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The Last Episode: Hafez al-Assad was Much Influenced by his Family Members, Our Relationship Sometimes Reached Rupture

Memoirs of Abdel-Halim Khaddam

Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
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The Last Episode: Hafez al-Assad was Much Influenced by his Family Members, Our Relationship Sometimes Reached Rupture

Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).
Then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad between President Noureddine Al-Atassi (left) and leader Salah Jadid (Asharq Al-Awsat).

In the eleventh and final episode of the memoirs published by Asharq Al-Awsat, former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam talks about the struggle for power in Syria between then-Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad and Assistant Secretary-General of the Baath Salah Jadid from 1966 till 1970.

He also presents his view of the changes in Assad’s attitudes, saying: “Al-Assad believed that his words are correct, and what he says must be implemented. He was sensitive to his family members... and he always believed that he was on the right path, and if he brought up an issue, he would not back down from it…”

Khaddam recounts: “As the regional leadership of the ruling Baath party settled its struggle with the national authority on February 23, 1966, it tightened control over the country, adopted an extremist Stalinist approach, and abandoned the party’s basic principles that called for freedom and democracy.

“This approach caused hostility of the majority of Syrians towards the party and the decline of the national economy, so the regime resorted to repression and detention to control the country. At that time, small groups of leading Baathists were formed from the various provinces, and I was among them, while contacts were taking place directly between them so that the matter would not leak out to the leadership.

“In 1968, a national conference for the party was held in Yaafour, near Damascus. During a meeting of the military committee, Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad proposed a project to establish a military front consisting of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. The leadership rejected the proposal, stating that it was not right to deal with Jordan because it is a US agent. It also refused to cooperate with Iraq due to the existing tensions between the two countries. Before the end of the conference, Assad announced positions that contradicted the stances expressed by the regime, including that the conflict with Israel “is not Syrian, but between all Arabs and Israel; therefore differences with Arab countries must be overcome.” Assad and the military representatives withdrew from the meetings and the conference was halted.”

Khaddam continues: “Ibrahim Makhous intervened, and tried to persuade President Noureddine Al-Atassi, Salah Jadid, and the minister of Defense to change their positions, provided that Assad would take over the premiership and abandon the ministry. But Assad rejected this proposal, and campaigns escalated between the two sides. At that stage, we communicated with Assad and agreed to convey to the people our confidence in power-sharing and changing the approach of oppression.

“In late 1968, an exceptional national conference was held in the military theater in Damascus…I gave a lengthy address, strongly criticizing the national leadership, and demanding a return to the party’s basic principles and the guarantee of freedom with the people’s participation…"

“Following my speech, I was targeted by a campaign by the supporters of the national leadership, and the conference did not result in a solution to the crisis. Contacts took place between Atassi and Assad, which resulted in an agreement to form a new government in which members of the national leadership would participate to help cool the tension and search for solutions. Consequently, Atassi formed the government that brought together members from the two sides, and in which I assumed the ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade.”

According to Khaddam, the new government was unable to solve internal crises and the situation in the country deteriorated. The national leadership decided to use its last card, calling for a conference in mid-November to distance Assad from both the party and the authority.

“Assad called me and asked me for a meeting to discuss the situation. I went to his office, and he said: “I don’t want to stage a military coup. I want to reform the party and the country.” We agreed that I would go to Atassi to assure him that Assad had no intention of military action.

“I went to Atassi’s residence, where I also saw Dr. Mustafa Haddad. I explained to him the Defense minister’s view, and I said: “You are the Secretary-General of the party, and what is required of you is to work to end the crisis.”

He furiously replied: “The crisis does not end unless Assad and his officers leave the country.” I said: “The search for a solution is better than pushing things towards a military action.” Dr. Haddad supported me, but Atassi insisted (…) The atmosphere was very tense."

“I went back to the army command and informed Assad of the meeting. He showed great resentment, and asked me: “What shall we do?” So I suggested that he send the secretaries of the party’s military branches to Atassi to explain the situation… After they arrived and met with Assad, they went to the secretary-general’s house and began to talk about the crisis. But he interrupted them, saying: “As the Secretary-General of the party, I expel you.” On that day, members of the national leadership were arrested, including Jadid and Atassi. A page was turned and a new chapter began.”

Khaddam says that during that evening, he gathered with Assad and a group of leading Baathists. The participants agreed to name Ahmad Al-Khatib as head of state and Assad as prime minister.

On the way the new regime dealt with the country’s affairs, Khaddam says: “The new constitution gave the president absolute powers that were not exercised by any democratic or dictatorial president… Article 91 stipulates that the President of the Republic shall not be responsible for the actions he carries out in the exercise of his duties, except in the case of high treason, and the request for his indictment shall be based on the proposal of at least one-third of the members of the People's Assembly…

“The problem with the state and the party was that Assad believed that his words were always correct and that what he says must be implemented. His speech was full of ideals and values at a time when the reality was otherwise. He was much influenced by his family. He transformed the democratic republic stipulated in the constitution into a dictatorship, thus dropping the role of the people and the party.”

