guard. That was when I first met him. Like most Iraqis and Arabs, I believed that he would be a difficult person, but the truth is that I saw him as a paternal figure,” he added. “When you work with him, you begin to develop a different opinion than the public impression. He was a very paternal figure.”

During their first meeting, they learned that they came from the same tribe and were distant cousins.

“I stayed by Mr. President’s side for around 20 years. I started off as part of his personal guard and he then tasked me with people’s affairs, meaning seeing to their needs and addressing their problems. He was very concerned with the people’s affairs and refused any one of them to be wronged. The truth is that many laws were amended or changed at the time following complaints from the people,” he revealed.

“There were two telephones at Mr. President’s office, and both were connected to my office. Whoever had a problem could call the president through the citizens’ line. I used to answer their calls and listen to their problems and set an appointment with the president. Sometimes I used to ask the caller to come in person with their request so that their problem could be tackled. Sometimes Mr. President would interject on the call to ask about the issue and would request to talk to the citizen on the line,” Mustafa said.

“He would listen to the person’s grievance and tell him to head to the dedicated office to tackle the issue. (...) So we used to receive hundreds of citizens every week to solve their problems. Mr. President was very concerned about these issues,” he stressed. “I have never met another person like him. He would listen, care and then come up with a solution.”

President’s son-in-law

Asharq Al-Awsat asked Mustafa about when he asked Hala to marry him. “It was in 1994. As is the tradition in Iraq, I headed with my uncles to Saddam’s family to ask her hand in marriage,” he said. “One of my uncles made the request to Mr. President on my behalf and he agreed and welcomed it.”

“A judge was summoned immediately for the ceremony, and we were married. We had lunch at the president’s house that same day. I first met Hala on September 12, and we were married on September 26. It was a short engagement in line with tradition.”

“Mr. President used to separate state affairs from his relationship with his family. His work was completely separate from family, which had nothing to do with political or state affairs. It never intervened in those issues. Mr. President was a man of state when he was doing his job, and a father when he came home. He treated his family as if he were its father – the perfect father. Every family wishes to have a father that can measure up to him because he looked after all of his children and all of his relatives,” Mustafa said.

“When he sat down to the dinner table, he himself used to serve his own food and ask his children about their day. He would serve them food and generally cared very much for them. The state is one thing and family is another. At the same time, he acted as a father to all Iraqis. He treated them fairly. This is Saddam Hussein,” stressed Mustafa. “He was always keen that Iraqis be treated justly and that none of them be wronged. He was also very firm with his children if they made any mistake.”

Saddam’s hobbies

Saddam was a “very traditional Arab man. He loved traditional Arab and Iraqi dishes. He himself used to cook his own version of the traditional Iraqi dish al-Habeet. (...) He also loved seafood and would cook the Masgouf fish dish himself,” Mustafa told Asharq Al-Awsat.

His hobbies included horseback riding, hunting, swimming and sharpshooting. “Occasionally, before heading to the front to fight against Iran, he would visit the al-Amarah region, where gazelle and geese are abundant, to hunt. As circumstances became more challenging, he limited himself to fishing, which he did regularly,” he added.

He was a skilled shooter from his youth. “Generally, growing up in a tribe, children are taught at a young age how to become a good shooter. This is part of our upbringing. He was also an avid reader. He was always reading something,” Mustafa said of Saddam.