‘Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb’: Aoun Returned to Baabda Onboard an Iranian Train as a Guard, Not a President

Asharq Al-Awsat publishes excerpts from a new book by Lebanese Writer Fayez Azzi (Part 1/2).

Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
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‘Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb’: Aoun Returned to Baabda Onboard an Iranian Train as a Guard, Not a President

Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)
Michel Aoun is sworn in as president as Speaker Nabih Berri (right) looks on. (AFP)

In his new book titled, “Guardian of the Republic’s Tomb”, Lebanese writer Fayez Azzi reviews President Michel Aoun’s term in office and presents documents and analyses that show that he placed the country in Iran’s clutches, instead of achieving his long-touted slogan of “freedom, sovereignty and independence” that he used to address the “great people of Lebanon.”

Azzi was very close to Aoun when the latter acted as army chief and then head of the military government in 1988. But he distanced himself from the general in 2006 after he signed the memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah – an agreement that Azzi saw as a breach of Lebanon’s sovereignty and a change in the values that Aoun had long touted.

Asharq Al-Awsat is publishing two episodes of excerpts from the book, which will soon be published by Dar Saer Al-Mashreq in Beirut. This is the fifth book by Azzi, who had played a role in Aoun’s communication with the Syrians before his return from Parisian exile in 2005.

On the choice of the title of his book, Azzi said: “I hesitated a lot, and disregarded the advice of my friend (former information minister) Melhem Riachy, whom I visited a few days after he assumed the media portfolio in the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri…”

“I have a new book. But I am taking my time to publish it. Because it is related to Michel Aoun,” Azzi told Riachy, who replied: “What is its title and what is it about?”

He said: “Aoun... the Republic.”

“Why three dots?” Riachy asked.

“I don’t want to rush in judging the man’s tenure, after I have accompanied him sincerely and with conviction for more than twenty years. So I’ll wait a year into his tenure, at least, to fill in the blanks in the title. I am torn between two words: guardian or protector; knowing that I am inclined towards my first choice: ‘Aoun, the guardian of the republic’s tomb,’ instead of: ‘Aoun, the protector of the Republic Palace,’”Azzi told his interlocutor.

The information minister responded: “Without hesitation, I advise you not to wait, just choose the first option.”

In his book, Azzi says that Aoun was able more than anyone else to fulfill an urgent need to protect the return of the displaced to their villages after they were forced to flee in 1985 during Lebanon’s civil war.

“This was my first concern and the only project that took me on a new political adventure called the Aounist experiment, to which I committed to the point of intoxication.

“This clarification has become necessary and obligatory. Without it, the reader will not be able to understand my long relationship with General Aoun, especially when they discover how close the ties were at times […] until he surprised me on February 6, 2006, by signing a memorandum of understanding between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah at the Mar Mikhael Church. I then dropped my understanding with him, turning it completely into a doctrinal enmity.”

Azzi recounts: “I knew Michel Aoun closely […]. He was practical and succinct and had convictions based on the purposes and intentions of reform and change. Here lies the secret of his strength and the fear that worried his allies before his opponents, especially if they (his allies) did not react to the general’s born or promised convictions.

“But this duality between the ‘rebellious’ general and the inconsistent president posed a great danger to the republic, specifically to the complex and almost impossible equation between a leader of the liberation battle and a president who was eager to satisfy the electorate.

“Therefore, I complete in this book a truth born of my conviction that the ‘former general’ who was elevated to the presidency, buried the dream of the republic, even before becoming an agent of the occupier and allied with the state’s rapists.”

On the general’s return from his exile in Paris, Azzi says: “Aoun’s visit to Syria was completed in a figurative sense. I was witness to the matter, on December 27, 2004, when Aoun and the Syrians agreed on his return to Lebanon […]. Gaby Issa (an official in the Free Patriotic Movement) visited Damascus and met with then-Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam.”

