Putin Refers Agreement over Sudan Navy Base to Duma

The Russian naval frigate "RFS" Admiral Grigorovich (494) anchored in Port Sudan last April (AFP)
The Russian naval frigate "RFS" Admiral Grigorovich (494) anchored in Port Sudan last April (AFP)
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Putin Refers Agreement over Sudan Navy Base to Duma

The Russian naval frigate "RFS" Admiral Grigorovich (494) anchored in Port Sudan last April (AFP)
The Russian naval frigate "RFS" Admiral Grigorovich (494) anchored in Port Sudan last April (AFP)

Russia wants to approve a binding agreement to establish a naval base in Sudan, passing it through all the legal approval mechanisms, weeks after Sudan froze the deal.

Russian President Vladimir Putin referred the agreement to the State Duma for ratification, in the second step of the final approval of the agreement after the Russian government formally ratified it last week.

However, the Sudanese leadership informed Moscow of its official position to freeze the deal through military and diplomatic channels.

According to the Kremlin's statement, Putin referred the draft agreement to the State Duma, after it was approved by the government.

The agreement stipulates establishing a logistics center for the Russian fleet on the coast of Sudan in the Red Sea. It grants Russia the right to use an operational logistic center in Port Sudan, provided that the maximum number of working personnel does not exceed 300 soldiers, and no more than four Russian warships will be able to stay there at one time.

The agreement is valid for 25 years, with the possibility of extension.

Putin delegated Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov as his representative in the Duma and the Senate to complete the final ratification process.

Last week, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree to "submit the agreement for ratification."

Early last month, Khartoum froze the agreement, and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mohamed Othman al-Hussein said that "Khartoum intends to review the agreement," noting that it was approved by the previous government and not the parliament.

Still, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that the agreement remains binding for both parties because it was signed on July 23, 2019, by the representative of the Transitional Military Council, that is, after the change of the political system in Sudan.

Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova noted that the document has not yet been ratified by the Sudanese party because there is currently no legislative authority in the country with such powers.

Zakharova hinted at Russia’s readiness to show flexibility in revising the text of the agreement and said Moscow was interested in strengthening cooperation with Khartoum.

She explained that even before the agreement enters into force, changes can be introduced to its text at the discretion of both parties.

A Russian source told Asharq Al-Awsat that after referring the document to the Duma and Senate, Moscow is seeking to give it full legal force. This will allow Russia to negotiate later with Sudan to introduce some amendments.

Last week, Sudanese Defense Minister Yassin Ibrahim Yassin announced during his visit to Moscow that there are four agreements relating to military cooperation between the two countries, three of which are still ongoing.

The minister indicated that the Sudanese government had ratified the agreement regarding the maritime supply center in July 2019, while the Russian side had ratified it in early December 2020.

He explained that when the agreement was concluded by Khartoum, the Transitional Sovereignty Council was the governing body, but circumstances changed with the formation of the new government.

Ibrahim said that the agreement is now in the process of being ratified, which should be done through the government and then the Sovereign Council, stressing that its final ratification requires many arrangements.

Asked whether the US was pressuring Sudan to review the agreement, the minister said Khartoum is open to the whole world and stressed the strength of its relations with Russia.



Independent Israeli Commission Blames Netanyahu and Others for October 2023 Attack

A protester walks between vehicles as people protest demanding the release of hostages who were kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, ahead of a possible ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 26, 2024. (Reuters)
A protester walks between vehicles as people protest demanding the release of hostages who were kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, ahead of a possible ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 26, 2024. (Reuters)
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Independent Israeli Commission Blames Netanyahu and Others for October 2023 Attack

A protester walks between vehicles as people protest demanding the release of hostages who were kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, ahead of a possible ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 26, 2024. (Reuters)
A protester walks between vehicles as people protest demanding the release of hostages who were kidnapped during the deadly October 7, 2023 attack, ahead of a possible ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon, in Tel Aviv, Israel, November 26, 2024. (Reuters)

The independent civilian commission of inquiry into the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel has found Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu directly responsible for the failures leading up to the attack, alongside former defense ministers, the army chief and the heads of the security services.

The civil commission presented its findings today after a four-month probe in which it heard some 120 witnesses. It was set up by relatives of victims of the Hamas attack, in response to the absence of any state probe.

The commission determined that the Israeli government, its army and security services “failed in their primary mission of protecting the citizens of Israel.”

It said Netanyahu was responsible for ignoring “repeated warnings” ahead of Oct. 7, 2023 for what it described as his appeasing approach over the years toward Hamas, and for “undermining all decision-making centers, including the cabinet and the National Security Council, in a way that prevented any serious discussion” on security issues.

The commission further determined that the military and defense leaders bear blame for ignoring warnings from within the army, and for reducing the army’s presence along the Gaza border while relying excessively on technological means.

On the day of the Hamas attack, the report says, the army’s response was both slow and lacking.

The civil commission called for the immediate establishment of a state commission of inquiry into the Oct. 7 attack.

Netanyahu has opposed launching a state commission of inquiry, arguing that such an investigation should begin only once the war is over.