Mossad Meetings with Hemedti Stir Anger in Sudan

A handout picture released by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry shows Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen (left) exchanging a document with Sudanese Defense Minister Ibrahim Yasin during their meeting in Sudan's capital Khartoum on January 25, 2021. (AFP)
A handout picture released by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry shows Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen (left) exchanging a document with Sudanese Defense Minister Ibrahim Yasin during their meeting in Sudan's capital Khartoum on January 25, 2021. (AFP)
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Mossad Meetings with Hemedti Stir Anger in Sudan

A handout picture released by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry shows Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen (left) exchanging a document with Sudanese Defense Minister Ibrahim Yasin during their meeting in Sudan's capital Khartoum on January 25, 2021. (AFP)
A handout picture released by the Israeli Intelligence Ministry shows Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen (left) exchanging a document with Sudanese Defense Minister Ibrahim Yasin during their meeting in Sudan's capital Khartoum on January 25, 2021. (AFP)

Political sources in Tel Aviv revealed that the Israeli government had received angry messages from Sudan’s head of the Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Prime Minister of the transitional government, Abdullah Hamdok, because of the contacts made by the leaders of the Mossad (the Israeli external intelligence service), with the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti.

The sources said that Burhan and Hamdok deemed these contacts a conspiracy by the Mossad against the legitimate authorities in Sudan, which concluded an agreement to normalize relations with Israel last year.

Until Friday evening, Khartoum had not commented on this information published by the Walla news website in Tel Aviv, while Asharq Al-Awsat was not able to obtain a comment from the Sovereign Council or the government in this regard.

Citing Israeli diplomatic sources, the Walla report said that a private plane, coming directly from Tel Aviv, landed in Khartoum last week. The same plane was used several times by the former Mossad chief, Yossi Cohen, in his secret visits to Sudan and other countries. Mossad officials reportedly held meetings with generals loyal to the Rapid Support Forces, and perhaps with Hemedti himself.

The website noted that Hemedti - since the beginning of the normalization process between Israel and Sudan - has tried to establish independent channels of communication with Tel Aviv, in order to advance his agenda in Sudan.

The Israeli website evoked information that was published last August about a meeting between Hemedti and Cohen in Abu Dhabi. According to the Israeli sources, these relations have continued and strengthened since then, although Burhan openly expressed his dissatisfaction to former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his envoys.

According to Walla, informed sources noted that the military and political wings of the Sudanese government were not aware of the visit of Mossad leaders to the country last week. The sources reported that Sudanese government officials complained to the Chargé d'Affairs of the US Embassy in Khartoum and expressed their dissatisfaction with the contacts with Hemedti. They have also requested the administration of US President Joe Biden to convey a message on the matter to Israel.

The Israeli media report revived latent differences within the ruling team in Khartoum over the normalization of relations with Israel.

In remarks last week, Hamdok hinted at violations in the file of foreign relations, which he considered as a threat to national sovereignty and the country’s higher interests.

“The matter calls for the formation of a single mechanism between the constituent parties of the transitional period to supervise the file of foreign relations, unify visions and strengthen our regional and international relations,” he stated.



Israel Uses Gas Deal as Leverage to Curb Egyptian Military Presence in Sinai

A view of Egyptian-Israeli border. (Reuters)
A view of Egyptian-Israeli border. (Reuters)
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Israel Uses Gas Deal as Leverage to Curb Egyptian Military Presence in Sinai

A view of Egyptian-Israeli border. (Reuters)
A view of Egyptian-Israeli border. (Reuters)

Israel is reportedly using its pending natural gas agreement with Egypt as a political pressure card to restrict the Egyptian military’s deployment in the Sinai Peninsula. The move comes amid escalating tensions between the two neighbors following the war in Gaza, which has complicated border security arrangements.

According to the Israeli daily Israel Hayom, Energy Minister Eli Cohen has been withholding final approval of a major gas export deal with Egypt “despite strong pressure from the administration of US President Donald Trump.”

The paper cited what it described as “alleged Egyptian violations of the peace treaty provisions concerning troop deployment in Sinai,” in addition to “concerns over rising gas prices for Israeli consumers.”

Days earlier, citing unnamed officials, Israeli media including Yedioth Ahronoth reported that US Energy Secretary Chris Wright canceled a planned visit to Israel after the Israeli government refused to endorse the large-scale gas export agreement with Cairo.

In a statement coinciding with reports, Cohen’s office said that “outstanding issues related to local pricing and national interests” remained unresolved, stressing that Israel “will not proceed until fair pricing for the domestic market and full energy security are guaranteed.”