Azzi recalls: “After his conditional return from Paris, he agreed with the Syrians, who, after [former Prime Minister Rafik] Hariri’s martyrdom, added two conditions to the agreement with Aoun: the first is to support [President] Emile Lahoud until the end of his term, and the second is to reach an understanding with Hezbollah.”

However, Aoun’s presidential ambitions collided with the endorsement of Hariri’s movement and Hezbollah of the election of Army Commander Michel Suleiman.

Thus, the Mar Mikhael understanding of 2006 did not fulfill the promise of Aoun becoming president.

Azzi said that at the end of Suleiman’s term, “the presidential elections turned into a theater for which two candidates initially competed: [Lebanese Forces leader Samir] Geagea and Aoun.”

“Michel Aoun, his team and his main allies did not spare any maneuver to disrupt the elections and maintain the presidential vacuum, as long as victory was not guaranteed […]. The speaker of parliament joined the scheme to disrupt the election in order to exploit the vacuum […].”

Azzi explained how Speaker Nabih Berri and Aoun both manipulated the constitution to hold the parliamentary session that saw the election of Aoun.

He says: “Aoun played an active role in disrupting the constitution, in letter and spirit, to reach the presidency.

“It was the end of the maneuver and the beginning of humiliation and surrender. Everyone welcomed [the elections] - some of them against their will – while failing to notice that the Lebanese politicians had abandoned the principle of free democratic elections, and submitted to the nomination of a biased president, who was increasingly submissive to the Iranian ruler. General Aoun repeated his old and constant phrase: ‘There is an empty chair, either they will invite me to it, or I will take it by force.’”

Episode 2/2: Geagea: We were unable to break Aoun’s position.



Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
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Cash Shortage Squeezes Gaza Residents

Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)
Palestinian children queue for a hot meal at a charity kitchen in Gaza City on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Omar AL-QATTAA / AFP)

Even when food is available, many in Gaza cannot afford to buy it, as the enclave suffers from a severe cash shortage. Israel has blocked the entry of new currency into the territory since October 7, 2023, leaving residents at the mercy of money changers who have hiked exchange rates on remittances to exorbitant levels.

Palestinians in Gaza primarily rely on the Israeli shekel for daily transactions, which used to enter the strip through banks operating under the Palestinian Monetary Authority, supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Banking operations in Gaza have ground to a halt since the start of the war, and no fresh banknotes have entered the enclave, worsening an already dire humanitarian situation. Residents say they have been left at the mercy of traders who exploit the cash shortage to impose arbitrary rules on currency use.

'The Traders’ Game'

Dubbed “the traders’ game” by many in Gaza, the practice began with merchants refusing to accept worn-out banknotes and certain coins, such as the 10-shekel piece (worth about $3), which have all but vanished from local markets. Some vendors now reject older versions of bills - like the brown-hued 100-shekel note (around $28) - insisting instead on the newer yellow ones. The same rules apply to various denominations.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hani Jahjouh, a resident of al-Shati Camp west of Gaza City, said vendors selling vegetables and essential goods - when available - often refuse worn banknotes or specific coins, claiming they are counterfeit or easily faked.

“This just adds to the burden of people already crushed by impossible living conditions,” said Jahjouh, 59. “We don’t have solutions. We don’t even know where to get the money they’re asking for.”

Only a very small number of traders accept digital payments, and even then, residents say, they impose tough conditions - such as inflated prices or demands for partial payment in cash.

Displaced Gazan Duaa Ismail, originally from Beit Hanoun in the north of the enclave, says even when goods are available, she cannot afford them due to a lack of cash.

“We’re suffering badly from a shortage of money, and that makes it even harder to get basic items like flour and sugar - when they’re even in stock,” she told Asharq Al-Awsat from a shelter in Gaza City’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.

Ismail said that during a brief ceasefire, some traders had accepted digital payments through mobile apps. “But once the war resumed, things worsened, and they stopped taking them altogether,” she said.

