Why Did Rome's Conference on Syria Ignore Conditions for Normalization, Reconstruction?

 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel (not in the picture) at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany June 23, 2021. Clemens Bilan/Pool via REUTERS
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel (not in the picture) at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany June 23, 2021. Clemens Bilan/Pool via REUTERS
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Why Did Rome's Conference on Syria Ignore Conditions for Normalization, Reconstruction?

 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel (not in the picture) at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany June 23, 2021. Clemens Bilan/Pool via REUTERS
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks during a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel (not in the picture) at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany June 23, 2021. Clemens Bilan/Pool via REUTERS

Representatives of some countries participating in the ministerial meeting on Syria, which was held in Rome a few days ago, were unable to pass two conditions that link aid to the reconstruction of the country and normalization with Damascus to the “progress in the political track,” which raised questions about the new political ceiling set by the main stakeholders.

When comparing the draft final statement of the Rome conference and the final text approved by the participating ministers of the G7 countries and regional and Arab states - with the exception of Iran and Russia – observers noted that the draft included a paragraph emphasizing that “only when progress occurs on the political track, will we consider providing assistance in the reconstruction process.” Another paragraph rejects “normalization with the regime” before achieving tangible improvement in the political process.

However, this endeavor was rejected by some of the participating countries, which forced the ministers to issue a statement that does not specify any condition on linking the “normalization” to “reconstruction.”

As Arab ministers focused in the closed meeting on the importance of the “Arab role” and “Arab identity” for Syria, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, called, in the special session, to “think about the involvement of the active stakeholders in the political process, including the Arab actors.”

Some participants reiterated the need for Arab countries to provide “Arab consensus” for the return of Damascus to the League, while others complained about the restraints set by the US Caesar Act on the possibilities of normalization and contribution to reconstruction. Jordan, for its part, focused on the priority of stability in southern Syria and the fight against extremism.

On the other hand, Russian representatives sought - in their meetings with Arab and foreign officials - to shed light on ongoing diplomatic and normalization steps with Damascus, by countries such as Italy or Greece.

A Russian official was quoted as saying that Italy will reopen its embassy in Damascus, while a Western diplomat reported that Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said in the closed meeting that normalization with the regime was currently excluded, unless Damascus showed seriousness in the political track. This stance was also expressed by the Greek foreign minister, Nikos Dendias.

The Rome conference, chaired by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, provided an opportunity for UN envoy Geir Pedersen to present his vision of a “step-for-step” approach between Russia and its partners, the United States and its allies, and then the formation of an international-regional support group for Syria.

Pedersen will also submit his proposal during Wednesday’s Astana Group meeting in the Kazakh capital.

According to Western officials, the UN envoy is convinced that three factors support his “step for step” vision: first, the stalemate on the contact lines that has been ongoing for 15 months; second, the economic collapse and living pressure in the country; and third, the conviction of the parties and stakeholders that a military victory in Syria is not possible, and the necessity of a “settlement.”

According to a western diplomat, no party, whether the Syrian government, the opposition, the Russians, the Iranians, the United States or the Astana Group, could dictate the outcome of the ongoing conflict.

In view of the different priorities among the participants - with a consensus on “changing the behavior of the Syrian government” according to one of the participants - Blinken presented his counterparts with the following priorities: Extending and expanding the decision to deliver humanitarian aid “across the border” and “cross lines” in Syria; maintaining the fight against ISIS, supporting the intra-Kurdish dialogue and talks between Damascus and the Kurds, and implementing the cease-fire across the country.

Also, there Washington’s implicit goal to return to assuming a coordinating-leading role with its allies and expanding the circle of those involved in its various positions, in parallel with its contacts with the Russian side, with the aim of “changing the government’s behavior.”

As soon as Blinken finished “coordinating” with his allies in Rome, the US National Security Council Middle East official, Brett McGurk, flew to Switzerland to meet with Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian president’s special envoy for Syria. The latter had stopped in Damascus to meet with President Bashar al-Assad before heading to Geneva to hold the first round of a “secret dialogue” between the two sides since the Biden-Putin summit on June 16.

These contacts preceded the Astana Group meeting on Wednesday, and the Security Council session to vote on the international resolution on humanitarian aid, which expires on July 10.