Israel Hayom later quoted Cohen as saying: “Israel’s top priority remains protecting its security and economic interests.”

Tel Aviv continues to delay the final approval of gas exports from the Leviathan field to Egypt “until a clear settlement is reached regarding the presence of Egyptian forces in Sinai,” it added.

Egyptian military analyst and professor at the Military Academy for Advanced Studies, Major General Nasr Salem, dismissed Israel’s claims as “baseless,” saying: “Israel benefits far more from the gas agreement, since it lacks liquefaction facilities to export its gas to Europe. Without Egypt, Israel cannot market its production.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Salem emphasized: “Egypt has not violated any terms of the peace treaty, otherwise the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) would have reported it.”

Military deployments in Sinai are “subject to coordination between Egyptian and Israeli security agencies,” he explained, adding: “Egypt will not be swayed by these false accusations or any Israeli pressure over troop presence or gas arrangements.”

In August, NewMed Energy, a partner in Israel’s Leviathan field, announced an amendment to the gas supply contract with Egypt, extending it to 2040 and raising its total value to $35 billion.

However, by early September, amid the Gaza conflict, Israeli media suggested that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had ordered a review of Egypt’s “full compliance” with the peace treaty before granting final approval.

Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs member and Israel affairs expert Ahmed Fouad Anwar described Israel’s stance as “a sign of weakness,” noting that the treaty’s security annex has already been amended twice to allow additional Egyptian forces in Sinai.

“Israel itself violates the peace arrangements, particularly in Zone D along the Philadelphi (Salah al-Din) Corridor,” he added.

In that area - designated a demilitarized buffer zone under the 1979 peace treaty - Israeli forces recently re-entered during the Gaza war.

Egyptian MP Mostafa Bakry accused Israel on X of occupying the corridor’s 14-kilometer stretch along Egypt’s border with Gaza “in violation of the 2005 security protocol.”


Panel of Experts Confirm Growing Houthi Threats in Yemen and Across Region

Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify their attacks on foreign ships (AFP) 
Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify their attacks on foreign ships (AFP) 
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Panel of Experts Confirm Growing Houthi Threats in Yemen and Across Region

Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify their attacks on foreign ships (AFP) 
Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify their attacks on foreign ships (AFP) 

The situation in Yemen remains a protracted crisis characterized by political and military complexity, a stalled peace process, and severe humanitarian deterioration, leaving two-thirds of the population in need of assistance, according to a final report presented by the Panel of Experts on Yemen to the Security Council.

The report noted that despite the issuance of several UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 2216 (2015), the implementation of the financial sanctions against Houthis has been limited.

It said asset freezes and travel bans have a limited or constrained effect on the militia group, which actively and successfully circumvents restrictions through sophisticated networks of intermediaries and front companies in the region.

Therefore, the Panel called for the strengthening of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM), which inspects ships travelling to Houthi-controlled ports to promote compliance with the arms embargo on the group.

Also, it said, the Houthis continue to pose a significant threat to peace, security and stability in Yemen and across the region.

Their deadly attacks against vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden undermined maritime security and the freedom of international trade.

The Panel said the Houthis continue to exploit the conflict in Gaza and their proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinians to justify their attacks on foreign ships as part of “the axis of resistance.

It warned that in the absence of a decisive deterrence, “grave consequences threaten regional stability and international navigation.” The Panel called on the Security Council to take stronger action, and support diplomatic efforts to revive the comprehensive Yemeni dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations.

Maritime Attacks

The Houthis have conducted at least 25 verified attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, using missiles, drones and rocket-propelled grenades with increasing frequency and sophistication, the Panel said in its report. The attacks were carried out between 1 August 2024 and 31 July 2025.

It said the sinking of two vessels, the killing of seafarers and the environmental hazards caused were major concerns.

The report noted that the United States and Israel carried out military operations against Houthi positions in Sana'a, Hodeidah, and Saada, targeting weapons storage facilities and missile launchers.

However, according to the report, the militia group “maintained a high operational capability” and continues to develop its military arsenal with funding and logistical support from regional parties, in a reference to Iran.

Foreign Support and Economy of War

The Panel said analysis of Houthi smuggling trends revealed continued violation of the arms embargo, including through concealment or misdeclarations.

Detections have increased owing to the diversion of vessels to Aden port after air strikes affected the infrastructure and capacity of Hodeidah port.

It said the June 2025 seizure of 750 tons of illicit materiel and weapons by the government proves that violations of the arms embargo continue to occur.