Khaddam presents some of the aspects of his relationship with Assad and says: “My relation with Assad was good at times and tense at others. At some stages, we reached a permanent rupture… That took place after the nomination of Rafik Hariri as the head of the Lebanese government in 1992, which came upon a decision by Assad…

“After he was assigned to form the Lebanese government, Hariri came to Damascus to discuss our candidates...I presented the issue to Assad, so he asked me to form a committee with Hikmat Al-Shehabi, Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General Ghazi Kanaan, head of the Military Security Branch in Lebanon, so that we would meet with Hariri to agree on the names. And indeed, we organized the meeting in my house and put together a list of a large number of names…

“Whenever we agreed on a name, I would go to the phone and report it to President Hafez, and he would ask me about the person’s specifications… Mr. Rafik Hariri took the approved names to Beirut and showed them to Mr. Nabih Berri, who gave his consent and informed the President of the Republic…"

“The next day, President Hafez called me and spoke in an angry tone, saying: “You are not working for the interest of the state, but for your interest.” I was much annoyed and responded: “I am not working for myself… I was keen to protect your reputation and that of the state.”

“The conversation ended, and we didn't speak to one another for over a month. After that period, he called me, saying: “You don’t miss anyone?” I answered: “You are the president and you set the appointments.” He replied: “I am waiting for you at 8.00 p.m.”

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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.

Features

Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
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Bethlehem Camp's 'Lifeline' Football Field Faces Israeli Demolition

Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)
Displaced Palestinian youths take part in a training session at the Aida Refugee Camp's football pitch, next to the separation wall outside Bethlehem in the occupied West Bank, on December 16, 2025, a few weeks after an Israeli military decision to demolish the field. (AFP)

Earlier this month a group of Palestinian boys turned out to train at their local football pitch in the shadow of the wall separating Israel from the West Bank's Aida refugee camp -- and found a note at the gate.

The children took the ominous message from Israeli authorities to Muhannad Abu Srour, sports director at the Aida Youth Center in the camp near Bethlehem, and the news was not good.

"We were shocked to discover that it was a decision to demolish Aida camp's football field," Abu Srour told AFP, adding that more than 500 children regularly train on the field roughly half the size of a regulation soccer pitch.

"The football field is the only open space we have. If the field is taken away, the children's dream is taken away," Abu Srour said.

The planned destruction of the Aida field is one of many points of contention in the occupied West Bank, but it is a particularly painful one for young Palestinians yearning for a better future.

One of the older members, 18-year-old Abdallah al-Ansurur, hopes to make it into the national Palestinian team, and, like many other youth at Aida camp, took his first steps in the game on the pitch flanked by the eight-meter concrete Israeli wall.

"I started when I was about 13 years old. This field gave me a real opportunity to train," said Ansurur, who was born and raised in Aida camp, one of the smallest in the West Bank.

Ansurur, who trains to be a goalkeeper, calls the astroturf-covered piece of land a "lifeline".

"Without this field, I wouldn't have had this chance. If it didn't exist, we'd be playing in the streets -- or not playing at all," he said.

Israel has occupied the West Bank since 1967 and frequently demolishes Palestinian homes or infrastructure, arguing they were built without permits.

AFP was shown the note from COGAT, the Israeli defense ministry body in charge of Palestinian civilian affairs, which says the field was not authorized.

But Anton Salman, who was mayor of adjacent Bethlehem when the field was built in 2021, told AFP the construction was legal.

Salman said his municipality leased the land from the Armenian Church authorities to whom it belongs, before allowing Aida camp's popular committee to manage it for the benefit of residents.

Saeed al-Azzeh, head of the popular committee, confirmed the information, calling the space, "the only breathing space" for camp residents.

"Today, more than 7,000 people live on the same piece of land. Streets are narrow, alleys are cramped -- there is nowhere else," Azzeh said, referring to the camp.

Like other Palestinian refugee camps, Aida was built to accommodate some of the hundreds of thousands of people who either fled their homes or were forced out during the creation of Israel in 1948.

With time, tents gave way to concrete buildings, with the football field representing one of the few open spaces in the camp's dense patchwork.

Abu Srour is proud of what came out of the field, with youth sports delegations able to travel abroad to play, a welcome escape from the West Bank's myriad restrictions.

This is because checkpoints, a fixture of the West Bank since the start of Israel's occupation, have multiplied since the start of the war in Gaza.

Abu Srour mentioned that bringing a local team to Ramallah, a city 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) away as the crow flies, took six hours recently, instead of one hour in the past.

Restricted mobility is a major issue for most Palestinian athletes as it makes it nearly impossible for athletes of similar levels from different cities to train together.

Waseem Abu Sal, who was the first Palestinian boxer to participate in the Olympics, told AFP he frequently sparred with athletes of different levels or weight categories for lack of mobility.

Taking a short break from running a practice for 50 excited five- to 10-year-old boys, coach Mahmud Jandia told AFP he hoped the field would remain.

"Yes, the wall is there -- it feels like a prison -- but despite that, the most important thing is that the field remains and the children keep playing."

"If the field is demolished, all the children's dreams will be demolished with it."