The last hours of negotiations in Rome, Geneva, Astana and New York aim to reconcile the priorities of the stakeholders regarding cross-border aid and “across the lines” between the spheres of influence, represented by the United States, Russian, Iran and Turkey.

Ankara wants to keep open the Bab al-Hawa crossing with Idlib in order to strengthen its area of influence in northwestern Syria, and opposes the opening of al-Yarubiyah crossing between eastern Euphrates and Iraq to ensure that its Kurdish opponents are not strengthened.

Washington wants to open al-Yarubiyah crossing to promote stability, help its Kurdish allies and prevent the emergence of ISIS in the east of the Euphrates, while Moscow (along with Tehran) wants to strengthen the position of its Syrian ally in Damascus, barter with its partners, and bargain with its opponents over “Syrian papers” related to normalization, reconstruction, sanctions and aid.



Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
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Sweida’s Druze, Bedouin Tribes Locked in Historic Grievances

Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)
Druze woman from Israeli-Occupied Golan gazes toward Syria (Reuters)

Sweida, a province in southern Syria, is teetering on the brink after days of deadly violence and clashes between local communities and government security forces, an unrest that signals deeper turmoil across the war-battered country.

The latest flare-up has laid bare tensions that go beyond the provincial borders, raising concerns about the future of coexistence and civil peace in a region long known for its rich tapestry of religious, social, and cultural diversity.

While the Syrian government in Damascus seeks to reassert control over all of its territory, local groups are renewing calls for greater recognition of their rights and “distinct identity.” The result is a fragile and combustible equation in a strategically vital region.

Sweida has long been a flashpoint, shaped by decades of uneasy relations between Druze communities and neighboring Bedouin tribes. That legacy of mistrust now intersects with a crumbling economy, a lack of essential services, the rise of armed factions, and a newly entrenched central authority in Damascus, factors that together threaten to turn the province into a flashpoint for wider instability.

Competing narratives have further muddied the waters, with each side offering starkly different versions of recent events, accounts that are often shaped not just by what happened in the past few days, but by long-standing grievances and buried animosities. The deepening rift and absence of trust among local communities highlight just how far Syria remains from reconciliation.

As pressure builds, observers warn that without a sustainable political solution that acknowledges local demands while maintaining national cohesion, Sweida may be a harbinger of further unrest in Syria’s uncertain future.

Power Struggles and Fractured Alliances

In Syria’s Sweida, power is fragmented among a complex web of religious authorities, influential families, and rival armed factions, a fractured landscape that reflects the broader divisions tearing at the country.

Local leadership is split between traditional Druze clerical authorities and prominent families, each with their own loyalties and varying degrees of influence on the ground. Political rivalries run deep, and military factions are equally divided, some aligning with the government in Damascus, while others openly challenge it.

Among the most prominent pro-government groups is the “Madafat al-Karama” faction led by Laith al-Balous, son of the late Druze leader Sheikh Wahid al-Balous. He is seen as a key ally of Damascus, alongside Suleiman Abdel-Baqi, commander of the “Ahrar Jabal al-Arab” group.

On the opposing side are factions such as the “Military Council in Sweida” and “Liwa al-Jabal” (Mountain Brigade), which collectively field around 3,000 fighters. These groups are seen as aligned with the views of influential Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who has been increasingly critical of the central government.

A newer alliance has also emerged under the banner of “Counter-Terrorism Forces” or the “Syrian Brigade Party,” bringing together factions such as “Dir’ al-Tawhid,” “Forces of Al-Ulya,” “Sheikh al-Karama,” “Saraya al-Jabal,” and “Jaysh al-Muwahideen.” This coalition formally severed ties with Damascus following Sheikh Hijri’s speech on July 15, in which he rejected the government’s announcement of a ceasefire agreement with local notables.

Also active in the province is the “Men of Dignity Movement,” a relatively large faction led by Abu Hassan Yehya al-Hajjar. Though not officially aligned with the new coalition, the group is also staunchly opposed to the Syrian government.

The growing number of factions and rival power centers has deepened instability in Sweida.

Bedouin Tribes in Sweida Say They Are Marginalized, Blamed and Forgotten

Even after government forces withdrew and a fragile ceasefire took hold in Sweida, clashes reignited, this time between Druze residents and Bedouin tribes, underscoring the deep and historical grievances simmering beneath the surface of the country’s sectarian fault lines.