The seizure included several advanced cruise, anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles that displayed characteristics similar to those of weapons produced in Iran, such as the Ghadir anti-ship cruise missile, Shahed uncrewed aerial vehicle, AM-50 Sayyad anti-materiel rifle and the Misagh series man-portable air defense system.

The Panel noted that the knowledge and ability to manufacture weapons systems domestically remains in place, making it challenging to eliminate the Houthis’ capabilities.

In addition, the availability of financial resources plays a major role in maintaining supply lines and manufacturing capabilities, taking into account the Panel’s assessment that the asset freeze has had limited effect.

According to the Panel, the main source of revenue for the Houthis are taxes, including on the income of both individuals and companies, real estate, a sales tax on fuel and cigarettes and on all imports.

Those taxes are in addition to customs duties. The Houthis, as the de facto authority, collect a major share of surplus profits from all sectors, mainly from the financial and banking sector.

Widespread Violations

The Panel showed that widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law continue in Yemen, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, arbitrary killings and detentions, conflict-related sexual violence, child recruitment and obstruction of humanitarian assistance.

The Houthis also continued to detain personnel of the United Nations, national and international NGOs, civil society organizations and diplomatic missions.

In addition, the Houthis used a range of repressive measures and heightened surveillance of people to prevent any opposition.

The Houthi practices therefore aim to establish a closed society with absolute loyalty to the group's leadership.

Coordination with Other Armed Groups

The Panel said it continued its investigations into the evolving relationship between the Houthis and Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab.

“That cooperation involves weapons smuggling, technical training, including in relation to operational tactics, and exchange of logistical support,” it wrote.

The Panel then proved the ability of the Houthis to conduct intricate operations inside and outside Yemen and establish a web of relations with armed groups in other countries.

It then noted that the strengthening of ties between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab could pose a growing threat to peace, security and stability not only in Yemen, but in the region as a whole.

 

 

 


Fatah Likely to Skip Upcoming Palestinian Factions’ Meeting in Cairo

Displaced Palestinians shelter in tents, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians shelter in tents, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
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Fatah Likely to Skip Upcoming Palestinian Factions’ Meeting in Cairo

Displaced Palestinians shelter in tents, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians shelter in tents, amid a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, November 4, 2025. (Reuters)

Two senior officials from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) told Asharq Al-Awsat on Monday that consultations are underway to hold a meeting of several Palestinian factions in Cairo this week. However, they said the Fatah movement is unlikely to participate in the talks, which are expected to focus on forming a committee to run the Gaza Strip.

One of the officials said that several factions are already present in Cairo, including the Islamic Jihad, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Reformist Current led by exiled Fatah leader Mohammad Dahlan. He added that Hamas had not yet arrived.

“Cairo is organizing the meeting, but no official invitations have been sent so far,” the source said, explaining that the event remains informal due to Fatah’s reluctance to join at this stage.

A source close to Fatah said the movement insists that any dialogue must take place within the framework of a comprehensive national dialogue, similar to previous rounds held in Egypt and China.

He argued that a limited meeting of a few factions “does not amount to a national consensus that could end the division or form a unified national strategy,” particularly amid “attempts by some to isolate the Gaza Strip.”

The upcoming talks follow an earlier Cairo meeting on October 24, which Fatah also boycotted. During that gathering, the factions agreed to continue implementing the ceasefire arrangements and to hand over Gaza’s administration to an interim Palestinian committee composed of independent figures from the enclave.

The factions endorsed the creation of an international committee to oversee the funding and implementation of Gaza’s reconstruction, emphasizing the unity of the Palestinian political system and the need for an independent national decision.

However, disputes later emerged over who should lead the new administrative committee, after Israeli media reports claimed that the factions had agreed to appoint Amjad Shawa as its head.

Last week, Abdelfattah Dawla, a spokesperson for Fatah, told Asharq Al-Awsat that his movement “will not stand in the way of any proposed candidate for the Gaza Administrative Committee, provided they are qualified professionals from the Strip.”

He declined to give further details about potential candidates, but another senior Fatah official said Dr. Majed Abu Ramadan, the Palestinian health minister and a native of Gaza, remains among the leading contenders to chair the committee.

“He is a national figure with extensive field experience and high competence that qualifies him to assume such responsibility,” the source added.

Taher al-Nounou, a senior Hamas official, said in a televised interview from Doha last week that the movement had proposed 45 independent technocrats to serve on the Gaza Administrative Committee.

He noted that these nominees “have no political affiliations” and were approved by all participating factions during the October 24 Cairo meeting.