Features

Worn Banknotes, Tobacco Taxes: How Hamas Pays Its Members

Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
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Worn Banknotes, Tobacco Taxes: How Hamas Pays Its Members

Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)
Palestinians shop amid the rubble in Khan Younis in southern Gaza, February last year (DPA)

More than two months after a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas took effect in Gaza, the group has steadily reasserted some security control in areas under its authority. Yet for Gaza’s residents, daily economic hardship and deteriorating living conditions show little sign of easing.

Hamas’s popular base, made up of its members, their families, and supporters, remains a key pillar of its strength. Nearly two years of war with Israel have partially disrupted the group’s ability to consistently pay salaries.

During the war, Israel sought to dry up Hamas’s financial network by killing figures responsible for transferring money inside Gaza, as well as raiding currency exchange companies in the occupied West Bank that Israeli authorities said were linked to Palestinian factions.

According to field sources and Hamas officials who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, the group faced difficulties and delays in paying salaries regularly at leadership, field and other levels due to security conditions.

It has since resumed partial payments to all its members, including leaders and fighters from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s armed wing, while paying lower rates to its preaching and social apparatus, described as civilian elements.

Where does Hamas get its money?

Sources agree that Hamas has managed to preserve some of its financial resources, including commercial activities inside and outside Gaza. One Hamas source said these business revenues generate income for the group alongside funds received from supporting parties such as Iran and others.

They added that such external support fluctuates, sometimes declining, increasing or arriving with delays for reasons related to the donors.

The source said Hamas faces growing difficulties in transferring funds into Gaza, forcing those overseeing salary payments to rely on whatever cash remains accessible in their reserves or to collect revenues from their own commercial sources.

How are salaries paid?

Sources who receive some of these payments told Asharq Al-Awsat, on condition of anonymity, that salaries and stipends were sometimes paid regularly each month but were also delayed by periods ranging from six weeks to two months.

A Hamas source said salary rates varied and did not exceed 80 percent at best, particularly for leaders and operatives in the Qassam Brigades and at the political level.

Lower percentages were paid to the preaching and social apparatus and other bodies, alongside allocations for activities aimed at supporting the population and what the group calls its popular base.

The source said the lowest rates were paid to government employees at both civilian and military levels, reaching 60 percent at most before declining in recent months to around 35 percent.

Several sources said Hamas continues to pay stipends to the families of its members and leaders killed over decades of its activities, as well as to prisoners and wounded fighters.

They added that the group also supports families whose salaries were cut by the Palestinian Authority, continues to provide social assistance and allocates funds to projects aimed at supporting its popular base, including food aid, water provision and communal kitchens, in coordination with foreign institutions.

Asked how salaries are delivered, Hamas sources said payments are made through tight networks and by hand to avoid Israeli monitoring of electronic wallets and banks.

Worn banknotes and tobacco taxes

As Hamas relies on manual delivery, questions remain over how it secures cash under Israel’s blockade. A Hamas source said the process was complex and could not be disclosed for security reasons.

Local sources outside Hamas said the group depends heavily on traders to obtain cash, alongside its existing cash reserves and revenues from businesses it operates.

One source said Hamas often pays worn banknotes to government employees in particular, and to a lesser extent to Qassam fighters and political figures. This forces recipients to manage on their own as most traders refuse to accept damaged or worn currency.

Hamas has encouraged some small traders, especially fruit and vegetable sellers, to accept such notes in exchange for continued support and access to goods at lower prices.

Another source said Hamas has imposed taxes on certain goods, such as tobacco products, to raise funds, noting that most cigarette traders deal in cash rather than electronic wallets, which many Gaza residents now rely on.

Israeli accusations against Iran

On Dec. 7, Israel accused Iran of supporting what it described as a banking network transferring hundreds of thousands of dollars to Hamas. Israel said the network consisted of Gaza-based money changers residing in Türkiye who exploit the country’s financial infrastructure for what it called terrorist purposes.

According to Israel, the network operated in full cooperation with the Iranian regime, transferring funds to Hamas and its leaders and managing wide ranging economic activity involving receiving money from Iran, storing it and transferring it to Hamas via Türkiye.

Israel published the identities of three individuals, including an official in Hamas’s financial apparatus and two money changers from Gaza, claiming they worked under the direction of Khalil al-Hayya.

Sources familiar with the two men told Asharq Al-Awsat they have lived outside Gaza for many years.

One was known to work with various Palestinian factions and had previously smuggled funds for them, including through tunnels along the Egyptian border, while also operating as a businessman in multiple fields beyond currency exchange.

Hamas sources dismissed the accusations as baseless, saying the group has its own methods for transferring funds.

They said Hamas often faces difficulties moving money from abroad into Gaza, a problem that also affects the West Bank due to Israeli pursuit and Palestinian Authority security pressure, though conditions there are better than in Gaza for transferring funds.

Sources from other Palestinian factions said they are also suffering financial crises and difficulties paying salaries and stipends to their members and leaders.

They said they sometimes distribute food aid and other assistance to help their members and families cope with harsh economic conditions, with most of the support coming through institutions backed by Iran or other parties.