The Bedouin, who see themselves as long-marginalized stakeholders in the region, say they have been caught in the crossfire - blamed for violence they did not initiate and excluded from political life and public services.

“We are the perpetual scapegoats,” said Mohammad Abu Thulaith, a lawyer and member of the Sweida Tribal Council. A descendant of one of the Bedouin tribes long at odds with the Druze population, he told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Bedouins are the weakest link in the local power struggle.”

The sense of injustice voiced by Abu Thulaith runs deep and is rooted in historical narratives. According to his account, the Druze - who migrated to the Jabal al-Arab area around two centuries ago - gradually expanded their influence, curbing the pastoral livelihoods of the Bedouin, particularly livestock herding. This, he said, led to the forced migration of nearly half of the Bedouin tribes from the mountain region toward Jordan, rural Damascus, and Daraa.

He cited the example of Saad Hayel al-Surour, a former speaker of the Jordanian parliament, who remains a Syrian citizen to this day. His father, Hayel al-Surour, once headed the Syrian parliament before the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt.

Many in the Bedouin community consider themselves the original inhabitants of the land, victims of what they describe as “a prolonged injustice” that denied them citizenship rights, political representation, and even basic services.

Abu Thulaith argues that the source of current tensions must be addressed at its roots. “We are blamed because the other side does not dare confront the real actors behind the violence,” he said, referring to armed groups operating in the area.

He called on the Druze tribal leadership - often referred to as “the people of the mountain” - to assume responsibility for protecting the Bedouin community and ending decades of exclusion. “We’ve suffered from a double injustice,” he said. “One at the hands of the Assad regime and Baathist rule, and the other from our neighbors. We have no access to employment, no political representation, and we’re deprived of the most basic public services.”

Despite the mounting frustration, Abu Thulaith insists that the Bedouin do not seek confrontation. “We don’t have the means to fight,” he said. “All we want is to live in peace with our neighbors. No one can erase the other. Since the fall of the former regime, tribal communities have hoped the state would step in to offer protection and ensure the most basic rights.”

As tensions in Sweida continue to spiral, voices like Abu Thulaith’s are demanding a deeper national conversation about identity, land, and the future of Jabal al-Arab - one that addresses long-neglected wounds before they erupt into further conflict.

Druze Grapple with a Perpetual Identity Crisis

For Syria’s Druze minority, identity is not just a question of culture or belief, it is a matter of survival. That fear of erasure has long shaped their political instincts, social structures, and geographic presence in the country.

“The Druze, like many minorities, live with a constant sense of threat,” said Khaldoun Al-Nabbouani, a professor of political philosophy at the University of Paris and a native of Sweida. “This persistent anxiety drives them to close ranks around their identity in a collective effort of self-preservation.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Nabbouani explained that the community’s inward turn is not only symbolic or cultural - it also manifests demographically. “Just as the Alawites are concentrated in the coastal mountains, the Druze have built their stronghold in Jabal al-Arab. It reflects a broader pattern among minorities to cluster in specific regions where they can reinforce their social cohesion and safeguard a perpetually anxious identity.”

That reflex dates back centuries. The very formation of the Druze sect, he said, was a political and cultural rebellion against traditional Islam. “Since its inception, the community has developed a deep need for internal solidarity and social insulation,” he said. “Even today, that’s visible in things like marriage practices - interfaith unions remain extremely rare.”

This insularity, he noted, extends to the political realm. The community has historically resisted the appointment of governors or officials from outside the Druze fold, a trend dating back to the 1930s and continuing into recent decades. One of the more controversial examples was the appointment of a non-Druze governor under the government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa, which sparked uproar, resignation, and a political standoff before the governor ultimately returned.

Tensions between the Druze and the central government are nothing new. Under President Adib Shishakli in the early 1950s, relations with Damascus deteriorated sharply. Shishakli accused the Druze of plotting against the state and in 1954 ordered artillery strikes on Jabal al-Arab, an assault that killed civilians, displaced families, and left deep scars that still echo in local memory.

When the Baath Party seized power in 1963, Damascus shifted tactics, pursuing what Al-Nabbouani described as a policy of “soft containment.” Symbolic appointments of Druze figures to government positions were coupled with tight security oversight in Sweida, a strategy aimed at managing rather than integrating the province.

As new waves of unrest ripple through southern Syria, the Druze community once again finds itself wrestling with existential questions caught between historical trauma, present instability, and an uncertain future.