Salaries They Can’t Spend

The crisis has also hit public-sector employees, private workers, and international aid staff, many of whom receive salaries through bank transfers or mobile wallets but have no way of accessing their funds with banks shuttered. They are forced to rely on currency dealers or traders with access to physical cash.

Amjad Hasballah, an employee with the Palestinian Authority, said he has been cashing his monthly salary through mobile banking apps for over a year and a half, paying a steep commission to money traders in return.

“When I received my last salary in early April, the commission had reached 30%,” he said.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Hasballah explained that at the start of the war, commissions hovered around 5%, but they spiked during Ramadan, peaking at 35% around Eid al-Fitr, before dipping slightly to 30%.

“My salary is just 2,800 shekels. When I pay a 30% fee, there’s barely anything left,” he said bitterly. “At this point, the traders might as well take the whole salary and just give us pocket money.”

Caught in a Trap

Jamal Al-Mashal, a father of six who lost two children in an Israeli airstrike, said he lives off 1,000 shekels (about $280) in monthly international aid. But even that amount is slashed by up to 30% when he exchanges it through local traders.

“People in Gaza have become a cash trap for currency dealers and big traders,” he said. “They’re exploiting our desperation, and it’s like a harvest season for them - raking in profits while we suffer.”

The poorest and most vulnerable are hit hardest. Many international agencies rely on electronic payment platforms to distribute aid to these groups, who often have no access to physical currency.

No Oversight, No Restraint

The Hamas-run government has made attempts to cap commission rates at 5%, but those efforts have largely failed. Officials blame ongoing Israeli targeting of personnel involved in regulating the process.

Money changers defend the high fees, arguing that the lack of currency entering Gaza leaves them with limited options.

“We raise commission rates because there’s simply no new cash coming in,” one trader told Asharq Al-Awsat. “Once money is distributed to the public, we have no way of getting it back. What goes out doesn’t return.”

He added that while ministries and law enforcement have tried to impose limits, traders view the rules as unfair. “There have been attempts to regulate us, but we haven’t complied - they’re asking too much from us under impossible conditions,” he said.

Some municipal leaders and community elders in Gaza have recently appealed to the Palestinian Monetary Authority in Ramallah to intervene in what they describe as unchecked profiteering by traders controlling access to scarce cash.

They have called for greater oversight, including monitoring and freezing the traders’ bank accounts.

The authority has repeatedly warned against exploitation of civilians and threatened to take action. But in practice, traders continue to charge hefty commissions on money transfers with little deterrence.

The Authority has urged residents to use its Instant Payment System available through mobile banking apps, which it says offers a practical alternative to cash, promotes digital payments, and enables real-time transactions.

Cash Squeeze Tightens Further

Despite the hardship, Israel is considering new measures that could further tighten the financial stranglehold on Gaza. One proposal involves withdrawing the 200-shekel banknote (worth about $55) from circulation, on the grounds that Hamas allegedly uses it to pay salaries to its fighters.

The suggestion was reportedly made by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to Bank of Israel Governor Amir Yaron, who rejected the move. Other proposals include voiding the serial numbers of banknotes believed to be inside Gaza, effectively rendering them worthless, a step that could deliver a significant financial blow to Hamas.

According to a report published Tuesday by the Israeli daily Maariv, the proposal has backing from several ministers and economists both within and outside the central bank.

The report estimated that around 10 billion shekels in high-denomination bills - 100 and 200 shekels - remain in circulation within Gaza. These notes entered the enclave over the years through official banking channels supplied by the Bank of Israel.

Economists told Maariv that Gaza residents receive an estimated 150 to 200 million shekels each month through digital transfers from aid organizations and the Palestinian Authority. That money is then converted into cash within markets dominated by Hamas and supported by a network of money changers.

Israeli security sources estimate that Hamas has accumulated up to five billion shekels since the war began and has spent nearly one billion shekels on salaries for fighters and new recruits. The sources claim Hamas has profited significantly by reselling aid and fuel at inflated prices during the conflict.